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Abstract 
Throughout the world decentralized experiments in natural resources management are being 
attempted on the assumption that through the inclusion of those who were formerly excluded - 
local/rural communities and governments- the management of those resources as well as 
local/rural living conditions shall be improved. In Cameroon, following the 1994 landmark 
Forest Law which transferred some powers, resources and responsibilities to local actors, two 
primary modes of decentralized forest management were conceived community and council 
forests. Whereas, in the more than fifteen years since the 1994 reform, community forests have 
been the object of intense scholarly attention, the study of council forests has lagged behind in 
spite of the fact that earlier studies had highlighted the predicaments of the overall forest 
management decentralization. This study sought to fill that gap in the literature. 
The central question addressed in this dissertation was straightforward: why did the forest 
management decentralization fail to achieve the goals of Sustainable Forest Management (SFM) 
and local development in Dimako Council? In order to answer that question, the dissertation 
examined the case of the Dimako Council and the Dimako Council Forest. That case was 
significant because it represented the first experiment in natural resources management by an 
THE DANGERS OF NATURAL RESOURCES DECENTRALIZATION: 
DECENTRALIZED FOREST MANAGEMENT, (LOCAL) DEVELOPMENT AND 
THE MAKING OF A BIG MAN IN THE DIMAKO COUNCIL, CAMEROON 
Gildas Allan Ofoulhast-Othamot, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2011 
 
   
 
 vi 
elected local government in the entire Congo Basin, the second largest reservoir of tropical 
forests after the Amazon. 
The empirical research found that the forest management decentralization in Dimako 
Council failed to achieve the goals of SFM and local development because the Mayor of 
Dimako, taking advantage of the new opportunities offered by the forest law, captured the 
council forest and utilized it for power-building purposes, thereby earning him the status of a Big 
Man. Overall, the main contribution of the study is to show that the decentralization theory of 
natural resources management instead of solving the ‘bad’ governance issues that it reportedly 
identified in the first place has in effect extended and entrenched the reach of the patrimonial 
state as well as aggravated the state of affairs in Dimako, leading to questions about its 
relevance. 
 vii 
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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I came to forestry and Cameroon almost by accident. Indeed, I had never intended to undertake 
this dissertation on the topic of forest management decentralization, or for that matter conduct 
fieldwork in Cameroon. Though, I always had been fascinated by the dynamic nature of the 
country, the original intent of the dissertation project was to conduct a study on the National 
Program of Administrative Reform of Gabon (PNRA), where a few years before I had been an 
intern at the General Committee for Administrative Reform (CGRA), the implementing agency. I 
already had contacts there and was familiar with the country’s customs as well as administrative 
culture, and, I thought, this would constitute an asset for the speedy completion of the degree.  
In 2006-2007, when I raised the issue with my then-advisor, later the chair of my 
dissertation committee, Dr Louis Picard, he remarked that my original topic was too broad and 
thus needed to be circumscribed. Furthermore, he suggested that I select another country instead 
of my native Gabon, for he argued that would be an intellectual asset as well as eye-opening. 
Eye-opening for what? It was unclear at that stage. By chance, besides the PNRA, I was 
interested in both Cameroon and political and administrative decentralization. Therefore, I 
decided to embark on the decentralization journey in that country. 
Alas, at least in the beginning, the search for the scholarly literature on political and 
administrative decentralization in the country proved fruitless. Instead of political and 
administrative decentralization, the majority of works focused on the forest management 
 xxvii 
decentralization started since 1994. I thought the choice was evident, study forest management 
decentralization and see where it leads. That is how I arrived at forestry. 
At first, I was concerned that understanding foresters’ language would prove a challenge 
and that the project turns into a technical study instead of investigating the decentralization 
phenomenon, which was my original intent. I still harbored these concerns until I arrived in 
Cameroon in the fall of 2009. I, then, realized that understanding foresters’ language was critical 
in understanding the (political) story on the ground. The dissertation which follows is the story of 
this adventure into the decentralization journey and the difficult quest for sustainable forest 
management and (local) development. It is a journey which, passed the first doubts, has made me 
aware of issues I used to take for granted; a journey which has allowed me to take a ‘fresh’ look 
at forests and the environment in general. And it is a journey which I am glad I embarked on. 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------- 
The completion of a study like a doctoral dissertation, although a personal endeavor, owes a lot 
to numerous people. Before I set out to acknowledge all those people, I have to first and 
foremost thank the Lord God Almighty because during this grueling experience I realized that I 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
“Cameroon is a strange country. Here, Catholics are polygamous; 
Protestants appear to be happy; Muslims drink beer; and the largest 
Yaoundé’s mosque is located off Pope John Paul the second’s 
avenue” (A departing French Coopérant to a former government 
minister). 
 
“Complexity” is the key word to describe Cameroon’s political, 
social, and economic configurations” (Victor T. Le Vine 1971, 
xix). 
 
‘Decentralization, more power to the people!’ That could be the cry heard all over the world 
since the end of the bipolar world, which saw the demise of the Communist Bloc and the end of 
the era of the clash between the two superpowers the United States and the Soviet Union, and the 
unabated rise of free markets as the organizing principle of the political, economic, and social 
world. It is as one writer, to qualify the numerous experiments in decentralization the world over, 
exclaimed like a “devolution revolution” is happening (Snyder 2001, 93). 
In Cameroon as part of the Congo Basin region, the second largest reservoir of tropical 
rainforests in the world after the Amazon (Topa et al. 2009, 14)1
                                                 
1 Besides Cameroon five other countries -the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and the Republic of the Congo- comprise the Congo Basin region. 
Together those six countries hold more than 198 million hectares of tropical forests (Topa et al. 2009, 14). 
, the World Bank and other 
International Financial Institutions (IFIs), assisted by domestic actors, have, following the 
country’s 1986 economic crisis, since the mid-1990s attempted to enact forest policy reforms 
2 
based on the international discourses of free markets, decentralization, participation and 
indigenous rights, sustainable development, Sustainable Forest Management (SFM), 
conservation and the like (Brunner and Ekoko 2000; Ekoko 2000; Essama-Nssah and Gockowski 
2000; Karsenty 1999; Oyono 2004a, 2005a; Silva et al. 2002, 72-74). This resulted in a slew of 
policy reforms among which the 1994 Forest Law stood as the major piece of legislative act and 
turning point in Cameroon’s forest policy since independence in 1960. Indeed, a Cameroonian 
observer noted that following the 1994 reforms, “legal and regulatory provisions entrench 
“sustainable forest management” as a key element in the organization of this sector” (Assembé-
Mvondo 2009, 91). 
The purpose of this dissertation is to examine the decentralization of natural resources 
management (NRM), in this case the forest management decentralization, in Cameroon through a 
case study of the Dimako Council and the Dimako Council Forest or Forêt Communale de 
Dimako (FCD) located in the forest-rich East Region in the south of the country. More 
specifically, the dissertation will take a critical look at the decentralization theory and show that 
the theory alone is not the answer to problems of governance such as natural resources 
conservation and depletion as well as development at the local level as claimed by some 
theorists. As such, the study fills the gap in the literature on forest management decentralization 
and council forests, decentralized forest management, local governance, decentralization and 
development in Cameroon. 
The major contribution of the study shall be to demonstrate that, by providing new 
opportunities for local elected officials to wield ‘unfettered’ new powers, the decentralization 
theory of natural resources management instead of solving the ‘bad’ governance issues that it 
reportedly identified in the first place has in effect extended the reach of the so-called 
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patrimonial state – a state mostly dominated by ‘personal’ rule rather than the ‘rule of law’- as 
well as entrenched and aggravated the state of affairs in Dimako, leading to questions about its 
relevance. The implication of this study is that unless the larger political system is transformed, 
the pattern described in Dimako is more likely to get repeated across different scales of 
government. 
1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Before the mid-1990s reforms, the Cameroonian state was the sole owner of forests (Carret 2000, 
44), and thus legally in control of the forestry sector and of all the timber revenues from forest 
harvesting. The 1994 Forest Law and the ensuing changes sought to alter the situation through 
decentralizing the sector. About the 1994 Forest Law, Peter Geschiere commented “Cameroon’s 
new forest law is heavily ecological in tenor. Its major concern is to guarantee that the 
continuing exploitation of the forest resources-which has become crucial for the national 
economy since the crash of world market prices of Cameroon’s main cash crops [coffee, cocoa, 
and cotton]-will be ‘sustainable’: that is, will not endanger the regeneration of the forest” (2004, 
238). 
Apart from the World Bank’s own objective of increasing fiscal revenues from timber 
harvesting (Carret 2000, 44), the reforms had three main aims: to promote local communities’ 
participation in forest management; to contribute to poverty reduction; and to improve the 
sustainable management of forest resources (Oyono et al. 2007, 3). Among the various 
transformations that the 1994 Forest Law initiated in the country, for the purpose of this study 
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four major provisions of the law stand out: community forests; timber revenues sharing; council 
forests; and community hunting zones (Oyono et al. 2007, 3-4). 
First, for the first time in the history of the country, and of the Congo Basin region, the 
Cameroonian state allowed forest-adjacent people to create their own community forests which 
they could self-manage for up to twenty-five years (Oyono et al. 2007, 7). Second, the law 
created avenues for local communities as well as local councils (communes)2 to benefit from 
timber harvesting revenues through revenue sharing mechanisms, with the most notable 
provision being the distribution of a forest tax known as the Annual Forestry Fee (RFA) between 
the central state (50 percent), the local council (40 percent) and the forest concession-adjacent 
community or communities (10 percent).3 Third, the law provided for the creation of local 
council forests that the state, in contrast to community forests’ twenty-five years management 
limit, would cede to local councils as their full property, thus under their sole management.4
Among the abovementioned provisions, those pertaining to community forests and the 
RFA are the ones that have been heavily investigated (see 
 Last 
but not least, the law created Community-Managed Hunting Zones (ZICGs). 
Egbe 2001; Etoungou 2003; Karsenty 
                                                 
2 Some authors in their translation have equated the French word commune with the English 
commune/communal. That is misleading as a translation especially when one starts talking about communal forest 
instead of council forest. A more appropriate translation of the French commune would be simply (local) council, 
since in its original meaning a commune equals the lowest level of (formal) local government in a country. In 
Cameroon for instance, because of this confusion some local authors or speakers use the term communal forest 
instead of the more appropriate council forest, thus bringing more confusion into the matter to an unperceptive 
observer. 
3 As an illustration, from 2000 to 2008, about 122 million USD were redistributed to approximately 90 
different (rural) councils (see Cerutti et al. 2010, 134). Moreover, in spite of local objections from the forested 
regions, that system was changed in late 2009 by the country’s parliament lower house the National Assembly. The 
new system set up an equalization fund with the aim of redistributing part of the RFA revenues to all local councils, 
not just those of the forested regions, the sole beneficiaries since 1994. The new formula sharing still reserved 50 
percent for the central state. However, out of the remaining 50 percent, 20 percent were now reserved for the local 
council of the adjacent forest concession, 20 percent to be redistributed to all local councils while the last 10 percent 
for the local community or communities was left unchanged (see MINATD, MINFI, and MINFOF 2010; and ROC 
2009b). 
4 At this stage, a council forest can simply be defined as a forest that has been gazetted and legally 
transferred to a local council (see section 4.3 for the legal definition of a council forest in Cameroon). 
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et al. 2010; Morrison et al. 2009; Oyono 2009; Oyono, Cerutti, and Steil 2009; Sharpe 1998), 
while the study of ZICGs and council forests has lagged behind. Specifically regarding council 
forests -the object of this study- various observers have attributed that lack of scholarly scrutiny 
on at least two main reasons. First, is the reluctance of local councils from the outset to take 
advantage of the law provision, preferring instead to receive RFA revenues (Bigombé Logo 
2006; Nguenang et al. 2007, 1).5
Nguenang et al. 2007, 1
 The second reason centers on the fact that since 1994 
international donors’ support in the country has primarily gone to community forests to the 
detriment of council forests. In fact, it is only lately, as some observers have noted, with the 
scandal of illegal logging happening within community forests that donors’ emphasis has shifted 
to council forestry ( ). 
Notwithstanding those two reasons, the result is that apart for a few scholarly and general 
studies on the emergence of council forestry in the country (see Assembé-Mvondo 2005; 
Assembé-Mvondo and Oyono 2004; Assembé-Mvondo and Sangkwa 2009; Oyono 2004c; 
Zülsdorf et al. 2008), very little is known about the actual consequences of the forest 
management decentralization which ushered in the creation of local council forests. This is 
especially the case in relation to both how local councils manage their forests, that is achieving 
the goals of SFM, as well as the utilization of council forests’ timber revenues for the pursuit of 
local development (improving the living conditions of local councils’ inhabitants), the two goals 
of Cameroonian policymakers (see MINFOF and GTZ 2008; Oyono 2009, 15). Clearly, a gap in 
the literature exists at this level that this dissertation seeks to fill. 
                                                 
5 Related to that argument are both ignorance of the law and the indifference of local councils, which are 
primarily located in rural areas, as well as the complexity of the process of acquiring a council forest. This led to a 
situation where in 2007 for instance, whereas there were 167 community forests in existence, only five council 
forests had been officially created (see Oyono et al 2007, 3; 5). Additionally, this state of affairs was aided by the 
fact that to receive RFA revenues local councils had just to be located in area where timber harvesting was occurring 
compared to the council forests situation where the forest had to be first gazetted as well as created before a council 
could start to earn the revenues, a process described in Chapter 4.0 that could take several years. 
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1.2 RESEARCH QUESTION AND HYPOTHESIS 
Since this dissertation investigates the forest management decentralization in Dimako Council 
which led to the creation of the Dimako Council Forest, it asks one central research question. 
Why did the forest management decentralization in Dimako Council fail to achieve the goals of 
SFM and local development? In other words, what accounted for the failures of the theoretical 
predictions of improvement in forest management as well as enhanced local development 
prospects following the transfer of powers, resources and responsibilities from the central state to 
the elected Dimako Council local government? 
Based on the empirical and theoretical literature on decentralization and natural resources 
management/governance, the study argues that the forest management decentralization has failed 
to achieve the goals of improving forest management (SFM) and local development (improving 
local villagers’ livelihood) because the Mayor of Dimako, an elected official, has taken 
advantage of the new opportunities provided by the forest law and captured the forest as well 
utilized the timber revenues not just for personal enrichment, but more importantly to advance 
his own power-building agenda. In other words, the Mayor of Dimako has financially and 
politically benefited from the forest management decentralization, for the forest resources, which 
represent money, have allowed him to build, strengthen, and expand his power unto the national 
stage, thereby earning him the official status of a Big Man (see below for more on that concept 
and the theoretical perspective adopted in this study). 
The dissertation argues that this state of affairs would not have been possible save the 
forest management decentralization. Put another way, the Big Man in Dimako was a creation of 
the forest management decentralization and the decentralization theory. 
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1.3 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
Multiple reasons abound as to the significance of Cameroon and the Dimako Council as the 
subject matters of this study. First, as mentioned above the country sits in the second largest 
reservoir of tropical moist forests in the world (Greenpeace 2007, 1). What is more, Cameroon’s 
tropical forests cover about 40 percent of its 475,000 square kilometers (km²) territory (Topa et 
al. 2009) and timber harvesting represents almost 7 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
while creating around 45,000 direct and indirect jobs (Morrison et al. 2009, 5). Second, because 
of deforestation fears, the World Bank singled out Cameroon in the 1990s along with nineteen 
other countries as a target country for forest policy reform (Lele et al. 2000, 1; see also Sharma et 
al. 1994), thus de facto making it a primary case to study in the Congo Basin region.6
Finally, at least concerning the institutional framework, the country is generally regarded 
as having a ‘progressive’ forest policy architecture because of the reforms implemented since 
1994 (
 
Morrison et al. 2009, 5). The Cameroonian case is significant because the 1990s reforms 
have made it a laboratory and a springboard for forest policy reforms in the entire Congo Basin 
region (see Greenpeace 2007; Minnemeyer et al. 2000, 7). 
For its part, aside from being located in the forest-rich East Region, the country’s largest 
one in terms of surface area, and the site of a French logging company, the Société Forestière et 
Industrielle de la Doumé (SFID), for more than fifty years, the Dimako Council case is 
significant for several reasons. First, for about a decade starting in 1992 until 2001, the council 
                                                 
6 As an illustration, the World Bank’s 1991 forest strategy estimated that 17 to 20 million hectares/year 
were lost in the developing world and that tropical moist forests were inevitably shrinking (Lele et al. 2000, 1). 
Furthermore, out of the twenty countries singled out by the 1991 forest strategy with threatened tropical moist 
forests, besides Cameroon, six other African countries, most of them in the Congo Basin Region, the Central African 
Republic (CAR), the Republic of Congo, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Madagascar, and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC), then Zaire, were included (Sharma et al. 1994, 17 footnote 21). 
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hosted two French-funded pioneer technical assistance projects, API-Dimako and Forêts et 
Terroirs, designed to study, promote, and help implement SFM in Cameroon. Second and related 
to the above point, the Dimako Council, because of both projects, was the first local government 
-led by an elected mayor- in the entire country, and in the Congo Basin region, to officially 
benefit from the transfers of powers, resources and responsibilities over a natural resource 
culminating in the creation of the first council forest the Dimako Council Forest (FCD) (see 
Assembé-Mvondo and Oyono 2004, 79; Assembé-Mvondo and Sangkwa 2009, 98). Third, since 
the inception of council forestry in the country, as of 2010 only five council forests were in 
activity with the FCD being the oldest one having started timber harvesting operations in 2004 
(see Om Bilong et al. 2009, 6).7
Finally, at the theoretical level, the case is pertinent insofar as it had the potential to 
validate or reject the theoretical expectations of the decentralization and NRM theories of 
improved forest management as well local development. As Jesse Ribot (
 In theory, sufficient time has elapsed to afford the researcher a 
unique chance to explore and assess the Dimako experience. 
2003, 54-55) has 
argued elsewhere, unlike the previous wave of decentralization centered on the provision of 
public services such as education, roads, and so on, decentralized natural resources management 
is a source of revenue and power which can help local governments provide basic services and 
be legitimate, so it deserves a chance to be attempted (see also Larson 2003, 223). Thus, in 
theory, the decentralization of natural resources holds the promises of improving local 
livelihoods as well as the sustainable management of natural resources. 
                                                 
7 Until December 2009, four council forests were in activity in Dimako, Moloundou, Gari-Gombo and 
Yokadouma councils, all in the East Region (see Om Bilong et al. 2009). In January 2010, Djoum Council Forest 
located in the southern Council of Djoum officially started timber harvesting operations (ACFCAM, and CTFC 
2010, 21). 
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1.4 DECENTRALIZATION AS THE PANACEA? 
To be fair, decentralization simply defined at this stage as the transfer of powers, resources and 
responsibilities from the central state to the subnational levels, whether regional or local, as a 
policy goal did not start in the 1990s (see Cohen and Peterson 1996, 3-5; B. Olowu 2001; D. 
Olowu 2001; Picard 1983; Ribot 2002a; Rondinelli, Nellis, and Cheema 1983). But since the 
failure of centralized approaches to governance in developed as well as developing countries, it 
has taken an unprecedented turn (see Andersson 2002b; Andersson, Gibson, and Lehoucq 2004; 
Hope 2000; Manor 1999, 39; World Bank 2008; Wunsch 2000, 501; Wunsch and Olowu 1990).8
On account of its many failures, the centralized state everywhere has lost a great 
deal of legitimacy, and decentralization is widely believed to promise a range of 
benefits. It is often suggested as a way of reducing the role of the state in general, 
by fragmenting central authority and introducing more intergovernmental 
competition and checks and balances. It is viewed as a way to make government 
more responsive and efficient. Technological changes have also made it 
somewhat easier than before to provide public services (like electricity and water 
supply) relatively efficiently in smaller market areas, and the lower levels of 
government have now a greater ability to handle certain tasks. In a world of 
rampant ethnic conflicts and separatist movements, decentralization is also 
regarded as a way of diffusing social and political tensions and ensuring local 
cultural and political autonomy (
 
The view of decentralization as the answer to the central state governance failures is best 
summarized by Pranab Bardhan when he observes that: 
2002, 185). 
 
Decentralization is not only sought as an answer to the failures of centralized governance, 
but also on account of its purported benefits which, according to popular and scholarly 
literatures, range from increasing efficiency and effectiveness, alleviating poverty, empowering 
                                                 
8 Indeed, the ubiquitous presence of decentralization as a worldwide policy objective could be seen by 
looking at the figures of the premier international development institution, the World Bank. In a 2008 review of the 
World Bank’s financial support to decentralization of public services delivery in its client countries, it was estimated 
that from 1990 to 2007, the agency specifically committed about 10.6 billion USD to the endeavor (World Bank 
2008, 7). 
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local citizens and promoting local democracy as well as accountability, good governance and 
local development and so on (see Agrawal and Ribot 1999; Arghiros 2001; Bako-Arifari 1997, 4; 
Bird and Rodriguez 1999; Crook 1994, 2003; Crook and Sverrisson 2001; Grindle 2007a, 2007b; 
Johnson 2001; Manor 2002; Naab 2005; Parker 1995; Parker and Kirsten 1995; Parry 1997; 
Ribot 2002b, 2005, 2009; Ribot, Lund, and Treue 2010; Steiner 2007). 
In the area of natural resources management, since the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, forests, 
fisheries, wildlife, water and natural resources more generally have become a major policy area 
in national as well as international circles on account of their ecological, social, and economic 
value(s) (Assembé-Mvondo 2006a, 2006b; Lassagne 2005). The fact that tropical forests have 
become such a global policy terrain of contestation is not surprising to some extent, for as Alan 
Grainger noted “for centuries, these forests were a dark, distant, and mysterious ‘other’. 
Mahogany, ebony and teak were miraculously translated from the steamy, dripping jungles into 
the urban jungle of the metropole. There then arose a colonial discourse of environmental crisis, 
in which the spread of deserts could be prevented only by managing forests with modern 
scientific tools” (2008, 324). 
The situation was purportedly rendered urgent by the fact that in the case of forests for 
example, past degradation and deforestation figures were alarming. In fact, between 2000 and 
2005, it was estimated that because of agricultural conversion a net global annual loss of 7.3 
million hectares of forests on average took place of which 5.8 million hectares or 79.5 percent 
were primary forests, primarily in Africa and South America (Charnley and Poe 2007, 302). 
Though since the 1990s, deforestation rates have abated, the concern still remains about other 
issues such as forest degradation which could lead to simplification of forest structure, 
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biodiversity loss, and alteration of forest ecosystem processes and functions (Charnley and Poe 
2007, 302). 
Hence, confronted with such issues of natural resources degradation and depletion and 
bolstered by the findings of common property theory as well as successful local efforts at natural 
resources management (see Benjaminsen 1995; Degnbol 1995; Goldman 1998; Ostrom 1990), 
policymakers, scholars, environmentalists argue that powers be transferred to local level actors 
(Agrawal 2001b). The rationale for this transfer of power from the central to the local level is 
purportedly to avoid Hardin’s ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin 1968). 
The key point about the decentralized model advocated at the local level is the belief that 
it shall lead to more efficient, flexible, equitable, accountable and participatory local governance 
outcomes (Andersson, Gibson, and Lehoucq 2004, 421). Undergirding this shift to more local-
level forms of Community-based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM) are four 
assumptions. First, local people are reasonably knowledgeable about local ecosystems compared 
to outside experts; second, more benefits can be obtained from managing the resources rather 
than using it totally; third, a group capable of managing the natural resources exists; and fourth, 
control over the resource shall be the prerogative of the community (Fortmann, Roe, and van 
Eeten 2001, 171).9
Agrawal and Gibson 1999
 All these assumptions have been challenged by recent scholarship apparently 
to no avail (see ; Blaikie 2006; Kumar 2005; Purcell and Brown 2005). 
Broadly speaking, in the current decentralization of natural resources management being 
advanced, two models have emerged (see Andersson, Gibson, and Lehoucq 2004). Whereas the 
first one seeks to transfer property rights from the central state to local individuals as well as 
                                                 
9 According to Meynen and Doornbos three strands of thought are currently driving the natural resources 
management emphasis to the local-level: neo-liberal public choice advocates concerned with efficiency, market 
deregulation, and privatization; the ‘good governance’ agenda, still neo-liberal but with an accent on accountability 
and transparency; and finally, populist advocates found in community-based approaches (2004, 238-239). 
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communities, the other one aims to formally transfer central powers to local governmental units 
(Andersson, Gibson, and Lehoucq 2004, 421; see also Larson 2003). Generally, as judged by the 
number of published studies, CBNRM still dominates the study of decentralized natural 
resources management. 
Next, in spite of the purported virtues of decentralization, the empirical record is mixed 
on the impacts of decentralization the world over on some of the benefits outlined above (see for 
example Andersson 2002a, 2002b; Heller, Harilal, and Chaudhuri 2007; Khadiagala and 
Mitullah 2004; Larson and Soto 2008; Matose and Watts 2010; McDermott and Schreckenberg 
2009; Meynen and Doornbos 2004; Nijenhuis 2010 ; D. Olowu 2001; Pagdee, Kim, and 
Daugherty 2006; Wunsch 2001). A writer observes, for instance, that the same arguments 
advanced in favor of decentralization are sometimes used in defense of centralization, thus 
leaving one to question the overall merits of decentralization (De Vries 2000). 
In Cameroon for example where local councils and communities since 1994 have been 
able to benefit from forest resources through the sharing of forest taxes as well as community 
forests, scholars have documented the travails of the forest management decentralization 
experiment starting with difficulties in the implementation of the law, funds’ embezzlement and 
misappropriation, corruption, increase of local conflicts, elite capture, resistance of central 
authorities leading to the recentralization of the process (Assembé-Mvondo 2006a, 2006b; 
Bigombé Logo 2002, 2003b; Brown and Lassoie 2010; Etoungou 2003; Geschiere 2004; 
Karsenty et al. 2010; Oyono 2004a, 2004b, 2004d, 2005a, 2005b, 2009; Oyono, Cerutti, and Steil 
2009; Oyono, Kouna, and Mala 2005; Oyono et al. 2007). 
The main conclusion of the empirical research in the country has demonstrated that the 
expected benefits in terms of improvement of local democracy and governance, equity, 
13 
betterment of living conditions, poverty alleviation, social vulnerability, and sustainable 
management of the forests have yet to be materialized (Oyono et al. 2007, 1) for the reasons 
mentioned above. That is not to say that some positive outcomes have not been noted such as 
local communities’ greater awareness of their rights and benefits as provided by the new law 
(Bigombé  Logo, Guedje, and Joiris 2005; Oyono et al. 2007). 
1.5 GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
In this expanding literature on decentralization of public services delivery and natural resources 
management, the theories which seek to explain the success and failure of decentralized 
experiments can be categorized into three main schools of thought.10
Cheema and Rondinelli 2007
 The first school, the 
‘traditional’ literature, is most epitomized by public administration and political science scholars 
such as the late Dennis Rondinelli and Shabbir Cheema ( ; 
Rondinelli 1981; Rondinelli, Nellis, and Cheema 1983), but also Dele Olowu and James Wunsch 
(Olowu and Smoke 1992; Olowu and Wunsch 2004b; Wunsch 2001; Wunsch and Olowu 1990, 
1997). Over the years, these scholars have focused on the decentralization of public services 
provision and delivery in areas such as primary healthcare, education, water provision, 
education, sanitation and the like. Concentrating on formal local governments’ structures, the 
findings of these scholars have highlighted the lack of financial resources, personnel, training 
and capacity, as well as continued central control as impediments to the emergence of effective 
local governments. 
                                                 
10 On the whole, despite this neat classification, all three literatures are relevant for the study of forest 
management decentralization, and more importantly intersect with each other as can be seen by the various 
collaborations among these scholars. 
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The second school is the ‘democratic decentralization’ and accountability school 
represented by Jesse Ribot, Anne Larson and Phil Oyono among others which argues that insofar 
as sufficient powers have not been transferred to local communities or governments and that 
representation and downward accountability are lacking, decentralization shall not achieve its 
officially stated goals because the theoretical expectations are presumed on the basis of complete 
transfers of powers (Agrawal and Ribot 1999; Kanté 2006; Larson and Ribot 2004; Larson 2002, 
2004, 2005; Oyono 2004a, 2004b, 2004d; Oyono and Efoua 2006; Ribot 1999, 2002b, 2003, 
2005, 2008a, 2009).  Richard Crook and James Manor (Crook 1994, 1996; Crook and Manor 
1998) can also be included within that school. 
Finally, the last school of thought is best represented by studies of CBNRM as well as 
more recent studies of municipal and local governments’ natural resource management. Building 
on collective action and common property theories, Elinor Ostrom’s groundbreaking Governing 
the Commons (1990), and new-institutionalist theories, these theorists include Arun Agrawal, 
Krister Andersson, Clark Gibson, and Pablo Pacheco to name a few (Agrawal 2001a; Agrawal 
and Chhatre 2006, 2007; Agrawal and Gibson 1999; Andersson 2004, 2006; Andersson, Gibson, 
and Lehoucq 2004, 2006; Andersson and Ostrom 2008; Andersson and van Laerhoven 2007; 
Bartley et al. 2008; Ferroukhi 2003; Gibson and Lehoucq 2003; Kaimowitz et al. 1998; 
Kauneckis and Andersson 2009; Pacheco 2005).11
For this strand of thought, success depends on cooperation between the various actors 
involved in decentralized natural resources governance. Furthermore, for some new 
 
                                                 
11 Three strands of the ‘new’ institutionalism can be distinguished: economic/rational choice; historical 
institutionalism; and cultural/organizational neo-institutionalism. Together, the approach “share a commitment to 
understanding the sources and consequences of institutions-defined as relatively stable sets of rules (formal or 
informal) that prescribe and proscribe particular courses of action-although their particular conceptions of 
institutions and their analytical foci vary” (Bartley et al. 2008, 163). Peters (2008, 3-4) for his part distinguishes four 
major approaches in (new) institutional theory: the normative approach of James March and Johan Olsen; rational 
choice; historical; and finally, empirical institutionalisms. 
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institutionalists within that strand, understanding the interests of local politicians or mayors, the 
ones usually receiving powers when they are transferred to local elected governments, is critical 
to understanding the success or failure of decentralized forest governance. 
Overall, the literature, especially the decentralized natural resource governance one, 
converges around four findings. First, popular participation in local decision-making is important 
for the success of decentralization efforts; second, downward accountability of local elected 
officials to local populations is critical; third, local governments need to possess the technical 
capacity to perform the new responsibilities; and fourth, a secure source of revenues to take on 
the new transferred tasks should exist (Andersson 2006, 26). 
1.6 PERSPECTIVE OF THIS STUDY 
Of all the three abovementioned schools, only the last school, especially the rational choice new 
institutionalism, centers its attention on the political interests, that is the motivations, of the 
elected officials (mayors) receiving the transferred powers. To be sure, though, as mentioned 
above, in the past politics, in the form of central bureaucratic obstacles and lack of political 
commitment for instance, has been blamed for the failure of previous decentralization efforts, it 
remains that politics, especially the local one, as a variable influencing the outcomes of more 
recent decentralization experiments has been overall neglected (see Andersson, Gibson, and 
Lehoucq 2004; Andersson, Gibson, and Lehoucq 2006). That is the case because for the most 
part local elected officials have been portrayed in the literature as the ‘victims’ of central states’ 
reluctance to cede powers, resources and responsibilities. 
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Although in a number of cases, this might have occurred, the fact of the matter is that 
local politics, and the interests of local elected officials, as an analytical focus have not received 
the attention it deserves. On the other hand, in recent years, some decentralization scholars 
analyzing the reasons why government decentralization occurs in the first place have challenged 
conventional arguments that the occurrence of the phenomenon was in response to fiscal crisis; 
pressures from the international community; pressures from below; or sociostructural causes 
(O'Neill 2004, 39). Kathleen O’Neill, for instance, has argued that internal party pressures and 
electoral incentives dictate the decision that governments adopt to decentralize. In fact, for the 
author, decentralization is an electoral strategy of political parties whose support appears to 
decline nationally while subnationally, that is at the regional or local levels, it looks more 
promising (O'Neill 2003, 2004, 2005). Overall, these authors have argued that decentralization 
reforms are the result of intentional political calculations from national politicians to entrench 
their power (see Boone 1998, 2003; Dickovick 2005; Eaton 2001; Montero and Samuels 2004a, 
2004b; O'Neill 2003). 
Even though the focus of this literature is not on the outcomes of decentralization 
reforms, these studies are significant to the extent that they have added a ‘new’ perspective that 
can be useful when studying decentralization outcomes. Indeed, by emphasizing the political 
determinants or logic of decentralization, that literature has also reminded scholars that those 
local elected officials receiving powers are not benevolent officials, as it is so often portrayed in 
the literature, and that decentralization involves a redistribution of power with ‘winners’ and 
‘losers’. In sum, their argument has been that politics and local elected officials’ political 
interests should be an integral part of the explanation (see Andersson 2006; Andersson, Gibson, 
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and Lehoucq 2004; Andersson and van Laerhoven 2007).12
see Andersson, Gibson, and Lehoucq 2006, 579
 By pointing this, these scholars have 
reminded us that the interests of the local elected officials receiving the transferred powers, 
resources and responsibilities do not necessarily coincide with the official goals of the 
decentralization program ( ). That is why it is 
essential to separate the two. 
Recognizing this is even more important today because though the current literature has 
alluded to the risk of elite capture of decentralized natural resources management experiments as 
a variable accounting for their success or failure, save a few scholars, it has also been largely 
silent on the political objectives underlying this phenomenon in spite of the fact that “forest is 
power” as Barrie Sharpe aptly notes (1998, 41). Certainly, as mentioned above, one of the main 
explanations for Cameroon’s forest management decentralization not achieving its goals has 
revolved around the fact that the elites –at national, regional and local levels- who have 
reportedly captured and derailed the process have only been interested in the capture of forest 
revenues for personal enrichment/benefit (see Bigombé  Logo 2004; Bigombé Logo 1996, 
2003a, 2003b; Bigombé Logo 2006; Etoungou 2003; Morrison et al. 2009; Nkoum-Me-Ntseny 
and Logo 2004; Oyono 2004c). 
                                                 
12 In fairness, the ‘democratic’ decentralization school led by Jesse Ribot by arguing the importance of 
downwardly accountable local elected officials for the success of decentralization efforts, has recognized the 
inclusion of local interests in the analysis. Where these authors differ from the approach chosen here is that 
‘democratic’ decentralization theorists seem to believe that downwardly accountable local elected officials exist, 
‘out there’ and that one needs simply transfer powers to them instead of the current situation of powers being 
transferred to upwardly accountable officials. Clearly, this study does not agree with that view that local beneficent 
officials are ‘out there’, rather it argues that the overall structure of incentives (downward and upward 
accountability, sanctions, monitoring, enforcement of laws and so on) dictate or not the behavior of local elected 
officials. Thus, in a different set of incentives, a local elected official can be either downwardly or upwardly 
accountable in the neo-institutionalist approach. Finally, it can be argued that the lack of attention on local elected 
officials receiving decentralized powers, responsibilities and resources was understandable to the extent that 
community forests have been dominating the study of decentralized natural resource management. Indeed, whereas 
villages elected representatives could sit on the management ‘board’ of community forests, in decentralized local 
government natural resources management, one is talking about elected officials, generally elected mayors, at the 
helm of these schemes. 
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However, as this study shall argue, and as shall become apparent by the end, this 
explanation and the others advanced above are insufficient to explain the phenomenon which 
occurred in Dimako Council. That is why, the study argues that decentralization be 
conceptualized as another political process, subject as any other to the same vagaries of the 
political system. Indeed, as Nancy Thede notes: 
in order to adequately comprehend the process and impacts of decentralization, it 
is necessary to conceptualize it first and foremost as political process; that is, as a 
series of conflicting -although sometimes convergent- initiatives by different 
groups and individuals attempting to promote specific interests and ideals, and 
translating differential symbolic and material investments or stakes in the 
potential outcomes of the change in the local balance of power that 
decentralization represents (2009, 105). 
 
That is to say that there are no inherent reasons why local elected officials receiving the 
newly transferred powers would behave differently than any other elected official at the central 
scale, or at any other, given the fact that all operate within the same political structure and their 
incentives are structured by it. Achieving success -defined as the achievement of the official 
goals of any given decentralization program- is contingent upon understanding local elected 
officials’ behavior as well as their operating environment, that is the larger political structure 
within which those behaviors take place. As Agrawal and Gibson put it “all local interactions 
take place within the context of larger social forces” (1999, 637). 
As such, even though this study agrees with the abovementioned overall findings of the 
literature (popular participation in local decision-making; downward accountability of local 
elected officials; local governments’ technical capacity; and a secure source of revenues) 
regarding the reasons of failures, the study also builds and supplements the arguments advanced 
by new institutionalist theorists of decentralized governance such as Andersson, Gibson, and 
others (Andersson, Gibson, and Lehoucq 2004, 2006; Andersson and van Laerhoven 2007) who 
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have highlighted the need to adopt a critical local political perspective in explaining the success 
or failure of decentralized forest management efforts. Indeed, in opposition to some 
decentralization scholars who view the local scale as endowed with inherent properties, what is 
called the ‘local trap’ (Purcell and Brown 2005), the study argues that the scale does not matter, 
for the local is subject to the same problems as the center once it is recognized that power as well 
as power asymmetries are at the heart of the process (see Reed and Bruyneel 2010, 2). 
This, in reality, means, as the Dimako case study shall demonstrate, that a focus away 
from the relations of power involved in decentralized experiments as well as from the larger 
structure within which they take place leads, as mentioned before, to the extension, entrenchment 
and aggravation of the governance model to other scales -in this case the lower one- that the 
decentralization reforms seek to eliminate in the first place. In other words, the decentralization 
reforms in the end only serve to entrench the status quo. 
Finally, though this study builds on the approach of new institutionalist scholars, it is 
important to emphasize that the perspective taken here differs in two main ways. First, in 
contrast to the new institutionalist authors cited above, the study stresses that not only do local 
politicians seek to stay in power, but, more importantly, they also seek to expand their power at 
higher levels, most especially at the national level where political power still remains 
concentrated in a number of countries.13
                                                 
13 The expansion of power dimension of local elected officials is the key difference of this study in 
comparison to for instance Andersson, Lehoucq or Kauneckis and other theorists who have only emphasized the 
staying in power/entrenchment incentive of local elected politicians. 
 Furthermore, in order to achieve their aims, they need 
resources, especially financial ones, and, depending on the institutional context they operate into, 
they shall strive to use whatever resources at their disposal. In that view, congruent with the 
current institutional incentives in place in Cameroon, the Mayor of Dimako as the main local 
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elected official shall seek to use the forest management decentralization to further his own 
political objectives. In effect, the Dimako Council Forest, which represents timber revenues, is 
considered a resource, as any other, for the achievement of the higher aim of acquiring more 
political power-national prominence- which is synonymous to achieving Bigmanship status. 
Second, by blending the new institutionalist approach (for the promises as well as perils 
of institutional theories see Peters 2005) and the Big Man concept/paradigm (see below), the 
study augments the validity of the approach as well as filling an important void in the literature 
by showing that local politicians’ interests negatively affect the prospect of successful forest 
management decentralization through their search for personal power. 
1.7 THE BIG MAN CONCEPT/PARADIGM 
As the title of this study suggests, the Big Man is a major concept/paradigm that shall be utilized 
throughout this dissertation, in particular towards the end. Though it is not addressed in the 
decentralization literature, it is congruent with the new institutionalist perspective adopted in this 
study as the reader shall discover. The concept, though it has evolved over the years, has a long 
theoretical history. Two particular conceptualizations of the Big Man are of importance for this 
study (for more recent discussions on the Big Man see Diamond 2008; Smedt 2009). 
The first one is the classical anthropological Big Man described by Marshall Sahlins in 
his 1963 seminal article, Poor Man, Rich Man, Big-Man, Chief: Political Types in Melanesia 
and Polynesia. While attempting to explain the causes of the “western Melanesian 
underdevelopment against the greater Polynesian chiefdoms” (Sahlins 1963, 286), Sahlins 
focused on the organization of both societies, especially their types of leadership. In fact, Sahlins 
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argued that while the Polynesian paramount chief ruled through formalized institutions which 
allowed him to capture the economic surplus and ‘invest’ it in development, Melanesian islands’ 
lack of hierarchical structures of powers impeded their development. Furthermore, in Melanesia, 
instead of paramount chiefs, the types of leaders which emerged in these chiefless societies were 
self-made men, called Big Men. For Sahlins, institutional, political and economic development 
was inhibited by this type of leader who relied on personal networks of power instead of 
formalized institutions.14
Sahlins defined a Big Man as “one who can create and use social relations which give 
him leverage on others’ production and the ability to siphon off an excess product-or sometimes 
he can cut down their consumption in the interest of the siphon” (
 
1963, 292). However, because 
the Big Man was a self-made man and had no hereditary or formal authority, his ‘power’ and 
prestige came from his personal followers whom he provided favors but also was beholden. This 
meant in practice that because of this lack of institutional power, it was hard for the Big Man to 
summon the resources necessary for extracting the economic surplus to be used for investment, 
for this would in turn signify the end of his status.15
                                                 
14 To be sure, whereas in Melanesia, “small, separate, and equal political blocs” were the norm, in 
Polynesia, the society was organized along “an extensive pyramid of groups capped by the family and following of a 
paramount chief” (Sahlins 1963, 287). In Polynesia while there was only one chief at the top, in Melanesia, the lack 
of ‘concentration of political power’ meant that the struggle was permanent among local actors to achieve the Big 
Man status. 
 
15 The following summed up the contrast between a Big Man and a paramount chief. “The Melanesian big-
man seems so thoroughly bourgeois, so reminiscent of the free enterprising rugged individual of our own heritage. 
He combines with an ostensible interest in the general welfare a more profound measure of self-interested cunning 
and economic calculation. His gaze, as Veblen might have put it, is fixed unswervingly to the main chance. His 
every public action is designed to make a competitive and invidious comparison with others, to show a standing 
above the masses that is product of his personal manufacture. The historical caricature of the Polynesian chief, 
however, is feudal rather than capitalist. His appearance, his bearing is almost regal; very likely he just is a big man-
“‘Can’t you see he is a chief? See how big he is?’”. In his every public action is a display of the refinements of 
breeding, in his manner always that noblesse oblige of true pedigree and an incontestable right of rule. With his 
standing not so much a personal achievement as a just social due, he can afford to be, and he is, every inch a chief” 
(Sahlins 1963, 289, emphasis original). Finally, one has to remember that these ideal types developed by Sahlins 
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Building on the insights of Sahlins, the second Big Man is the one described by Jean-
François Médard in his 1992 article Le "Big Man" en Afrique: Analyse du Politicien 
Entrepreneur. That Big Man, which Médard argues can be found in a number of African 
countries, main characteristic from Sahlins’ is that he or she relies on accumulating or holding 
several political or state offices at multiple levels of government (Médard 1992). 
By holding these disparate political or state offices, the goal here, in a context where the 
state is itself seen as a resource, is to amass the financial resources which are going to help 
establish the Big Man status as well as strengthen it. Hence, in contrast to Sahlins’, this Big Man 
is first and foremost seeking political power, not solely recognition, though the enterprise is a 
global one because it involved displaying economic, social and political resources (Médard 1992, 
172). As Médard argued, the politician entrepreneur, that is the Big Man: 
Takes advantage of his access to the state to enrich himself. [And] on the basis of 
those economic resources already accumulated, he invests one part of his wealth 
in various economic undertakings; at the same time he converts another part of his 
wealth into a symbolic capital, in the form of political supports, by redistributing 
it. The art of redistribution is the key to [obtaining] legitimacy and therefore of 
accumulating political capital. Political capital in turn allows [one] to extract more 
economic resources. The important thing here is not so much the nature of the 
controlled resources at the start than the process of interaction between those 
resources. The interchangeability [échangeabilité] between resources has for 
consequence, that seeking political power and seeking wealth is the same thing, 
since if one needs to acquire political power to get rich, one also needs to be rich 
to keep it (1992, 172, emphasis added).  
 
Médard’s use of the concept Big Man, as in this study, comes from the translation of the 
French word grand, which simply means big. As he acknowledges “the term which 
spontaneously comes to mind to designate [the political elites in Africa] is that of “big man”, 
because it is used by the man on the street in Francophone Africa, but particularly because it is 
                                                                                                                                                             
have been criticized, especially because it has been argued the differentiation in practice is not as neat as the author 
had first portrayed (see for instance Médard 1992, 171). 
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indeed this image that the political elites deliberately project to the intention of the local 
population” (Médard 1992, 168).16
Based on Sahlins and Médard’s above conceptualizations, a Big Man in this study refers 
to a political actor who either holds an elective or administrative office and who uses that 
position to acquire financial and political resources to achieve national prominence, that is 
‘maximum visibility’ (
 In Dimako Council, the term also reflects a type of 
dichotomous-hierarchical view of the world from local villagers, which divides the world 
between the haves, les grands, and the have nots, les petits. 
Daloz 2003, 271).17 As in both authors, thanks to the financial and 
political resources the Big Man of this study has been able to create a ‘loyal’ following as well as 
allies strong enough for him to extend his power.18
Finally, it is important to note that several types of Big Man exist. In fact, Big Men can be 
found at the local, regional, and national levels (see for instance 
 
Daloz 2003; Laurent 2000).19
                                                 
16 Of particular importance to this study, Médard distinguishes three paths to achieving the Big Man status. 
Of the three paths, the passages from the politico-administrative to the economic sphere; and from the economic to 
the political sphere strictly speaking constitute the only avenues leading to a Big Man status. However, as it shall 
become clear by the end of this study, the paths described by Médard are not exclusive, for the path of the Mayor of 
Dimako, though at a later stage an economic operator, was primarily achieved through his position as an elected 
official at the helm of a council forest. 
 In 
a country like Cameroon, as in most Francophone Africa, which has inherited the French 
centralized pattern of government, the national level is where most of the politicians seek to 
ultimately establish themselves and display their power. Thus, a ‘true’ Big Man, usually residing 
17 Note that the term political actor is meant to include actors such as politicians or civil servants. This is 
the case because a Big Man does not always have to hold an elective position (see note 17 below). 
18 This does not mean that the Big Man is able to satisfy all his or her followers. Indeed, as Médard (1992, 
189) has argued, and as it shall become apparent by the end of this study, part of the dissatisfaction with a Big Man 
revolves exactly around the (perception of) lack or insufficiency of the redistribution of the accumulated resources. 
19 Pierre-Joseph Laurent studied Big Men in a small rural Sahelian town located at the border of Burkina 
Faso and Ghana. Of interest here that small rural Sahelian town is mainly dominated by one Big Man who happens 
to be a marabout. Then, four other Big Men follow. By decreasing order, they are a church pastor; the central state 
local representative; a local economic operator (entrepreneur); the local mayor; and finally a merchant 
(commerçant) (for more see Laurent 2000, 170-171). Note that the local mayor only comes in fourth place in that 
classification. Jean-Pascal Daloz for his part notes that the Big Man model “applies to all types of elites including 
other important categories in sub-Saharan Africa, like “traditional rulers,” some religious and even top military 
leaders” (2003, 271). 
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in the national or a regional capital, is defined as one whose power extends at the national level 
and radiates downward. Indeed, in Cameroon, the term ‘weekend mayors’ has been used  to 
designate, as well as lament, those local elected officials, who, though elected mayors of local 
rural councils, prefer to dwell in the capital Yaoundé (see Soh 2004).20
1.8 ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
 The obvious objective 
being to use their local elective position to either seek national office or strengthen the already 
acquired national position. 
The dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2.0 presents the conceptual framework as well 
as reviews the literature on decentralization and natural resources management and governance. 
Chapter 3.0 outlines the methods used in this study as well as the data analysis process. Chapter 
4.0 describes the institutional and legal framework of forest management decentralization in 
Cameroon. Then, before presenting the results of the field investigations, Chapter 5.0 introduces 
the East Region as well as the Dimako Council and the FCD. Of particular importance in this 
chapter is a genesis of the capture of the FCD by the Mayor of Dimako as well as of the 
predicaments of the whole Dimako experiment. 
The results section which includes Chapters 6.0, 7.0, and 8.0, illustrate how the mayor of 
Dimako has captured the council forest and how neither SFM nor local development has 
occurred. Indeed, the evidence presented in both Chapters 6.0 and 7.0 appear to show that the 
Mayor has harvested the forest in ‘unsustainable’ ways as well as allegedly misappropriated and 
                                                 
20 In theory, this is supposed to abate because the 2004 political and administrative decentralization laws 
for instance prohibit mayors from concurrently holding other positions in the state apparatus such as government 
ministers, lawmakers (députés or senators), or senior civil servants (see ROC 2004b). 
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personally benefited from the forest revenues. More importantly, Chapter 8.0 demonstrates how 
thanks in large part to the council forest project and the patronage of the Dimako native and 
Cameroon’s First Lady Chantal Biya as well as the political exploitation of this relationship, the 
Mayor of Dimako has morphed from a mayor of a small impoverished rural council into an 
influential national politician. Collectively, these chapters show that the decentralization reforms 
appear to have extended the national ‘bad’ governance model currently in vogue at the local 
level. 
Finally, after summarizing the main findings of the study as well as discussing them in 
light of the broader literature on decentralization, forest management and development, the latter 
part of the conclusion brings the theoretical and empirical parts together and proposes a ‘revised’ 
theory of decentralization which puts politics and power firmly at the center and suggests doing 
away with the major theoretical assumptions of the current theory. The dissertation ends by 
indicating the main limitations of the approach taken here well as the implications for further 
study of forest management decentralization. 
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Box 1.1. Definition of key terms used in this study 
Capture: seizing of the benefits designed for an entire group by one person or a group of person. 
Political Power: The definition adopted here is adapted from Jean-Patrice Lacam who defines it 
as “the capacity to systematically have one’s ideas prevail during decision-making processes 
involving critical issues and this, as part of one’s control of the political agenda” (Lacam 1988, 
25). 
Local government or local council: In Cameroon, since the 1996 Constitution, two tiers of 
subnational governments exist: the region and the council. This study is concerned with 
governments at the local level, so both concepts of local government or local council are used 
interchangeably. In Cameroon, local councils “occupy the lowest rung of the government 
administrative ladder in Cameroon. They are charged with the responsibility of executing local 
development projects, delivering basic social services and executing other tasks aimed at 
ameliorating the living conditions of citizens within their respective jurisdictions” (Njoh 2011, 
103). In other words, local councils are legally responsible under central supervision of economic, 
social, and cultural development matters. Finally, “Under public law [they are] given judicial 
personality and financial autonomy” (Morrison et al. 2009, 7). In addition, local councils include 
both urban and rural areas, though since 2004, legally the distinction between urban and rural has 
been abolished. Councils are generally headed by an elected mayor, or an appointed government 
delegate in major cities assisted by an elected deliberative body called the municipal council. Both 
the mayor and the councilor which together comprised the municipal council are elected for a 
five-year term renewable. 
Governance: by opposition to government, the act of including other non state actors into the 
management of public affairs. Environmental governance involves “a range of formal and 
informal institutions, social groups, processes, interactions, and traditions, all of which influence 
how power is exercised, how public decisions are taken, how citizens become engaged or 
disaffected, and who gains legitimacy and influence” (Reed and Bruyneel 2010, 2). Management 
here is the formal act of administering an organization or any other entity. 
Sustainable Forest Management (SFM), based on the International Timber Trade Organization 
(ITTO): “involves managing forests to achieve one or more objectives with regards to production 
of continuous flow of goods and services without undue reduction of their inherent values and 
future productivity” (see Mendoza and Prabhu 2000, 659).  
Institutions “are defined as formal and informal rules that are, in fact, followed by most affected 
individuals. Such rules structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or 
economic. Incentives, then, mean the rewards and punishments that are perceived by individuals 
to be related to their own actions and those of others” ( Andersson 2002a, 6). 
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2.0  THEORETICAL AND CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: REVIEWING THE 
LITERATURE 
“Decentralization is rapidly replacing God, Country and 
Motherhood in popular favor (…) All major shades of opinion 
seem to ascribe to decentralization great powers of social and/or 
moral regeneration” Norman Furniss, The Practical Significance of 
Decentralization (1974, 958-959). 
 
This chapter reviews the literature on decentralization in general with particular emphasis on the 
literature on decentralization of government as well as of forest management. The chapter is 
divided into two main sections. The first section defines the concept as well as discusses the 
conceptual difficulties that have arisen in the study of decentralization. Before concluding the 
chapter, the second section reviews selected empirical works dealing with the success and failure 
of decentralized experiments along the lines of the literature briefly mentioned in the 
introduction. 
2.1 A CONCEPTUAL MUDDLE 
This section reviews the conceptual issues that have arisen in the study of decentralization. The 
section commences with a discussion about the definition as well as the types of decentralization 
and ends with a presentation of the meaning of the concept in Cameroon. 
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2.1.1 Defining decentralization 
Decentralization, Philip Mawhood argues, “is a word that has been used by different people to 
mean a good many different things (…) too often the word seems to convey only what the public 
relations department wants it to mean (1983b, 1). As Mawhood suggests defining 
decentralization has been a problem from the outset; indeed, as he points out decentralization is 
used by various people to mean different things. The same conceptual quandary noted by 
Mawhood was also observed by John Cohen and Stephen Peterson who commented that the 
literature is marked by its size and diversity as well as “linguistic preferences, invention of new 
terms, and inconsistent use of established terms [which] creates methodological confusion in any 
comparative review of decentralization” (1996, 13). However, for conceptual clarity, the 
meaning of decentralization in this study has to be delineated. 
To begin with, several authors or schools of thought have advanced various definitions of 
the concept. In public choice theory for example, decentralization is defined as “a situation in 
which public goods and services are provided primarily through the revealed preferences of 
individuals by market mechanisms. Decentralized governments are regarded as having better 
knowledge of local or grassroots preferences, either in the sense of having access to information 
previously denied to them, or in the sense of observing preferences with less noise” (Hope and 
Chikulo 2000, 28-29). 
Conversely, for an author such as Brian Smith, decentralization involves: 
The delegation of power to lower levels in a territorial hierarchy, whether the 
hierarchy is one of governments within a state or offices within a large-scale 
organization. Decentralization may be clearly distinguished from the dispersal of 
the headquarters’ branches from the capital city, as when part of a national 
ministry is moved to a provincial city to provide employment there. It may also be 
distinguished from delegation, when a superior entrusts a subordinate with some 
of the former’s responsibilities, though decentralization will involve delegation 
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when the subordinate, whether it be an individual bureaucrat or an elected 
assembly, takes part responsibility for a designated area within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the organization or state concerned (1985, 1). 
 
What is more, for Smith decentralization “entails the subdivision of the state’s territory 
into smaller areas and the creation of political and administrative institutions in those areas” 
(1985, 1). In his definition, the author limits the use of the concept of decentralization to 
devolution or political decentralization, not delegation or deconcentration as other scholars have 
done (see below). 
Building on Smith, the ‘democratic decentralization’ school defines decentralization as 
“any act in which a central government formally cedes powers to actors and institutions at lower 
levels in a political-administrative and territorial hierarchy” (Ribot 2002b, 6). The emphasis here 
is on the formal transfer to outside actors and various organizations, not only governmental 
entities as in Smith’s above. For some theorists of this school, such as Agrawal and Ribot: 
When powers are transferred to lower-level actors who are accountable to their 
superiors in a hierarchy, the reform can be termed deconcentration. This is true 
whether lower-level actors are appointed or elected officials, because elections 
can still be structured in ways that make elected officials upwardly accountable. 
When powers are transferred to lower-level actors who are downwardly 
accountable, even when they are appointed, the reform is tantamount to political 
decentralization (1999, 475). 
 
Finally, the most enduring framework, ‘the majority view’ (Cohen and Peterson 1996, 
12), that has guided the study of decentralization in the last twenty years is the one put forward 
by Dennis Rondinelli, John Nellis, and G. Cheema. In effect, in a 1983 study, decentralization 
was defined as “the transfer of responsibility for planning, management and resources raising 
and allocation from the central government and its agencies to (a) field units of central 
government ministries or agencies, (b) subordinate units or levels of government, (c) 
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semiautonomous public authorities or corporations, (d) areawide, regional or functional 
authorities, or (e) nongovernmental private voluntary organizations” (Rondinelli, Nellis, and 
Cheema 1983, 13). Furthermore, four types or forms of decentralization were distinguished 
deconcentration, delegation, devolution, and privatization (Rondinelli, Nellis, and Cheema 1983, 
14, see below for more).21
Since that early definition, the concept of decentralization has morphed over the years,
 
22
Cheema and Rondinelli 2007, 
6
 
and to account for the evolution Cheema and Rondinelli now define decentralization as “not only 
the transfer of power, authority, and responsibility within government but also the sharing of 
authority and resources for shaping public policy within society” (
). What is more, “in this expanding concept of governance decentralization practices can be 
categorized into at least four forms: administrative, political, fiscal and economic” (Cheema and 
Rondinelli 2007, 6).23
                                                 
21 In a 1981 article, Rondinelli argued that two forms of decentralization could be distinguished functional 
and areal. Whereas, functional decentralization “focuses on the transfer of authority to perform specific tasks or 
activities to specialized organizations that operate nationally, or at least across local jurisdictions”, areal was 
“always primarily aimed at transferring responsibility for public functions to organizations within well-defined sub-
national spatial or political boundaries- a province, district municipality, river basin or geographical region. Usually 
the transfer or delegation of authority is to an institution that may legally perform those functions only within a 
specified geographical or political boundary” (1981, 137). Furthermore, a second distinction was made between 
three degrees of decentralization, namely deconcentration, delegation and devolution (1981, 137-139). Finally, it is 
important to note that despite its dominant status in the study of decentralization, not everyone agrees with the 1983 
framework outlined by Rondinelli. 
 
22 According to Cheema and Rondinelli (2007, 2-3), in the 1970s-1980s, decentralization was 
conceptualized as deconcentration; in the mid-1980s as political power sharing, democratization and market 
liberalization or expanding the scope for private sector decision-making; and finally, in the 1990s as the inclusion of 
civil society organizations to the state governance . On the other hand, Olowu (2001, 4-11) distinguishes four phases 
of the evolution of the concept and practice: 1945-1960s ‘development of an efficient and democratic system of 
local government’; early 1960s-late 1970s ‘receding of local governments’ independence’; late 1970s-late 1980s 
‘local governments as service providers and with decentralization as an approach to the reduction of the central state 
role in the economy’; and 1990s-present ‘democratic decentralization’. Finally, Cohen and Peterson (1996, 3-4) 
divide the history of decentralization into three phases: the early 1960s’ focus on decentralization as an 
administrative approach to local-level governance; the early 1980s’ service delivery focus; and finally, the early 
1990s’ democracy promotion emphasis. 
23 Because these ‘newer’ types differ a little from the earlier types the study does not present them in detail. 
Suffice to say that for Cheema and Rondinelli administrative decentralization includes deconcentration, delegation 
and “decentralized cooperation of government agencies performing similar functions through ‘twinning’ 
arrangements across national borders” (2007, 6-7); political decentralization or devolution refer to “organizations 
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In spite of the disagreements over its actual meaning and forms, the various authors 
reviewed here agree that decentralization includes a transfer of powers from the center to local 
entities, be they local representatives of the central government, elected local governments, and 
communities or private organizations (non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for instance). 
Additionally, all these definitions in one way or another include Cheema and Rondinelli’s three 
major forms deconcentration or administrative decentralization; fiscal decentralization; and 
devolution or political decentralization. Last but not least, from an early focus on government 
institutions over the years the concept has evolved to include outside actors such as civil society 
and private economic firms (see also Allen 1999, for the evolution of the concept of local 
government to today's local governance). Instead of government decentralization, today scholars 
talk of decentralized governance to reflect the shift in emphasis (see Cheema and Rondinelli 
2007). 
2.1.2 Types of decentralization 
Although most scholars have relied on the Rondinelli’s framework to conceptualize 
decentralization, some have also excluded Rondinelli’s privatization and delegation, because as 
Ribot (2002b, 4) argued, privatization relies on an exclusive logic in contrast to the inclusive 
                                                                                                                                                             
and procedures for increasing citizen participation in selecting political representatives and in making public policy; 
[and] changes in the structure of the government through devolution of powers and authority to local units of 
government” (2007, 7). Fiscal decentralization refers to the “means and mechanisms for fiscal cooperation in 
sharing public revenues among all levels of government; for fiscal delegation in public revenue raising and 
expenditure allocation; and for fiscal autonomy for state, regional, or local governments” (2007, 7). Finally, 
economic decentralization includes market liberalization, deregulation, privatization of state enterprises, and public-
private partnerships (2007, 7). 
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public logic of decentralization.24
2.1.2.1 Deconcentration or administrative decentralization 
 Thus, for Ribot and other scholars, decentralization only 
combines three forms deconcentration or administrative decentralization; fiscal decentralization; 
and devolution or political decentralization or what some have called democratic 
decentralization, a point that shall be critiqued below. Hence, in the following lines, the study 
only reviews these three most common forms referred to by the literature. 
Deconcentration or administrative decentralization is defined as the “dispersal of agents 
of higher levels of government into lower level arenas” (Manor 1999, 5). It is an intra-
organizational process which entails the transfer of selected administrative functions from the 
central government to lower level ministerial entities or agencies (Hope and Chikulo 2000, 30). 
Finally, the main distinction between deconcentration and devolution is that while the former 
focuses on efficiency and effectiveness of the central administrative system, the latter is 
concerned with political and popular participation as well as empowerment aims (D. Olowu 
2001, 3). 
2.1.2.2 Fiscal decentralization 
Fiscal decentralization could be seen as a separate type of decentralization, but also as a 
cross-cutting issue (Ribot 2002a, iii), for, as it has been remarked, powers transferred without 
revenues are meaningless. In effect, “decentralization must be attended both by some fiscal 
decentralization (since that supplies financial resources) and by some deconcentration or 
                                                 
24 Manor (1999, 4-5) for instance excludes delegation and privatization from his definition of the concept 
insofar as privatization entails transfers outside the political system and delegation has rarely been attempted or 
succeeded as he observes. 
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administrative decentralization (since that supplies bureaucratic resources required for 
implementation). If it is to have significant promise, decentralization must entail a mixture of all 
three types: democratic, fiscal and administrative” (Manor 1999, 7). 
2.1.2.3 Devolution or political decentralization 
For James Manor, devolution or political decentralization consists of a “transfer of 
resources and power (and often, tasks) to lower level authorities which are largely or wholly 
independent of higher levels of government, and which are democratic in some way and to some 
degree” (1999, 6). Overall, devolution consists in the development of effective local institutions 
of collective decision making; the devolution of authority to local-level political institutions; the 
deconcentration of administrative capacity, and the allocation of finances and the control of 
personnel to lower level administrative organizations; and finally, the establishment of and 
support for viable democratic local political processes (Picard, Groelsema, and Lawrence 2008, 
155). 25
2.1.2.4 The confusion surrounding devolution and democratic decentralization 
 
To begin, some scholars equate ‘democratic’ decentralization with political 
decentralization or devolution (Larson and Ribot 2004; Manor 1999; Olowu and Wunsch 2004b; 
Ribot 2002b, 2003, 2008a, 2008b, 2009). In the view of these authors, insofar as the goals of the 
                                                 
25 Further, devolution involves “the granting of decision-making powers to lower authorities and allowing 
them to take full responsibility without reference back to the authorizing government. This includes financial power 
as well as the authority to design and execute local development projects and programs. The essence of devolution is 
discretionary authority. To the extent that lower levels of government have discretionary authority, they can do 
essentially what they decide to do subject only to broad policy guidelines; their own financial, human, and material 
capacities; and the physical environment within which they must operate. Devolution is the strongest form of 
decentralization. It allows for the reduction of the levels of administration through which activities have to pass and 
it enhances citizenry productivity and participation in development activities (Hope and Chikulo 2000, 30-31, 
emphasis added). 
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current wave of decentralization reforms include the promotion of local democratic governments, 
the label ‘democratic’ is affixed to the term decentralization. The problem with this approach, as 
several authors have noted before, is that this concept conflates two different processes 
democracy and devolution, which although related, are nonetheless analytically and empirically 
separate (Oxhorn 2004, 6). In addition, it complicates the analysis by likening devolution or 
political decentralization to democratic decentralization (see Mawhood 1983b, 2-3). 
Whereas, for instance, Dele Olowu and James Wunsch used the term democratic 
decentralization in a somewhat ‘neutral’ way to refer to a process where “significant elements of 
authority, responsibility for services, and fiscal and human resources were transferred to 
[elected] local governments” (2004b, 1), Ribot (2010), Manor (1999), Blair (2000) and Heller 
(2001) for their part explicitly link democracy and decentralization to form the democratic 
decentralization concept. Indeed, for an author such as Jesse Ribot, political and democratic 
decentralization are the same and downward accountability is the key in democratic 
decentralization. He even goes as far as to argue that “without discretionary powers, or without 
downward accountability, there is no democratic decentralization. Rather, there is 
deconcentration, autocracy, privatization, etc” (2008a, 20). 
The conflation even goes further with Harry Blair (2000) who equated ‘democratic 
decentralization’ with democratic local governance. As he argues “the major promise of 
democratic decentralization, or democratic local governance (DLG) is that by building popular 
participation and accountability into local governance, government at the local level will become 
more responsive to citizen desires and more effective in service delivery” (Blair 2000, 21). 
To be fair, the amalgamation of democracy and decentralization is not new a matter, for 
as Robert Cameron (2003, 109) reminded us in early public choice theory, there was “a 
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‘motherhood and apple pie’ version of decentralization that views it almost as a synonym for 
democratization”.26
The issue of democratic decentralization is complicated by the existence of “a tendency 
by some specialists to simplistically argue that democratic elections and responsible officials and 
councils are essential for effective decentralization” (Cohen and Peterson, 1996, 24). However, 
“just because a country is highly centralized does not mean that it is unable to effectively 
decentralize the provision of collective goods and services through the field administration type 
of deconcentration. In sum, democratization can facilitate administrative and/or political 
decentralization strategies, but its absence does not necessarily mean that such strategies cannot 
be efficient or effective” (Cohen and Peterson 1996, 25). 
 At the same time, the amalgamation of democracy and decentralization into 
democratic decentralization blurs the line between the means and ends of decentralization. In 
effect, decentralization is a strategy conceived to achieve several aims which include for instance 
equity, democracy, and others. When democratic decentralization becomes the means and the 
end in itself, it further analytically complicates the issue. 
In truth, the qualifier democratic, authoritarian or other used by various scholars should 
be reserved to local governance which can be seen as the end state of the decentralization 
process. A fact that Olowu and Wunsch have noted when they asserted that “decentralization, 
even “democratic” decentralization, and local governance are not identical: initiating the first 
does not mean one has achieved the second” (2004b, 27). 
In light of this critique, this study proposes to subsume democratic decentralization under 
political decentralization. Seen this way, political decentralization can take two subtypes or 
forms: authoritarian or democratic. Thus, authoritarian corresponds to the situation where local 
                                                 
26 Cameron cites for instance Vincent Ostrom’s 1973 opus the Intellectual Crisis in American Public 
Administration. 
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officials are either elected or appointed but not downwardly accountable, whereas the democratic 
decentralization subtype retains Ribot and his associates’ original signification. 
2.1.3 The meaning of decentralization in Cameroon 
According to the 2004 Loi d’Orientation de la Décentralisation establishing the general 
framework of territorial decentralization in the country, decentralization refers “to the transfer by 
the state, to the decentralized local authorities, of particular powers as well as appropriate 
resources (compétences particulières et de moyens appropriés)” (ROC 2004a, Art. 2,1). 
Furthermore, in Cameroon, decentralization is seen as “the fundamental axis for the promotion 
of development, democracy and good governance at the local level” (ROC 2004a, Art. 2,2 
emphasis added). 
In the country, a distinction is made between decentralization and deconcentration, in 
contrast, for instance, to Rondinelli’s above definition, which are seen as two distinct yet 
connected processes. While decentralization is only reserved for devolution/political 
decentralization defined as the transfer of powers and responsibilities to local councils and 
regions, deconcentration refers as in the literature to the dispersion of the central state 
representatives to the local and regional level, symbolized in the figures of Governors 
(Gouverneur), Prefects (Préfet), and Sub-prefects (Sous-préfet) (see ROC 2008a). 
2.1.4 Decentralization in this study 
Last but not least, the definition of decentralization adopted in this study, building on 
Rondinelli’s 1983 and 2007 frameworks, refers to formal arrangements where the central 
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government cedes or transfers authority, responsibility as well resources, alone or in 
combination, to lower levels of administration or within a political system to organizations or 
actors outside of the bureaucratic structure such as in the case of local communities. Similarly, 
the definition put forward here does not include what is sometimes referred to as decentralization 
by default or when lower level authorities stepped in to fill the void left out by central authorities 
(see Manor 1999, 4). 
A final point worth mentioning is that because of the Rondinelli’s 1980s framework, 
there has been some tendency, as Philip Oxhorn (2004, 5) remarks, to see the three types of 
decentralization (deconcentration, delegation and devolution) as discrete steps rather than ideal-
types “towards which policy-makers repeatedly aspire” (Mawhood 1983c, 250). The view of 
discrete steps is in contrast to Rondinelli himself who in a 1981 article remarked that “in reality, 
although there are differences among the various forms of decentralization, they are not mutually 
exclusive. All government structures consist of some combination of these forms of 
decentralized administration” (Rondinelli 1981, 139). Hence, the different forms of 
decentralization should not be seen as mutually exclusive; they are rather complementary. 
In line with Oxhorn’s conceptualization (2004), this dissertation views decentralization as 
a multidimensional process where the various forms could be conceptualized along a continuum 
stretching from a minimum of deconcentration, the ‘least’ extensive type to a maximum of 
devolution, the ‘strongest’ type (Hope and Chikulo 2000, 30-31). 
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2.2 THE THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL RECORD 
As mentioned in the introduction, broadly speaking three schools of thought can be found in 
decentralization ‘studies’: the ‘traditional’ literature by public administration and political 
science scholars; the ‘democratic’ decentralization and accountability school; and finally the 
collective action, common property and new institutionalist theories. The rest of the chapter 
presents selected empirical evidence of the literature regarding the success and failure of 
decentralization of public services provision and delivery, with an emphasis on decentralized 
forest management or governance. 
2.2.1 Decentralization of public services provision and delivery and natural resources 
management 
To begin with, Olowu and Smoke (1992) identify seven case studies of ‘successful’ local 
governments in Sub-Saharan Africa (Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Kenya and Benin). In their 
investigation, the authors find that success for local governments is determined by the following 
factors: location in an area with an adequate economic base; well-defined responsibilities in a 
satisfactory legal framework; capacity to mobilize sufficient resources; supportive central 
government activities; and appropriate management practices, including development of 
productive internal and external relations and satisfactory responsiveness to constituents. For the 
authors, no single factor alone accounts for successful local governments. Therefore, in order for 
local governments to be successful, all the factors mentioned above have to be present. 
On the one hand, Olowu and Smoke findings are notable because they demonstrate that 
the task of decentralizing is a complex task. On the other hand, in spite of these findings, the 
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study falls short on one significant ground the definition of success. To illustrate, Olowu and 
Smoke mainly define success not in terms of achieving the goals of decentralization, rather in 
terms of local governments’ fiscal performance and capacity to mobilize resources (Olowu and 
Smoke 1992, 4-5). Such a measure is not really targeted at the provision of public services, 
which remains the goals of decentralization, but at whether a local government can mobilize 
financial resources. Put another way, the capacity to mobilize resources does not automatically 
translate into improved services provision. Finally, because of the year when the article was first 
published, the study cannot account for the multiple developments that have taken place since in 
decentralization practice and theory. 
Next, Olowu and Wunsch’s (2004b) edited volume review the conditions under which 
decentralization reforms have led to progress in local governance. After a synopsis of the six 
case studies (South Africa and Botswana, Nigeria, Ghana, Chad, Uganda, and Kenya) by various 
authors, Olowu and Wunsch conclude that four factors are critical for the effectiveness of local 
governance: the existence of a supportive national context; effective systems of 
intergovernmental relations; strong local demand for public goods and the existence of social 
capital; and well-designed local governance institutions (Olowu and Wunsch 2004a, 255). While 
these factors are important, the issue in most cases is that it is difficult to find all these factors at 
once, especially given the fact that most decentralized experiments occur in settings where 
governance shortcomings are widespread. Thus, how does one achieve effectiveness of local 
governance is unclear in that scenario. 
Crook and Manor (1998) in their comparative study of democracy and decentralization in 
South Asia and West Africa look at the impact of democratic participation on the performance of 
decentralized institutions. The goal of the authors is to ascertain, first, whether local participation 
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in the wake of ‘democratic’ decentralization reforms has increased and, second, its impact on the 
performance of elected local councils in the Indian state of Karnataka, Bangladesh, Ghana and 
Ivory Coast. The authors hypothesize that “the quality of accountability relationships would have 
a crucial impact on performance at two levels: first, relations between elected representatives and 
the public, and second, relations between local bureaucrats, other government agencies and 
executive officials on the one hand, and elected representatives on the other” (1998, 12). 
From the four case studies, the authors argue that among the various factors increased 
participation; adequate resources for councils; the socio-political contexts of decentralization 
reforms, institutional and popular accountability mechanisms appear to be the ‘most critical 
determinant’ of improved local performance and thus accounts for the variation between the four 
cases (Crook and Manor 1998, 21). This study is significant because unlike other 
‘accountability’ theorists who only mention the downwards or popular dimension of 
accountability, Crook and Manor also emphasizes the institutional dimension of the concept. 
However, as part of the ‘democratic decentralization’ and accountability school, the two authors 
share the same critique that shall be leveled below. 
Still on the accountability issue, Agrawal and Ribot (1999) examine whether 
decentralization of natural resource management has occurred in four Asian and West African 
case studies (India, Nepal, Mali and Senegal). They argue that “the presumed benefits of 
decentralization become available to local populations only when empowered local actors are 
downwardly accountable” (Agrawal and Ribot 1999, 474). For both authors, representation and 
accountability are the key elements “if devolved powers are to serve available local needs 
efficiently and equitably” (Agrawal and Ribot 1999, 474). In their framework, Agrawal and 
Ribot focus on three variables (actors, powers and accountability) instead of the more traditional 
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definition of institutional reform in the political, fiscal, or administrative realm. In Agrawal and 
Ribot’s conceptualization, increased change in the three variables toward more local autonomy is 
similar to ‘more’ decentralization. 
Following their conceptualization, the two authors argue that decentralization has 
occurred in India and Mali, but not in Nepal and Senegal. Insofar as powers have been 
transferred to entities upwardly accountable to the central state, they judge that in Nepal and 
Senegal, instead of (democratic) decentralization, rather those are instances of deconcentration 
(Agrawal and Ribot 1999, 491-492). Finally, it has to be noted that the authors’ framework is 
based on the analysis of legal, political and administrative documents of the goals of 
decentralization and that the analysis seeks to determine whether what is labeled as 
decentralization constitutes decentralization. Thus, the authors’ focus is not on decentralization 
outcomes. Nonetheless, the study is relevant for determining the conditions for success. 
Overall, the issue with the framework put forward by the authors, as they acknowledge 
themselves, is that it does not analyze whether decentralization, whatever the types, has achieved 
its stated aims in a given situation. The framework is only useful to the extent that it allows the 
analyst to ascertain whether decentralization has occurred or not. Once this has been ascertained, 
work still remains to be done on establishing whether the goals have been achieved or not. In 
spite of Agrawal and Ribot’s contention that once powers have been transferred to entities that 
are downwardly accountable, decentralization policies have a chance of actually reaching their 
stated aims, the fact of the matter is that the process of achieving the goals is not automatic, the 
study would argue (see also Chapter 9.0 for a more elaborate point). 
Oyono (2004a) analyzing the experience of Cameroon’s model of forest management 
decentralization started in 1994 argues that the experiment has led to outcomes contrary to 
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theoretical predictions (see also Oyono 2005a). To be sure, he remarked that “the process of 
forest management decentralization is hijacked at the regional level by mayors, administrative 
authorities, timber companies, politicians and many other interest groups” (Oyono 2004a, 182). 
Moreover, through the case study of five community forests, one council forest as well as nine 
forestry fee (RFA) management committees (see section 4.2 on forest policies in Cameroon 
below), the author argues that Cameroon’s forest management decentralization has led to a 
conflict of authority between customary authorities and new local actors that have emerged in the 
wake of the 1994 forest management decentralization. 
For the author, “the available evidence demonstrates a significant gap between the 
experience in Cameroon and arguments that decentralization should necessarily lead to 
efficiency, equity and ecological sustainability” (Oyono 2004a, 187). This is due, according to 
the author, to the fact that there is a tension between on the one hand the state, which does not 
want to relinquish its powers, and local actors who seek greater powers and argue for change. 
Finally, in order for decentralization to work, Oyono stresses that downward accountability, local 
democracy, the ‘mystique of responsibility’, as well as strong institutional arrangements at the 
local level and awareness of the common interest be cultivated. 
For Oyono (2004a), like Agrawal and Ribot (1999) above, the issue is simply one of local 
democracy and accountability at the local level. Indeed, for the author, if these elements were 
present at the local level, Cameroon’s forest management decentralization would have more 
chance of achieving its stated goals of efficiency, equity and ecological sustainability. Although 
this may be true, the author seems to evade the fact that decentralization is, as various scholars 
have noted before, a political process; it is about power, and it is unlikely that even in the 
presence of local democracy and downward accountability, such matters would simply be 
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resolved. Other elements such as the capacity to manage forests, and an enabling institutional 
framework would still be needed. Hence, Oyono’s study does not really account for the power 
struggles at the local level and only sees the local population or the ‘community’ as passive 
actors in the struggle over control of forest resources and revenues instead of seeing it as 
embedded in the process of negotiation and renegotiation of the forest management 
decentralization in the country. Indeed, as various examples of community forests in the country 
have shown, local villagers bear some of the blame for the failure of the experiment (see for 
instance Assembé-Mvondo 2006a). 
The case of municipal forest management is analyzed by Kaimowitz et al. (1998) who 
study the impact of forestry as well as decentralization laws in Bolivia which afford municipal 
governments a stronger role in forestry. The study examined four areas where transfers have 
occurred: logging, protected areas, indigenous territories, and land-use planning. The authors’ 
intent is to ascertain whether the transfer of powers to municipal governments has led to 
sustainable resource use, improvement in local governance and greater equity for local 
populations. The authors’ conclusion is that the decentralization laws have created opportunities 
for various groups, among which small farmers and indigenous people, to benefit from forest 
resources as well as influence forest policies, but these groups have been unable to fully take 
advantage of the law. Despite the benefits, the authors report that local governments’ capacity for 
forest governance still remains limited. Therefore, in their conclusion, Kaimowitz et al. point out 
that outside support and supervision are needed for local governments to take on their new tasks 
in forest management. 
For the authors, the key point is that the theoretically predicted outcomes about 
decentralization are by no means automatic, and that outside intervention is necessary for local 
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governments to perform their duty. This is in contrast to studies which have emphasized only 
local-level governance factors. The merit of this study is to show that decentralization does not 
have to always mean the retreat of the central state; rather, it means that its role has to be 
redefined. 
Like Kaimowitz et al. above, Larson (2002) reviews the role of twenty one (21) local 
governments in Nicaragua to determine what is their role in forest management, but also what is 
required to improve local governments’ effectiveness in their new role of natural resource 
managers. The author found that Nicaraguan local governments are often reluctant to assume 
their role of natural resource managers, but that when they do it is for economic reasons not out 
of concerns for the long term health of forests. Larson’s conclusion is that “municipal forest 
management varies greatly among the 21 cases reviewed here, which range from municipal 
governments virtually paralyzed by infighting or corruption to those that have demonstrated clear 
concern for forest management-with many stages in between. Even the best cases still have 
important obstacles to overcome” (2002, 28). 
Finally, the author argues that three factors are needed for local governments to be 
effective resource managers: capacity; incentive; and long-term commitment. For her, civil 
society can play a role in enhancing those three factors (Larson 2002). Larson, as Kaimowitz et 
al. above, sees that the process of transferring powers to local governments does not 
automatically result in improvement of forests as well as benefits for local populations. As she 
notes, for local governments to be effective resource managers the three conditions need to be 
met. Conversely, given that she observes that economic motivation directs the involvement of 
local governments in forest management, how does one ensure that this focus is not detrimental 
to the larger goals of the forest management decentralization? Equally important, are for instance 
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the two objectives of obtaining the economic rent and conserving the forest antithetical given the 
author’s conclusion. If not, how to ‘incentivize’ local governments so that not only do they 
extract the rent but also ‘sustainably’ manage the forests given their immediate imperatives? To 
these interrogations, the article remains silent. 
Ribot, Agrawal and Larson (2006) seek in their comparative study of six countries 
(Senegal, Uganda, Nepal, Indonesia, Bolivia, and Nicaragua) to demonstrate that efforts at 
‘democratic’ decentralization of environmental management, specifically in the forestry sector, 
fail because of intentional central governments interference. The six case studies are significant 
because as the authors mention they include the world’s “most important or innovative efforts to 
decentralize” (2006, 1865). 
To support their overall argument, the three authors argue that in the six case studies two 
main strategies are designed by central governments to thwart the emergence of successful 
decentralized governance at the local level. In effect, the strategies to limit the ability of local 
governments to make meaningful decisions consist in limiting the kinds of powers transferred as 
well as transferring powers to institutions or allies of central governments that are upwardly 
accountable and responsible to central concerns instead of those of the local populations (Ribot, 
Agrawal, and Larson 2006, 1864-1865). 
In this view, the will of central authorities to retain control through insufficient or 
inappropriate transfer of powers and selective implementation lead to the failure of 
decentralization policies in achieving their stated goals. To put it differently, the incompleteness 
of the reforms is to be blamed for their failure. Indeed, “effective decentralization requires the 
construction of accountable institutions at all levels of government and a secure domain of 
autonomous decision making at the local level” (Ribot, Agrawal, and Larson 2006, 1864). Thus, 
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unless, democratic decentralization is fully implemented, decentralization policies shall not 
achieve their full potential. 
In general, the authors are to be commended for bringing up an issue that has beleaguered 
past decentralization efforts, namely the schemes designed by central authorities to retain power 
that they are supposed to transfer in the first place. However, the main issue with the authors’ 
conclusion is that though they recognize that political-economic calculations affect 
decentralization outcomes as could be seen by central actors’ resistances, they equally seem not 
to draw the appropriate conclusion regarding the conflictual nature of decentralization. It appears 
as if the authors occult the fact, as others have remarked, that decentralization is a political 
project; it is about power and conflict is inherent in it. Additionally, the authors seem to take the 
role of local officials as a ‘fixed’ variable, that is downwardly accountable local actors exist ‘out 
there’ and that one needs only transfer powers and responsibilities to them and the situation shall 
get solved. However, it is more complicated than that. In reality, democratic politics can be 
contrary to the objectives of decentralization programs (see Chapter 9.0 discussion). 
Lastly, as other scholars have argued, and as it shall become apparent by the end of this 
study, local elected officials have their own interests which do not necessarily coincide with 
those of the local populations or national decentralization policymakers (see below). Moreover, 
under different institutional configurations, it is possible that local upwardly accountable 
officials can behave differently. Thus, the focus should be broadened to include not only the 
[downwardly accountable] actors, but also the institutions within which actors are embedded. 
A similar argument made by the three abovementioned authors is also made by Ribot 
(2009) in a study of a rural community forest in Senegal where since 1998 the forestry code has 
transferred powers and responsibilities to local councils over the management of local forests. 
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The study specifically examines the signing of the official order to open or not the rural 
community forest to charcoal production in 2006. Ribot finds that irrespective of the formal 
transfers from the central government to locally elected officials, the decision to open charcoal 
production, and to benefit from the revenues, still remains in the hands of the Forest Service. 
Using arguments of national good and local incompetence as well as the support of local 
deconcentrated officials such as the sub-prefect, and urban-based forest merchants, the Forest 
Service refuses to transfer that power to local elected officials.  
About local elected officials, Ribot concludes:  
They are elected but cannot serve. Local democracy has no substance. As long as 
the sectoral powers remain the discretionary domain of line ministries, there is 
little chance for local democratic transformation in rural Senegal. Colonial 
forestry services were used to dominate the commercial extraction of forest 
resources. These resources are still colonized by line ministries. Prying the fingers 
of line ministries off the lucrative resources they control is a major frontier of 
decolonization that has not yet been crossed. The new democratic decentralization 
laws get us to that frontier, but not across it (2009, 126). 
 
To restate, the same critique addressed to Ribot, Agrawal and Larson above applies to 
this article as well. Suffice to say that Ribot here is a victim of the same error mentioned above, 
that is viewing local actors as passive individuals confronted by the mighty power of central 
actors, while in reality the picture is more complicated than that because by their intermingling 
the two sets of actors negotiate and renegotiate the whole process. 
One issue that has arisen in the study of decentralized governance pertains to the role of 
cooperation in enhancing the prospects of success especially in the provision of public services 
in the forestry sector. Therefore, Andersson (2004) studies the role of repeated interactions in 
decentralized governance in the Bolivian Lowlands. The author proposes that scholars move the 
unit of analysis from the local government administration to the wider arena of the local 
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governance system in assessing the outcomes of decentralization. For Andersson, to the extent 
that local governments in developing countries do not possess the capacity alone to effectively 
govern, it is necessary to recognize the linkages between the local government and the other 
actors at the local level. 
In his study, Andersson attempts to account for the ‘mixed’ results of Bolivia’s efforts at 
forest management decentralization. In his study of 32 Bolivian municipalities, the author found 
that repeated communication, that is face to face interactions, between central government 
representatives, municipal government officials and staff as well as NGOs and forest user groups 
and individuals is associated with better local governance outcomes. In this respect, two types of 
communication linkages are important for local governments vertical and horizontal (Andersson 
2004, 239). Vertical occurs between actors at different levels such as forest users while 
horizontal happens with other municipalities, forestry actors, and NGOs (Andersson 2004, 241).  
The author concludes that success depends on “the mandated actors at different levels of 
governance [building] institutions for communication and cooperation through which they can 
combine their resources and efforts. Hence, the challenge to organize the decentralized 
governance of forests in Bolivia is to achieve collective action among a diverse set of actors with 
varying interests and access to information, power, and resources” (Andersson 2004, 234).  
The main finding of the study is interesting insofar as it addresses the need for 
cooperation in order to achieve the effectiveness of the local governance system. Nonetheless, 
the study falls short in one significant way, for it does not define the types of interactions which 
make a difference in municipal forest governance between success and failure. In reality, the 
study measures the presence and strength of local interactions as well as their overall frequency, 
not their content or the type of information that is being exchanged among all these actors. 
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Presumably, one would expect that the type of information exchanged would matter. In addition, 
which actor is to take the lead in these interactions if the officially ‘mandated’ actors decline to 
do so or are not interested? Is coercion an alternative, in particular from central state authorities 
whom decentralization efforts seek to restrain the role in natural resources management in the 
first place? 
In the end, while the study does not consider all these issues, its advantage resides in 
pointing out that first cooperation between various actors is critical for the success of 
decentralized governance, and second in widening the arena of analysis from the local 
government administration to the local governance system. 
Next, Kauneckis and Andersson (2009) examine the performance of 390 randomly 
sampled municipalities in four Latin American countries -Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Peru- in the 
local governance of natural resources. The authors hypothesize that both local and national 
institutional factors (the devolution of formal political responsibilities; national and local 
political incentives; competitive elections; and civil society) shall influence the provision and 
production of natural resources services locally, with local factors being the key determinant of 
those outcomes. The services include land use zoning programs, farming extension and training 
programs, reforestation, watershed management, technical assistance among others (Kauneckis 
and Andersson 2009, 33). 
In opposition to their starting hypothesis where local factors were predominant, the two 
authors discover that both local and national institutional factors are important in determining the 
‘incentive structure’ for local politicians. Indeed, while formal devolution of powers to local 
authorities had the largest impact on successful outcomes (Kauneckis and Andersson 2009, 39), 
on the other hand, local factors associated with the presence and organization of civil society 
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were found to have the greatest influence on the quality of service delivery in the natural 
resources sector. Certainly, “whereas national-level institutions provide a pivotal role in defining 
local political incentives, municipal politicians are most responsive to citizen demands when 
there is demand for services articulated through these civil society organization” (2009, 42). 
Kauneckis and Andersson’s conclusion is summed up as follows: “it is the overall 
structure of incentives, rather than any particular institution that makes the difference” (2009, 
42). Thus, they agree with other authors reviewed above who have argued that a supportive 
national context as well as local institutional factors are significant for effective local 
governments. 
Last but not least, Andersson, Gibson, and Lehoucq (2006) in a comparative statistical 
analysis of 200 municipalities and their mayors in Bolivia and Guatemala examine the linkage 
between forest governance and municipal politics (for a similar argument, see also Andersson, 
Gibson, and Lehoucq 2004). The authors’ hypothesis is that the success of decentralization 
efforts at the local level depends upon the (institutional) incentives of local politicians. In fact, 
the three authors argue that local mayors in both Bolivia and Guatemala would be interested in 
municipal forest governance if these efforts politically, that is electorally, and financially benefit 
them. The assumption being that since local mayors are rational actors, they would only invest 
their time, energy and resources to the extent that they personally benefit in some way from these 
efforts. As they point out: 
We approach the problem of forest governance from the perspective of local 
politicians…we view local politicians as individuals who worry about staying in 
power. Staying in power, in turn, means that local politicians must make choices 
about how to employ their limited time and resources to serve political as well as 
programmatic goals. Given this view, decentralized natural resources 
management may or may not change local politicians’ preferences in a way that 
protects forests. The important point is to view the interests of local politicians as 
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distinct from the interests and goals of the central government and its 
decentralization policy (2006, 579, emphasis added). 
 
The approach builds on the new institutionalism school of political economy and sees 
local politicians as self-interested, rational actors. The conclusion supports the authors’ 
hypothesis that politics helps explain the success of forest management decentralization. 
Notwithstanding that fact, the approach does not account for other motivations that might inhabit 
other local mayors who are not ‘rational’ self-interested actors or who harbor a different type of 
rationality. As an illustration, how does one account for the fact, as Andersson (2002a) has for 
instance, that some mayors have been able to successfully fulfill their new roles while others 
have not? Put another way, what accounts for the discrepancy between those local elected 
officials who are successful and those who are not given the fact that all are elected officials, 
hence supposedly inhabited by the same political objectives? 
Indeed, since all or most local mayors are elected officials one would expect them to 
behave in the same manner since their common goal, according to the authors, is to stay in 
power. This contradiction suggests that other factors might be involved. That is to say that the 
same factors that might make municipal forest governance successful can also be responsible for 
the failure of those municipal efforts as when local mayors are interested in municipal forest 
governance only for their personal own benefit, and not the goals of the decentralization reforms. 
In other words, the study is incomplete since it is only concerned with determining whether local 
politicians shall get involved in forest management, not whether that involvement shall be 
beneficial for both forests and local residents. Finally, what about the role of other local 
organizations such as civil society or central government local representatives, whose role other 
authors aforementioned have argued are critical for the success of decentralization efforts? 
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Despite these caveats, the advantage of the approach is to look at politics as a key 
explanatory variable for the outcomes of forest management decentralization efforts. As the 
authors conclude “local politicians play an increasingly critical role in environmental governance 
because they may conform to, filter, or completely ignore their new decentralized mandate” 
(2006, 590, emphasis added). That is a non-negligible contribution as the dissertation shall 
demonstrate later. 
2.3 SUMMARY 
This chapter has reviewed the literature on decentralization of public services provision as well 
as natural resources management. The chapter started with a discussion about the conceptual 
difficulties attached to the concept of decentralization, presented the types as well as critiqued 
the notion of ‘democratic’ decentralization as synonymous to political decentralization. Then, the 
chapter moved to the literature review which highlighted the three classes of theory which seek 
to explain the success and failure of decentralized experiments, namely the ‘traditional’ 
decentralization school; the ‘democratic’ decentralization and accountability school; and finally, 
collective action, common property and new institutionalist theories. The next chapter describes 
the methods as well as data analysis procedures used for this study. 
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3.0  METHODS AND DATA ANALYSIS 
After the review of the literature in Chapter 2.0, the following chapter describes the research 
methods used as well as the unfolding of the data analysis process. The chapter is organized into 
two main sections. The first section justifies the choice of the qualitative approach used for this 
study, operationalizes the independent and dependent variables as well as describes the unfolding 
of the field investigation. The second and final section concludes the chapter by providing a 
synopsis of the data analysis process. 
3.1 THE RESEARCH METHODS AND THE FIELD INVESTIGATION 
The following section presents the main methods used in the conduct of this study. The section 
begins with a brief overview of the case study approach, then proceeds with operationalizing the 
main variables before describing the main methods utilized in this study. The section concludes 
with a brief discussion on some of the methodological issues involved in the conduct of this 
scientific research. 
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3.1.1 The approach used: the case study and qualitative methods 
Robert Yin defines a case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon 
and context are not clearly evident” (1994, 13, emphasis added). That was the approach chosen 
for this study. In effect, the case study and qualitative methods were selected for this study 
because they were better suited to answering the primary research question. Indeed, because of 
the sensitivity of the topic, the lack of knowledge and the lack of data as well as the current 
limited number of existing and operating council forests (five), it was difficult to conduct a 
statistical analysis. Thus, the only research methods appropriate for this study were qualitative 
methods. In addition, the case study was selected because they usually “are the preferred strategy 
when “how” or “why” questions are being posed” (1994, 1).27
Overall, the approach chosen required fieldwork on the ground in Dimako and centered 
on a process which “entails immersion in the everyday life of the setting chosen for study, values 
and seeks to discover participants’ perspectives on their worlds, views inquiry as an interactive 
process between the researcher and the participants, is both descriptive and analytic, and relies 
on people’s words and observable behavior as the primary data” (
 
Marshall and Rossman 1999, 
7-8). 
                                                 
27 What is more, for Yin the use of one type of research in the social sciences, experiments, surveys, 
archival analysis, histories and case studies, over another depends on three conditions the type of research question 
posed; the extent of control that the investigator has over actual events; and the degree of focus between 
contemporary or historical events (Yin 1994, 4). Thus, the case study is “preferred in examining contemporary 
events, but when the relevant behaviors cannot be manipulated. The case study relies on many of the same 
techniques as a history [which relies on primary and secondary documents, as well as cultural and physical artifacts], 
but it adds two sources of evidence not usually included in the historian’s repertoire: direct observation and 
systematic interviewing. Again, although case studies and histories can overlap, the case study’s unique strength is 
its ability to deal with a variety of evidence-documents, artifacts, interviews, and observations” (Yin 1994, 8). 
Within the case study genre, he further adds that six methods constitute the sources of evidence for the case study, 
namely documents; archival records; interviews; direct observations; participation-observation; and physical 
artifacts (see Yin 2994, 78-101). 
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In line with the case study genre, three primary methods were used for this study: 
documents retrieval and archival research, in-depth semi-structured interviews and direct 
observation. The methods were applied in three main settings, Yaoundé, the capital city, Bertoua, 
the Eastern Region’s Capital, and Dimako Council, including the FCD. The investigations 
occurred over a period of five months: two months in Yaoundé, and the rest in Bertoua-Dimako 
(see below). 
3.1.2 Operationalizing the variables 
From the extant literature on municipal forest management in the world, as well as forest policy 
documents in Cameroon, two main goals of council forestry can be elicited (MINFOF and GTZ 
2008). The first objective of council forestry is to help the conservation of forest resources, what 
is called in the first article of the 1994 Forest Law sustainable forest management (SFM) (see 
Assembé-Mvondo 2009, 91). The second objective is to derive resources to improve local 
livelihoods and help alleviate rural poverty, or in the Cameroonian case as it is referred to local 
development. 
Thus, the two goals of forest management decentralization examined in this study are 
SFM and local development and those are the two goals that shall be used to ascertain the 
success of the forest management decentralization experiment in Dimako Council. That is the 
dependent variable success is defined as the achievement of the two official goals of the 
program. Finally, for its part the independent variable shall ‘measure’ the mayor’s financial and 
political motives. A brief explanation of the indicators of the dependent and independent 
variables is provided below (for a more complete breakdown of the variables see Appendix B). 
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3.1.2.1 Sustainable forest management and the forest management plan 
Although no agreement exists as to the meaning of SFM, and even the confusion over 
such terms as SFM and sustainable management of forests, the operational definition of SFM 
used here views the concept along the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) 
definition (see Chapter 1.0). Further, SFM in opposition to logging “typically combines 
harvesting guidelines designed to increase the growth of marketable timber with efforts aimed at 
lowering the damage to commercial trees” (Rice et al. 2001, 6). Put another way, SFM seeks to 
prohibit logging which “involves the swift cutting of a limited number of highly valued species 
with little attention given to the condition of the residual stand and no investment in 
regeneration” (Rice et al. 2001, 11).28
One of the primary tools to achieve SFM is through the design and implementation of a 
forest management plan. The management plan is “a document in which the potentialities of the 
resource are evaluated, the trade-offs among the ecological, economic, and social aspects of 
management are assessed, and balanced solutions proposed” (Cerutti, Nasi, and Tacconi, 2008). 
In Cameroon, on top of the legal guidelines for SFM, the main tool to implement SFM is the 
forest management plan (see Cerutti, Nasi, and Tacconi, 2008). Therefore, it is the document that 
constitutes the basis for evaluating whether SFM is happening in the FCD. 
 Hence, the goal of SFM is to ensure the availability of 
forests resources for future generations. 
However, it has to be recognized, as Cerutti, Nasi, and Tacconi (2008) have argued, that 
SFM involves more than the implementation of an officially approved forest management plan 
                                                 
28 Note that the study uses interchangeably such terms as timber harvesting and forest harvesting; and 
harvesting and logging. 
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(see also Higman et al. 2005, 5, for the major components of SFM).29 But, since legally the 
management plan constitutes the primary tool for implementing SFM in the country, the study 
argues that evaluating the implementation of the plan, especially its major provisions, are 
significant indicators of SFM success.30
To assess the success of SFM in Dimako Council, three major provisions of the 
management plan shall be examined: 
 
1. Following the logging rotation cycle (harvesting order) set out in the management 
plan as well as respecting the Annual Allowable Cut (AAC) - the surface area or 
the volume to be harvested in a given year- boundaries when harvesting the forest 
2. Abiding by the Minimum Harvesting Diameter (MHD) and the Minimum 
Management Diameter (MMD) in harvesting species to ensure the long term 
health of the forest 
3. And finally, reforesting the forest 
In theory, if all these three major provisions of the forest management plan are 
implemented, the likelihood that forest resources are preserved is enhanced, that is the pursuit of 
SFM is judged as successful. Finally, insofar as all the above standard provisions of the 
                                                 
29 That is why for instance multiple criteria and indicators, which include social, economic, and ecological 
values, are being developed by several forest organizations in order to adequately measure SFM. According to 
Higman et al. (2005, 5) the major components of SFM include: a) a legal and policy framework; b) sustained and 
optimal production of forest products; c) protection of the environment; d) wellbeing of people; and e) plantations 
and regeneration of the forest. What is more, according to Julius Tieguhong (2009, 431) SFM in Cameroon involves 
“many facets: forest concessions, enforcement of legal frameworks, development of forest management plans, forest 
certification, reduced impact logging, selling of environmental services, reforestation of degraded lands, the use of 
forest residues, adaptive collaborative management, environmental impact assessments and the development of 
model forests”. Note that some of these facets are directly included into the forest management plan making it 
appropriate for the study of SFM in Dimako Council. 
30 Notwithstanding the fact that in the country, the management plan is comprised of several parts dealing 
with forest harvesting, social demands, land tenure, Non Timber Forest Products (NTFPs), and wildlife protection 
(see Cerutti, Nasi, and Tacconi, 2008, 2), this study only deals with the timber or forest harvesting dimension. This 
is dictated not only by the fact that this is the primary area of intervention of the council, but also because of the 
inherent nature of council forestry some of the demands associated with private commercial firms have proven 
difficult to be applied upon local councils (see Chapter 5.0). 
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management plan, as Chapters 4.0 and 5.0 below shall detail, exist in the management plan of the 
FCD, this makes it appropriate to evaluate the implementation of the management plan along the 
lines of those selected indicators. 
3.1.2.2 Measuring local development 
To begin with, what represents development has been a contentious issue in development 
theory since the beginning of the field (see for instance the edited volume of Desai and Potter 
2008). However, for operational purposes and in line with the meaning adopted in Cameroon, 
local development here simply refers to ‘concrete’ achievements such as potable water provision; 
electricity; construction and maintenance of roads, bridges, construction works; sports 
equipment; construction, maintenance, and supply of schools as well as health centers; provision 
of medications; all other projects fulfilling community interest. 
Given the above definition, it probably would be more appropriate to talk of 
‘development projects’ instead of local development, but, in keeping with local customs, the 
term ‘local development’ will be utilized here. Thus, when the term local development here or 
development projects is used here, it is not to talk about the contentious meaning of 
development, but rather to refer to whether roads, health centers and other essential public 
services are being provided. The main reason for using a straightforward indicator of local 
development is due to the fact that as George Niksic, in his study of decentralization in Port 
Elizabeth in South Africa, has remarked: 
debates about the meaning of development are not prominent, however, at the 
local level in Port Elizabeth. Instead, councilors, officials and even popular actors 
understand development in an unproblematized and “common-sensical” way. To 
them, development is about ameliorating the historically disadvantaged areas, 
constructing infrastructure, delivering essential services, improving the local 
economy, and creating jobs for the many unemployed people. Development here 
is about nuts and bolts issues (2003, 5 emphasis added). 
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Additionally, this measure has been used in the past by other scholars such as Crook and 
Manor who agree that “the ‘low technology, low resources’ context of rural government in poor 
countries demands instead relatively simple measures of achievement which, it may be argued, 
are adequate in situations where what is usually at stake is the difference between no provision 
and some provision of a school, clinic or feeder road” (1998, 8-9, emphasis original). In their 
study, the two authors use the concept of output effectiveness to refer to the provision of services 
in rural areas (Crook and Manor 1998, 18). 
3.1.2.3 The independent variables 
As mentioned above, the two independent variables of this study measure both the 
mayor’s financial and political powers. The first independent variable labeled personal 
enrichment measures how the mayor allegedly enriched himself -or personally benefited- 
through the council forest while the second variable deals with the pursuit of political power, 
which is synonymous to achieving the Big Man status. 
3.1.3 Documents/archival records 
The first method used to gather data and collect evidence about forest management 
decentralization in Dimako Council consisted of documentary information about the general 
framework of forest management decentralization in the country and government 
decentralization (laws, rules, regulations, and so on); about council forests (how to create a 
council forest for instance); and finally, about the Dimako Council case (timber harvesting 
figures, budgets, maps of the FCD, revenues, development projects’ list, forest management 
techniques and so on). The aim of that preliminary phase of data collection was also to 
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“corroborate and augment the evidence from other sources” (Yin 1994, 81), though documents 
and archival records, as other collected evidences, “should not be accepted as literal recordings 
of events that have taken place” (Yin 1994, 81). Indeed, these “documents must be viewed with 
the skepticism that historians apply as they search for “truth” in old texts” (Marshall and 
Rossman 1999, 117). 
Documents are important since they “provide background and context, additional 
questions to be asked, supplementary data, a means of tracking change and development, and 
verification of findings from other data sources. Moreover, documents may be the most effective 
means of gathering data when events can no longer be observed or when informants have 
forgotten the details” (Bowen 2009, 30-31). 
Finally, the documentary information and archival records were gathered from various 
sources including government ministries, private organizations, NGOs, research institutions, as 
well as international donors’ website present in the country. In total, more than three hundred 
(300) documents and archival records were collected during the five months stay in Cameroon. 
More than half of those documents were directly pertinent to the case study at hand. 
3.1.4 Direct observations 
Direct observations constituted the second method of data collection for this study. In general, 
observation “entails the systematic noting and recording of events, behaviors, and artifacts 
(objects) in the social setting chosen for study. The observational record is frequently referred to 
as field notes-detailed, nonjudgmental, concrete descriptions of what has been observed” 
(Marshall and Rossman 1999, 107, italics original). In comparison to documentary evidence and 
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archival records, periods of direct observation primarily occur in Dimako Council and in the 
FCD. 
Though, the researcher was privy to some workshops about forest management 
decentralization and council forestry, where he observed participants interact, one of the main 
tasks set at the onset of the study and during the fieldwork was to observe operations in the FCD, 
and this was accomplished. Unfortunately, the researcher, though he had hoped to, was unable to 
observe Municipal Council meetings or sessions specifically dealing with forest issues, for no 
meeting took place while fieldwork was being conducted. However, this did not constitute an 
impediment to data collection. 
3.1.5 Interviews 
The last and final data collection method involves conducting in-depth semi-structured 
interviews, also called focused interviews (Rubin and Rubin 1995, 5), of people involved in 
forest management decentralization in Dimako Council. This method constituted the most 
extensive part of fieldwork. In fact, before leaving for Cameroon, the researcher had drawn a 
detailed list of about fifty (50) people seen as likely interviewees for this study. It turned out in 
the field, as one would expect, that the final tally included more than the initial group of 
individuals. The goal was to interview three sets of actors, central, regional, and local in 
Yaoundé, Bertoua, and Dimako Council, involved in decentralized forest management and/or 
local government.  
There was a rationale for selecting all three types of actors for interviewing. First, 
interviewing central actors was critical not only because forest management decentralization was 
initiated from the center, but also because legally those actors are involved in council forestry 
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through the issuance of timber harvesting permits as well as other activities such as the 
enforcement of forest law, rules and guidelines. Second, regional actors were interviewed first 
because of their proximity to the field, but also because of their role as central actors’ field 
representatives. Finally, local actors because of the obvious fact that these were the primary 
targets of this study. 
At the central and regional levels (Yaoundé and Bertoua), the main organizations to get 
interviewed were government ministries representatives, including the forest administration; 
local researchers; private organizations and NGOs. In Dimako Council, three sets of actors or 
organizations were interviewed: the council executive (the mayor and his deputies); Municipal 
Councilors; and CCG members (see Chapter 5.0 for more on the CCG). The main reason for 
selecting these three sets of local actors was straightforward. By law and council administrative 
edicts, these are the primary actors involved locally in decentralized forest management.31
The majority of the interviews was conducted once; only in five (5) cases were the 
interviewees questioned at least twice. Over all, as 
 
Table 3.1 below indicates, the researcher 
formally interviewed sixty one (61) people. The breakdown of the interviewees, as the table 
illustrates, is the following: twenty four (24) village or quarters chiefs; fourteen (14) municipal 
                                                 
31 Regarding CCG members, it has to be mentioned that the researcher interviewed former and current 
CCG members, although former CCG members were not the primary targets of the study. Indeed, the researcher had 
assumed that CCG members elected in 1999 were still in place while another election had occurred in 2007. Instead 
of the initial seventeen (17) CCG members, the CCG organization had been expanded to twenty-two (22) members 
and only three from the 1999 elections were left. The others had been promoted or elected to other positions, such as 
chiefs or councilors, or decided not to run. Similarly, the researcher included village chiefs because initially, from 
secondary sources during the literature review, he had wrongly assumed that village chiefs were part of the CCG 
organization. However, after the first round of interview, the researcher realized the information to be inaccurate. 
After careful consideration and based on the informational value as well as the fact that in November 2009, the 
Mayor of Dimako officially decided during a meeting to involve village chiefs into the management of the FCD, the 
researcher decided to keep interviewing village chiefs. It turned out to be a ‘good’ idea because of the ‘revolving 
door’ phenomenon in Dimako Council whereas people move from one position to another inside the town main 
organizations. So in the end, to the extent that chiefs were part of the creation of the FCD in their former or current 
capacity, because of their ‘high’ informational value, and also because they represent the authority at the village or 
quarter level, the researcher interviewed them. 
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councilors (out of twenty-two currently living),32
Table 3.1. Formal semi-structured interviews conducted 
 including the Mayor and two of his three 
deputies; fifteen (15) CCG members (out of twenty-two); Dimako Council Secretary-General as 
well as the Municipal Tax Collector (Receveur Municipal); and other interviewees from the 
forest and territorial administrations as well as other local actors for a total of eight (8) 
interviewees. 
Interviewees type Number Characteristic 
Village or quarter chiefs 24 Local 
Municipal councilors 14 Local 
CCG members 14 Local 
Others 8 Central, regional, and 
local 
TOTAL 61  
 
The formal semi-structured interviews referred to interview that were formally conducted 
after officially informing the interviewee that the researcher would be conducting an interview 
about the FCD. On top of the formal interviews, the researcher also conducted informal 
interviews as well as relied on ten (10) other informants through ‘snowball’ sampling, meaning 
using interviewees or informants to point out other knowledgeable people not included in the 
original interview design (see Auerbach and Silverstein 2003, 18). Three of these ten informants 
turned out to be key informants, for they provided the local context and pointed the way forward 
to understanding the case study. Hence, in total, when the researcher includes informal and 
unscheduled interviews, as well as other conversations relating to Dimako Council, the 
                                                 
32 The municipal council counts twenty five members; however, three councilors who passed away have yet 
to be replaced. 
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researcher interviewed more than eighty (80) people at the central, regional, and local levels of 
government.33
3.1.5.1 Locating the interviewees 
 
Whereas selection of formal interviewees occurred before and during fieldwork, the 
researcher still had to identify the exact location of the interviewees, especially in the Eastern 
Region, in Bertoua and Dimako Council. It was especially challenging in Dimako Council not 
only because of the state of the local roads, which made frequent traveling an issue, but also 
because of the fact that about a third of the villages are located outside the center of the town. 
The researcher had to travel to each village, more than twenty (20), to interview the chief, the 
councilor, and the CCG member. That task of interviewing in Dimako was facilitated by a 
reliance on the council staff to locate and inform the interviewees of the project as well as the 
request for their voluntary participation. 
Four arguments militated for the approach through the council for the researcher: 1) 
respect for local customs and the fact that local authorities consider research as official business 
here, thus researchers have to go through all the authorities of the town to inform of their 
presence; 2) identification and official stamp of approval for villagers to greet and receive the 
researcher because they know that official approval has been obtained from local authorities; 3) 
access to local authorities’ archives as well as interviews’ request approval of municipal 
councilors for instance; 4) and finally physical safety issues. 
                                                 
33 The ‘sample’ was mostly male-dominated, especially at the local level, only three women were 
interviewed for this study. This was mainly due to the ‘overrepresentation’ of men in the forest management 
organizations at the local level. 
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Needless to say that the reliance on council staff to locate and inform the interviewees 
raised an ethical dilemma as the choice for the researcher was between access through the 
council and trust by the local interviewees. Fortunately, except at the onset of the study, the 
reliance on the council staff to inform interviewees of the project did not impede data gathering 
or trust from the interviewees. That is to say that, during the entire research process, the 
researcher was in control of the process by using the skills of a diplomat to gain access and trust 
(Marshall and Rossman 1999, 183). 
3.1.5.2 The structure of the interviews 
Before leaving for Cameroon, based on the initial research question (s) and the literature 
on decentralization and natural resources management, the researcher had devised a set of twenty 
(20) questions which after the first week of interviewing were condensed to less than ten (10) 
questions. This task was necessary not only to account for the interviewees’ education level, but 
also to allow for more questions to be answered. 
Six main questions were raised at the outset of most interviews: 
1. What do you think of the council forest and the forest management 
decentralization idea? 
2. What is the role of the Consultative Committee and the Monitoring Commission 
in the process? 
3. What is the role of the Municipal Council or the Dimako Council in the 
management of the council forest? 
4. Until now, what has the forest management decentralization in Dimako achieved? 
5. Is the forest management decentralization working? If yes or no, why? 
6. What is needed for the forest management decentralization to be effective? 
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The goal of these introductory questions was to guide the interview by setting the stage 
for the ensuing discussion. Moreover, the questions centered on understanding the concepts of 
council forest and forest management decentralization, and the promises as well as the perils 
surrounding them and how the process was unfolding on the ground. Depending on how the 
interview proceeded as well as the interviewee’s willingness, additional questions were raised. 
Most interviews on average lasted about an hour and fifteen minutes (1 hour and 15). The 
shortest lasted about twenty (20) minutes while the longest stretched for almost three (3) hours. 
The interview questions were semi-structured in the sense that the researcher left open the 
possibility for the interview to go the direction of the interviewees. This was a critical technique 
since it allowed the researcher to elicit the political dimension of forest management 
decentralization in Dimako Council, not only the governance side. 
For consistency and comparative purposes, the same questions were asked to every 
interviewee. Only when the researcher interviewed people with specialized knowledge, such as 
forest administration officials and elites such as the Mayor, did the researcher adjust the 
questioning. Finally, because most of the interviews were not tape recorded at the request of the 
interviewees, the researcher tried to periodically review his notes as well as interview transcripts 
in order to ensure that the data obtained were relevant for the study and also to determine new 
emerging questions or follow-up interviews if needed. 
3.1.6 Accuracy and reliability of the council figures 
A final point has to be made regarding the accuracy as well as reliability of the figures presented 
in this study. As shall be apparent in the results section, the accuracy of the Dimako Council 
figures regarding timber production, sales and revenues are contested by various central, regional 
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and local actors involved in council forestry. That is why, an effort has been made, when 
available, to include other figures from varied sources. Yet despite this attempt, most of the 
figures, especially financial ones, for this study come from official council documents such as 
the budget and the administrative account (compte administratif), mandatory documents that 
local councils have to annually submit to the central state (see Tandja 2008). 
Does this mean that those figures have to be completely discounted? Not necessarily. 
Indeed, because of this point of contention, and as the evidence charted below shall establish, the 
study suggests looking at those figures primarily in two different ways. On the one hand, 
concerning the council financial statements (see chapter 7.0), the study argues the officially 
reported figures on timber revenues, though significant, be construed as understatement of the 
council forest actual revenues while expenditures be seen as overstatement of the council 
achievements. On the other hand, the council timber figures should be regarded as 
undervaluation of timber sales and production primarily because of the alleged prevalence of 
illegal logging –defined simply at this stage as acts contrary to the management plan provisions 
as well as the forest administration rules and guidelines- in the FCD as the evidence shall later 
show. 
The assumption undergirding this position, as shall become apparent later, is motivated 
not only by the disagreement about the accuracy of the council figures, rather their 
undervaluation, but also by the evidences that shall be presented throughout this study which 
suggest a deliberate attempt from the part of the Mayor of Dimako to mislead outsiders about the 
whole council forest experiment in Dimako. The two assumptions of undervaluation and 
overestimation suggest that the situation might be even more troubling than the evidences 
presented here would indicate if the main hypothesis of the study holds. 
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3.2 ANALYZING THE DATA 
Analyzing (qualitative) data is the “process of bringing order, structure and interpretation to the 
mass of collected data. It is a messy, ambiguous, time-consuming, creative, and fascinating 
process. It does not proceed in a linear fashion; it is not neat. Qualitative data analysis is a search 
for general statements about relationships among categories of data; it builds grounded theory. It 
is the search among data to identify content for ethnographies and participants’ truths” (Marshall 
and Rossman 1999, 150). The section which follows presents the data analysis steps conducted 
for this study. 
3.2.1 The method used: grounded theory 
Numerous qualitative studies and researchers over the years have relied on the grounded theory 
method developed by Strauss and Corbin three decades ago (Flick 2002, 177). Although the 
method has been refined over time, the key principle remains the same: the theory is developed 
from the data (Kvale 1996, 206-207). In practice, however, the process combines induction and 
deduction (see Rossman and Rallis 1998, 10). The grounded theory method “uses a data analysis 
procedure called theoretical coding to develop hypotheses based on what the research 
participants say. Grounded theory derives its name from the fact that theoretical coding allows 
you to ground your hypotheses in what your research participants say” (Auerbach and Silverstein 
2003, 7 emphasis original). 
Though the method followed in this dissertation relies on grounded theory, it follows 
more closely the approach outlined by Auerbach and Silverstein in Qualitative Data: An 
Introduction to Coding and Analysis (2003) regarding how to handle a ‘sea of information’ when 
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analyzing data. Though as the authors point out the process is hardly linear, in reality the 
approach main advantage, but also drawback, is that it fragments the process of data analysis into 
seven discrete steps that one must follow to arrive at the grounded theory (Auerbach and 
Silverstein 2003, 43). To palliate the approach’s deficiency, the researcher supplemented the data 
analysis process with more ‘traditional’ grounded theory approaches such as the ones by Rubin 
and Rubin (1995, 226-256 for data analysis chapter) and Rossman and Rallis (1998, 164-189) to 
guarantee that coding was properly conducted. 
Next, after the transcription phase, ‘the raw text’ which constituted the first step, the 
remaining steps of the data analysis included the following (Auerbach and Silverstein 2003, 43): 
1. An explicit statement of the research concerns and theoretical framework (broader 
than the research questions) 
2. Selecting the relevant text from the raw text (transcripts) 
3. Recording Repeating Ideas (the ideas that keep being repeated in the relevant text) 
4. Organizing Repeating Ideas into Themes 
5. Theoretical constructs (more general concepts) 
6. Creating the theoretical narrative 
These staircase coding steps involve moving from a lower to a higher level of abstraction 
and could be used for generating as well as testing hypotheses although grounded theory primary 
aim is to generate hypotheses (Auerbach and Silverstein 2003, 3-9; and 13-21). The following 
seven steps involve first, making the text manageable (steps 1, 7, and 6); second, hearing what 
was said (steps 5 and 4); and third, developing theory (steps 3 and 2). 
Finally, the order of analysis goes from the bottom to the top (bottom-up coding) 
(Auerbach and Silverstein 2003, 104), but before starting coding, the researcher has to openly 
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state his research concerns, in the case of this dissertation the main research question, so that he 
can direct the process and does not feel overwhelm with the data at hand (Auerbach and 
Silverstein 2003, 44). 
3.2.2 The coding process 
To code the data, the researcher started with interview transcripts, and then applied the codes 
discovered from those transcripts to the field notes as well as the documentary and archival 
evidences. The aim was to triangulate the data and ensure that the coding was consistent 
throughout all three sets of data as well as corroborate or confront the coding categories (see 
Bowen 2009, 28; 35; 37), in this case Repeating Ideas (RI), Themes, and Theoretical Constructs 
(TC). Over all, during the coding process, the researcher discovered about fifty (50) RI, which 
when recoded were reduced to twenty two (22). From these 22 RI, it was determined that five (5) 
key themes could be found in the data (see Appendix B). Finally, the researcher ended up with 
five theoretical constructs that were later merged during the writing stage into two key 
constructs: the Big Man and governance problems. 
All these coding categories, especially the TC, were tentative until the writing phase 
when they were recoded, reorganized as well as renamed because the researcher realized that 
what he had conceptualized as separate categories before were in fact not. In practice, the 
process was simultaneous; that is to say that the researcher did not code the data separately or 
looked for a sole construct, rather he used the constant comparison method (see Flick 2002, 213) 
to include the data into a given category. 
On the whole, the process was similar to theoretical coding of the grounded theory 
method, for it involves moving to a higher level of abstraction, from RI to Themes to TC as in 
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open, axial and selective coding (see Flick 2002, 176-190; see also Montgomery and Bailey 
2007, 68-69). The researcher concluded data coding when the process had reached theoretical 
saturation, that is when the coding process provided no further knowledge (see Flick 2002, 183). 
3.2.3 An iterative process 
 
 
 
   
 
 
  
 
Figure 3.1. Data analysis model 
Source: adapted from (Auerbach and Silverstein 2003, 35) 
 
Contrary to the image of the discrete steps described in the preceding section, and as Figure 3.1 
indicate, coding the data was an iterative process, moving back and forth from raw data to the 
theoretical constructs and constantly comparing the categories (RI, themes, TC). The aim was to 
guarantee that the coding was properly conducted and that the ideas and concepts developed fit 
into the categories they had been assigned to. 
The coding and analysis model which the researcher followed is best illustrated by Figure 
3.1 above which shows the adapted version of the Auerbach and Silverstein’s model. The model 
Relevant Ideas (RI) 
Coding and recoding back to 
RI, Themes and Theoretical 
constructs 
Theoretical narrative 
and interpretation 
Themes and theoretical 
constructs (TC) 
Raw data 
Relevant text 
Constant comparison 
throughout 
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here reflects the process utilized for this dissertation; a process not involving discrete steps as the 
figure would suggest, but rather an iterative, non-definitive model, constantly moving back and 
forth between the data analysis and the writing processes.  
Finally, the model used above is not sequential but rather circular with the constant 
comparison box in the middle to signify the iterative nature of the process throughout, as well as 
the fact that coding and categories generating was constantly compared to ensure the rigor of the 
process. 
3.3 SUMMARY 
This chapter has described the research methods as well as the data analysis process followed in 
this study. The chapter began with a brief discussion about the rationale for the selection of a 
qualitative approach, operationalized the independent and dependent variables as well as 
presented the three primary methods used in the study documents and archival records; direct 
observations; and in-depth semi-structured interviewing. The chapter concluded with a 
description of the data analysis process which involved building a grounded theory from the 
data. 
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4.0  THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK OF FOREST MANAGEMENT 
DECENTRALIZATION IN CAMEROON 
“The French tend to take for granted the essential irresponsibility 
of local elected bodies, and accordingly to insist on administrative 
safeguards against it” Brian Chapman, An Introduction to French 
Local Government (quoted in Mawhood 1983a, 197). 
 
This chapter previews the institutional framework -mainly organizational, legal, and regulatory- 
of forest management decentralization and SFM in Cameroon. The overall goal of this chapter is 
to provide the reader the tools to understand the main reforms being implemented in Cameroon’s 
forestry sector since the 1990s as well as the fundamentals about council forestry. The chapter is 
organized into four sections as follows. While the first section starts by providing a succinct 
historical perspective on Cameroon’s politics and economy, the second highlights the critical 
role played by the forestry sector in the national economy as well as describes the key reforms 
that have happened in the sector since 1994. Of particular importance in this section is the 
distinction between the various mechanisms of the 1994 Forest Law such as RFA, community 
and council forests. The last two sections of the chapter are devoted to explaining in greater 
detail the institutional and supporting framework of council forestry. Indeed, while section three 
focuses on the process involved in creating a council forest, section four provides a synopsis of a 
critical donor-supported program to develop council forestry in the country. 
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Overall, the last two sections of the chapter highlight the complexity of the process for 
local councils when attempting to accede to forest ownership as well as the potential rewards 
once the ownership transfer has materialized. 
4.1 ABOUT CAMEROON 
Cameroon is located in the Gulf of Guinea and stretches from western to central Africa over an 
area covering 475,000 square kilometers of which forests occupy 19.6 million hectares of the 
country (Topa et al. 2009, 14).34
Singer 2008, 9
 The country is often called ‘Africa in miniature’ because it is 
believed to represent all of the continent’s geographical formations ( ). Indeed, 48 
percent of all mammals, 54 percent of birds; 30 to 75 percent of reptiles; 25 to 50 percent of 
butterflies residing on the African continent live in Cameroon (Tesi 2000, 148).35
                                                 
34 Geographically, the country can be broadly divided into two zones of flora and fauna (Singer 2008, 10). 
The northern part is of the ‘Sudano-Zambezian’ type with Sahelian, regularly subject to droughts, or savanna-like 
(tall grasses) climates (Singer 2008, 10). The southern part known as the ‘Congo-Guinean’ region “is naturally 
covered in thick forest and is home to a much more humid and less seasonal climate favorable to jungle vegetation 
and fauna” (Singer 2008, 10). What is more, the southern part can be further divided into two zones, the western 
fragmented but high species diversity and endemic-Guinean forest stretching to Sierra Leone and Guinea Conakry, 
and the eastern and southern-Congo Basin larger forests inhabited by large mammals such as elephants, gorillas and 
chimpanzees (Singer 2008, 10. For is part, Victor Le Vine (1971, 30-31) in his description of the Federal Republic 
of Cameroon, which remains applicable to the current Republic of Cameroon, divided the country into five 
geographic zones: 1) the western mountain regions; 2) the ‘very hot and humid’ coastal forest plain; 3) the inland 
forest plateau dominated by the tropical rain forest and less humid than the coastal region; 4) the Adamawa Plateau 
running east-west which is an extension of the mountain region; and finally 5) the northern savannah plain from the 
Adamawa Plateau region to Lake Chad covered with either scrub or grass. 
 The last census 
figures estimate the population at approximately 19.5 million inhabitants with 52 percent living 
35 More specifically, the country is home to a total of 300 mammal species; about 8,000 to 10,000 plant 
species; 849 bird species; 1000 butterfly species (Tesi 2000, 148). 
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in urban areas (Nyuylime 2010).36
 
 The section which follows provides a brief profile of the 
country, including its political and economic history to date. 
 
Map 4.1. Cameroon 
Source: United Nations 
                                                 
36 Four cultural regions can be distinguished in Cameroon (see Singer 2008, 11). First, the Sudano-Sahelian 
region of Muslim pastoralists; second, the West and Northwest grassfields where the Bamiléké and Bamun sacred 
royalties at the head of strong hierarchical societies live; third, the Sawa region stretching from Edea through Buéa 
and the Bakassi Peninsula with various groups living on the coast and having been in contact with Europeans. For 
these groups, the relationship with the sea is their defining trait; finally, the Fang-Beti zone covers the forest-rich 
East, Central and South Regions. The groups inhabiting these regions are primarily from the Bantu group and share 
the same linguistic features. Examples include the Fang, Beti, Bulu, Ntumu, Bakoum, Kako, Maka, and so on. In 
addition, two groups of pygmy the Baka and Bakola inhabit these regions. 
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4.1.1 History and politics 
Little written records exist about the country now called Cameroon until the arrival of the 
Europeans. Yet, as Willibroad Dze-Ngwa remarked “there was no country known as Cameroon 
before the arrival of the early Europeans. The territory was constituted of several well-organized 
autonomous chiefdoms, kingdoms and lamibes whose livelihood depended on their customs and 
traditions” (2009, 4). The name Cameroon only appeared with the arrival of Europeans in Africa. 
Indeed, in 1472 when the Portuguese reached the coast near the Wouri River estuary they gave 
the country the appellation Rio dos Camarões (river of shrimps) (Singer 2008, 20).37
Dze-Ngwa 2009, 4
 Later, 
Cameroon was variously referred to by the Portuguese’s Rios dos Camarões; the Spanish’s 
Camerones; the British’s Cameroons; the Germans’ Kamerun; and finally, the French’s 
Cameroun ( ). 
While the Germans, British and French were trading and battling for the territory, it was 
the Germans who on 14 July 1884 signed a treaty in Douala with King Bell which made 
Cameroon a German protectorate. The act was officially recognized at the 1884-1885 
Kongokonferenz or Berlin Conference (Singer 2008, 21) which set the stage for the ‘scramble for 
Africa’. The period that followed 1884 and thereafter saw in turn the German, the British and the 
French rule over the territory until the country reached independence in the 1960s.38
                                                 
37 Dze-Ngwa reminds us that what the Europeans then called Cameroon only referred to the Wouri River 
estuary or the coastal region (2009, 4). Further, Le Vine (1971, 2) remarks about the Wouri River that “the 
Portuguese named the river Rio dos Camaroes, or River of Prawns, after catching and eating-and mistaking for 
prawns-a variety of crayfish found occasionally in the estuary. The name stuck and subsequently was generally 
applied to the entire coastal area between Mount Cameroon and Rio Muni (formerly Spanish Guinea)”. 
 
38 It is important to note that following Germany defeat in World War I, the French and the British took 
control of the country. While the French inherited the eastern part of the territory, the British Cameroons was made 
up of the Northern and the Southern Cameroons which altogether were later known as Anglophone Cameroon. 
However, when scholars currently talk of Anglophone Cameroon, they just refer to Southern Cameroons which 
voted for reunification with Francophone Cameroon whereas Northern Cameroon joined the Nigerian Federation. 
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Since independence, Cameroon has been ruled by two presidents Amadou Ahidjo (1960-
1982), whose presidency has been called by some as ‘imperial’, under the one-party state and 
Paul Biya who has been running the country following Ahidjo’s resignation on 4 November 
1982.39
see Konings and 
Nyamnjoh 1997
 In 1990, following many protestations throughout the country, multiparty was 
reintroduced in the country -reintroduced because it had existed before- (
). However, owing to various factors, among which the division of the 
opposition and the ruling elite’s reluctance to cede power, the elections that followed in 1992, 
1997, and 2004 saw Biya retaining power amid widespread allegations of fraud and vote rigging 
(see Fonchingong 1998; Takougang 2003; Touo 2009). Overall, the portrait that was painted by 
Cameroonian observers at the end of the 1990s depicted a democratic transition of the early 
1990s gone awry; a picture of a state and its elites in crisis, weakened by domestic as well as 
international assaults for change, but clinging onto power by all means (see Gros 1995). In the 
words of Mehler, the democratic transition in Cameroon did not happen (Mehler 1997).40
This description of the 1990s of Biya and his partisans clinging onto power and using all 
available means to do so still remains applicable today. In fact, eighteen years after the 
reintroduction of multipartism, in 2008, riots erupted, immediately repressed by security forces, 
over rising food prices as well as Biya modification of the two-term constitutional limit paving 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Finally, strictly speaking, after having been a German colony until World War I, Cameroon was never a French or 
British colony, for the country was administered by both powers under mandate of the League of Nations (Singer 
2008, 24) and then United Nations (UN) trusteeship after 1945 (Dze-Ngwa 2009, 4). That meant in theory that 
French and British Cameroons were to be governed differently than the two powers’ colonies. Nevertheless, the 
reality saw the territory governed by the British and the French as their colonies (Singer 2008, 24). Nonetheless, the 
distinction is still worth mentioning. 
39 The exact reasons of the 4 November 1982 resignation are unknown, but it has been speculated that 
Ahidjo was sick and did not want his ‘entourage’ to take charge. Later on, Ahidjo tried to return to power and the 
following years a battle between Biya and Ahidjo went on until April 1984 when a failed coup d’Etat, attributed to 
Ahidjo and his followers, secured Biya’s hold on power (for more see Singer 2008, 31). 
40 The French title of the article being “Cameroon: une transition qui n’a pas eu lieu”. 
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the way for him to run again in the upcoming October 2011 presidential election (see Onohiolo 
2009a). 
In recent years, the country has suffered from a reputation of being among the most 
corrupt places in the world according to Transparency International (see Cerutti, Ingram, and 
Sonwa 2009, 46). That is why, under domestic and international pressures, President Biya 
initiated the Opération Epervier purportedly designed to root out high level corruption in the 
country. Initially heralded, the operation has been lately criticized as an attempt to silence Biya’s 
political opponents, especially on the eve of the 2011 presidential election (see Dalle Ngok 
2010a, 2010b; Dougueli 2010a, 2010b; Jeune Afrique 2010; Soudan 2010). 
Finally, the anti-corruption operation has been happening at the same time that the Biya 
government, following the adoption of the 2004 decentralization laws, has been implementing a 
national program -separate from the sectoral forest management decentralization- of political, 
administrative, and fiscal decentralization. That program is designed to transfer more powers, 
resources and responsibilities to subnational governments, i.e. local councils and regions in the 
following areas: local economic development; environment and natural resources management; 
planning (planification), land use and urbanism (aménagement du territoire, urbanisme) as well 
as housing; health and social development; and finally education, sports and cultural 
development (see Cheka 2007; ROC 2004a).41
                                                 
41 Note that since January 2010 while Cameroon ten provinces have been renamed Regions, the elected 
regional officials supposedly in charge of the executive as well deliberative bodies of the newly ‘created’ regional 
governments have yet to be elected. So far, only centrally appointed Regional Governors who are supposedly in 
charge of administrative supervision of the elected regional governments have been put in place. 
 Although many a local commentator at the time 
criticized the laws for not going far enough, it has been acknowledged by some observers that 
the scope of the powers and responsibilities transferred to subnational governments, especially 
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local councils has been widened (see for instance Azebaze 2004; Nach 2004; Ndoumbé Diwouta 
2004; Soh 2004). 
4.1.2 Economy 
Cameroon economic history since the 1960s can be divided into three phases (see Mandeng 
Ambassa 2009). The first period which went from 1960 to 1988 was characterized by heavy 
involvement of the state through parastatals and the use of planning to direct economic activities 
(see also Konings 2004, 308). The second period from 1988 to 2006 was marked by Structural 
Adjustment Programs (SAPs) following the 1986 economic crisis. Finally, the current period 
starts with the completion point of the Heavily Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) debt reduction 
initiative and reported attempts at jumpstarting the economy (Mandeng Ambassa 2009, 6).42
In reality, the most important year in Cameroon’s recent economic history –and even 
overall recent history- remains 1986, for in the ensuing period the country embarked on a series 
of political, economic, and social changes (
 
see Konings 1996). In effect, what Cameroonians call 
in French la crise saw, as in other African countries, the start of SAPs designed to alter the statist 
emphasis and purportedly return the country to growth through the expansion of private markets 
(Konings 2004, 310). That objective was to face the reluctance of the Biya government to 
implement the provisions of the SAPs to the point where the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
“had signed and canceled three successive stand-by agreements because of the government’s 
failure to achieve the negotiated targets” (Konings 2004, 313). In recent years, GDP growth has 
                                                 
42 The HIPC Initiative, launched in 1996 by the IMF and World Bank, aims to ensure that countries with 
unsustainable debt burden receive relief after achieving two major steps the decision and the completion points. The 
funds saved are designed to be used for social spending. 
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been negative and the trade balance between imports and exports negative as well (Singer 2008, 
12). 
Finally, Cameroon economy today, as in the past, is concentrated around agricultural 
products. While agriculture and livestock represents 44 percent of the national economy, industry 
and services in turn account for 16 and 40 percent (Cerutti, Ingram, and Sonwa, 45). 
Nevertheless, oil remains the primary source of state exports (49.9 percent) with agricultural 
products, cocoa, cotton, and timber representing 6.5 percent (Cerutti, Ingram, and Sonwa 2009, 
45). 
4.2 THE FORESTRY SECTOR 
Although the contribution of the forestry sector to African economies is still modest compared to 
its potential -in 2000 for instance it accounted for 0.16 percent of the total African workforce, 1.5 
percent of GDP, and 2.2 of merchandise exports (Whiteman and Lebedys 2006, 31)- the sector 
remains nonetheless important for these countries, including Cameroon. The following section 
describes the main reforms that have happened in the forestry sector since the passage of the 
1994 Forest Law, the legal basis of decentralized forest management in the country. Of particular 
importance in this section is the distinction between the various mechanisms of the law such as 
the RFA, community and council forests. 
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4.2.1 The Forestry sector in the national economy 
Cameroon’s tropical moist forests primarily lie in the South and East Regions, with the latter 
accounting for more than half of the country’s forests spread over an area of more than 10 
million hectares (see Morrison et al. 2009, 5). Small fragments of forests are also located in the 
Centre, Littoral, West, Southwest, and Northwest Regions, with the Adamaoua, North and 
Extreme-North holding dry forests used as fuel by the local populations (Singer 2008, 15). Of the 
Congo Basin region, Cameroon’s forests occupy 40 percent of the territory or 19.6 million 
hectares providing “about 8 million rural and poor Cameroonians with important nutritional 
complements, traditional medicines, domestic energy, and construction material” (Topa et al. 
2009, 15). 
Of the 19.6 million hectares of Cameroon’s forests, it is estimated that 7.7 million are 
currently designated for production with about 6.8 million hectares allocated for timber 
harvesting (Morrison et al. 2009, 5) –most in the form of Unité Forestière d’Aménagement 
(UFA) or Forest Management Units (FMUs) and Sales of Standing Volume (SSVs).43
Morrison et al. 2009, 5
 Finally, of 
the 5.6 million hectares awarded for timber production almost 70 percent of the concessions have 
approved forest management plans, the highest figure in Central Africa ( ). 
In the national economy, the forestry sector accounts for 20 percent of the total export 
revenues (the second largest category) (Tieguhong 2009, 412), less than 7 percent of GDP and 
about 45,000 direct and indirect jobs (Morrison et al. 2009, 5).44
                                                 
43 Out of the above 6.8 million hectares reserved for timber harvesting, 5.6 million hectares are classified as 
FMUs and 56,000 hectares as SSVs (Morrison et al. 2009, 5). 
 By accounting for around 25 
44 The figures regarding employment in the forestry sector vary depending whether one includes formal or 
informal employment. For instance, the figures from the ministry of forests point out that in 2006, 163,000 people 
worked in the sector, of which 13,000 alone in the industrial sector (see Cerutti, Ingram, and Sonwa, 2009, 46). 
Chupezi for his part estimates that the sector has 33,000 direct jobs (2009, 412). Lastly, Karsenty (2007, 19) put the 
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percent of export revenues, timber has been since 1980 the second largest source of the country’s 
foreign exchange after oil exports (Topa et al. 2009, 13).45
Morrison et al. 2009, 5
 Most of commercial timber 
production is concentrated in three Regions the Centre, South and East where, according to 2001 
estimates, 17 percent or about a little more than 1 million rural inhabitants living in poverty in 
Cameroon reside ( ). Finally, “Cameroon’s forests have an estimated total 
timber stock of 310 million cubic meters, valued at about 2500 billion FCFA” (Tieguhong 2009, 
412). 
However, despite the variety of tree species being available for logging in Cameroon’s 
forests, only a handful of those species are actually being logged. Below, Table 4.1 shows the ten 
most logged species by the formal sector in Cameroon. From the table, it is notable that while the 
ten species collectively account for 81 percent of total production, in practice two species, Ayous 
and Sapelli, dominate local timber production (51 percent), a sign of a selective harvest 
according to the authors of the 2006 audit of the forestry sector (Karsenty et al. 2006, 21). 
Table 4.1. The ten most logged species by Cameroon’s formal forestry sector, 2006 
Species Percentage 
Ayous/obéché 34.84 
Sapelli 16.43 
SUB-TOTAL 51.27 
Tali 6.96 
Azobé/bongossi 5.11 
                                                                                                                                                             
total of formal employment at 13,000 people, but including the informal sector, such as furniture makers, the figure 
could top 150,000 workers. 
45 In the 1970s, timber production totaled less than 1 million cubic meters then rose to 2.5 million in 
1993/94 and more than 3.3 million cubic meters in 1997/98 (Bigombé Logo, Guedje, and Joiris 2005, 169, note 1). 
In 2005, Cameroon’s annual timber production totaled about 2 million cubic meters (Morrison et al. 2009, 5). 
Finally, timber production in the informal sector is estimated to reach about 1 million cubic meters (see Cerutti, 
Ingram and Sonwa 2009, 54). 
83 
Iroko 3.9 
Okan/adoum 3.82 
Fraké/limba 3.77 
Movingui 2.22 
Kossipo/kosipo 1.98 
Padouk (Red) 1.97 
TOTAL 81 
Source: adapted from (Cerutti, Ingram, and Sonwa 2009, 53) 
4.2.2 Forest policies before 1994 
The first legal acts passed regarding forests in Cameroon were done by the Germans in 1900. 
Indeed, Governor von Puttkamer signed two acts protecting forest resources as well legalizing 
timber trade (Singer 2008, 35). In 1922 and 1926 in French Cameroon, the French reinforced 
state control over forests while the British on their side of the territory “took over management of 
many of the forests, but the land remained in the hands of local populations” (Singer 2008, 35). 
In 1946, in French Cameroon, the Cameroon Forestry Service was created and the 3 May 1946 
Decree stated that forests were “vacant land[s] with no master” and timber production was given 
preeminence (Singer 2008, 36). The conflit de langage between indigenous’ customary rights 
over forests and the state purported ownership of forests can be said to have originated around 
these times (see Oyono 2005b). 
The next major change pre-1994 occurred in 1981 when a new forest law was adopted by 
Cameroon’s National Assembly and enacted the following year (see Topa et al. 2009, 21). The 
law “introduced the first production quotas for certain timber species while promoting logging of 
lesser-used species and raised the percentage of timber to be transformed before export from 20 
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to 60 %” (Singer 2008, 36). Notwithstanding these provisions in the 1981 Forest Law, 
conventional logging was privileged; debates about sustainable development and management, 
SFM, decentralization and local communities’ involvement in forests had not yet taken hold. 
Indeed, “between the colonial period and 1994, Cameroon’s legal tenure arrangements placed 
forests under exclusive State ownership and management” (Oyono et al. 2007, 2). The 1990s 
reforms, at least to its proponents, aimed to shift control and management away from the central 
state (see Ekoko 2000). 
4.2.3 Forest policy from 1994 and onwards 
Multiple reasons exist as to why Cameroon undertook to reform its forest law and focus on SFM 
and away from conventional logging. Nevertheless, observers agree that following the 1986 
economic crisis that hit hard the country, the IMF and the World Bank saw the forestry sector as 
an engine of growth that could help the country earn hard currencies and help reimburse its debt 
(Topa et al. 2009, 23). In addition, in line with the international debate about sustainable 
development and environmental stewardship after the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, these IFIs and 
proponents of forest policy reform saw the economic crisis as an opportunity to reorganize 
Cameroon’s forestry sector and conform to the new international consensus about managing 
tropical forests (see Ekoko 2000). 
4.2.3.1 Objectives of the 1990s reforms and main innovations 
According to Topa et al. “the overarching objective of the [forest] reforms was to replace 
chaotic and opaque arrangements for accessing forest resources, which benefited the few, with a 
more organized, transparent, and sustainable system that would benefit greater numbers of 
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people and the environment” (2009, 27).46
see Ekoko 2000
 The 1994 Forest, Wildlife and Fisheries, the 1994 
Forest Law, of 20 January was the first major act of the forest reforms sought by the IFIs in the 
country ( ). 
The draft of the 1994 Forest Law focuses on five key areas (Topa et al. 2009, 22): 
1. The forest estate was divided into two estates the Permanent Forest Estate (PFE) 
or Domaine Forestier Permanent (DFP), and the Non-Permanent Forest Estate 
(NPFE) or Domaine Forestier Non Permanent (DFNP) (see Appendix D). The 
PFE, reserved for the state and local council forests, aimed to cover at least 30 
percent of the country as well as represent the country’s ecological diversity (see 
ROC 1994, Art. 22). Finally, for its part the NPFE, also known as the agroforestry 
zone (Cerutti, Ingram, and Sonwa 2009, 49), was designated as the site of non-
forests activities such as agriculture, community forests and so on (see ROC 1994, 
Art. 20). 
2. A public auctioning system for long term forest harvesting rights based on 
technical and financial criteria was set up. 
3. Forest-related government institutions were to be reorganized to focus on forest 
governance, regulation and control, away from productive activities which were 
transferred to community forests as well as production forest operations. 
4. Forest Management Plans were made obligatory for private timber harvesting 
firms as well as local councils operating in the PFE. Both entities had to develop 
and implement these plans under the monitoring of the forest administration. 
                                                 
46 Oyono et al. (2007, 3) note that the 1994 reforms had three main objectives: (i) to promote community 
participation in forest management; (ii) to contribute to poverty reduction; and (iii) to the sustainable management of 
forest resources. 
86 
5. Finally, community and council forests were established to enable local 
communities as well as councils to benefit from forest resources. 
When the draft law arrived at the National Assembly, important modifications were made 
to these provisions.47
On the whole, for the purpose of this study, apart from the mandatory management plans, 
the 1994 reforms innovated in two ways from the previous 1981 Forest Law. First, it embodied 
the two principles of participatory forest management as well as conservation of forest resources. 
Second, and of more importance here, to achieve both objectives at the local level the law and 
the ensuing administrative regulations created several mechanisms for local councils and 
communities to benefit from the timber revenues and forest resources generally via schemes such 
as community and council forests, and the various revenues sharing taxes.
 Albeit lawmakers’ objection were taken into consideration, the five above 
provisions, though altered in some way, constituted the basis of the 1994 Forest Law as well as 
the new guidelines for sustainable forest management in the country. 
48
see also Karsenty et al. 2006, 
 Among the major 
revenues sharing tax mechanisms instituted following the 1994 law directly relevant to local 
communities and local councils, whereas the Redevance Forestière Annuelle (RFA) or Annual 
Forestry Fee (AFF) was the most significant in terms of revenues (
                                                 
47 A prime example was the auction system which was opposed by lawmakers who argued that indigenous 
firms could not compete with foreign companies, thus the system was attenuated (Ekoko 2000, 145; Topa et al. 
2009, 22-23). 
48 Except for the RFA, the Felling Tax (FT) or Taxe d’abattage; the Sawmill Entry Tax (SET) or Taxe 
d’entrée a l’usine; and the Log Export Tax (LET) or Droits de Sortie sur les grumes stood among the major taxes 
that were created by the law. In 2000/2001, an Export Surtax (Surtaxe a l’exportation) depending on the species 
exported was added on top of the LET (see Oyono, Cerutti, and Steil, 2009, 20). The Felling Tax (FT) is a volume-
based tax that must be paid by all logging companies on the volume (cubic meters) per species declared to the 
administration after harvesting has taken place. The Sawmill Entry Tax (SET) is also a volume-based tax; it must be 
paid, on a per species basis, on logs entering the sawmill; and finally the Log Export Tax (LET) is collected on logs 
leaving the country (see Oyono, Cerutti, and Steil 2009, 20). Finally, it should be noted that these taxes only concern 
the forest sector and on top of them, other taxes such as taxes on corporations, value added, etc… are added (see 
Bindzi and Beramgoto 2008, 14; Karsenty et al. 2006, 47-48). 
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54; Oyono, Cerutti, and Steil 2009, 20), the most famous was the Mille Francs tax (see 
Mendouga Mebenga 2000b).49
4.2.3.2 Community and council forests 
 
Although Section 4.3 below deals in depth with the procedure of acquiring a council 
forest for local councils, the subject of this study, it is important at this stage to highlight the 
main differences between community and council forests. First of all, it is worth mentioning that 
while community forests, and to some extent council forests, were already known around the 
world, in Asia and Latin America notably, both types of forests were still a novelty in the region 
(Singer 2008, 56). To be fair, before 1994, Cameroon 1981 Forest Law and the 1983 
implementing decree provided for the creation of local councils forests (forêts des collectivités 
publiques) (see ROC 1981a, 1981b, 1983a, 1983b). However, for various reasons, the 1981 Law 
and 1983 Decree provisions regarding local councils’ forests were never implemented as seen by 
the fact that until the passage of the 1994 law, no council forests existed in the country.50
                                                 
49 “The RFA is an area-based tax (redevance de superficie). According to the rules set by the 1994 forest 
law, FMUs and SSVs (two of the most important logging titles in regards to volume logged) must be allocated by 
the administration by means of an auction. The bidding price is made up of two  parts: a minimum price set by the 
administration, plus the company’s offer (...) The minimum bidding price in 2007 was at 2,500 FCFAA/ha for SSVs, 
and 1,000 FCFA/ha for FMUs. The total AFF [RFA] due annually is thus the concessionaire’s bidding price times 
the entire surface (in ha) of the allocated FMUs (or SSV)” (Oyono, Cerutti, and Steil 2009, 19). Four objectives 
undergirded the creation of the RFA: (1) make a consistent contribution to the state budget; (2) contribute to poverty 
alleviation; (3) enhance equity in the redistribution of forest-related benefits; and (4) contribute to the sustainable 
management of forests (Oyono, Cerutti, and Steil 2009, 19). For its part, the Mille Francs tax was instituted by the 
ministry of forests in a 22 February 1996 circular letter on SSV. The letter stipulated that for every harvested cubic 
meter of timber, private firms were to pay 1000 CFAF to local communities for the provision of socioeconomic 
amenities (Oyono, Cerutti, and Steil 2009, 20). However, Luc Mendouga Mebenga (2000b) referred to that situation 
as ‘the tragedy of the 1,000 CFAF’ because in his view local communities preferred to receive this transient revenue 
instead of pursuing the long term avenue of obtaining a community forest where revenues would be more stable. 
 
50 For instance, unlike the 1994 Forest Law and the 1995 implementing decree, the 1981 provisions did not 
specify in detail the process of creating and acquiring a council forest for local councils. In addition, whereas in 
1994 council forests were to be part of the local councils’ private estates once gazetted and under their sole self-
management, in the 1981 and 1983 provisions, the forest administration was in charge of almost everything, 
including harvesting, regeneration, and monitoring (see Decree No 83-169 ROC 1983a; 1983b, Art. 16). 
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That having been said, apart from being under the jurisdiction of local villages and local 
councils, the first difference between community and council forests, as noted before, is that the 
while the first one is located inside the NPFE, the other one is part of the PFE where a 
management plan is mandatory in order to engage in forest/timber harvesting.51
see Ezzine de Blas et al. 2009, 447
 In contrast, 
precisely because community forests are located inside the NPFE, local communities only have 
to prepare a Simple Management Plan or Plan Simple de Gestion (PSG) and signed a contract 
with the forest administration which by law must provide them a gratuitous technical assistance 
at their request (see ROC 1994, Section II). Second, whereas a community forest surface area is 
limited to 5,000 hectares ( ), in theory, local councils’ forests 
surface area is not limited by law or administrative regulations, although in practice they range 
from 5,600 to about 42,000 hectares (see Appendix E). 
Finally, and perhaps the most important distinction, while local communities are only 
delegated powers over community forests, for a period of up to twenty-five years, though 
renewable every five years (Poissonnet et al. 2006, 9), council forests, once transferred through 
the gazetting procedure, become part of local councils’ private estate. In reality, of all the 
participatory scheme of the 1994 Forest Law (council and community forests, RFA and 
community-managed hunting zones), “the transfer of rights and powers is effective and 
permanent only in the case of council forests. These powers- the powers to own a council forest, 
to exploit it and to manage the revenue-are discretionary and rely on the principle of 
subsidiarity” (Oyono et al. 2007, 7, emphasis added). 
                                                 
51 Technically, since villages are not recognized as legally recognized entities, for management purposes 
local communities have to come together as associations or any other associational form permitted by law (for more 
on those issues, see Egbe 2001). 
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4.3 COUNCIL FORESTS 
This section describes the process of creating a local council forest in Cameroon. The section is 
organized as follows. Whereas the first subsection starts by defining what is considered a council 
forest in the sense of the 1994 law, the second outlines the legal steps required to create a council 
forest. Finally, the next three subsections provide an overview of the immediate steps required 
for local councils to begin forest harvesting once the legal step of gazetting the forest, which 
results in the transfer of powers, resources and responsibilities, has been completed. The section 
concludes by highlighting the difficulties faced, but also promises of revenues, by local councils 
when attempting to accede to forest ownership. 
4.3.1 What is a council forest? 
Article 30, section 1 of the 1994 Forest Law defines a council forest as “any forest that has been 
subject to a gazetting act for the said council or that has been planted by that council” (ROC 
1994).52
see MINFOF and GTZ 2008, 20
 Thus, from a reading of the law, two primary modes of creating council forests in the 
country can be distinguished. The first mode involves a legal process whereas the central state 
cedes part of its forest estate to a council through the gazetting process. By contrast, the other 
mode involves a local council planting trees on its own land and then asking the central state to 
recognize it as a council forest ( ).53
                                                 
52 Oyono (2004b, 98, italics original) defines a council forest as “a forest classified for use by a local 
government, a commune, or planted by that local government” (his own translation of the same article of the 1994 
Forest Law). 
 
53 The procedure by plantation is slightly different from the one examined here (for more see MINFOF and 
GTZ 2008, 20). 
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In both cases, once a council forest is officially created through the gazetting process, by 
law it is incorporated into the council private estate (domaine privé de la commune) and a land 
title (titre foncier) is delivered to the council to officially symbolize the transfer of ownership 
(ROC 1994,  Art. 30 subsections 2 and 3). 
4.3.2 The gazetting process 
Officially, the gazetting process is the act through which a council forest comes into existence 
and becomes the property of a local council. The forest law states that at the end of the process, a 
gazetting act or decree signed by the prime minister officially sanctions the creation of a council 
forest as well as defines the boundaries, the management objectives, and the user rights of the 
local populations (populations autochtones) (see ROC 1994, Art. 30, subsections 2 and 3). 
Among the various acts issued by the forest administration, the Ministry of Environment 
and Forests’ (MINEF) Decision 1354 remains the organizing document for gazetting all PFE 
forests (MINEF 1999).54
Box 4.1
 The 1999 Decision outlines the six main steps for the gazetting process 
of these forests, with particular emphasis on the imperative and close involvement of local 
populations during the entire process (see  below).55
                                                 
54 To achieve that aim, the decision prescribes the creation in each village of a Forest-Farmer Committee or 
Comité Paysan-Forêt (CPF) to act as the official representative of the local population in any act involving the 
gazetting of PFE forests when a local representative organization of the people does not exist. In addition, the CPF is 
composed of eight villages’ members elected for three years renewable. The members are the village chief, a 
representative of the village development committee, one representative for the internal and another for the external 
elites, two members representing women and one for the farmers (planteurs), and finally, one for young people (see 
MINEF 1999, 3-4). 
 
55 These steps only apply to council forests being created through the gazetting process. For those being 
created by plantations, the steps only include five and six on top of other requirements not discussed here (for more, 
see MINFOF and GTZ 2008, 20-21). In truth, the process of gazetting a forest involves various central, regional as 
well as local actors. However, in the gazetting process, the ministry of forest’s Forest Directorate and its local and 
regional offshoots in tandem with the said local council are responsible for handling it as well as preparing the 
gazetting draft decree (MINFOF and GTZ 2008, 6). 
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Finally, as some local observers have observed, in spite of the precaution taken to involve 
all affected parties, the process of gazetting is a complex, lengthy and costly endeavor, with total 
costs as high as 200 million CFAF (see Appendix E), which can take some time to bear fruit, 
especially when it involves poor local rural councils (see Delvienne et al. 2009).56
                                                 
56 Appendix E at the end provides an example about the costs involved in gazetting a council forest. At this 
stage, suffice to say that in-between steps one (1) and six (6) in Box 4.1 above, local councils have to spend between 
3 and 7 million CFAF, a significant amount for most rural councils which for the most part lack adequate revenues. 
The costs of creating a council forest are even more significant if a local council has to acquire the land title. Indeed, 
as the table in Appendix E.1 suggests for a council forest of the size of the FCD (16,240 hectares) the total costs 
could almost top 200 million CFAF. 
 
Box 4.1. Gazetting process steps for the PFE forests 
 
1. The first step involves the preparation of the preliminary information technical memorandum 
(note technique préliminaire d’information). Through this memorandum, the council officially 
announces its intention to submit a request for the creation of a council forest. 
2. The second step involves a public notice (avis au public) to the council inhabitants stating that 
the council intends to acquire and gazette a portion of the neighboring forest. The goal of this 30 to 
90 days period, depending on whether the planned council forest is within or without the official 
zoning plan, is to gather people’s opinions as well as objections. 
3. Thirdly and fourthly respectively, information campaigns for local deconcentrated authorities 
(such as prefects, and forest administration representatives) as well as local elites (sensibilisation 
des autorités administratives et des elites locales), and local populations (sensibilisation des 
populations) are held. 
4. Fifth, a local gazetting commission (travaux de la commission de classement) chaired by the 
prefect meets to approve or not the council forest project at the local level. The commission is also 
competent to receive or dismiss the objections of the local villagers affected by the project as well 
as assess the value of monetary compensations related to expropriation (see MINFOF and GTZ 
2008, 15). 
5. Finally, the forest administration prepares the official documents to submit to the prime 
minister’s office for the signature of the gazetting decree (preparation des textes a soumettre au 
premier ministre pour signature de l’arrêté). 
 
Source: (MINEF 1999; MINFOF and GTZ 2008) 
1 Note that the commission is chaired by the local prefect or his/her representative and composed of 
local representatives of the forest, tourism, land (domaines), environment, livestock, agriculture, 
mining, aménagement du territoire ministries, the local députés, the mayor (s) or his/her 
representative, and finally the traditional local authorities. Finally, in spite of the fact that the 
commission will have to decide on their objections to the project, nowhere is mentioned at the all-
important session of the local gazetting commission the presence of a representative of the local 
populations (for more, see MINFOF and GTZ 2008, 15-16). 
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4.3.3 The management inventory and the council forest management plan 
By law, council forests have to be managed according to a management plan approved by the 
forest administration (MINFOF and GTZ 2008, 25). In fact, the law states that “every activity 
inside a council forest must, in all cases, be performed according to its management plan” (ROC 
1994, Art. 31, 2). In order to establish the management plan, two operations are required. The 
first one is a management inventory or “the general inventory of the forest area” (FAO 2003, 16) 
to determine the composition of the forest (available tree species, wildlife, NTFPs, etc…).57 The 
second operation involves conducting a socioeconomic survey of the local population and its 
milieu to provide the information about local customs as well as utilization of the forest. Once 
both operations have been conducted, the information collected helps establish the management 
plan (see Appendix E) as well as assign the management objectives, mostly timber production in 
a ‘sustainable’ manner for council forests (SFM).58
                                                 
57 By law, there are two kinds of inventory that timber harvesters in the country need to conduct: the 
management and the harvest inventories. Generally, the inventory regards all trees species with diameters above 
twenty centimeters (MINFOF and GTZ 2008, 24). The management inventory is done at a rate of 1 percent and is 
performed to obtain an overview of the potential of a given forest. This inventory forms the basis of the 
establishment of the management plan. In contrast, the harvest inventory (inventaire d’exploitation) is conducted at 
a rate of 100 percent and concerns the trees to be harvested during a given year (see MINFOF and GTZ 2008, 24). 
Overall, the cost of conducting the management inventory and producing the management plan is significant, 
ranging from 1,200 to 2,500 CFAF per hectare (CRADEL 2007, 105). 
 
58 Officially, the management plan is submitted by a local council to a sub-commission of the forest 
administration that analyzes the document, and then to a commission composed of various ministries which gives its 
recommendation. Finally, the minister in charge of forests gives the final approval for the management plan to enter 
into effect (see MINFOF and GTZ 2008, 25). Because the management plan is established for the long term, 30 
years in Cameroon though revisable every five years, it needs to be translated into operational documents for the 
scheduled management objectives to be implemented. That is why, two other documents need to be produced to help 
implement the management plan (for more, see Appendix E). Whereas the first document is the medium-term 
management plan or the Five Years Plan (Plan Quinquennal de Gestion) as it is known in Cameroon, the second is 
the Annual Plan of Operation or Coupe (Plan Annuel d’Opérations), sometimes referred to as the Operational Plan. 
That document is important because it constitutes the roadmap for annual timber harvesting. In fact, it is the step 
“through which the management plan is programmed, implemented and monitored annually. This is the tool for the 
everyday management of harvesting, with all interventions recorded in the forest register” (FAO 2003, 14). 
Moreover about the Annual Operation Plan, it is “the last and most immediate level (1-2 years) of operational 
planning in the sustainable management of a forest area or concession. This is the phase that involves the planning, 
design and implementation of all RIL harvesting activities. However, this plan and its operations can only be 
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By law once the forest is gazetted and transferred to a council private estate, the council 
is responsible for the implementation of the management plan under the monitoring and control 
(suivi et contrôle) of the forest administration which  “can suspend the implementation of acts 
contrary to the provisions of the management plan” (ROC 1994, Art. 32, 1, emphasis added). In 
addition, “in case of failure or negligence from the council, the administration in charge of 
forests can substitute itself to the council to perform, at the said council expenses, selected 
operations scheduled in the management plan” (ROC 1994, Art. 32, 2).59
4.3.4 The Environmental Impact Survey 
 
Cameroon’s 1996 Law regarding the Environment stipulates that all economic activities which 
have an impact on the environment are subject to an environmental audit (ROC 1996, Art. 17) to 
determine whether a project has a positive or negative impact on the environment (ROC 2005, 
Art. 2). In 2004, MINEF, created in 1992, was separated into two entities the Ministry of Forests 
and Wildlife (MINFOF) and the Ministry of Environment and Protection of Nature (MINEP) 
(see Cerutti, Ingram, and Sonwa 2009, 50). A year after, the Prime minister and MINEP issued 
                                                                                                                                                             
successful if the sustainable management of the forest area has been rationally pre-determined by the concession 
holder or logging company, eschewing a predatory approach and opting for entrepreneurial behavior that is more 
respectful of the ecosystem and of the social and economic environment of the forest” (FAO 2003, 14). 
59 Further, the 1995 implementing decree added that “the implementation of a council forest management 
plan, officially approved by the minister in charge of forests, is the duty of the said council which makes sure that it 
has the appropriate qualified personnel” (ROC 1995, Art. 48, emphasis added). Finally, Article 80, 3 (emphasis 
added) of the same decree pointed out that “the administration in charge of forests can suspend at any time any 
activity contrary to the provisions of the management plan of the said council, after an official warning went 
unheeded for 15 days from the date the warning was issued”. Beyond the 1994 Forest Law and the 1995 
implementing decree, other documents from the forest administration explicit the ministry’s role in forest law 
enforcement. For instance Arrêté 0222 gives the forest administration authority over such matters as: the verification 
of AAC boundaries as well as the council adherence to the harvesting of one AAC at the time; the respect of the 
MHD and MMD; the implementation of reforestation activities; the use of RIL techniques as well as the 
construction of infrastructures designed to mitigate environmental damages and finally, the protection of wildlife to 
name a few (for more see MINEF 2001, especially Art. 53). 
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both a Decree and an Arrêté prescribing the types of environmental survey needed by all 
economic actors in order to start their activities (see MINEP 2005; ROC 2005).60 Two types of 
surveys are prescribed the Simple Environmental Impact (Etude d’Impact Environmental 
Sommaire) and the Detailed Environmental Impact (Etude d’Impact Environmental Detaillée) or 
(EIE). Only the first one applies to council forests, or community forests for that matter.61
Finally, following the gazetting process concluded by the signing of the official transfer 
of powers and ownership decree, the forest inventory and the establishment of the management 
plan as well as the completion of the EIE, a council forest is now set to be harvested. 
 
4.3.5 The start of timber harvesting and the modes of operation 
First of all, in spite of the fact that council forests can, in theory, be designated for other purposes 
such as recreation, ecotourism, hunting and other activities (see for instance Kamdem 2006, 14), 
the reality is that local councils which seek the creation of a council forest remain primarily 
motivated by the promise of timber revenues as the examples of the four pioneer council forests -
Dimako, Gari Gombo, Moloundou and Yokadouma- show (see Om Bilong et al. 2009).62
                                                 
60 Article 21 of Decree 2005/0577 granted to already operating firms thirty six (36) months from the date of 
the signature of the decree, thus until February 2008, to comply with the requirements of the decree (see ROC 
2005). 
 In 
order to annually harvest timber, all timber harvesters in the country have to obtain a permit from 
61 After completion of the EIE, an Environmental Management Plan or Plan de Gestion Environnemental 
(PGE) is established. The plan outlines the steps that a council shall take to mitigate the damages to the environment 
during forest operations (MINFOF and GTZ 2008, 29). Similar to the management plan monitoring provision, the 
administration in charge of the environment, or a private contractor under its request, is charged with ensuring the 
implementation of the PGE (ROC 2005, Art 18-20). To conduct a simple EIE, a council must pay respectively 2 
million CFAF for the study terms of reference as well as 3 million CFAF for the application fees (CRADEL 2007, 
105). Moreover, once the terms of references approved, a council has to spend between an additional 1,000 to 1,500 
CFAF per hectare for the conduct of the actual EIE (CRADEL 2007, 105). 
62 Kamdem (2006, 14) observes that council forests can either focus on timber harvesting; fuelwood; or 
NTFPs.   
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the forest administration known as Permis Annuel d’Opérations or the Annual Permit of 
Operations (PAO).63
Officially, four modes of operation exist. Whereas the first major mode called the self-
management regime (en régie) involves a local council self-harvesting its council forest, the 
second through a Sales of Standing Volume (SSV) sees a local council ceding the rights of 
harvest to a third-party, usually a private commercial firm, against the payment of royalties.
 After receiving the PAO, a local council is now set to officially log its 
forest and start benefiting from the forest resources and revenues. 
64
MINFOF and GTZ 2008, 31
 
Finally, the other two remaining options include the issuance of an harvesting permit (permis 
d’exploitation) to a private commercial firm for no more than 500 cubic meters as well as the 
granting of a private authorization to log the council forest (autorisation personnelle de coupe) 
for up to 30 cubic meters to a private commercial firm ( ).65
Of all the council forests currently being harvested, Dimako’s is the only one officially to 
be under the self-management regime, though the evidence presented below shall dispute that 
assertion. In the same way, disagreements exist concerning the case of Yokadouma, Gari-Gombo 
 
                                                 
63 Essentially, this involves producing the Annual Plan of Operation or Coupe and submitting it along with 
other documents to the forest administration for official approval. Of utmost importance in prelude to actual forest 
harvesting two operations, the demarcation as well as the conduct of a harvest inventory of the Annual Allowable 
Cut (AAC), that is the area to be annually logged, are required (see MINFOF and GTZ 2008, 30).63 The harvest 
inventory usually conducted a year or two prior to the actual harvest, is especially critical, for it shall determine the 
official number of trees as well as the volume of timber to be harvested for a given year (see MINFOF and GTZ 
2008, 24; and also FAO 2003, 25). 
64 The self-management regime means that the council itself is the one harvesting timber in the forest. 
Typically, this involves a council buying or renting equipment as well as employing its own staff, as it appears to be 
the case with Dimako Council. In this case, the council is both the harvester and the seller. Councils choose this 
mode because, in theory, it allows them to benefit from all the timber revenues without the costs attached to a 
middleman. By contrast, in the SSV mode, which involves a middleman, the council’s role is to monitor the firm as 
to ensure that forest management activities proceed in accordance with the management plan provisions. 
65 As can be seen, of all the four modes of operations, only the first two involves the harvest of significant 
quantities of timber and are thus the preferred modes of operations of council forests. Equally important, a 
comparison of the tax burden between the two major modes of harvesting (see Appendix E) indicates that the self-
management regime affords local councils less burden in terms of tax purposes, although in practice because of the 
underdevelopment of council forestry regulations (see section 6.3.3) as well as the vide juridique (legal vacuum) 
which characterized it, local councils have been exempted of the payment of these taxes as forest administration 
officials have acknowledged (Bindzi and Beramgoto 2008, 15). 
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and Moloundou Council Forests as to under which modes of operations or even whether those 
forests are harvested according to the existing modes. As an illustration, it has been argued that 
the Moloundou Council Forest is being harvested outside the four above mentioned types 
(Bindzi and Beramgoto 2008, 13). That confusion about the harvesting regime, and more 
generally the confusion surrounding council forestry, as the section below shall illustrate, has 
meant that problems have surfaced in the overall management of council forests (see also the 
report by Om Bilong et al. 2009). 
4.3.6 A complex reality 
Delvienne et al. (2009, 5) observe that “a council gazetting process can require more than the 
length of an elective term to succeed, and that does not motivate elected officials to get involved. 
The gazetting process is difficult and takes time to get completed given the human resources that 
it requires, the will to get the process finished, and the participation costs that councils have to 
bear”. Numerous examples abound about the predicaments of local councils on the road to 
council forestry. 
As it was shown throughout this chapter, the process of creating council forests in 
Cameroon is littered with obstacles from the moment local councils engage in the process (see 
Ntiga 2010). From the gazetting process, the management plan, the EIE, to the start of forest 
activities, local councils are not guaranteed that a council forest is going to get created. As an 
illustration, the East Region’s Salapoumbé Council started the gazetting process in April 2004 
(Delvienne et al. 2009, 3), and 6 years after the council had yet to receive the gazetting decree 
signed by the prime minister (see Appendix E.6, the council being in the column “waiting 
gazetting decree and management plans in progress”). Additionally, once a council has 
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completed all the legal steps regarding the creation of the council forest, in order to start 
harvesting timber, it still has to go through other official and unofficial steps. These steps, it has 
been noted, put local councils at a disadvantage compared to private commercial firms for 
instance, most accustomed to navigating the forest administration’s corridors (CRADEL 2007, 
106). 
The question can be raised as to the utility of the council forestry steps outline above, 
especially in light of the fact that, as mentioned above, some of these provisions are not 
completely enforced, if enforced at all. To take an illustration, while the law requires local 
councils to obtain a land title after the gazetting process, the actual practice has been that these 
councils have started their operations inside the forests before completing that step (CRADEL 
2007, 104). In effect, because of the costs involved, for instance for a forest of 16,000 hectares it 
costs about 190 million CFAF (see Appendix E) as well as the forest administration disregard of 
that requirement before engaging in timber harvesting, the incentive to acquire the title is low for 
councils as judged by the fact that no local councils among the council forests currently 
operating has acquired the document (personal communication from a forest administration 
official). In the same way, notwithstanding council forestry environmental provisions, the reality 
is that of all the five council forests being harvested today, none has completed the entire process 
since in practice the EIE provision has also not been fully enforced. Indeed, Dimako Council’s 
terms of reference for the survey were only approved by MINEP in October 2009 (MINEP 
2009), although the forest has been harvested since March 2004. 
However, with the gazetting process, the critical issue is whether all these steps are even 
warranted in the first place. To take the case of the land title mentioned above, during the days of 
Forêts et Terroirs (see section 5.7.2), Maurice Kamto (2000), a well-respected Cameroonian 
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legal scholar, suggested that the central state symbolically forfeits the costs of the land title for 
local councils. His argument was that the gazetting process in itself already constituted a sort of 
title because it sets aside a portion of the forest estate for a council, therefore making it 
unavailable for any other use. That position has prompted the Mayor of Dimako in the past, and 
now as president of ACFCAM, to ask for the suppression of the fees associated with the 
establishment of the title (Mongui Sossomba 2001b, 2009). 
Nonetheless, in spite of all those obstacles on the way to forest ownership, because of the 
significant financial resources involved, and today the support of the PAF2C (see below), more 
and more local councils are willing to take their chance at acquiring a council forest. Indeed, the 
motivation is amplified by the fact that once gazetted, the forest is under the sole management of 
a local council and as the law states 100 percent of the forest products obtained through its 
harvesting, hence all revenues, belong to the council (see ROC 1994, Art. 32, 3). Once the 
provisions of the law were known, the issue was not whether local councils wanted to acquire a 
council forest; rather it was how. The answer came when in 2006 local mayors came together 
and decided that the process needed to advance more rapidly. Thus, was launched a program to 
advance council forestry in the country. The last section of this chapter describes that effort. 
4.4 THE PROGRAMME D’APPUI AUX FORETS COMMUNALES DU CAMEROUN 
In the first place, as mentioned in the introduction to this dissertation, local observers have 
advanced various arguments to account for the lack of implementation of the council forestry 
provisions of the 1994 Forest Law in comparison to those of community forests and the RFA for 
instance (see Bigombé Logo 2006; FNCOFOR, ONF International, and ACFCAM 2007, 4; 
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Nguenang et al. 2007). Those reasons coupled with the lengthy process of creating a council 
forest as well as obtaining a harvesting permit meant that until 2007, thirteen years after the 
adoption of the 1994 law, only four council forests were officially created and operating.66
The following section describes the situation of council forests since the start of the 
Programme d’Appui aux Forêts Communales du Cameroun or the Support Program for Council 
Forests of Cameroon -known locally as the PAF2C- the main organization, and institutional 
support, promoting council forestry in the country. The main contribution of this final section of 
the chapter is to show the growing role that ACFCAM and the PAF2C are playing in council 
forestry in the country, especially in light of the fact that the main actor at the center of this 
study, the Mayor of Dimako, is also at the helm of the association. 
 It is 
only since 2007 that local councils have started, with donors’ assistance, to take advantage of the 
forest law provisions directed at council forests. 
4.4.1 The Association des Communes Forestières du Cameroun 
Before the creation of the Association des Communes Forestières du Cameroun or the 
Association of Forest Councils of Cameroon (ACFCAM), local councils of the forest regions had 
                                                 
66 Before the PAF2C, Cameroon Southern Zoning Plan had set aside more than a dozen of forest sections in 
the PFE to be transferred to fifteen local councils in order to create council forests (MINFOF and GTZ 2008, 4). In 
spite of that, when the PAF2C was launched in 2007, only six forests had been officially created in Dimako, Gari-
Gombo, Yokadouma, Moloundou, Djoum and Messondo (FNCOFOR, ONF International, and ACFCAM 2007, 6 
and 9). It is worth mentioning that there is a minor conflict over the exact number of sections of the forest that were 
set aside. For instance, the above document talks about fifteen (15) while another one talks about fourteen (14) (see 
FNCOFOR, ONF International, and ACFCAM 2007, 6). In effect, that last document states that the Decree No 
95/678/PM regarding Southern Cameroon Zoning Plan set aside fourteen (14) council forests over a total area of 
364,000 hectares or 4.5 percent of the PFE in the East, Centre and South Regions, then provinces, the council 
forests’ areas involved vary from 14,000 to 45,000 hectares (see FNCOFOR, ONF International, and ACFCAM 
2007, 6). In any case, the difference is minor as to constitute an issue; but for consistency purposes it had to be 
pointed out. 
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no association to lobby and represent their interests at the central state level.67
Nankam 2009b, 10
 The situation 
changed in 2003 when twenty-one Cameroonian mayors present at the France-Cameroon 
Decentralized Cooperation Congress came together to launch ACFCAM with the support of the 
National Federation of Forest Councils of France (FNCOFOR) ( ). ACFCAM' 
immediate significance was demonstrated four years later, in 2007, when following negotiation 
with the French and German cooperations, the proposal for the creation of the PAF2C was 
officially approved (Nankam 2009b, 10).68
4.4.2 The PAF2C 
 
The PAF2C main objective is to “contribute to the sustainable management of the forest heritage 
of the country as well as to the improvement of the standard of living of rural people” 
(FNCOFOR, ONF International, and ACFCAM 2007, 3). The ultimate goal of the program is to 
create fifty (50) council forests over a surface area of 1.3 million hectares, reforest 3,000 hectares 
of forests as well as enrich 1,000 hectares of natural forests currently being harvested (Beligné 
2009, 4).69
                                                 
67 Although a local councils’ association Communes et Villes et Unies du Cameroun (CVUC) or 
 The four year 17.2 million USD program covers the period 2008-2012 and is 
United 
Councils and Cities of Cameroon (UCCC) exists to represent the country’s local councils, no association specifically 
targeted at local councils of the forest regions existed. UCCC is the result of the merger of two local councils’ 
associations in 2003 the Association des Communes et Villes du Cameroun (ACVC) and the Union des Villes et 
Communes du Cameroun (UCVC). 
68 The First Council Forestry Conference (assises) was only held in May 2006 (Nguenang et al. 2007, 1). In 
spite of having been created in 2003, the association was only legally recognized by the central state in 2006 
(Nankam 2009b, 10). At the same time that ACFCAM was launching its activities, in July 2006, with the support of 
the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) and GTZ, a project to promote SFM and forest certification in council forests 
was also being launched (see Nguenang et al. 2007, 1). 
69 The program is directed at ACFCAM members which as of November 2009 numbered eighty local 
councils (CTFC 2010b, 14). To qualify as a Forest Council and thus ACFCAM membership, a local council has to 
either already own a council forest, submitted, or intend to submit an official request to the forest administration, or 
planted its own forest.  Finally, the PAF2C noted that among the country’s 340 local councils, up to 160 are 
potentially eligible to accede to forest ownership over a total area of 3.9 million hectares (see FNCOFOR, ONF 
International, and ACFCAM 2007, 9). 
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principally financed by the French Global Environment Facility (FFEM) as well as the Germans’ 
Technical cooperation (GTZ) and Development Agency (DED) (see ACFCAM and FFEM 2007, 
71).70
The program area of intervention revolves around the six following themes (
 
Beligné 
2009, 4): institutional and technical assistance to forest councils as well as the forest 
administration for the creation of council forests; forest management, reforestation 
(reboisement), enrichment (enrichissement) and sustainable management of council forests; local 
promotion of council forests’ products; development of local development strategies; protection 
or restoration of biodiversity as well as fight against global climate change; and finally, help for 
the consolidation of the CTFC (see below) as well as local councils’ technical units in charge of 
council forestry.71
Lastly, 
 
Table 4.2 below shows council forestry figures since the start of the PAF2C. 
While the table reveals that the program has yet to achieve the 1.3 million hectares of council 
forests target, it also discloses that under the PAF2C, council forestry has been on the rise. In 
fact, the area where the program appears to have achieved significant results is on the number of 
council forests in process of being gazetted, which went from three before the PAF2C to twenty 
nine. 
                                                 
70 1 Euro for 1.43 USD. The amounts in CFAF and Euros are respectively 8.5 billion and 12.9 million. To 
this total amount, FFEM and the GTZ are said to respectively bring 1.3 and 3 million Euros on the table. Among the 
rest of the financial support, ACFCAM members are supposed to contribute 1.1 million Euros; the Pro-PSFE or 
FESP (Forest Sector Environment Program) and the National Program for Participatory Development (PNDP) 
respectively 2.9 million and 1.05 million Euros. Finally, thanks to the decentralized cooperation, French and 
German local governments are said to contribute 760,000 Euros to the program (FNCOFOR, ONF International, and 
ACFCAM. 2007, 23). DED assists the program by providing two technical assistants (ACFCAM and FFEM 2007, 
62). Finally, in January 2011, the German government merged GTZ, DED and Inwent into the Gesellschaft für 
Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), the new development agency. 
71 The PAF2C has four primary target areas: the East, the Centre, the West and the Great North. Depending 
on the area and the state of the forests, the specific goals range from the promotion and implementation of SFM 
(East Region), enrichment in degraded forests (Centre Region), to reforestation in humid and dry savannas (West 
and Great North Regions) (see Beligné 2009, 4). 
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Table 4.2. PAF2C activities as of August 2010 
Activities Pre-PAF2C Under PAF2C 2011 target % achieved 
Council forests (FCs) gazetted (1) 06 07 29 24 
FCs being gazetted (2) (3) 03 22 29 76 
FCs having an officially approved management 
plan (4) 
04 05 19 26 
Surface area of FCs under an officially approved 
management pan (in ha) (4) 
109,887 125,557 490,727 26 
FCs to be under an officially approved  
management pan (5) (6) 
02 11 19 57 
Surface area of FCs to be under an officially 
approved management plan, (in ha) (6) (7) 
32,134 279,006 490,727 57 
Reforested Area  by CTFC and donors, in ha 
(reboisée) 
0 6,500 1,000 650 
Source: Reproduced from (CTFC 2010b, 15) 
ha: hectares 
(1) Gazetting decree signed by the Prime Minister and approved by the Presidency 
(2) Does not include line (1) 
(3) Includes from the moment the technical file has been written and submitted to MINFOF 
(4) Forest Management Arrêté signed 
(5) Does not include line (3) 
(6) Beginning with first technical step (inventory, cartography, socioeconomic study, EIE,…) 
(7) Does not include line (4) 
4.4.3 The Technical Center on Council Forestry 
The Technical Center on Council Forestry or Centre Technique de la Forêt Communale (CTFC) 
was officially launched in July 2008 to support the PAF2C (Nankam 2009a, 4). The Center also 
known as the Maison des Communes Forestières is the implementing agency of the PAF2C 
program as well as act on behalf of ACFCAM members in all forest-related matters. Its main 
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role is to help local councils achieve the objectives of the PAF2C.72
see FNCOFOR, 
ONF International, and ACFCAM 2007, 16
 The CTFC various activities 
primarily revolves around the promotion of SFM (conducting forest inventories, ecological and 
fauna diagnostic; socioeconomic surveys; EIE) as well as the training of local councils and the 
technical units in charge of council forests, and timber processing among others (
). 
On the whole, despite its main focus on technical assistance for SFM, the center has also 
been involved in various tasks from support to health and HIV-AIDS, promoting local ‘good’ 
governance, to the creation of local councils’ development plan (PDC).73
Last but not least, since the PAF2C and the creation of the CTFC, various agreements 
have been signed to help promote council forestry in the country (see Appendix E for a more 
detailed overview of the PAF2C impact on council forestry). As an illustration, to help accelerate 
the gazetting process as well as the approval of management plans by the forest administration, a 
council forestry focal point (point focal foresterie communale) was created in 2008 for the sole 
purpose of handling council forests requests where previously no office existed (
 This is the case 
because many in the Center have argued that forest governance is related to local ‘good’ 
governance, and thus the agency needs to broaden its focus to be effective. 
MINFOF and 
GTZ 2008, 4). In the same way, another significant agreement was later signed in 2010 between 
ACFCAM and the Special Council Support Fund for Mutual Assistance or FEICOM as it is 
                                                 
72 In order to accomplish those goals, the CTFC has four regional offices, Bertoua for the East, Yaoundé for 
the Centre-South, Foumban in the West, and finally Buéa in the South-West (FNCOFOR International and 
ACFCAM 2007, 18). Only, the Centre-South and East offices are fully functional (see ACFCAM and CTFC 2010, 
8). 
73 Because of the financial resources involved in forestry, CTFC wide ranging attributions have not gone 
well with other actors involved. It was reported for instance that MINFOF officials have suspiciously looked at 
CTFC intent to centralize the establishment of the management plan, which is a very lucrative activity for 
contractor, as an attempt to dominate the process, and thus threaten MINFOF interests. An agreement between the 
ministry and ACFCAM to enhance cooperation was signed in 2010, but it remains to be seen whether that will sooth 
these emerging tensions. On the other hand, regardless of these tensions, there still remains a risk of CTFC 
overstretching because of its broader focus on local governance than ‘pure’ forest management. 
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locally known (see FEICOM and ACFCAM 2010). The agreement shall for instance allow 
FEICOM to provide grants to local councils to help offset the costs of the establishment of 
management plans.74
for more on FEICOM role, see MINATD 2008, 140
 The agreement, if it yields fruit, has the potential to substantially advance 
council forestry and transform the landscape in the country given FEICOM’s enormous 
resources ( ). FEICOM is also important for 
this study insofar as the Mayor of Dimako sits on its board and, as the study shall argue in 
Chapter 7.0, has utilized FEICOM local achievements to further his own political agenda. 
4.5 SUMMARY 
This chapter previewed the institutional framework -mainly organizational, legal, and regulatory- 
of forest management decentralization and SFM in Cameroon. The chapter began with a brief 
profile of Cameroon history, politics and economy. The chapter then situated the importance of 
the country’s forestry sector in the national economy as well as provided the context of the 1990s 
reforms. Finally, the chapter described in detail the process of creating a council forest in 
Cameroon as well as the major actor, that is the PAF2C, involved in promoting council forestry. 
The following chapter now turns to the East Region as well as the Dimako Council and the FCD, 
the object of this study. 
                                                 
74 The agency was established in 1977 and focuses around five primary activities: provide local councils 
with cash advances as well as solidarity contributions; finance local investment; centralize and redistribute Centimes 
Additionnels Communaux (CACs) or council additional taxes; cover the costs of council personnel training; and 
finally, acts as the financial intermediary for donors involved in local governance (see MINATD 2008, 140). 
FEICOM resources come primarily from portion of local councils’ taxes that are then redistributed especially the 
CACs, or used to finance local councils’ projects (see MINATD 2008, 140). In practice, for anyone working in local 
government financial assistance, FEICOM is the major actor which saw its status and role reinforced in 2009 with 
the addition to its portfolio of responsibilities over the distribution of RFA funds under the new equalization system 
mentioned above. 
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5.0  THE DIMAKO COUNCIL AND THE COUNCIL FOREST 
 
Figure 5.1. A view of downtown Dimako, March 2010 
Source: author 
 
The goal of this chapter is to describe Dimako Council political, economic and social 
organization as well as the Dimako Council Forest project. The first section of the chapter 
provides an overview of the Dimako Council local organization then through a presentation of 
both the API-Dimako and Forêts et Terroirs projects, the forerunners of the FCD, the chapter 
traces the origin of the creation of the FCD. In the same section, a subsection is devoted to 
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presenting the main characteristics of the two management plans of the FCD as well as the local 
organizations and the institutional arrangements that were purportedly put in place to help ensure 
the success of the forest management decentralization in Dimako. Overall, Chapter 5.0 is 
significant because it sets the stage for the next three chapters which constitute the main 
evidence of the thesis being advanced in this study. 
5.1 PRIOR HISTORY BEFORE THE CREATION OF THE COUNCIL 
Next to nothing is known about the history of Dimako before the arrival of SFID in the then-
villages that now constitute the entire local council. According to a council document, Bakoum 
and Pol people settled in the Dimako area before the First World War, fleeing from the North the 
invasion of the Peul conqueror Adama (CRDKO 2003b, 6). What is more, the same document 
notes that the area known today as Dimako Council was at the turn of the nineteenth century a 
settlement for rubber transporters on the way to the German Fort of Doumé (CRDKO 2003b, 7). 
It is only after the First World War that a group of families from the Ngolambélé chieftaincy 
decided to settle in the actual site of Dimako, which was then known as Kpwengué (CRDKO 
2003b, 7). 
The name ‘Dimako’ is said to have appeared around 1947 when thanks to the installation 
of the two Frenchmen Saubatte and Gerberon, SFID’s forerunner, workers from the neighboring 
Kadey division recruited by both Frenchmen named the town in remembrance of their native 
village (CRDKO 2003b, 7). Local accounts report that initially the Frenchmen had planned to 
establish their factory in the adjacent Doumé town, but local villagers refused. On the contrary, 
in Dimako, then administratively subordinated to Doumé, chief André Bangda, who reigned over 
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a thirty years period, agreed to let Saubatte and Gerberon installed their sawmill there, and thus 
became the facilitator of forest harvesting in the area (see CRDKO 2003b, 8).75
5.2 POPULATION 
 
Dimako Council is primarily inhabited by native Bakoum and Pol people from the Bantu group, 
and Baka pygmies people (Mekok Balara 2001a, 12-13). Bakoum people represent the majority 
group in the council followed by the Pol and then the Baka (see CDKO 2006b, 14-15). In 1992, 
the council population was estimated at 14,176 inhabitants divided into 2905 households -with 
an average size of about 6 people- spread alongside the three main road axes Dimako-Bertoua, 
Dimako-Mbang and Dimako-Kagnol (Mendouga Mebenga 2000a, 5-6).76 Beyond that period, 
population figures are conflicting and vary depending on the source.77
                                                 
75 Another council document relates the same story but notes that the event happened around 1800. 
Furthermore, the document also notes that chief Bangda facilitated the installation of the two Frenchmen in order to 
alleviate rising tensions between Bakoum, Pol, and Kaka people (see CDKO 2010c, 15). Later, to thank him, it is 
reported, the company built his Kpwengué’s compound –visible in downtown Dimako- as well as provided him with 
several facilities. Kpwengué today is the official residence of the current superior chief (chef supérieur) as well as 
Dimako Council’s second deputy mayor André Bangda junior, the great grandson of André Bangda. Incidentally, in 
town it is said that the Kpwengué quarter is among the quarters where some of the most vocal critics of the mayor 
live. More generally, with the advent of timber harvesting in Dimako, the town’s path to the status of a local council 
can be dated around those times. Indeed, local narratives report that to operate at ease the timber company needed 
state security protection and a Gendarmerie post, a kind of military police, was created and in 1955 the town of 
Dimako given the status of district, at the time the lowest administrative level. Finally, Singer (2008, 90) provides 
another account of the period when he observed that SFID settle in Dimako primarily because of the town easy 
location, being on the main Yaoundé-Bertoua axis as well as the presence of primary forests at the time in the area. 
 
76 That figure was established by André Sieffert and Hua Xuong Pierre Truong (1992) who conducted a 
‘diagnostic’ study in prelude to and for the API-Dimako. The 1987 national census put the population figure at 
11,225 inhabitants with more than half (5,615) living in Dimako town. The ratio then was 6,994 men for 4,231 
women (see Mekok Balara 2001, 12). 
77 Singer (2008, 90) for instance mentioned that at the height of the town prosperity, the total population 
numbered 20,000 people. Furthermore, he pointed out that when SFID factory closed 457 workers were employed 
(2008, 93). Finally, he added that “although no reliable census has been carried out, it is believed that Dimako lost 
between 2,000 and 3,000 people in a single year [following the plant closure]” (idem). Singer’s figures are in 
contrast to those of the Dimako Council. For instance, a 2003 council document noted that based on projections 
from the 1987 national population census as well as a 1992 local socioeconomic census, about 32,200 people 
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Today, in the aftermath of SFID departure in 2002 (see below), council official 
documents report a global figure of 15,389 inhabitants (see CDKO 2003a). 
5.3 VILLAGE ORGANIZATION 
For local administrative purposes the council authorities have divided the area thirty two (32) 
villages and quarters along four sectors: the Savanna Sector (Secteur Savane); the Forest Sector 
(Secteur Forêt); the Pol Sector (Secteur Pol); and finally, Dimako town (see Appendix F).78 
Whereas the Savanna and Forest Sectors are home to Bakoum people, the Pol Sector includes 
primarily the Pol and two of four Baka pygmies’ villages, Mayos and Nkolbikon.79
 
 Dimako town 
for its part includes the center of the town as well as villages bordering the council forest (see 
Appendix F). 
                                                                                                                                                             
inhabited the council (CRDKO 2003b, 3). Out of that figure, it was estimated that 12,000 Bakoum people; 8000 Pol 
people; 3,000 Baka pygmies resided throughout the council; and finally, 9,200 people from within and without the 
country (CAR, Niger, Nigeria) inhabited Dimako town itself (CRDKO 2003b). It should be noted that the issue of 
local councils’ population figures is a sensitive one, for population estimates are used to determine for instance the 
CACs amount that each council is set to annually receive. Thus, some observers have noted the presence of small 
tensions between mayors on the one hand, whom central government officials argue tend to inflate their population 
estimates to receive more money, and mayors on the other hand, who believe that central government officials are 
underestimating their population figures, and therefore giving them less money. The researcher witnessed this 
exchange of views in November 2009 at a FEICOM workshop in Yaoundé between a central government official 
and a mayor of a rural council who called herself a ‘bush’ mayor or maire de brousse. 
78 That division has been a contentious issue locally insofar as some quarters have claimed the ‘higher’ 
status of villages instead of being a ‘simple’ quarter. In practice, the difference between villages and quarters is not 
so visible since both are headed by a third degree chief. However, for local politics, the status of villages is critical, 
for it provides ‘full’ access when benefits, such as timber revenues for instance, are distributed in town.  
79 The orthography of villages’ name depends on the source used or even local customs. For instance, 
Kandara will be called Kandala; Koumadjap or Nkoumadjap, Djandja or Tchandja and so on. In practice, the 
difference is minimal since it usually consists of a letter or so. Still, the distinction is worth pointing out to the extent 
that the reader might come across another usage. 
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Figure 5.2. Petit-Pol village, February 2010 
Source: author 
 
Of all the council 32 villages and quarters, Dimako town represents the main center of the 
council. Each village or quarter is headed by a third degree chief (chef de troisième degré) who 
in turn is under the purview of the superior chief André Bangda Junior, whose family has been in 
power for more than three generations (CRDKO 2003b, 4).80
                                                 
80 In Cameroon, the government Decree No 77/245 of 15 July 1977 organized chiefs into three category or 
‘degrees’ of local chieftaincy: first, second, and third degree. Usually village chiefs are third degree chiefs whereas 
the sub-division chieftaincy is usually represented by a second degree chief. First degree status is usually reserved 
for chiefs in divisional capital such as Abong Mbang. However, the decree creating these degrees of chieftaincy is 
being reconsidered in light of internal debates about the meaning of chieftaincy in the country as a Ministry of 
Territorial Administration (MINATD) official communicated. 
 As a rule, chiefs are selected by 
village elders (notables) among the lineage of past chiefs, with the final approval residing with 
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the sub-prefect and the prefect (Mendouga Mebenga 2000a, 6). The notables assist the chiefs in 
regulating village life (Mendouga Mebenga 2000a, 6).81
Lastly, unlike in the Bamiléké western inlands, chiefs in the Eastern Region are not 
traditional chiefs (
 
see Elong 2005, 60-61) In the southern part of Cameroon, chiefs are 
considered auxiliaires d’administration or central government representatives at the village level 
under the immediate supervision of these authorities (Mendouga Mebenga, 2000a, 6). In 
Dimako, chiefs answer to the sub-prefect also known as chef de terre in remembrance of the 
times sub-prefects concentrated all the local powers. 
5.4 ADMINISTRATIVE AND POLITICAL ORGANIZATION 
In 1955, the administrative district of Dimako was founded (CRADEL 2007, 7), while in 1982 
and 1983 respectively the Dimako subdivision and the Dimako Rural Council (CRDKO) -since 
2004 the Dimako Council (CDKO)- were established (CRDKO 2003b, 6).82
                                                 
81 In practice, as witnessed by the tensions that have surfaced in some of the council villages, the selection 
procedure for chiefs is not always followed. Indeed, some losing candidates to the chieftaincy have accused the sub-
prefect of taking sides and in some cases of even accepting bribes to get other candidates appointed, though these 
claims have yet to be substantiated. 
 In those days when 
local governments, especially rural ones, were still appendages of the central government and 
had not yet acquired the status of independent elected local councils, the district and the council 
in Dimako were respectively headed by what was then called sub-prefect-mayors (sous-préfets-
maires) and then municipal administrator (administateur municipal), both of whom were 
82 It has to be noted that following the 2004 political and administrative decentralization laws, the division 
between local urban and rural councils was abolished. Thus, officially the Dimako Rural Council (CRDKO) is 
simply referred to as the Dimako Council (CDKO). Have also been abolished, administrative districts which since 
2010 have now become subdivisions. 
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centrally appointed civil servants (for an account of the period in the country, see Mawhood 
1983a).83
Today, Dimako is both a sub-division and a (rural) local council -located in the Haut-
Nyong division of the East Region- covering an area of 750 square kilometers (Mongui 
Sossomba 2001a, 132).
 
84 Administratively, the council itself is under the supervision of the 
prefect living in Abong Mbang, the subdivisional capital.85 In Dimako, the sub-prefect as well as 
various government offices, for instance agriculture and women’s affairs, represents the central 
government in an environment characterized by a lack of the most basic amenities as well as 
infrastructure (see Chapter 7.0).86
Finally, the council is headed by a mayor assisted by three deputy mayors as well as a 
twenty-five member municipal council organized into three commissions Great Works (Grands 
Travaux); Social Affairs; and Finances.
 
87
                                                 
83 The function of administrator-mayor came to an end when the first nationwide municipal [local councils] 
elections were held in 1996 following the return to multipartism in the country. 
 By law, the council executive (l’exécutif municipal), 
which is composed of the mayor and his three deputies (Adjoints) -all elected councilors- is 
responsible for the day to day handling of council affairs. However, also by law, for its 
84 Arrondissements are central state administrative sub-divisions usually headed by a sub-prefect, whereas a 
local council is generally an autonomous local government headed by an elected mayor assisted by a municipal 
council. In the case of Dimako, both territorial boundaries are contiguous. That need not be the case. For instance in 
the adjacent Doumé’s administrative sub-division, the Arrondissement is comprised of two separate local councils 
the Doumé and Doumaintang Councils. 
85 The Dimako Council is located 310 kilometers from the capital Yaoundé, 30 from Bertoua, the regional 
capital, and 75 from Abong Mbang. 
86 Indeed, except for the Dimako City Hall (DCH) or Hôtel de Ville de Dimako, the sub-prefecture and the 
Gendarmerie compounds, the council only houses a small hospital, a government technical school called the Centre 
d’Enseignement Technique et Industriel du Cameroun (CETIC), a vocational training school Rural Artisan Centers 
also known as Section Artisanale et Rurale et Section Ménagère (SAR/SM), Dimako High School (Lycée de 
Dimako), a medical center in Dimako town, an integrated health center (centre de santé integré) in Petit-Pol village, 
and a dozen of primary schools (see CDKO 2010c, 18-19). However, most of this infrastructure is either barely 
underequipped or in need of repair. 
87 Councilors represent villages by sectors in the following way: four councilors for Savanna and Forest, 
and eight and nine respectively for Pol and Dimako town sectors. The actual breakdown is as follows: three 
councilors for Tombo quarter; two councilors each for Kpwengué, Source, Toungrelo, Ngolambélé, and Petit-Pol; 
and one councilor for each of the following villages Ayene, Bongossi, Baktala, Beul, Djandja, Grand Pol, Kouen, 
Longtimbi, Nkolméyanga, Siméyong, Tahatte, and Tonkoumbé.  
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management, the executive is accountable to the deliberative body called the municipal council 
(see ROC 2008b). 
5.5 LOCAL ECONOMY 
Two periods of the local economy can be distinguished: the period under SFID until 2002, and 
the post-SFID era. The following subsection briefly describes both periods. 
5.5.1 Local economy under SFID 
SFID is a logging company belonging to the French Rougier Group which operates in the Congo 
Basin forests, notably in Congo-Brazzaville (Mokabi) and Gabon (Rougier Gabon) (Rougier 
n.d.). In Cameroon, the company is known as SFID and has been involved in timber harvesting 
for a number of years, especially in the Dimako area where for more than half a century it 
provided employment to local residents as well as dominated the area economy (see Singer 2008, 
89-93). In effect, Sieffert and Truong report that in 1992, before the start of the API-Dimako 
project (see section 5.7 below), SFID employed around 700 people in then-East province with 
330 working in Dimako and 350 in Mbang (1992, 29). Further, they noted that even though 
SFID employees came from other parts of the country, in Dimako a significant number of the 
employees were natives from the Bakoum group (Sieffert and Truong 1992, 29).88
                                                 
88 The Dimako figure was relatively higher than in Mbang where the authors note that 10 percent of the 
employees were locals. Further, Singer (2008, 90) talks about 400 or 500 (total) workers in Dimako alone. 
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Under SFID, although local residents were also involved in agriculture, Dimako economy 
was dominated by timber harvesting and related activities with the company building a sawmill 
and a plywood factory (Singer 2008, 90). In fact, during the heyday of SFID, Dimako residents 
remember that the town was prosperous; that residents had money to spend and spillover 
activities abounded, including the establishment of a transport company to evacuate SFID 
products (Singer 2008, 91). The exact reasons for SFID departure in 2002 are still subject to 
debate in town, with some villagers seeing that act as an unnecessary betrayal. Nonetheless, there 
is some evidence that SFID departed because of the fact that valuable timber was becoming 
scarce in the area (Singer 2008, 92). As a matter of fact, Sieffert and Truong reported that the 
move away from the Dimako area had even begun in the early 1970s (1992, 29).89
Eight years after the factory closure, Dimako residents are still upset about what they see 
as a betrayal of the French company. Everything here in town is due to SFID presence. Residents 
remember the positive as well as negative contributions of SFID. They note that for a first, the 
presence of the firm provided employment and built local infrastructure. But they also remember 
that because of the firm and easy job availability as well as the hiring priority afforded to family 
members, local villagers did not value education insofar as one only needed to complete primary 
 
                                                 
89 In effect, in 1973 SFID had started to move away from the Dimako concession for Batouri in the Kadey 
division, and then around 1982 started timber harvesting in Mbang (Sieffert and Truong 1992, 29). Seen in this light, 
it is only normal that after more than half a century presence in Dimako, the firm closed its Dimako factory and 
moved all its operations to Mbang town in the Kadey division, about 120 km from Dimako, leaving most of its 
former employees unemployed. Another line of argument holds that SFID left because of the expiration of the tax 
exempt status in Dimako as well as the organization of a major strike by local trade unions in 2002 (see Singer 2008, 
92-93). With law enforcement intervention, the strike turned violent and resulted in some of the factory equipment 
being damaged (Singer 2008, 92). Singer sees this as the most compelling argument for the departure of SFID, 
especially in light of the fact that since 1994 with the appearance of the first trade unions in Dimako, local workers 
could now bargain for better working conditions and wages (2008, 92). During the interview rounds, the researcher 
heard that line of argumentation being also advanced by some local villagers as the immediate cause of SFID 
departure, which after the deadly strike, SFID simply decided to pull out to avoid future strikes. 
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education to get hired by the company. As Chapter 7.0 shall describe the issue of education has 
become a thorny one in the council. 
5.5.2 The local economy today 
Now that SFID has departed, Dimako economy has primarily reverted to traditional agriculture 
and a ‘small informal timber and furniture sector’ (Singer 2008, 89). For those residents who 
have stayed, small scale agriculture has become the primary means to have access to cash and 
buy needed produce. Shifting cultivation or slash and burn agriculture is the one practiced in the 
area villages by the Bantu groups and to some extent the Baka people (Mendouga Mebenga 
2000a, 7).90
Mendouga Mebenga 2000a, 14-15
 Beyond agriculture, local villagers live out of hunting, fishing, and collection of 
forest products inside the council forest, especially in the southeast corner where the resources 
are abundant ( ). 
Finally, in recent years, because of the creation of the council forest and the promise of 
job opportunities as well as improvement of living conditions, the issue of timber harvesting and 
                                                 
90 Droit de hache is practiced in this region; it means that forest and land ownership is on the first come 
basis principle (see Sangkwa 2001); however, the land belongs to the community and not to individuals. Individuals 
only possess the right of usufruct (Mendouga Mebenga 2000a, 6-7). The actual Dimako economy revolves around 
the cultivation of agricultural products such as cocoa, coffee, manioc or cassava, and plantains all year round, while 
corn is cultivated once annually. Villagers sometimes mix both types of cultures, corn, peanuts, manioc, macabo 
(Xanthosoma), plantain among others in fields which are located on a distance of about 1.5 kilometer deep behind 
family houses (Ibid., 8). The main food crops consist of manioc, maize, and peanuts whereas the secondary ones 
include yams, macabo, squashes and sweet potatoes (Ibid. 9). Plantains and bananas are cultivated along the 
Dimako-Kandala and Dimako-Grand Pol roads and constitute an important source of revenues for villagers (Ibid. 
10). Finally, a small livestock composed of chickens, ducks, goats, lambs and pigs in non-enclosed area is being 
raised, primarily for domestic consumption, and has been a source of local conflicts insofar as local villagers have 
argued that these animals can cause damage to people’s field (see Mendouga Mebenga 200a, 16). On the whole, 
these produce are primarily cultivated for villagers’ domestic consumption, but commercial trade also occurs with 
travelers and the bayam sellam coming from Dimako town or Bertoua in search of agricultural produce (Idem). The 
bayam sellam (for buy and sell them) are retail merchants, usually women, who go from village to village to buy the 
local produces and then resale it at higher margins in cities or neighboring countries. Yet, villagers, mainly of the 
Pol Sector, have complained about the practices of these buyers in search of low prices, practices which have been 
accentuated by the state of the rural road leading to the area villages. 
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revenues has been thrown back to the forefront of the local economy. The issue of the council 
forest and the utilization of the forest revenues, as the following three chapters shall illustrate, 
has become the issue in town. 
5.6 THE MAYOR OF DIMAKO 
According to available data, the current Mayor of Dimako, Janvier Mongui Sossomba, was 
appointed in 1987 under the one-party state as the council municipal administrator. After the first 
multiparty nationwide municipal elections in 1996, Mayor Mongui was elected for the first time 
and then reelected twice in 2002 and 2007 under the banner of the ruling party Cameroon’s 
People Democratic Movement (CPDM) -or Rassemblement du Peuple Camerounais (RDPC) as 
it is better known by its French acronym. Nonetheless, in 2007, for the first time in the history of 
the council, primary elections for the mayoral position were organized inside the CPDM Dimako 
chapter -the implication of the primary episode will be clear in Chapter 8.0. Including his time as 
appointed ‘mayor’ and the current 2007 term -set to expire in 2012- the mayor has been in power 
for a quarter of a century. 
Apart from holding political office, early in his career, Mayor Mongui had been an 
executive at the Cameroon Tobacco Company (Société Camerounaise de Tabac) (Mbodiam 
2011b), and later the owner of a defunct logging company called the Forestière Industrielle de 
Doumé Dimako (FODDI). According to Singer (2008, 111), at one point the mayor was even the 
owner of two logging companies, one of which, probably FODDI, filed for bankruptcy following 
the post 1994 Forest Law tax increases which rocked small logging companies. Today, following 
not only the demise of his main company, FODDI, but also his numerous current (political) 
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responsibilities, there are some conflicting accounts about the extent of the mayor’s private 
involvement in timber harvesting apart from the council forest. At the same time, the field 
evidence suggests that the mayor in recent years has been involved in logging under the cover of 
his wife’s company Etablissement Kakouandé et Fils Sarl (K&F) –pronounced locally KF.91
Lastly, until March 2011, on top of his private economic activities, Mayor Mongui held 
several national and regional positions as follows by order of importance: since 2007 he is the 
‘face’ of council forestry in Cameroon, being the president of ACFCAM - and as such also the 
president of the executive and steering committees of the donor-financed PAF2C (see section 
 
4.4) -; since 2006 a FEICOM board member (administrateur), which as the study noted earlier is 
a major player in local government financial assistance in the country (section 4.4.3 above, 
especially note 68); a delegate of the central committee of the ruling party CPDM for the Haut-
Nyong division centre section; he represents the local councils and cities association in the East 
as the President of the East Regional section of UCCC (CVUC/Est); a vice president of the 
international association of forest councils; a Rotary Club member as well as hold other positions 
in various civil society organizations (see Mbodiam 2011b). 
                                                 
91 Unofficially, the FODDI company collapsed because of unpaid taxes and the mayor created a new one 
under his wife’s name, the abovementioned Kakouandé et Fils. 
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5.7 THE DIMAKO COUNCIL FOREST PROJECT 
 
Figure 5.3. The main entrance of the Dimako Council Forest, February 2010 
Source: author 
 
Were it not for both the Aménagement Pilote Integré de Dimako (API-Dimako) and Forêts et 
Terroirs projects, Dimako Council would not perhaps have attracted scholarly attention, for the 
town is located away from the country’s main political and economic decision-making centers, 
usually the center of attention of scholars. Though for more than half a century the town had 
hosted the first logging company in the East, it remained relatively unknown until the advent of 
the two French-funded projects. This section describes the process leading to the official creation 
of the first council forest in the entire Congo Basin, the Dimako Council Forest (FCD). The 
section is divided into four main subsections as follows. The first two subsections start with the 
description of both the API-Dimako and Forêts et Terroirs projects, the forerunners of the FCD. 
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By highlighting the predicaments of both projects, the first two subsections preview some of the 
issues that were to surface later in the Dimako experiment. For its part, the third subsection 
presents the characteristics and institutional framework governing the FCD as well as provides a 
brief comparison of the council revenues pre and post-FCD. Finally, the chapter concludes by 
showing that even before the council forest officially started its operations, the Mayor of Dimako 
had already planted the seeds for the failure of the experiment out of his personal thirst for 
power. 
5.7.1 The Aménagement Pilote Intégré de Dimako project (1992-1996) 
Following the 1990 Libreville’s ‘Ministerial Conference for the Development and Sustainable 
Management of Central African forests’ (Mise en Valeur et Gestion Durable des Forêts 
d’Afrique Centrale), the French government and central African leaders decided to attempt a new 
approach to the management of tropical forests away from conventional logging (Singer 2008, 
94).92
The result of the three years agreement, which started in September 1992 (
 With the help of the French Ministry of Cooperation, in charge of official development 
assistance, the Republic of Cameroon (ROC) was selected as the host of a technical assistance 
pilot project dedicated to the implementation of the sustainable management of tropical forests 
(aménagement durable des forêts tropicales). 
Esteve et al. 
1993, 8), came to be known as API-Dimako or Dimako Integrated Pilot Management project. 
The project area was around Dimako, hence the name API-Dimako, and Mbang subdivisions in 
                                                 
92 Conventional logging simply defined here as the logging of trees without thinking about the long term 
preservation of the forest (for more on the definition, see Appendix A). 
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the East province, now the East Region, (see Esteve et al. 1993, 2). The total project area covered 
a surface are of around 800,000 hectares of forests (API-Dimako 1995a, 7). 
5.7.1.1 The forest research and rural development phase 
To begin with, as Chapter 8.0 shall illustrate, the exact reasons for the choice of Dimako 
as the site of the French-funded project within the council, and even beyond, have been the 
subject of multiple interpretations since.93 However, Singer (2008, 95) notes that Dimako was 
chosen for three main reasons. First, the relatively short distance from Yaoundé; second, the 
location of the area at the limit between savannah and forest; and finally, Dimako had been the 
site of industrial logging since 1947.94
The primary objective of API-Dimako –which was described as a research-development 
pilot project ‘en grandeur nature’, meaning a real world experiment- was to promote the 
“integrated management of natural forest with the participation of a commercial logger” (
 
Esteve 
et al. 1993, 2). That component was called the volet forestier, for forestry, designed over the long 
run to preserve the ecosystem. The second related objective was to couple the forestry 
component with rural development opérations aimed at stabilizing agriculture and therefore 
maintain “une ambiance forestière pérenne” (Esteve et al. 1993, 2-3).95
                                                 
93 Locally, two main reasons have been advanced for the choice of Dimako. The first one is that the French 
wanted to help their own company thus privileged SFID instead of any other company. The second one which has 
enormous implications for local politics is that the choice of Dimako was motivated by the fact that Cameroon’s 
First Lady is a town native. Thus, this was considered as a gift of the ‘daughter’ of the town to its inhabitants. This 
second line of argument as we shall see in the remainder of this study is especially relevant for the concern of this 
study. 
 
94 Since the project was French-funded and called for the participation of a logging firm, SFID in this case, 
it was natural that the French cooperation chose Dimako. Yet, as Singer (2008, 95) observes because of the 
participation of SFID, which many had denounced the logging practices, API-Dimako from the onset was under 
international criticism. 
95 For Singer (2008, 95) “the project had two principal components, hence its “integrated” aspect: first, a forestry 
component (volet forestier) in collaboration with SFID focused on studying the effects of various logging and 
planting practices on forest ecology. The aim was to identify the practices which would ensure the greatest 
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Simply put, the project goal was to help sustain local villagers’ commitment to 
sustainable forest management, and therefore reduce shifting agriculture, even after the end of 
the project. Because the project had hypothesized that a management plan not including the local 
populations’ interests was doomed to fail (see Clément and Dubus 1993, 5), it was imperative to 
involve them from the onset. Thus, in its original description, the project already embodied two 
nascent concepts of what was later to become sustainable forest management: the involvement of 
local villagers as well as commercial loggers in order to ensure the sustainable management of 
forests (see Appendix G). In spite of the recognition of the role of local populations, the project’s 
main emphasis remained to find ways to conserve the forest ecosystem as to guarantee the long 
term provision of timber for commercial loggers (API-Dimako 1995a, 1-3; Esteve et al. 1993, 3). 
On a more practical level, the project results were expected to be delivered by July 
1995.96
Esteve et al. 1993, 3
 The project task was critical because its work was expected to form the basis for the later 
revision of the then-1981 forestry law ( ). However, the abovementioned 
conflicting objectives of the project also meant that it was ill-equipped to cope with its main task. 
5.7.1.2 Confronting the practical reality 
In truth, from the start, the project was marred with controversy. To assess its progress, 
French consultants were sent in Cameroon less than a year into its schedule. In March-April 
1993, the consultants reported that the project had trouble defining its role as well as delimiting 
                                                                                                                                                             
reconstitution of the timber stock whilst minimizing the impacts of logging on forest ecology, including biodiversity 
and hydrology. Secondly, the rural development component (volet développement rural) in collaboration with local 
populations aimed at promoting more intensive means of cultivating crops in a bid to prevent further deforestation or 
forest degradation through traditional slash-and-burn practices”. 
96 By the July deadline it was expected that forest management plans would be prepared and completed 
over a maximum surface area of 500,000 hectares -those management plans would later serve to conclude 
management contracts between the forest administration and commercial loggers-; and the project was also expected 
to formulate new guidelines for the sustainable management of forests (see Esteve et al. 1993, 3). 
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its area of operations, and, more importantly, it was judged as being overambitious (Clément and 
Dubus 1993, 2). Similarly, a few months later, another report noted that API-Dimako suffered 
from “a negative image in Cameroonian [public] opinion” primarily because of technical and 
communication missteps” (Esteve et al. 1993, 4). The report added that “by successive 
evolutions, the project went from an initial typical research-development component based on 
the gestion de terroir approach to a classical integrated rural development project” (Esteve et al. 
1993, 5 emphasis added). In other words, instead of being seen as a provisional [forestry] 
research and technical assistance project, API-Dimako was mistakenly seen as another rural 
development scheme (see Clément and Dubus 1993, 2-3). The deviation from the original course 
began in mid-1992 and led to “unrealistic promises to local populations who now feel 
dissatisfied and duped” (Esteve et al. 1993, 5) -a situation which will repeat itself in the FCD era 
as Chapter 7.0 shall demonstrate. 
The report team recommended that API-Dimako go back to its primary mission (forestry) 
as well as refocus on the immediate Dimako area, instead of the sprawling project zone, and 
downsize the rural development component, now renamed volet Interaction populations-forêts 
(Esteve et al. 1993, 5; see also p. 15; and 16-17).97
                                                 
97 The project zone was comprised of 150 villages (Esteve et al. 1993, 16) with a total of about 60,000 
people (Clement and Dubus 1993, 2), thus making rural development operations (roads, bridges, fertilizers, credit 
facilities, health, school and social infrastructure, and commercial assistance) difficult to achieve. Also at the end of 
the project, the populations were expected to have stabilized agriculture, diversify their produces as well as their 
source of revenues, establish commercial circuits or get integrated to already existing ones, ensure the functioning of 
autonomous producers groups and benefit from the rational exploitation of community forests as well as continue to 
benefit from their traditional usage rights in the forest permanent domain (Esteve et al. 1993, 15). How to achieve 
these secondary goals at the same time while pursuing forestry assistance to commercial loggers turned out to be 
impractical. 
 The situation was critical because, as of 
September 1993, of the 500,000 hectares of forests to be inventoried, only 91,000 hectares or 
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18.2 percent had been (Esteve et al. 1993, 23). 98
for a self-reflective assessment on the project, see Durrieu De 
Madron et al. 1998
  That called for a new ‘chapter’ if the project 
was to succeed in its original aim (
). 
5.7.1.3 A new beginning 
The second ‘chapter’ of the API-Dimako project (1994-1996) started with an exclusive 
focus on the forestry component while also having to take into account the newly passed 1994 
law which splits the forest into two estates (see Esteve 2000, 61-62). Compared to the first 
‘chapter’, the second was more successful. In fact, when API-Dimako was terminated in 1996, 
among the results achieved by the project were the drafting and submission of six (6) forest 
management plans covering 360,000 hectares (see Appendix G). Included in this, was the FCD 
first management plan which, nonetheless, because of MINEF lack of official approval never 
went into effect (see Collas de Chatelperron 2000, 3).99
At the end of API-Dimako, the FCD was still a distant dream. While the project had 
anticipated some of the 1994 reforms, it had been unsuccessful in reaching its targets and phased 
out in the midst of the implementation of the law. From 1996 to 1998, while the follow-up phase 
of the project was still being contemplated, amid French reluctance to fund it (Singer 2008, 96), 
the new forestry law was slowly being implemented putting in jeopardy the whole FCD project. 
Finally, in late 1998, the second phase of the French-funded project started under the designation 
 
                                                 
98 To salvage the project, senior officials at the French Ministry of Cooperation asked CIRAD-Forêt, which 
previously had been a contractor to the project, to study the possibility of taking over (Esteve et al. 1993, 7). As a 
French state public corporation, CIRAD could be more easily made accountable technically as well as financially 
the report argued as a justification for this request to take over (Esteve et al. 1993, 7). 
99 The first Dimako Council Forest management plan was produced as his engineer’s thesis for the project 
API-Dimako by a then-student at the National Institute for Rural Development (INADER) Salomon Nti-Mefe 
(Mekok Balara 2001, 4). Incidentally, Nti-Mefe is now the mayor of the southern council of Djoum, and also 
Secretary-General of ACFCAM. Around January 2010, the Djoum Council officially received the authorization 
from the forest administration to start timber harvesting operations in the Djoum Council Forest. 
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Forêts et Terroirs, supposedly to reflect a new emphasis. The FCD project was again back on 
track. 
5.7.2 The Forêts et Terroirs project (1998-2001) 
 
Figure 5.4. The former compound of Forêts et Terroirs hidden behind the trees, February 2010 
Source: author 
 
The Forêts et Terroirs project took charge of matters where API-Dimako had left. The task of 
the three years 14 million French Franc-funded project was to educate and provide the forest 
administration, logging firms, and local populations with the tools of sustainable forest 
management (Forêts et Terroirs 2000b, 3).100
                                                 
100 1 Euro for 6,56 French Franc or about 2.1 million Euros or 1.5 million USD today. 
 Particularly, the project, which started in April 
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1998, had for mission to help the forest administration in the aftermath of the 1994 Forest Law 
implement the new provisions of the law, in particular SFM techniques, community and council 
forests, train and advise the forest administration (Collas de Chatelperron 2000, 1). 
5.7.2.1 The gestion de terroir approach 
From the onset, the project sought to be different and avoid the travails of its predecessor. 
The concept Forêts et Terroirs itself was chosen to signify “in two words the entirety (globalité) 
of the action- it is the whole territory (ensemble), forested and agricultural, that the new forest 
law invites to organize and manage- and the interdependence between these two terms, that 
complement each other and that no one should not try to oppose to each other” (Forêts et 
Terroirs 1997, 2).101
Bassett, Blanc-Pamard, and Boutrais 2007
 The approach borrowed from the French gestion de terroir school which 
argues the interrelatedness of the social, agricultural and forest landscapes (for more on the 
gestion des terroirs villageois approach see ; 
Batterbury 1998; Degnbol 1995; Engberg-Pedersen 1995; Painter, Sumberg, and Price 1994).102
Furthermore, to avoid API-Dimako predicaments, from the start the French Ministry of 
Cooperation elected the more experienced CIRAD-Forêt -the forestry department of the 
International Cooperation Centre on Agrarian Research for Development (Centre de 
Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique pour le Développement)- as the project 
 
                                                 
101 In line with that approach, for the project, “the technical [and] silvicultural aspect of [forest] 
management is not for instance more or less important than the sociological or economic, since they constitute a set 
of coherent activities that should speak to common goals of ecological, social, and economic sustainability” (Forêts 
et Terroirs 1997, 9). 
102 The French Gestion des Terroirs Villageois approach to local environmental management in vogue in 
Francophone Africa “is widely used by development projects working with settled agricultural communities. It 
involves the transfer of control over resource management and the land used by that community (its terroir or 
territory) to local people. This is usually achieved by vesting decision-making powers in a village group or 
committee. The majority of these village groups take on informal decision-making powers, although some do have 
legal status as registered co-operatives or membership organizations” (Batterbury 1998, 873). 
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manager (Fonds d’Aide et de Coopération (FAC) 1997, 9). Moreover, although it operated in the 
same geographical area, in contrast to API-Dimako, the Forêts et Terroirs project circumscribed 
more tightly its area of intervention. Indeed, the project zone was subdivided into three zones of 
decreasing priority, with the Dimako area as of prime importance (Forêts et Terroirs 2000b, 3-5) 
(see Appendix G).103
In spite of these precautions taken, the project faced similar difficulties as its predecessor. 
To illustrate, in 2000, less than a year before it was officially phased out, FMUs set to be 
allocated by the forest administration during the life of the project had yet to be allocated 
(
 
Bertault 2000, 5). For the project, in the absence of those allocations, it could not monitor and 
test the [new] indicators of the implementation of the management plan. All this led a 
consultancy report to warn about the unsatisfactory progress on the project’s main objectives 
(Bertault 2000, 3). In response, CIRAD-Forêt pointed out that the unforeseen delays were due to 
the difficulty of the local institutional context, as well as the forest administration (MINEF) lack 
of implementation of the forest law (see Bertault 2000, 5-7), both issues that were to resurface 
later in the management of the FCD. 
5.7.2.2 The legacy of API-Dimako and Forêts et Terroirs 
At the end of the almost ten years (1992-2001) period in Dimako of both projects, the 
French cooperation had helped set the stage for the implementation of the 1994 Forest Law 
provisions about SFM, and more importantly for this study, launched the process leading to 
                                                 
103 The rationale for selecting the Dimako zone as the primary terrain for action was straightforward. The 
Dimako area was chosen because it included the 1994 law’s three major innovations (FMU, Council and possibly 
Community forests), and thus allowed the project to have a continuous area of intervention (Forêts et Terroirs 1997, 
11). 
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gazetting and creation of the FCD.104
Collas de Chatelperron 2001a
  On the whole, Forêts et Terroirs’ two main goals -and to 
some extent API-Dimako too- had been achieved in some way with the provision of institutional 
support to the various actors implicated in the establishment of the management plan as well as 
the creation of guidelines for the gazetting process and for writing up management plans (about 
the two projects' achievements, see ; Collas de Chatelperron 
2001c). 
Forêts et Terroirs hoped that, through its hard work, its motto “des Forêts et des Terroirs 
pour les générations futures”, that is forests and village lands for future generations, would 
indeed still be there years after the project ended. The first test of that philosophy was to come in 
the experience of one of its flagship achievements the Forêt Communale de Dimako (FCD). 
5.7.3 The Forêt Communale de Dimako 
The FCD is among the more than dozen council forests that were established by the Southern 
Cameroon’s Zoning Plan (Mongui Sossomba 2001a, 132).105
Assembé-Mvondo and Sangkwa 2009, 
98
 The council forest is not a primary 
forest; rather, it is a semi-degraded dense humid forest (
) with an official surface area of 16,240 hectares. Prior to the forest inventory, the forest 
administration records revealed that SFID harvested the forest over a quarter century period 
under two licenses SFID 1352 in the west (1958-1974) and SFID 1445 in the east (1965-1983) 
                                                 
104 To the credit of API-Dimako and Forêts et Terroirs, multiple studies and pilot experiments were 
conducted about timber harvesting and RIL techniques, SFM, as well as the local milieu in the Dimako region (see 
Collas de Chatelperron 2001; and Durrieu de Madron et al. 1998). 
105 Initially, the surface area reserved for the FCD before the gazetting process started was 18,052 hectares 
(Mekok Balara, 2001, 4). After the gazetting process, the total forest surface area was limited to 16,240 hectares in 
order to stay within the council boundary limits on the east of the Kadey division, as well as account for illegal 
logging which happened over several hundred hectares (see Mekok and Borie 2000, 2; and Bertault 2000, 25). 
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(Mekok Balara 2001a, 18-19).106
Ngniado 1999, 3
 In license SFID 1352 alone, a volume of about 230,000 cubic 
meters of timber was estimated to have been harvested by the firm over the quarter century 
period ( ). 
When the 1995 forest inventory was completed, it revealed that more than sixty (60) 
different tree species can be found in the FCD (Mekok Balara and Borie 2000, 3). However, a 
more detailed analysis of the forest inventory, exhibited in Table 5.1 below, shows that including 
all diameters, six (6) species account for 52 percent of all tree species found in the FCD. 
Moreover, among these six tree species, Lotofa (Sterculia rhinopetala) and ayous (Triplochiton 
scleroxylon) represent more than half of that total.107
Table 5.1. Tree species found in the Dimako Council Forest (all diameters) 
  
Name Scientific name Percentage 
Ayous Triplochiton scleroxylon 12 
Bété Mansonia altissima 10 
Fraké Terminalia superba 10 
Lotofa/Nkanang Sterculia rhinopetala 15 
Tali Erythrophleum ivorensis 3 
Sapelli Entandrophragma 
cylindricum 
2 
Others Various tree species 48 
TOTAL  100 
Source: (Mekok Balara 2001a, 26) 
 
                                                 
106 While the western side was inactive for twenty five years, the eastern side had only been fallow at that 
time for two dozen years. 
107 The first forest inventory of the FCD was conducted by the National Office of Forest Development 
(ONADEF), the former state monopoly in charge of forest management inventory, under API-Dimako supervision 
in 1995 at a rate of 1 percent (Mekok Balara 2001, 22). In 2000, Forêts et Terroirs proceeded to update the 1995 
results to account for the changes intervened in the area since (Mekok and Borie, 2000, 3). 
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A survey of human activities in the forest revealed that the FCD northern side108
Mekok Balara 2001a, 
17
 -close to 
the main entrance on the Dimako-Kandara-Mbang road (see Map 5.1)- remains the area that has 
been the most affected, while the southern part, close to the Doumé River and Pol Sector 
villages, is the area where timber and other forest resources abound (
).109
5.7.3.1 The 2001 management plan 
 Finally, from the forest inventory and local consultations, two management plans were 
established, one by Forêts et Terroirs in 2001 and the other by the Dimako Council itself in 
2006. Below, the main characteristics of both plans, which shall be analyzed in the following 
chapter, are briefly presented. 
First of all, in total three management plans were established for the FCD. Of those three, 
two, the 2001 and 2006 versions, were officially approved by the forest administration and thus 
constituted the legal bases for the implementation of SFM in the FCD. The first plan to enter into 
effect was the 2001 version which was officially approved on 6 January 2003 by MINEF (Global 
Witness Cameroon 2004a, 1). It was under this plan that the council forest was legally harvested 
in 2004 and 2005. In the 2001 management plan, based on the management objectives of 
                                                 
108 For its part, the fauna survey disclosed the presence of only 18 mammal species, such as gorilla and 
chimpanzee, and 196 bird species (espèces aviaires), 79 being endemic (Mekok Balara 2001a, 10). In general, 
villagers have noted the quasi-disappearance of animal species such as leopards (Panthera pardus); guerezas 
(Colobus guereza); African buffalos (Syncerus caffer); giant pangolins (Manis gigantea); gorillas (Gorilla gorilla); 
common chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes); Bongo antelopes (Tragelafus euryceros; and elephants (Loxodonta 
africana) (Forêts et Terroirs 2000a, 4-5). 
109 This is due for instance, to the fact that when SFID opened harvesting roads, local residents took 
advantage and penetrated the northern zone to practice shifting agriculture as well as engage in other forest activities 
(Mekok Balara 2001a, 22). The process of human pressure on the forest appears cyclical in the area. Indeed, Mekok 
Balara (2001b, 89) also notes that agriculture pressures on the forest started in 1972 when SFID encountered some 
commercial difficulties and thus reduced the number of workdays to three days/week, giving the opportunity to 
Dimako residents to attend to their fields. Then, the pressure peaked in the 1990s with SFID increasing its activities 
as well as the creation of the Dimako High School and a local timber transport company. The pressure was reduced 
at the end of the 1990s because of numerous reasons such as forest fires, lack of roads to evacuate produces and so 
on. 
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development and conservation (Mekok Balara 2001a, 10), as Map 5.1 below illustrates, the FCD 
was segmented into three main areas (séries). The first area was reserved for timber harvesting 
(14,950 hectares) while the second was designated for botanical and ecological research 
purposes (426 hectares) (see also Assembé-Mvondo and Oyono 2004, 79).110 
 
Map 5.1. Area divisions of the FCD according to 2001 Management Plan (hectares) 
Source: Adolphe Ondoua and reproduced from (Mekok Balara 2001a, appendix, Map 14) 
 
The last area of the council forest was set for agroforestry (824 hectares) and the 
objective here was to regenerate the forest cover lost to local villagers’ old fallows as well as to 
                                                 
110 That was the case because within the FCD CIRAD and the Institute for Agricultural Research and 
Development (IRAD) were already conducting and expected to pursue their study on Sapelli’s characteristics 
(Mekok Balara 2001b, 88). 
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prevent the disappearance of certain tree species following harvesting operations (Mekok Balara 
2001b, 88). The agroforestry area was necessary since it was estimated that 73 percent of that 
portion of the forest had been affected by shifting agriculture (see Forêts et Terroirs 2000a, 2).111
As the above map points out, besides the above three areas division, the timber harvesting 
area, which occupies the largest surface area, was subdivided into five Annual Coupes (Assiette 
de Coupe Annuelle) or (AC).
 
112
MINEF 2001, Article 6, section g
 These ACs -labeled A1, A2, A3, A4, A5 on the map- holding on 
average more than 90,000 cubic meters were to be harvested for a five year period and then left 
to rest until the next rotation -defined in Cameroon as the space between two consecutive 
harvests at the same place ( )113- which was set at twenty five 
(25) years, the least according to forest rules and regulations at the time (see Mekok Balara 
2001a, 32; 37). 114
On top of the technical and economic reasons which motivated the design of the 2001 
management plan,
 
115
                                                 
111 The agroforestry area was further subdivided into four sectors: one reserved for plantation; one for 
support to natural regeneration; one for gathering the seedlings to be used for planting; and the last one to maintain a 
forest barrier around the agroforestry area (Mekok Balara 2001b, 89). Overall, with poaching, the other issue that 
this management plan had to grapple with concerned the threat represented by shifting agriculture (Mendouga 
Mebenga 2000a, 19). 
 politically, there was a specific reason for the choice of the five years AC 
112 Technically, these were not AC since they were designed to be harvested for a five year period. 
Nevertheless, for consistency purposes, the term AC is utilized here. 
113 Karsenty et al. (2006, 132) note that in Cameroon the rotation and the felling cycle are used to refer to 
the same thing, though it need not be the case. In fact, while the rotation is simply defined as the time taken to 
harvest the forest from the first AAC and come back to the beginning, the felling cycle for its part refer to the 
interval between the first and second felling in the same plot (parcelle). Today, per administrative rule, the rotation 
is officially set at thirty years (see MINEF 2001, Art. 6, g). 
114 The overall commercial volume was 452,191 cubic meters for 32 harvestable tree species. This volume 
represented the estimated volume after applying market preferences. Furthermore, if using only the following six 
species, Ayous, Bossé-Clair (Guarea cedrata), Bossé-Foncé (Guarea thompsonii), Dibétou/Bibolo (Lovoa 
trichilioides), Iroko (Milicia excelsa), Sapelli, and Tali, the commercial volume would be limited to 196,646 cubic 
meters (Mekok Balara 2001, 38). 
115 Three technical and economic reasons formed the basis of the choice for the 25 years rotation period 
(Mekok Balara 2001a, 32-33). First, Forêts et Terroirs argued that based on the fact that the east side of the FCD 
had ‘sufficiently’ regenerated itself, 25 years appear sufficient for the council forest to naturally replenish itself. 
Second, to the extent that the FCD surface area reserved for timber production was small (14,950 hectares), the 
project team hypothesized that ACs from that rotation, on average about 3,000 hectares, would be about profitable 
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which was based on ‘democratic politics’.116
Mongui Sossomba 2001a, 132-133
 In fact, as the Mayor of Dimako pointed out, in 
2000 an AC equaled about 2,500 hectares. This meant that since the FCD timber area was 
subdivided into five ACs, in five years the council forest would have been totally harvested and 
the council would have to wait for the 25 years rotation to end in order to harvest the forest 
again. That formula did not suit the council, the mayor argued, therefore timber harvesting in the 
council forest would be aligned to coincide with the five years municipal councilors’ term 
( ). In that scheme, each elected municipal council, the mayor 
as well as the other twenty four municipal councilors, would be afforded the chance to harvest 
timber inside only one AC (Mekok Balara 2001a, 56; and Mongui 2001a, 133). 
The argument was that at the end of the five year-municipal council term, Dimako 
residents could assess their elected officials based on their actual achievements, and then decide 
at the polls whether the team in office gets reelected or not (personal communication from a 
former project team member). That philosophy was the thrust of the first management plan; 
nonetheless when came the time to implement it, it immediately ran into conflict with the forest 
administration’s own guidelines. For instance, whereas the 2001 management plan had been 
officially approved as submitted, the forest administration insisted that instead of the five years 
AC, the forest be harvested on a yearly basis. In practice, that policy signifies no five years 
authorization; only one year at the time (see Global Witness Cameroon 2004b, 3).  In the end, 
three years after taking effect the 2001 management was replaced. 
                                                                                                                                                             
for private commercial firms to venture into the council forest. The third and final technical-economic reason was 
that since the council forest was not subject to a 15 years-definitive agreement (convention definitive) as FMUs, 
setting the rotation period according to that of FMUs’ was unwarranted (Mekok Balara 2001a, 33).115 Thus, for the 
project team, 25 years seemed the perfect choice technically and economically. 
116 It has to be noted that all the provisions of the 2001 management plan were approved by Dimako 
Council local authorities, whether reluctantly or not that is another matter. 
132 
5.7.3.2 The revised management plan (2006) 
Around the years 2005-2006, the forest administration -now referred to as MINFOF- 
under new guidelines issued beforehand compelled the Dimako Council to revise the 2001 
management plan to conform to the new legal framework (see CDKO 2006a). For the FCD, the 
year 2006 also fell on the five years obligatory period to revise forest management plans in the 
country.117
CDKO 2006a
 As a result, in March 2006, Mayor Mongui submitted a new plan, which, although it 
sought to fulfill the guidelines of Arrêté 0222 – the main regulatory document for establishing 
and monitoring the management plans-, fell short as the mayor himself acknowledged in the 
letter accompanying the plan ( ).118
MINFOF 2006
 Nonetheless, the plan was approved on 22 
March 2006 ( ).119
Among the central modifications, the 2006 management plan renamed and reorganized 
the three 2001 areas into timber production (15,286 hectares), protection (405 hectares), and 
agroforestry (587 hectares).
 
120 MINEF 
2001, Article 6, section g
 The rotation period by law being set at thirty (30) years (
), the management plan divided the FCD into six Unités Forestières 
d’Exploitation or Forest Exploitation Unit (FEU) and then into AACs (CDKO 2006b, 40). 
Similar to an AC a FEU is then subdivided into five smaller AACs which means that a FEU 
                                                 
117 In effect, forest rules and regulations stipulate that in spite of the management plan being approved for 
thirty years, it is nonetheless amendable every five years. 2006 in that view coincided to the year for which changes 
were needed since the management plan was submitted in 2001 -though only officially approved in 2003, two years 
later. 
118 Arrêté 0222, which was issued by MINEF on 25 May 2001, outlines in detail the procedures for 
establishing, approving, monitoring, and controlling management plans in the PFE’s forests (see MINEF, 2001). 
119 For instance, a new forest inventory, though required, was not completed. After the approval of the 
management plan, the council still had to provide the forest administration with FEU 2 management plan and 
produce the environmental impact study (see MINFOF 2006a). 
120 The 2006 division totals 16,278 hectares instead of the official surface area of 16,240 hectares meaning 
either two things. First, it could be either a computing error or a discrepancy due to the software used and the fact 
that the official boundary are certified by the national cartography institute which, the researcher has heard, still uses 
‘physical’ maps to draw boundary. Second, this could simply means that the FCD has overstepped its boundary, 
which local villagers argue it has by encroaching into their fields. In any case, the difference, 38 hectares, is 
meaningless for the argument of this study. 
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cannot be officially harvested at once. The implication of the change was that over was the five 
year AC; instead of harvesting about 3,000 hectares on average, now the council was afforded an 
annual average of 598 hectares to harvest or about five times smaller than in the previous plan. 
 
Map 5.2. Dimako Council Forest FEU and AAC divisions according to the 2006 management plan 
Source: Adolphe Ondoua, CTFC Bertoua, adapted  from (CDKO 2006b, 44) 
 
Map 5.2 above illustrates the actual FEU and AAC configuration of the FCD following 
the 2006 revision. From the map, two features are immediately noticeable. Firstly, except for the 
agroforestry area, designated agroforestry zone on the map, the current division does not include 
the protection area (refer to Map 5.1 for comparison). In point of fact, where previously was 
located the botanical and research area, replaced in 2006 on paper by the protection area, sits part 
of FEU 1 and 2 (AAC 2-1). This raises two immediate points. Either the 2006 management plan 
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simply repeated the 2001 area division without consideration for the actual division, or the area 
division was never delimited on the ground, thus the map could not reproduce what did not exist. 
In any case, as Chapter 6.0 shall illustrate, irrespective of this division the field evidence 
indicates that forest harvesting in the council forest is being conducted throughout the entire 
forest. 
Finally, in this revised version, the mayor affirmed that in spite of the lack of a new 
inventory as well as adherence to the forest administration guidelines, the council would focus 
on regeneration and reforestation (reboisement) in the agroforestry area and in the FEUs (CDKO 
2006a). That focus on regeneration and reforestation was surprising inasmuch as in the 2006 
revised management plan, the agroforestry and protection areas respectively decreased by 237 
and 61 hectares, while the area dedicated to timber harvesting expanded by 336 hectares as 
mentioned above. Rather than a focus on regeneration and reforestation, these newer provisions 
suggested that timber harvesting was still the main emphasis as the area dedicated to it had been 
enlarged. In spite of these changes, the 2006 version was almost similar to the 2001 management 
plan. A key difference, nonetheless, existed from before. While not explicitly mentioned in the 
2006 revised edition, instead of one monitoring commission, the CCG, there were now two. In 
the intervening period, a new commission had been created. Both are described below. 
5.7.3.3 The forest monitoring commissions 
To begin with, it has to be stated that despite local villagers eventually accepting the 
creation of the council forest, in the beginning some villagers were skeptical of the initiative. To 
illustrate, the southern located Pol Sector villages, which historically have claimed ownership of 
the forest lands, objected to the project, in particular because it included all the council villages 
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(Mendouga Mebenga 1999, 3).121
4.2.3.1
 The Pol argue that since other villages had already benefited 
from the SSV 1,000 CFAF Tax per cubic meter (see section  above, particularly note 49), 
and now their turn had come, it would be unfair to gazette the forest for the entire council or 
include the other villages into the council forest scheme, for that meant that “they would eat 
[receive money] twice” (Sangkwa 2001, 128). For the Pol, the issue was one of equity, and since 
the area reserved for the council forest was in their view a potential site for a SSV, thus they 
were set to receive the 1,000 CFAF tax, they would be the losers from the whole council forest 
project. 
At a more important level, for the purpose of this study, the second set of criticisms 
raised by local villagers during the Forêts et Terroirs’ village surveys was directed at the Mayor 
of Dimako. In truth, local villagers’ opposition or skepticism to the project was also motivated 
by what they saw as the risk of capture of the FCD by the mayor as well as the perceived lack of 
independence of the municipal council vis-à-vis the mayor. Because of his dual status as a 
private logger and mayor as well as what they saw as his (mis)handling of local affairs, the 
villagers argued that the mayor represented a threat for the council forest project, for a risk 
existed that he, the logger, might capture the council forest for his own benefit. A Forêts et 
Terroirs report summarized the villagers’ fears in the following terms: 
[For local villagers] the municipal council is not credible in their eyes because the 
municipal councilors have become yes-men (béni oui oui) when they meet during 
the municipal council [sessions]. [Local villagers have also expressed a critical 
judgment about] the person of the mayor for his dual hats as logger-mayor. They 
are more concerned about the logger than the mayor side and are afraid that the 
                                                 
121 The Baka pygmies also were lukewarm to the idea because they believed since they had been 
traditionally excluded by the Bantu from any council benefit, the same would happen with the council forest 
(Mendouga Mebenga 1999, 3). On the whole, local villagers’ claims were also motivated by the fact that the council 
forest constituted part of their livelihood zone (fields, gathering forest products, hunting and fishing). For the 
specific land claims of the two villages of Koumadjap and Nguinda, see (Assembé and Oyono 2004). 
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logger’s interests will take over those of the mayor on the FCD issue (Mendouga 
Mebenga 2000a, 17, emphasis added). 
 
Finally, another report commented that the villagers also questioned the mayor’s 
eagerness for the establishment of the council forest; they saw it as a sign that it was for his own 
interests that the mayor was a supporter of the initiative (Mendouga Mebenga 1999, 2, emphasis 
added). Because of all these concerns about equity, and most importantly, the fear of capture by 
the logger-mayor as well as the obedience of the municipal council to him, to assuage local 
villagers’ concerns the first monitoring commission was established. 
 
The Consultative Management Committee (CCG) 
In the first place, albeit the Dimako Council and the Forêts et Terroirs project created the 
Comité Consultatif de Gestion de la Forêt Communale de Dimako or the Consultative 
Management Committee (CCG), in practice the structure differs a bit from the requirements later 
set out in the 1999 MINFOF Decision 1354 regarding the gazetting process in the PFE (MINEF 
1999). On the other hand, the creation of the CCG on 22 June 1999 by Deliberation 4 of the 
municipal council met the official requirement of involving local populations, since in its midst 
the organization included local villagers’ elected representatives (see CRDKO 1999a). In line 
with their reservations about the independence of the municipal council, local villagers preferred 
not to involve councilors in the FCD daily management, and argued instead that an elected 
independent body was needed. As a Forêts et Terroirs report observed then, local villagers 
“believe that this way each village will see its interests protected and that the management of the 
council forest will be well monitored” (Mendouga Mebenga 1999, 4). However, the CCG that 
was established on top of the seventeen (17) elected members also comprised other members -
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either appointed or members of the council staff- with the mayor or his representative presiding 
over the commission (CRDKO 1999a, Art. 2), already putting in doubts its independence.122
Five months after the creation of the CCG, on 12 October 1999, Mayor Mongui followed 
the creation of the CCG with the issuance of the Municipal Arrêté 11 outlining the organization’s 
role. Article 1 of that Arrêté defining the role and duties of the CCG stated that the organization 
was mainly responsible for the following three matters: 
 
a) To participate in all activities leading to the final gazetting of that said forest 
for the council. 
b) To recommend to the municipal council any suitable ideas leading to the 
sound, profitable, transparent and sustainable management of that said forest.  
c) To recommend to the municipal council a sound plan for the utilization of the 
forest revenues by adequately choosing projects to be realized village by village 
in line with the five-year campaign plan set out by the municipal council and 
according to the law in force (CRDKO 1999b, emphasis added). 
 
With the first objective accomplished in 2001 with the reception of the gazetting decree, 
the two remaining roles of the CCG were not only to recommend the municipal council ways to 
‘soundly, profitably, transparently, and sustainably’ manage the council forest, but also propose 
local development projects to be realized in each of the council villages. Apart from the adoption 
of the forest boundaries by local villagers as well as the revision of the management plan -where 
                                                 
122 Except for the president, the CCG members included the following: the Forêts et Terroirs representative 
or the head of the forest administration local UTO-Doumé as advisers (both organizations have since been phased 
out); Dimako Council Secretary General as the CCG Secretary General; the Presidents of the three commissions of 
the municipal council Great works; Social Affairs; and Finances as Members; another member was the Bakoum-Pol 
superior chief André Bangda Junior, currently the second deputy mayor; two other members included the Chef de 
poste forestier or Forestry Post Chief (the equivalent of a forest ranger) locally known as CP; and the Ministry of 
Agriculture local representative, the Agriculture and Rural Development Subdivisional Delegate (Délégué 
d’Arrondissement d’Agriculture et Développement Rural). The Subdivisional Delegate of the Ministry of 
Agriculture although mentioned in the Forêts et Terroirs document, was not explicitly mentioned in the 
Deliberation 4 creating the CCG. In practice, despite the CCG organization being officially composed of all these 
people, locally only elected villagers are known by the appellation of CCG members. Furthermore, these elected 
CCG members simply refer to themselves as CCGs. The fact that only elected CCGs are called CCG members has 
led to some confusion for outside observers insofar that they were looking for a CPF as the law stipulates and could 
not find any, but only CCG members representing the CCG organization. In this study, when the appellation of CCG 
members is utilized, it is only reserved for villages elected representatives. 
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the CCG members had been involved and consulted- they had also concurrently with local 
councilors under Forêts et Terroirs trained in the basics and techniques of SFM as well as the 
monitoring of timber harvesting in the FCD (see Borie 2001; Efandène 2000). With that last step, 
the stage was set for both the CCG and the municipal council to experiment with the 
management of natural resources in Cameroun with the municipal council, including the mayor, 
holding the decision-making powers for projects submitted by the CCG. 
To help the CCG fulfill its mission, a forest register (sommier) of the forest to be used as 
a management tool was produced (see Ngniado n.d.). The forest register was conceived as the 
archival holder of all forest operations, whether timber harvesting or not, as well as a monitoring 
and control mechanism. It was designed to be consulted by local villagers upon request as well 
as allow CCG members to monitor and control the private commercial firm which would harvest 
the FCD. However, during a training session, local villagers expressed doubt as to whether the 
sommier would be available for all to consult, for they feared that the logger-mayor would try to 
control everything and preclude the other councilors as well as CCG members from accessing 
the document (see Efandène 2000, 7). 
Notwithstanding the doubts raised before and during the project, the hope of local 
villagers as well as the Forêts et Terroirs team was that the organization would serve as an 
accountability mechanism in the management of the council forest as well as utilization of its 
revenues (see Mendouga Mebenga 2000a, 18).123
                                                 
123 Since the establishment of the CCG, two elections have been held. The first 17 village CCG members 
were elected in 1999 under Forêts et Terroirs, but their term was officially slated to have commenced on 3 February 
2000. Overall, the first CCG members served for eight years, that is from 1999 until 2007 - apparently got their 
mandate extended by the mayor to coincide with the 2007 nationwide municipal elections- when new elections were 
held and fourteen ‘pioneer’ members were replaced. The first CCG was composed of the representatives of the 
following villages: Longtimbi, Baktala, Toungrelo, Kouen, Djandja, Mayos, Petit-Pol, Simeyong, Nkolmeyanga, 
Grand Pol, Nguinda, Kandala, Ngolambélé and four representatives for Dimako town. Following the council 
villages reorganization, the organization was expanded to twenty two (22) elected members who are scheduled to 
 Indeed, as far as forest management was 
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concerned, they were comforted in that belief when Mayor Mongui declared in 2000 during a 
communication to a Forêts et Terroirs’ workshop that the CCG “main role was to monitor the 
strict adherence (strict respect) to the management plan [provisions]” (Mongui Sossomba 2001a, 
134). 
 
The Monitoring Commission (CSE) 
Among the local organizations created during the FCD project, nowhere in the Dimako 
Council or Forêts et Terroirs written records is mentioned the name or the role of the 
Commission de Suivi de l’Exploitation de la Forêt Communale or the Monitoring Commission 
(CSE). Indeed, the monitoring commission was apparently never envisaged as part of the overall 
framework of forest management in Dimako Council. That was the case because -although a 
point of contention as the next chapter shall demonstrate- the role of monitoring the council 
forest was already reserved to the abovementioned CCG. A former member of Forêts and 
Terroirs for instance observed that when the mayor raised the issue of establishing a monitoring 
commission, the idea was objected to because the prime reason for creating the CCG was exactly 
to monitor the FCD. Additionally, the fear was that by adding another institutional layer, this 
would blur responsibilities between these separate organizations and complicate the task of 
monitoring the FCD. 
Despite that warning -or because of it as the next chapter shall argue- on 27 April 2004, a 
month after the official start of forest harvesting in the council forest, the municipal council 
                                                                                                                                                             
serve until 2012. The ‘status’ of villages being officially bestowed on by the central state, in 1999 only 17 villages 
had been officially recognized. Hence, for instance, the Ngombol and Akano villages which now have the full status 
of villages depended before on the Grand Pol chieftaincy. Because of those changes, five villages were allowed to 
vote their own CCG members. These villages are Petit-Ngolambélé, Tahatte, Tonkoumbé, Bongossi and Nkolbikon 
were allowed to vote their own CCG members. 
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approved the creation of the CSE to monitor the activities of the FCD. The following day, in 
Memorandum Number 02, Mayor Mongui outlined the CSE structure as well as responsibilities 
(see CRDKO 2004a). To justify the creation of the CSE and assuage his critics, the mayor 
argued that the organization was warranted because “we then realized that we needed an 
information gathering organization since being the [council] chief executive, the logging 
manager only answers to me. So by municipal decision, we created a light organization the 
Monitoring Commission” (Mayor Mongui, 9 March 2010). 
Officially, the commission’s responsibilities include the following: 
Gather every day from the FCD logging manager [chef de chantier] all the figures 
pertaining to the harvest inventory; felling; and skidding operations. Daily, the 
logging manager will provide gross volumes of timber on landings according to 
species; the sold quantities containing identification of the buyer, as written in the 
transportation letters [lettres de voiture]. [Nonetheless], CSE members do not 
have authority to a) monitor scaling operations; b) appraising the bids [l’expertise 
des lots]; c) in summary, their role is essentially to collect information from the 
logging manager and not to substitute him (CRDKO 2004a).124
 
 
The CSE as outlined by the 2004 Memorandum is composed of seven members: three 
municipal councilors; and three CCG members all under the supervision of the mayor or his 
representative (CRDKO 2004a). Membership in the commission is set at three months by 
municipal council term (five years) and is nonrenewable “in order to allow the involvement of 
more people, crucial element for the transparency [sic] which must exist in the exploitation of 
this forest” (CRDKO 2004a).125
                                                 
124 As another critical responsibility, the memo also afforded CSE members the right of say regarding the 
type of transaction for the sale of forest products, either no bid contract (vente de gré à gré), or auctions (vente aux 
enchères), as well as the choice of clients, and finally the enforcement of user rights in the FCD (CRDKO 2004a). 
 
125 What is more, like the CCG, the CSE can be dissolved by the municipal council at any time (CRDKO 
2004). 
141 
In order to monitor forest activities, CSE members were organized into a three person-
team composed of one deputy mayor, a councilor, and a CCG member. That system which 
involved one or two three members team alternating inspections inside the forest came to be 
known in town as the CSE rotation (see CRDKO 2004a).126
5.7.3.4 The revenue sharing formula 
 By including CCG members in the 
CSE, although the organization was not formally dissolved, this effectively meant that the CCG 
role, especially regarding the monitoring of the FCD, was subsumed into that of the CSE, which 
the study shall argue in Chapter 6.0 was the main objective all along. Lastly, save the CCG and 
the CSE, three other Dimako Council local organizations are officially ‘implicated’ into the 
management of the council forest: the council executive (the mayor and his deputies); the 
municipal council; and the Cellule de la Foresterie Communale or the Technical Unit (CFC) 
officially established in 2008. 
The forest management plan adopted and the CCG in place, in prelude to the start of 
harvesting operations, the next issue that the council and local villagers had to solve was how to 
redistribute the council forest revenues. That issue was resolved on 6 August 2003, a year before 
the official start of activities, when the Dimako Council Municipal Council adopted Deliberation 
7 or what is locally known as the revenue sharing formula (clef de répartition des revenues de la 
Forêt Communale de Dimako) (CRDKO 2003a). That Deliberation, as Figure 5.5 below 
illustrates, organized the distribution mechanism of the FCD revenues among four major 
components. While 50 percent of the forest revenues were reserved for local development and 
                                                 
126 From the interviews on the ground, it appears that the CSE started its activities earlier in an informal 
capacity before the mayor decided to establish an ‘official’ schedule for 2008 and 2009. Compared to the CCG, 
almost no detailed written records exist about the CSE role, schedule or rotation. 
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socioeconomic projects, 30 percent was set aside for the council operating costs as well as for its 
‘normal’ operations. 
Reforestation
10%
Villagers' cash 
handouts
10%
Council operating 
costs and 'normal' 
operations
30%
Local 
development and 
socioeconomic 
projects
50%
 
Figure 5.5. The 2003 revenue sharing formula for the FCD revenues 
Source: (CRDKO 2003a)  
 
Finally, of the remaining 20 percent, 10 percent each were devoted to reforesting the 
forest and to direct in-cash handouts to local villagers (CRDKO 2003a). The local villagers’ 10 
percent came to be known in town as the ‘10 percent to ‘eat’.127
                                                 
127 The 10 percent in-cash handouts are exclusively reserved for Dimako Council natives, since they are the 
‘owners’ of the forest. As the study shall illustrate, tensions have arisen more generally about the 10 percent issue, 
most notably about its distribution and also because of what some non natives or natives not residing in villages 
chosen for distribution perceive as blatant discrimination. Finally, because of some confusion among some 
Cameroonian observers, it is important to note that the Dimako 10 percent scheme is different from the RFA 10 
percent, though it probably borrowed from that. In Dimako, one is talking about amount ranging between 5-20 
million theoretically while in the case of the RFA the money involved is a lot of more significant and can go as high 
as 70 million CFAF. 
 The 2003 revenues sharing 
formula is significant not only because it is the lens through which the timber revenues are 
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supposedly allocated in the council, but also because part of the argument of the study is built 
around it. 
5.7.3.5 The sudden increase of revenues 
The adoption of the revenues sharing formula in order to better direct the use of the 
money was critical because as Table 5.2 below shows the council total revenues under the FCD 
have increased exponentially. In effect, the table discloses that over the 2004-2010 period, the 
council total revenues have hovered above 100 million CFAF each year, with a peak in 2005 of 
about 350 million CFAF, of which timber revenues represented more than 95 percent. 
Table 5.2. Total council (TC) and FCD revenues, 2004-2010 (CFAF million)* 
Year TC Revenues FCD revenues % FCD R/TCR 
2004 250,580,593 179,603,808 71.7 
2005 360,839,373 345,598,854 95.8 
2006 135,248,155 84,912,000 62.8 
2007 204,435,868 171,726,821 84 
2008 184,505,888 158,353,594 85.8 
2009 385,788,092 113,480,5861 29.4 
SUB-TOTAL 1,521,397,969 1,053,675,663 69.3 
2010 313,631,287 227,500,000 72.5 
TOTAL 1,835,029,256 1,281,175,663 69.8 
Source: (CDKO 2004b, 2005b, 2006c, 2007c, 2008c; 2009a, 4; 2009b, 2010d) 
*2009 total council revenues are projected figures from the council provisional budget. 2010 
figures of both total council revenues as well as FCD revenues are projections from the council 
provisional budget. 
1 The figures of 113,480,586 CFAF in timber revenues was reported by the council for the period 
of January-July 2009. However, the figures used in the council provisional budget for FCD 
revenues totaled 87 million CFAF. For consistency purposes, the January-July 2009 figure is used 
in this table. 
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Overall, the table demonstrates that in the six years period of 2004-2009, the council has 
earned in total revenues approximately 1.06 billion CFAF (2.1 million USD), an average of 
about 176 million CFAF (352,000 USD) a year, with the FCD alone accounting for more than 
two thirds of total revenues. If the 2010 projections held, the council would have earned 228 
million CFAF (456,000 USD) in additional timber revenues that year. This is in contrast to the 
previous six years period (1998-2003) where combined revenues, which had been declining, 
reached a little more than 160 million CFAF (322,000 USD) -around 30 million CFAF annually 
(60,000 USD) (see Appendix H). This means that under the FCD from 2004 to 2009 Dimako 
Council total revenues have approximately increased tenfold from the 1998-2003 years. 
5.7.4 A promising experience or an ominous presage of things to come? 
When the Forêts et Terroirs project ended in the summer of 2001, the FCD was a reality. On 13 
June 2001, the prime minister’s office issued Decree 386 which, by gazetting the area now 
encompassing the FCD, officially transferred that portion of forest to the Dimako Council. That 
16,240 hectares area of forest was no longer without a ‘legal’ proprietor; the area, now the FCD, 
was definitively part of the council private estate and was specifically designated for timber 
production (ROC 2001, Art. 2, 1). Moreover, the decree reaffirmed two principles of the 1994 
Forest Law. First, all timber harvesting operations within the forest had to be conducted 
according to the officially approved management plan (ROC 2001, Art. 2, 2). Second, and 
equally important for this study, “forest products of all type obtained through the exploitation of 
the Dimako Council Forest exclusively belong to the said council” (ROC 2001, Art. 2,3 emphasis 
added). 
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This was a sign that undoubtedly the council forestry experiment was in progress in 
Dimako, and as a Forêts et Terroirs report had optimistically remarked earlier, “the interest 
shown by the Dimako Council for the [sustainable] management of this forest as well as its 
relatively small area represent tools for success” (Forêts et Terroirs 1997, 12). For previously 
cautious local villagers, their main hope now, as another Forêts et Terroirs document observed, 
was that the forest revenues be equitably and fully used in their interest as well as invested for the 
benefit of all villages and particularly those closest to the forest (Mendouga Mebenga 2000a, 18, 
emphasis added). 
5.7.4.1 The self-harvesting mode 
The request that the timber revenues be equitably and fully used as well as invested for 
local development was significant because the expectation was that the royalties paid by the 
logging company would be substantial, and indeed as the preceding table has illustrated they 
turned out to be. For that reason, the final major decision that the Dimako Council had to take 
regarded the selection of the subcontracting timber harvesting firm which would better suit the 
council interests. Though the law permitted different modes of operating the FCD (see section 
4.3.5), the consensus during the local consultations of Forêts et Terroirs was that the council 
would not involve itself in forest harvesting. Indeed, the expectation was that “the council 
chooses a logger through the request for tender process (procédure d’appel d’offre[s]) and 
contracts with it an exploitation agreement (convention d’exploitation) for 15 years” (Efandène 
2000, 5). 
In that original scheme -as with the other existing council forests- once the forest 
subcontracted, the role of the council executive-led mayor would be limited to supervising the 
subcontracting firm, while the municipal council would continue to play its deliberative role and 
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the CCG was set as the monitor of the implementation of the management plan provisions (see 
Mongui Sossomba 2001a, 133-134). However, in opposition to the local consensus of the Forêts 
et Terroirs’ days, the municipal council led by Mayor Mongui refused to subcontract the FCD, 
electing instead to self-harvest the forest. Officially, the self-management regime means that all 
forest harvesting operations are conducted internally, and the council only elects to outside 
contractors when it is unable to conduct the task itself, even for complex tasks. It also means that 
the mayor, as the council chief executive, is the one responsible for the daily management of the 
FCD.128
For Mayor Mongui, the decision to self-harvest the forest was taken because the council 
wanted “to benefit from the gross margin”, that is benefit from most of the timber revenues. 
Moreover, Dimako Council First Deputy Mayor André Zéla Noumendjala added that the choice 
of self-management was based on the fact that “this avoid[ed] wasting timber that classical 
logging companies are known for. They only have financial profit as the leitmotiv and disregard 
other important objectives such as conservation and the rational management of forests” (23 
February 2010). 
 
Thus, from the mayor and his first deputy, two main reasons were at the heart of the 
council decision to self-harvest the FCD. Whereas, for Mayor Mongui, as a logger involved in 
forest harvesting before the FCD, the issue was simply a business one, i.e., benefit from the gross 
                                                 
128 The task of assisting the mayor rests with the Technical Unit (CFC) which is tasked with fulfilling and 
requesting all administrative documents to the forest administration as well as forest harvesting operations. These 
operations are conducted by a team of local villagers hired by the council through a six months rotative system 
under the management of the CFC head who only answers to the mayor. Only two people the CFC head and the 
logging manager work full-time while the rest of the workers are concerned with the rotative system. The rotative 
system is also locally known as the ‘rotation’ and is officially in effect for six months. In theory, it works as follows. 
All local villagers of the council with qualifications in timber harvesting submit their resume to the council 
authorities and a commission chaired by the first deputy mayor selects the workers for six months and the process 
starts anew at the end of the period. During the so-called selection process, an effort is made to include all villages 
so as to be representative. Nonetheless, in practice the system never worked and is broken for the simple reason that 
the mayor has reportedly captured the forest and thus employs people according to his own will. 
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margin, and this would be achieved by the removal of the middle man that a private commercial 
firm represented. By contrast, for his deputy Mayor Zéla, a former CCG member, it was out of 
regard for the rational or sustainable management of the forest that the council elected to self-
harvest the FCD. What is more, Mayor Zéla did not believe that a private commercial firm could 
at the same time seek profit and care for the preservation of the forest over the long term. In 
other words, for him, profit seeking was incompatible with sustainable management; only, the 
council could balance the two objectives of harvesting the forest for ‘profit making’ and 
‘sustainably’ manage it. 
That was the case because not only was the council the elected local government and the 
representative of local villagers, thus presumably having local interests at heart, but also because 
the council, in contrast to the ‘short’ term profit-motivated view of private commercial firms, 
harbored a long term view. 
5.7.4.2 The logger-mayor and the capture of the council forest 
Though it was perfectly legal, that the Dimako Council opted to self-harvest the forest 
was perilous for three interrelated reasons. First, as mentioned above the decision stood in 
contrast to what was agreed to locally during the village consultations as a prelude to the official 
creation of the FCD. Second, the council as an entity had never been engaged in forest 
harvesting, hence had no experience nor equipment or machines for that type of activity. Third, 
the decision was further startling in two respects. In the first place, in town Mayor Mongui was 
known to be involved in forest harvesting through his now-defunct private commercial firm 
FODDI. In fact, the preceding lines noted that local villagers were at first skeptical of the entire 
project insofar as they feared that the council forest might be a ploy designed to benefit the 
mayor’s company. Second, the mayor’s local reputation as far as forest harvesting was 
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concerned was that of a logger concerned more with short-term profit than the long term 
preservation of the forest. As CCG member 11 recalled about the mayor’s forest activities 
around the council: 
One year the mayor came around here to log the forest. He did not arrange the 
road; logging trucks came by quickly until the mayor withdrew his forest 
equipment. He logged the forest, and then left, abandoning a lot of timber saying 
that the timber was sick, that it had defects. He said that timber had diarrhea 
because water was flowing inside. He said that the timber was bad; it had this 
disease and so and so and thus abandoned the timber inside the forest. It was in 
1998 even before the FCD was created; [it was at the time] with his logging 
company FODDI (7 September 2010). 
 
In truth, the municipal council decision to self-harvest the forest was risky given the risk 
of the conflict of interest with the mayor being a logger at the same time; a risk, as this chapter 
described, which prompted the creation of the CCG because of local villagers’ disdain for the 
councilors’ subservience -the béni oui or yes-man councilors- vis-à-vis the mayor. On the other 
hand, because of the béni oui oui, it was almost certain that everything Mayor Mongui would 
propose to his fellow councilors would be accepted given his domination of the municipal 
council. As a Forêts et Terroirs’ report already quoted above warned “the populations believe 
that the management of the council affairs is not good. They say that for the moment everything 
seems to be done by the mayor of Dimako who impose his ideas on the municipal council which 
accepts everything that he proposes without constructive criticism. They are very preoccupied by 
this situation and are afraid that the management of the council forest becomes the personal 
business of the mayor” (Mendouga Mebenga 1999, 3-4, emphasis added). 
Because of these fears about the logger-mayor Mongui, Forêts et Terroirs and local 
villagers had argued that the mayor had to be primarily involved in this project in his capacity of 
a council elected official. By acting as a council elected official, it was believed the mayor would 
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be compelled to ensure the defense of all the council villages’ interests, not his company or self-
interest. As a project team member commented, “The Mayor of the Dimako Rural Council must 
be frank (doit jouer franc jeu) and should only involve himself in this endeavor as mayor and not 
logger. Any other act taken be it near or within the council forest shall doom the project of the 
council forest” (Mendouga Mebenga 1999, 5, emphasis added). 
All along villagers had been skeptical of Mayor Mongui’s intentions towards the FCD; 
they had sensed that he harbored a desire to capture the council forest for his own benefit. 
Apparently, they were on point, for in the end the decision to self-harvest the forest was in reality 
a ruse by the mayor that allowed him to capture the council forest. One local actor to 
immediately notice the situation was the staff of the Technical Operational Unit or Unité 
Technique Opérationelle de Dimako-Doumé (UTO-Dimako-Doumé). The UTO, populated by 
former staff members of Forêts et Terroirs -some of whom were also forest administration 
officials- had been established following the termination of the project.129
Among its main duty, the UTO had for mission to help the Dimako Council transition 
into its new role of local natural resources manager. Nonetheless, some in the UTO staff were 
not content with the direction of the FCD, for they had seen how the experiment had slowly 
veered from its original goal and immediately the confrontation with the mayor ensued. 
Benjamin Singer (
 
2008, 98) remarked for instance that: 
The UTO…turned out to have little effect in the field. The mayor of Dimako, on 
top of his own two logging companies that operated nearby, took over the 
management of the newly created council forest. Criticisms of the forest’s 
management by UTO staff set their relationship off on a bad footing. According 
to UTO staff, the mayor saw nothing more in the UTO than the eyes and ears of 
the Provincial Delegation of the Ministry of Environment and Forests with whom 
he also had a conflictual relationship. 
                                                 
129 The Forêts et Terroirs project also transferred all of the project assets (data, documents, equipment, 
vehicles and so on) to the UTO (for more see also Singer 2008, 98). 
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With the UTO now out of the way, a task which was officially completed with its 
dismantling in 2005 by the forest administration, the road was wide open for the Mayor of 
Dimako to fulfill his ambition of becoming a Big Man. Through the capture of the council forest, 
he could acquire the resources needed to become a viable local, regional and later national 
political actor. As it shall become plain by the end of the study, though local villagers and the 
project team had missed the ‘real’ motive of Mayor Mongui, that is the mayor sought to increase 
his political power and use the council forest as a springboard to higher political offices not only 
financially benefit from the timber revenues, the next chapters shall show how prescient some of 
the local villagers’ as well as Forêts et Terroirs’ warnings turned out to be. 
5.8 SUMMARY 
This chapter was organized around one main theme: the presentation of the Dimako Council as 
well as the Dimako Council Forest project. The chapter commenced by describing Dimako 
Council political, economic and social organization. The chapter then proceeded with the history 
of both French-funded projects API-Dimako and Forêts et Terroirs, the forerunners of the 
council forest. Of particular importance here, the study traced the genesis of some of the 
predicaments that the council forest experiment has faced since the beginning. In the same 
section, a subsection was devoted to presenting in detail the two management plans of the FCD 
as well as the local organizations and the institutional arrangements that were purportedly put in 
place to assist the council in its new role of natural resource manager. Finally, the chapter 
concluded by arguing that immediately before the start of forest harvesting in the FCD, the 
Mayor of Dimako had captured the forest, hence already planted the seeds for the experiment to 
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go awry primarily out of his desire to be the only one to benefit from the council forest and use it 
as a springboard for higher political offices. 
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RESULTS: DECENTRALIZED FOREST MANAGEMENT, LOCAL DEVELOPMENT, 
AND THE MAKING OF A ‘BIG MAN’ IN THE DIMAKO COUNCIL 
The following three chapters present the results of the field study regarding forest management 
decentralization in the Dimako Council. First, Chapter 6.0 demonstrates how the logger-mayor 
has managed the council forest, and how allegedly he has disregarded the management plan 
provisions during forest harvesting. Second, Chapter 7.0 describes how the timber resources 
have been allegedly used to enrich the mayor, rather than for local development or the 
improvement of local villagers’ conditions. Finally, Chapter 8.0, the chapter before the 
conclusion, demonstrates how, thanks to the forest resources, a relatively unknown local 
politician, the Mayor of Dimako, went from being the mayor of an impoverished rural council, to 
becoming a major national actor. In so doing, these three chapters shall illustrate the damage, 
through the forest management decentralization, that the decentralization theory has actually 
brought about on the ground. 
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6.0  SUSTAINABLE FOREST MANAGEMENT IS DEAD! 
“The management plan is the basic tool for good forest 
management. Unfortunately, on the ground people establish the 
document for the [forestry] administration since it is a requirement. 
They take an officially licensed contractor, establish it and put it 
aside after. They do it for the administration, that is why you need 
people on the ground [to ensure implementation]” (A forest 
administration official, 13 June 2010). 
 
“Currently the council forest does not exist anymore. They [the 
workers] come into people’s fields to cut timber (…) the council 
forest is finished; really the council forest was planned for twenty 
five years, but in six years, it’s all over and all that is in people’s 
fields it’s over too (….) a forest scheduled to last for twenty five 
years, but in six years, it’s over!” (Chief 28, 17 September 2010) 
 
“Dimako’s forest is about to finish. You have some mayors 
[talking about the Mayor of Dimako] who think that they have to 
plunder the forest before they retire” (A Cameroonian forester, 29 
May 2010). 
 
When the Dimako Council experience as the first Cameroonian [elected] local government to 
own and manage a council forest officially debuted in March 2004, the council had lost many of 
its formers residents and the council’s fiscal resources were dwindling thanks to the 2002 
departure of SFID. With the new experiment underway, at stake for the council was an 
opportunity to show the first council forest in the Congo Basin region managed according to new 
‘sustainable’ practices emphasizing respect for the forest social, ecological and economic 
functions. This chapter describes the consequences of the mayor’s capture of the FCD, in 
particular regarding the implementation of the two forest management plans’ main provisions; 
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the roles of both the local monitoring commissions as well as of the forest administration tasked 
with law enforcement in the country’s forests. 
6.1 IF YOU CAN DO AWAY, DO AWAY WITH IT OR THE DISREGARDING OF 
THE FOREST MANAGEMENT PLAN 
In Cameroon, as mentioned earlier, since the 1994 Forest Law, every forest title holder in the 
PFE is required to implement a management plan as part of the country’s commitment to SFM. 
Indeed, in the country, the management plan remains the primary tool to implement SFM. Over 
the six years since timber harvesting operations began in the FCD, the forest has been harvested 
under two management plans. From 2004 to 2005, the FCD was harvested under the 2001 
management plan; it was not until 2007 that the revised 2006 management plan went into effect. 
This section presents the evidences regarding the implementation of the two management plans. 
Overall, the evidence presented in the section reveals that, following his capture of the FCD, 
Mayor Mongui appears to have completely ignored the main provisions of the two management 
plans as well as ‘unsustainably’ harvested the forest.130
                                                 
130 It is important to note that while in practice the mayor has captured the council forest, as the study shall 
argue, it remains that the legal entity responsible for managing the FCD is the Dimako Council. That is why 
sometimes in this study, the word council is utilized instead of the mayor when specifically referring to matters of 
legal incidence. 
 
155 
6.1.1 The minimum diameters 
To begin with, one reason why the management plan is critical for SFM is that it sets both the 
Minimum Harvesting Diameter (MHD) and the Minimum Management Diameter (MMD).131
In the 2001 FCD management plan, the goal was to reconstitute 100 percent of the stocks 
after the first rotation (Mekok Balara 2001a, 34). That is why for instance fifteen species MHDs 
were raised insofar as the estimates showed that their stock recovery rates would be less than 100 
percent at the end of the first rotation (Mekok Balara 2001a, 34-35). Among these fifteen 
species, two species ayous and Lotofa, representing 27 percent of all diameters trees found in the 
forest, and also the two most felled trees (see below), saw their diameter respectively raised from 
80 to 100 centimeters and 60 to 70 centimeters (see 
 
The goal of the minimum diameter is to ensure that harvestable trees are still available at the end 
of the first rotation, that is that all forest trees do not get harvested at once (see Cerutti, Nasi and 
Tacconi 2008). Put another way, both diameters establish the minimum upon which trees can be 
felled (see Singer 2008, 107, note 61). Whereas the MHD is legally or administratively set by the 
forest administration, MMDs “are specific to a concession or council forest as they need to take 
into account the rate of reconstitution of every logged species (…) [MMDs] are thus based on 
predictions of the future trends of existing timber stocks and are supposed to be one of the key 
elements of sustainable logging” (Singer 2008, 107 note 61). 
Table 6.1 below). In simpler terms, the 
elevation of these fifteen species’ diameters meant that fewer trees of those species were to be 
felled when the first management plan was in effect. But in reality the elevation of the fifteen 
species diameter, in particular for ayous, did not affect harvesting practices in the FCD. 
                                                 
131 In Cameroon, they also are respectively known as the Diamètre Minimum d’Exploitabilité (DME) and 
the Diamètre Minimum d’Aménagement (DMA). 
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In spite of the obligation to abide by the MHDs and MMDs provisions of the 
management plan, from the beginning of timber harvesting operations in the FCD, the mayor and 
his team were felling trees which had not yet reached maturity. This suggests that they were 
engaged in illegal activities, for illegal logging is defined “as the felling and extraction of logs 
from forests that is not in conformity with an approved forest management plan or an official 
license issued by forest authority in accordance with operations authorized by prevailing forestry 
laws” (Mir and Fraser 2003 quoted in Alemagi and Kozak 2010, 554). 
That alleged practice of illegally logging the forest -in this case below the management 
diameter- was noticed in a 2004 report by Global Witness Cameroon, then the independent 
monitor of Cameroon’s forests (2000-2005). To illustrate, after visiting the FCD the team 
observed that “an inspection of log ponds revealed that DRC [Dimako Rural Council] did not 
comply with stipulations on the minimum exploitable diameter of Ayous (100 cm) set by the 
management plan. In one of the log ponds, the mission team found about half a dozen ayous logs 
with a diameter less than the 100 cm” (Global Witness Cameroon 2004b, 2, italics original).132
The Global Witness episode happened on 18 May 2004, three months after the official 
start of timber harvesting in the FCD, and could be imputed to the fact that the council forest had 
 
The fact that ayous was harvested below the legal and management diameters was confirmed by 
the testimonies of those who were present at the start of the FCD, like CCG member 1 who 
remarked that the “the big problem with illegal logging happening in the FCD is that timber is 
felled under diameter; it is not a normal diameter” (5 September 2010). 
                                                 
132 In another document summarizing its mission in Cameroon, Global Witness observed that following the 
independent forest monitoring project in the country, the nature of forest violations had shifted. In fact, the 2005 
report noted that while on the one hand out of boundary logging had decreased, on the other hand “logging 
undersized stems [under diameter] and logging over the allowed volume within boundaries remain[ed] substantial” 
(Global Witness 2005, 3). 
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just commenced its activities. Nonetheless, more recent data abounds about the lack of respect of 
the MHD and MMD in the FCD. As an illustration, a forest administration official recalled a 
recent episode where trees were being felled outside of the management plans diameters. He 
commented that “you go to inspect the forest and you see a log with buttresses and they tell you 
that it is the second of two, but you clearly see that this is under diameter. When you ask where 
is the first of one they tell you that they abandoned it in the forest” (19 December 2010). 
Apart from the technical jargon used here first of one and second of two, which means 
that when the log is too large it is sectioned into two logs and the first one is referred to as the 
first of two while the second as the second of two, this official is alluding to the same issue 
encountered by Global Witness Cameroon a few years ago, that is the harvesting of trees below 
the legal and management diameters. As a matter of fact, if the log was a second of two, it should 
not have had the buttresses; only the first one would have them since it is the one closer to the 
ground where the diameter is measured from. 
The situation about harvesting trees without regard for their diameters appeared 
especially widespread during the years 2004-2005 when the five years AC was in effect. During 
that time, a local observer recalled that “in those years…they [the workers] crushed the forest 
like private commercial firms do” (24 February 2010, emphasis added). In those years, local 
villagers recalled that the areas covered by FCD workers were immense as to wonder whether 
the forest logging rotation cycle would last twenty five years as prescribed in the 2001 
management plan. 
From the 2004 Global Witness Cameroon inspection in the FCD and the year 2009, five 
years have passed, but the conclusion remains seemingly the same: the FCD is being harvested 
outside of the management plan provisions, in this case those regarding species’ MHD and 
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MMD. Indeed, for one forest worker, though he blames the situation on the poor working 
conditions within the forest, He conceded that “we do not have the tools to ensure that the 
diameter is alright. When you ask the fallers how they do, they tell you that they know by 
experience. If they cut under diameter or not, you do not even know” (4 February 2010). 
However, as with all explanations provided in Dimako, this only explains part of the story; 
rather, the process of felling trees under the management plan MHD and MMD provisions 
appears to be part of a pattern of deliberately disregarding the management plan provisions, a 
pattern which continued with the change of the MHD and MMD as the study shall demonstrate 
below. 
6.1.1.1 The after-the-fact change of diameters 
As already mentioned in Chapter 5.0, in 2006 the forest administration ordered the 
revision of the 2001 management plan. That revision of the management plan was critical 
because it also permitted Mayor Mongui and the council to make some changes to its main 
provisions. Among the most significant changes from the 2001 provisions, tree species MMDs 
(see Table 6.1 below) as well as the stock recovery rate were decreased. Ayous, the most 
harvested species in the FCD, saw its diameter fall from 100 in 2001 to 90 centimeters in 2006 
(shown in bold in the table). 
Table 6.1. Species diameter in the FCD management plans 
Species 2001 2006 
Ayous 100 90 
Fraké 80 70 
Iroko 110 100 
Tali 90 80 
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Lotofa 70 70 
Sapelli 110 110 
Source: (CDKO 2006b, 38; Mekok Balara 2001a, 34) 
 
Usually, to change the provisions of the plan, such as the one regarding the diameters, a 
new inventory is necessary since unlike MHDs which are administratively set, MMDs are 
supposedly based on such factors as the forest structure, diameter distribution, increment and 
mortality of main species, and the rotation regime (FAO 2003, 121). However, since the council, 
according to Mayor Mongui, was unable to access API-Dimako complete data as well as did not 
conduct a new inventory before the establishment of the 2006 management plan (see CDKO 
2006a), it is unclear on which basis the 2006 changes which led to new ayous and other species 
diameters, rested upon.133
The change of diameters had two immediate impacts. The first one was that the new 
diameters allowed more trees to be felled under the 2006 management plan provisions. Second, 
and related to the first one, was that since more harvesting could be done on ayous and other 
species, the council could ask the forest administration for what is locally known as a Repasse, or 
the authorization to go collect the species above the new diameter. That possibility of obtaining 
 In the absence of those data, the 2001 MMDs should have been 
maintained as a precautionary measure, especially given the fact that for foresters the MHD and 
MMD are known as the last defenses against unsustainable logging. 
                                                 
133 The main reason advanced as to the MMDs change was that “because of the dilapidated state of the 
equipment left by the Forêt et Terroirs Project and of the type of data analysis, it has been difficult to directly 
analyze data with the TIAMA software [the forest administration official software for producing management 
plans]. Data were transferred using the original ACCESS software. However, some minor inconsistencies still 
remain” (CDKO 2006b, 37). In other words, data analysis procedures were to be ‘blamed’ for the discrepancy 
between the 2001 and 2006 management plans MMDs. Finally, remember that in contrast to the 2001 management 
plan, this plan was officially produced by an outside contractor at the request of the council authorities. 
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from the forest administration a new authorization to harvest the residual volume was 
emphasized in the 2006 management plan as follows: 
FEU number one was logged at once according to the specifications of the first 
management plan. During the year 2006, Dimako Rural Council is entitled to 
request the authorization to go back [to FEU 1] in order to log the species which 
harvesting diameters have been reduced, in particular Ayous which is the main 
species being logged. Ayous diameter change from 100 to 90 cm enables the 
council to log a residual stock estimated at a gross volume of 13,005 m3 for 1,626 
harvestable trees (CDKO 2006b, 40). 
 
Yet, the assumption of a residual volume following the decrease of MMDs in the 2006 
management plan could only hold to the extent that the previous 2001 provisions were already 
being implemented, which they were not as the evidence presented above demonstrated. As this 
forest administration official commented: 
Dimako harvested the forest in the dark. In the first management plan ayous 
diameter was 100 centimeters; in 2006 it was brought down to 80 centimeters. So 
[it was] suggested that the mayor asked MINFOF to go back and fell the ones that 
were above 80 centimeters, but everything was already gone so he [the mayor] 
could not ask for official permission since he was not already respecting the 
diameter (20 March 2010). 
  
In other words, the assumption that the council could go harvest the residual volume was 
misleading because, to start with, the council was not respecting the diameters. Put another way, 
Dimako Council authorities headed by the mayor had already logged ayous trees below the legal 
limit set out in the 2001 management plan even before they officially decided to decrease it in 
the 2006 revised version from 100 to 90 centimeters. The decision to decrease it appeared as an 
after-the-fact move to conform to a situation which was already occurring. At the same time, the 
decision from the forest administration to approve the new diameters meant that legally the 
council was allowed to harvest more trees than previously permitted in spite of the fact that it 
was not already adhering to the previous diameters’ provisions. 
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For SFM respecting the minimum diameter is very important because it is the key to 
ensuring that some species do not disappear and that forests are still going to exist for the next 
generations. Indeed, the minimum diameter “is mainly chosen to ensure that there will still be a 
significant number of harvestable individuals left for the next rotation period” (Cerutti, Nasi and 
Tacconi 2008). Thus, if the council harvests timber without regards for the MHDs and MMDs, 
this is endangering the long term survival of a particular species, such as ayous, especially given 
the fact that the council is harvesting the forest outside of any planning as shall be shown below. 
Further, inasmuch as the council forest is, as was mentioned above, not a primary forest, 
but a forest which was harvested twice by SFID until the 1980s, this disregard of the MHDs and 
MMDs is of great consequence to the forest. That is the case because as a Global Witness brief 
observes “in practice, many forest concessions in the tropics are commercially logged out well 
before the end of the first rotation” (Global Witness 2009, 4). The same case seems to be 
happening in Dimako Council where in the search for timber revenues forest harvesting is 
characterized by timber mining and ‘skimming’, that is the selective harvesting of commercial 
high value species, principally ayous and lotofa (for more on timber mining, see Global Witness 
2009, 4; Sieffert and Truong 1992, 128). 
6.1.1.2 Logging by orders or ‘skimming’ the forest in search of ayous 
First, to account for the ‘skimming’ practices inside the FCD, one major reason has been 
put forward by council authorities. In effect, local authorities have argued that the buyer of FCD 
timber ALPI Cameroon, also known locally as Alpicam, is responsible for this situation insofar 
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as it is electing only to purchase ayous and lotofa. 134
Granted that the buyer is directing the selection of species, it is also fair to say that the 
‘logging by order’ strategy only explains part of the story. That is the case because in the six 
years since the council has been engaged in timber harvesting despite unofficially complaining 
on the terms of the agreement, the fact remains that the council has not denounced it nor has 
proposed another commercial strategy. In the same way, while the reason for the focus on the 
two species is subject to debate, the fact remains that ‘skimming’ is operating in the forest. 
 Further, since the council is said to have 
signed an exclusive contract with Alpicam, this means that the council has to fulfill its 
obligations by providing the buyer with the species it needs. As the CFC head Alain Ebalé 
declared “we have one main timber buyer and we move according to the rhythm of its orders. If 
it exclusively needs ayous, we fell it; so we log on orders. If we do not have an order for sapelli, 
we do not fell it” (22 January 2010, emphasis added). 
To illustrate the point about ‘skimming’ or the hyperselective harvest and the search for 
ayous and lotofa, Table 6.2 below provides the figures regarding the proportion of the two most 
felled species in the FCD. 
Table 6.2. Percentage of the two most felled species in the FCD, 2004-2009* 
Species 20041 20051 20072 20083 2009 2004-2009 
Ayous 66.7 53.8 81.7 40.7 80.7 63.3 
Lotofa 18.7 17.1 11.8 45.8 14.3 17.76 
TOTAL 85.4 71 93.5 86.5 95 86.3 
Source: (CDKO 2008a; 2008e, 3; 2010a, 2; 2010c, 66; n.d.a; Mongui Sossomba n.d.) 
*officially, no harvesting occurred in 2006 
1 Incomplete figures 
2 Does not include the extended period figures (1 January-14 February 2008)  
                                                 
134 Alpicam is a subsidiary of the Italian group ALPI with its main factory being located in the Eastern 
Region town of Mindourou. It is also the subcontractor of the Moloundou Council Forest (see Om Bilong et al. 
2009, 6). 
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3 These figures are based on timber sold not felled 
 
First, though the figures are incomplete and should be taken cautiously because as 
mentioned in Chapter 3.0 some local observers have argued that they have been understated to 
detract from the fact that in the FCD illegal logging is allegedly rampant, Table 6.2 indicates that 
the two species ayous and lotofa dominate timber production in the FCD. In fact, in the 2004-
2009 period both species, as the table shows, accounted for between 71 and 95 percent of total 
production, with on average approximately 87 percent over the period. More importantly, the 
table points toward ayous being the main felled species (63 percent over the six years period) in 
the FCD. In that sense, the FCD figures are also consistent with those of the 2006 audit of the 
forestry sector where it was pointed that ayous and Sapelli remained the two most felled species 
in Cameroon accounting for 55 percent of the total production in 2004, with ayous at 38 percent 
alone (Karsenty et al. 2006, 21-22). 
At the same time, this sign of selective harvesting is damaging for the forest. In effect, 
Alain Karsenty observed about logging in ‘high forests’ of the Congo Basin that it “is very 
selective, with on average, one to two trees felled by hectare (but many more destroyed to get 
access to and extract them from the plots). Such ‘creaming’ of forest stands is not a direct factor 
of deforestation, but it can lead to biological erosion as it generally targets a handful of species” 
(2010, 124). Based on the above figures, the same conclusion of a hyperselective harvest seems 
to apply to Dimako as well, and, more importantly, it is not in line with the official commitment 
for SFM that the mayor expressed in the past (see Mongui Sossomba 2001a). 
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6.1.1.3 The stock recovery rate 
Of equal importance and related to the MHDs and MMDs, the second and final change 
from the 2001 management plan regarded the stock recovery rate (taux de reconstitution) of the 
tree species. That stock is defined as “the ratio of the potentially exploitable wood stock at the 
end of a felling cycle to the potentially exploitable wood stock at the beginning of this cycle, just 
before logging” (Picard et al. 2009, 2138).135
Cerutti, Nasi, and Tacconi 2008
 In 2001, the forest administration administratively 
set that rate at a minimum of 50 percent of the initial stock ( ) -
half of the 2001 management plan. Thus, during the 2006 revision, the council followed suit and 
diminished the stock recovery rate from 100 to 50 percent. 
To clarify, as already mentioned, the first management plan objective was to reconstitute 
100 percent of the timber stocks used during the first twenty five years rotation (Mekok Balara 
2001a, 34). That objective undergirded the decision to raise the fifteen species diameters in 2001 
as well as prohibit the harvesting of certain species such as Moabi (Baillonella toxisperma) and 
Red Doussié (Afzelia bipindensis) because of their low density as well as risk of complete 
extinction (Mekok Balara 2001a, 33-35). It was expected that at the end of the first twenty five 
years rotation, the total yield (possibilité totale) would have increased by 30 percent (Mekok 
Balara 2001a, 56). Conversely, by decreasing the stock recovery rate from 100 to 50 percent, this 
meant that the forest yield too at the end of the thirty years rotation of the 2006 management plan 
would get affected. 
To illustrate, Table 6.3 below compare the 2001 and 2006 management plans stock 
recovery rates for the FCD primary felled species. 
 
                                                 
135 The potentially exploitable wood stock “is defined as the number of stems with a diameter greater than a 
threshold called the ‘minimum diameter for exploitation” (MDE) [MHD}” (Picard et al. 2009, 2138-2139).  
165 
Table 6.3. Stock recovery rates for the FCD main felled species 
Species 2001 MMD 
(cm) 
Rate (100%) 2006 MMD 
(cm) 
Rate (50%) 
Ayous 100 104 90 80 
Fraké 80 100 70 81 
Lotofa 70 106 70 67 
Sapelli 110 117 110 111 
Tali 90 125 80 98 
Source: (CDKO 2006b, 38; Mekok Balara 2001a, 34) 
cm: centimeters 
%: percent  
 
Overall, the table shows that based on the 2006 recovery rates, ayous, Fraké, Sapelli, and 
Tali stocks shall get reconstituted each by more than 80 percent compared to the more than 100 
percent before in the 2001 management plan. The main discrepancy in Table 6.3 regards the 
Lotofa where at the same diameter, the reconstitution rates are different 106 and 67 percent 
respectively.136
More importantly, given the fact that the FCD is being harvested outside of the MHD and 
MMD as well as ‘skimmed’, it is doubtful that the above recovery rates shall be maintained. As 
one official commented about the FCD stock recovery rates “if you do 50 percent every time, it 
becomes 25 percent, and then 12.5 percent instead of the 50 percent from the beginning” (20 
March 2010). By that he meant that at the onset the stock recovery rate was 50 percent and if 
trees are being cut under diameters, the likelihood that the recovery rate would increase is 
lessened. In other words, doubts exist that at the end of the first rotation, ayous trees shall be 
 
                                                 
136 This could be attributed to an error or more likely stands as a confirmation of the argument made above 
that the change of diameters did not rest on sound data. 
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reconstituted by 80 percent as the above table suggests. After all, the main rationale for 
augmenting the diameters in the 2001 management plan was to protect the long term recovery of 
a number of species as well as prevent their extinction in case of overharvesting (Mekok Balara 
2001a, 33-34). 
Therefore, unless the 1995 inventory, and later the 2000 update, overestimated the entire 
stock before or the council, read the mayor, conducted a new inventory, which it did not by its 
own admission, again these changes are of great consequence for the long term health of the 
council forest. This is even more troubling if one is to believe Singer’s account (2008, 108) that a 
new inventory was conducted in the FCD after API-Dimako and Forêts et Terroirs, and that the 
inventory revealed that certain species stocks, most notably ayous, had been overestimated.137
In the end, the conclusion that can be drawn from the harvest of the council forest trees 
under diameter as well as the decrease of the stock recovery rate from 100 to 50 percent is that 
the principle of precaution that guided the 2001 management was all but abandoned in favor of 
more harvesting in the FCD in spite of the fact that the data on which these changes rested were 
apparently questionable (
 
Hence, instead of lowering ayous MMD, it should have been elevated to account for those 
updated data if they exist. 
for more on the 'problematic' quality of some officially approved 
management plans in Cameroon, see Vandenhaute and Doucet 2006).138
                                                 
137 Singer (2008, 108) reports that this information was given to him during an interview. However, this 
researcher did not come across evidence which would confirm or deny that information, though he believes that it is 
probable that API-Dimako and Forêts et Terroirs might have overestimated the potential of the FCD simply by the 
fact that the inventory was conducted with a sampling rate of 1 percent, which is normal for that type of inventory. 
Thus, with such a low rate, anything is possible. Finally, the fact that the FCD is not a primary forest, the study 
would argue, militates for a more cautious approach to timber harvesting in that forest. 
 Furthermore, the 
138 In their comparative study of twenty officially approved management plans in Cameroon, the two 
authors observed that: “the approval of the management plans seems, based on our results, to have been done at the 
very least in a lax manner. The study shows, in fact, that the quality of some management plans stands well below 
the acceptable minimum, some basic parameters having not been respected. In this context, it is clear that some 
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lowering of the recovery rate also meant that Dimako Council’s burden on reconstituting FCD 
timber stocks, as the owner of the forest, was lessened as could be seen from the table before. 
The process also allowed the council to reenter already harvested areas as we shall see below, 
and this did not bode well for the council forest to the extent that it was shown previously that 
trees were harvested below the officially approved MHDs and MMDs. 
6.1.2 The logging rotation cycle 
Among the objectives established by the management plan, the logging rotation/harvesting cycle 
(le passage en coupe), which is defined as “the sequence of harvesting in space and time for both 
management units and annual coupes” (FAO 2003, 17), constitutes a key element for SFM. This 
cycle is significant because it indicates the order of harvesting the FEUs as well as AACs that a 
given forest is set to follow over the rotation period. The analysis which follows is based on the 
2006 revised version of the management plan. 
To begin with, Table 6.4 below indicates the logging rotation cycle by FEUs that the 
FCD was scheduled to follow until the year 2027. The table reveals that FEU 2 was supposed to 
be harvested until 2012 when FEU 3 would start and last until 2017. Finally, from 2017 on, 
FEUs 4, 5, and 6 would complete the first rotation before harvesting resumes in FEU 1. 
Table 6.4. Logging rotation cycle, 2006 management plan 
Items 2007 2012 2017 2022 2027 Observations 
FEU 2 3 4 5 6 FEU 1 was 
logged under 
the AC system 
(2004-2005) 
                                                                                                                                                             
management plans would have required, before approval, modifications which could have led the beneficiary to 
carry out again on the ground studies (2006, 41, emphasis added)”. 
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Surface area 
(hectares) 
2,504 2,442 2,474 2,511 2,503 12,434 hectares 
Source: (adapted from CDKO 2006b, 40) 
 
To further illustrate the point about the logging rotation cycle, Table 6.5 below contrasts 
the logging rotation cycle set in the 2006 management plan with the actual cycle being pursued 
in the FCD. In contrast to the first table, this table shows the logging rotation cycle in AACs, not 
FEUs that the council was theoretically set to have followed since 2007. 
Table 6.5. Comparison of the 2006 management plan logging rotation and actual cycles in the FCD* 
Items 2007 2008 2009 2010 TOTAL 
2006  2-1 2-2 2-3 2-4 4 
AAC surface 
area (hectares) 
501 501 499 504 2,005 
Actual 11; 2-1 2-1; 2-3 2-4 3-1 92 
AAC surface 
area (hectares) 
3,261 1,000 504 490 5,255 
Source: (CDKO 2010b, 2; CRDKO 2006, 18; MINFOF 2007, 2008, 2009a) 
* The year 2006 is not included here because officially there is no record of timber harvesting 
operations. The reason given was that because of the revision of the 2001 management plan as 
well as the delay engendered by the process, the authorization to proceed that year was given late, 
precluding actual operations. 
1 FEU 1 was harvested at once in 2004 and 2005 before the 2006 management plan 30 AACs 
division. Since FEU 1 was never subdivided, in 2007 the harvest authorization was given for the 
entire FEU. 
2 Four AACs plus FEU 1 subdivided into five AACs 
 
The comparative analysis of the above table reveals two issues: first, the discrepancy 
between the management plan logging rotation cycle and the actual practice being followed in 
the FCD, and second, the harvesting of two AACs at the same time. To illustrate about the first 
issue, the table shows that while in 2008 the council was set to harvest AAC 2-2, it harvested 
AAC 2-3; in 2009, where AAC 2-3 was slated to be harvested, instead the council went to 2-4. 
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Finally, in 2010 where AAC 2-5 was scheduled, the council harvested 3-1. However, from Table 
6.4 before, the council was not supposed to have harvested FEU 3 until 2012; rather as Table 6.5 
suggests by 2010, the council had already exhausted FEU 2 and moved on to FEU 3, two years 
ahead of schedule. 
The overall conclusion from the two previous tables is that the management plan logging 
rotation cycle has been discounted and the FCD is being harvested according to an unofficial 
schedule. That assessment appears to be confirmed by the 2009 MINFOF-GTZ-CTFC first 
report on the implementation of the management plans in the four council forests of Dimako, 
Gari-Gombo, Moloundou, and Yokadouma (Om Bilong et al. 2009). Speaking about the FCD, 
the report observed that: 
The CFC, led by a technician superior of Water and Forests [the diploma title] 
and the logging team have a limited expertise as far as the management of a 
logging site [chantier forestier] is concerned. In effect, timber harvesting in the 
forest does not obey any planning and the extraction of some species happens five 
months after being felled. Harvesting simply entails entering the forest every time 
there is an order [commande] and takes what the customer needs (Om Bilong et 
al. 2009, 11, emphasis added). 
 
For Dimako observers, though they were aware of the situation, great was the 
bewilderment when they learned that the council was about to initiate timber harvesting in FEU 
3 in 2010. One forester upon learning that story exclaimed “[the FCD] is already at 3-1 in 6 years 
of harvesting when they are supposed to be at 2 something! It’s like the forest has been harvested 
for 11 years now” (20 July 2010). 
The second issue is the practice of harvesting two AACs at the same time within the 
forest. As an illustration, whereas in 2007 the council was set to harvest AAC 2-1 alone, it also 
harvested FEU 1. The same situation happened in 2008 where the council harvested AAC 2-1 
again and 2-3 instead of 2-2. On the whole during the period 2007-2010, the council officially 
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harvested a total of nine AACs, that is four AACs plus one FEU representing more than a third 
(5,255 hectares) of the official surface area dedicated to timber production (15,286 hectares) 
instead of the 2,000 hectares officially scheduled for harvest. That was the case because FEU 1 
(2,760 hectares) was never subdivided into five AACs during the 2006 revision139
6.1.2.1 The récolement 
; hence, the 
council was authorized to harvest the entire area in spite of the fact that it was officially closed to 
forest harvesting as the CFC head affirmed as well as the abovementioned fact that during the 
years 2004-2005, FEU 1 was ‘crushed like private commercial firms do’. 
Viewed broadly, while it should have been illegal for the council to harvest two AACs at 
the same time, it is not in itself a violation of the law in Cameroon to harvest one AAC two years 
in a row, as in 2007 and 2008 in Table 6.5. In fact, in forestry, an FEU or AAC can be opened to 
harvesting generally for a maximum of two years before its closure until the next rotation (see 
FAO 2003, 17). Consequently, in Cameroon that process is known in French as récolement.140
                                                 
139 The 2006 management plan noted that “the subdivision of FEU 1 into annual allowable cut [AAC] will 
be completed during the next revision [of the management plan] when the inventories will be redone” (CDKO 
2006b, 40). 
 
The récolement scheme is important for this study because the Mayor of Dimako since 2007, 
officially under the pretense of fulfilling the customer’s orders, has taken advantage of the 
process to repeatedly reenter already harvested areas within the FCD as illustrated in the table 
below. 
140 According to a forest administration official, that process allows timber harvesters who have not been 
able to collect all the species authorized in the PAO to request a new authorization to revisit and harvest the 
remaining timber volume. That process exists, it is said, to provide some flexibility to timber harvesting firms which 
have to provide species based on market demands that might not be available in a given year. Nonetheless, it is 
important to note that this scheme only works to the extent that timber harvesters once granted the first authorization 
limit harvesting to the tree species mentioned in the initial PAO. Finally, the steps to obtain a récolement certificate 
(certificat de récolement) to renew an AAC are spelled out in MINEF Arrêté 222 in its Art. 41, 1 (for more see 
MINEF 2001). 
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Table 6.6. Comparison of PAO and FCD felled volumes, 2007-2009 
Items 2007 2008 2009 TOTAL 
Harvested AACs 11; 2-1 2-1; 2-3 2-4 92 
PAO volume (m3) 23,554 20,037.6 15,797 59,388.6 
FCD officially 
declared volume 
(m3) 
6,1843 6,7044 8,844 21,732 
Remaining volume 17,370 13,333.6 6,953 37,656.6 
PERCENTAGE 
FELLED 
TREES-PAO 
26.2 33.4 56 36.6 
Source: (CDKO 2008a; 2008d, 3; 2010a, 2; CRDKO 2008; MINFOF 2007, 2008, 2009a) 
1 FEU 1 was harvested at once in 2005 and 2005 before the 2006 management plan 30 AACs division 
2 Four AACs plus FEU 1 subdivided into five AACs 
3 Does not include the 1,746 m3 figures for the special authorization from 1 January to 14 February 2008 
4 Does not include the 1,154 m3 Lotofa figures for the special authorization from January to February 2009 
m3: cubic meters 
 
Table 6.6 indicates that, save 2009 where the council harvested 56 percent of the legally 
authorized volume, in 2007 and 2008, only 26 and 33 percent of the legally authorized volume 
were harvested within the FCD. Overall, officially during the three years period, the council 
harvested about 37 percent of the FCD legally allowed volume of trees. Because of the 
récolement request, the council was allowed to harvest both FEU 1 and AAC 2-1 in 2007, 
whereas in 2008 it harvested both AACs 2-1 -harvested the year prior- and the newly opened 2-
3.141
                                                 
141 Technically, to harvest FEU 1 again, following the 2006 revision of the management plan which 
decreased some tree species diameters, the council requested the repasse or reentry to harvest the trees above the 
new diameter (see the section on the minimum diameters). At the same time, the distinction between terms such as 
récolement, repasse (reentry) or others used by the forest administration is difficult to grasp not only because in 
practice they mean the same thing, that is extending the harvest in already harvested areas, but also because these 
constitute ways to circumvent the 1994 Forest Law as some scholars have remarked (see Cerutti, Nasi and Tacconi 
 In theory, because of the 2009 remaining volume of more than 6,900 cubic meters, the 
council is entitled in the future to request a récolement. 
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In general, the above figures seem to suggest that the council is entitled to request a 
récolement every year to the extent that it does not reach the legal volume allowed by the forest 
administration. As a matter of fact, Mayor Mongui has remarked elsewhere that in the FCD 
while “the annual cutting capacity for a 500 hectares assiette [AAC] on average oscillates 
between 10 and 12,000 cubic meters in commercial trees (essences commercialisables)…[only] 
50 percent of that capacity is actually harvested given the needs of the market” (Nankam 2010, 
10). At the same time, this picture is misleading because, as many observers have noted, the 
practice of understating the actual harvest figures (see section 3.1.6 and subsection 6.1.1.2), as 
well as skimming the forest for ayous and lotofa and disregarding the MHD and MMD have 
meant that the figures utilized by the mayor to request the récolement are unreliable to begin 
with. 
Hence, the picture from Table 6.6 is deceiving not only because it apparently 
underestimates the actual volume of timber harvested in the council forest, but also because it 
does not take into account the fact that timber harvesting in the FCD proceeds without any 
planning, that is throughout the entire forest in contrast to the management plan AAC division. 
In fact, as local testimonies have confirmed, the process of récolement within the FCD is used 
for two main purposes. First, it is used to avoid the interruption of forest harvesting consecutive 
to the end of the Annual Operating Permit (PAO). As this former CCG member commented 
“they [FCD workers] fall timber and abandon it in the forest and go ask for an authorization and 
then go fetch the timber. When the year is over and the permit is near finished, they go over the 
limit” (26 February 2010). Usually, the rationale behind that maneuver is twofold: first, continue 
selling already harvested timber while applying for the new PAO -which usually arrives late 
                                                                                                                                                             
2008). Various people utilized these terms to refer to the same or different processes. An example is the use of the 
repasse in Dimako to refer to the récolement. That is why one has to be careful when utilizing them. 
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because of a cumbersome and lengthy process-, and second, finish felling operations inside the 
same AAC.142
The second issue, and perhaps more important, is that the récolement is allegedly used to 
harvest timber outside of the legally authorized area. In effect, when the récolement certificate is 
granted, instead of limiting itself to the area assigned, the council uses the authorization to enter 
new areas and fell new trees. That is why for instance every year the council needs to harvest 
more than one AAC; it is compelled to proceed that way inasmuch as the scheduled AAC has 
already been harvested in advance. This signifies that in reality, the council is not allowed to 
obtain a récolement certificate inasmuch as it is based on false pretext, the data suggests. 
 
In the same way, in recent years, the council has also received the authorization from the 
forest administration to extend the PAO for a two months period well into the new year after its 
official ending.143
CDKO 2010c, 66
 That extension was for instance granted to the council in 2008 (1 january-14 
February) for the year 2007, and in 2010 for the year 2009 (1 January-28 February 2010) (see 
; MINFOF 2009b). Officially, the council has requested it for two main 
reasons: the late issuing of the PAO by the forest administration as well as the repeated 
mechanical failures of the bulldozer, the main machine used for forest harvesting (see below), 
                                                 
142 One episode illustrates the situation described above. Once, during a visit in the FCD as the annual 
extended period permit was set to expire at the end of February 2010, a forest worker asked another worker whether 
it was possible to fall some timber and put it aside until the new PAO arrived. When asked about the rationale 
behind that proposal it was mentioned that it was done in order to ‘save’ time, since PAOs usually do not reach the 
council before March or April. In spite of the fact that the proposal was illegal, the practice appeared widespread not 
just exceptionally dictated by the actual circumstances. 
143 The extended period is another process through which, at the end of the year, the Dimako Council can 
ask for the extension of the PAO. 
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which have delayed work.144
Yet, this request for extension is unwarranted because it appears to be based on a ploy 
that the council needs more time to harvest the species authorized in the PAO. Further, because 
of the lack of planning noted before in the harvesting of the FCD (see also below), it is difficult 
to ascertain with certitude the volume of remaining timber to be felled, if there is any. The two 
months extension appears the more surprising because as a forest administration official 
commented “to harvest a 600 hectares’ annual allowable cut [AAC], it normally takes two 
months. You cut ten trees a day, and if you have one stem per hectare, you should complete the 
harvest in two months. However, the mayor harvests the forest for twelve months and even goes 
as far as to request a two-months extension” (8 June 2010). As with the récolement, the 
authorization has been allegedly utilized to harvest new areas and new trees beyond the legally 
authorized AAC boundaries as well as stock them while waiting or looking for customers, 
further contradicting the story that the council only logs by orders. 
 Thus, the request for extension is to allow the council to finish 
harvesting the legally authorized area for a given year, and therefore fulfill its customers’ orders. 
6.1.2.2 Logging outside of boundaries 
To be sure, the situation about logging outside of boundaries, that is beyond the legally 
authorized area, seems not solely limited to the utilization of the récolement or the two months 
extension; in the search for ayous and lotofa, field evidence suggests that that is the normal 
operating way inside the FCD. For instance, a local villager observes the following about forest 
harvesting within the FCD: 
                                                 
144 As a matter of fact, some in the council have argued that work has been at a standstill and the council 
has not collected revenues during these periods of waiting for the new year PAO. Thus, it needed more time to finish 
harvesting the AACs as well as honor the so-called customer’s orders. 
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Nobody among us has a map. The logging manager has a map, but to show us the 
map it is very difficult. But me, one time I asked him to show me the map and he 
showed me the map because I knew where we were working, and it was not in the 
AAC. He told me I show you because it is you. My conscience was telling me that 
the area where we were working was outside the limits. We were harvesting while 
we moved. We make the landing, the machine advances, we extract and we 
continue (…) since we were already outside of the [legal] boundaries, we had to 
work like that. That is the way we usually proceed when we are outside of the 
boundaries. We cut trees, then create a landing and the truck comes and pick up 
the timber and we continue. When it is over, the bulldozer closes the AAC (12 
June 2010, emphasis added). 
 
To clarify what this local villager is alluding to, take the examples of AAC 2-2 and 2-5 
(see Map 5.2 above) which are not recorded into the FCD archives as far as timber harvesting is 
concerned. This is surprising because if one is to refer to the 2006 management plan, both AACs 
should have been harvested in 2008 for 2-2, and 2011 for 2-5. But Table 6.5 before indicated that 
in 2008 AACs 2-1 and 2-3 were harvested where 2-2 was scheduled.145
In the first place, ascertaining what has occurred to both AACs is not a simple matter. 
Though the CFC head Alain Ebalé conceded that he could not provide an adequate answer about 
the case of AAC 2-5, he did not deny nor confirm that the AAC had been harvested or not. For 
AAC 2-2, he argued that the council had requested and obtained in 2008 the forest administration 
authorization to harvest AAC 2-3 not 2-2, which it did as the previous table showed, following 
the disappointing harvest inventory results. As he declared: 
 Further, since the council 
requested the authorization to harvest 3-1 in 2010, it is doubtful that it shall return to AAC 2-5. 
For that reason, what happened to both AACs 2-2 and 2-5? 
A river crosses AAC 2-2 and there is a big swamp which made it impossible for 
us to log it. Moreover, MINFOF agents came into the forest to verify that and 
with this big swamp there was almost nothing to log. Every area close to the 
Mbang Road [the main axis to enter the FCD] has been illegally logged before the 
                                                 
145 2008 not 2007 because since the management plan was approved late in 2006 officially the council had 
to wait until the next year (2007) to resume harvesting in AAC 2-1. 
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creation of the FCD so logging was impossible in AAC 2-2. No logging occurred 
in AAC 2-2 (22 January 2010, emphasis added). 
 
That story appears in contrast first to the evidence reported so far and second it begs the 
broader question of the reason for integrating that area within the timber production area during 
the establishment of the management plan in the first place. In theory, these swamps should have 
been included in the protection area if no valuable timber was found during the inventory.146
Map 5.2
 Yet, 
the CFC head above story makes sense insofar as it was mentioned before that, and  
already indicated this, irrespective of the actual management plan division of the forest, forest 
harvesting within the FCD occurs throughout the entire forest. This simply appears to be the 
modus operandi in the FCD. 
Further, about the AAC 2-2 story, the author of the FCD first management plan, who - 
although he could not specifically comment on the CFC head story- mentioned that in the 2001 
management plan, all unproductive areas, that is lacking valuable timber, were consigned into 
the agroforestry and research areas. Hence, the production area only contained valuable timber. 
In that answer, he implicitly contradicted the story of the CFC head. What has occurred most 
likely according to local observers is that the ‘missing’ AACs (2-2 and 2-5) have already been 
harvested in advance, and the CFC head just produced an after the fact explanation to soothe 
outsiders.147
                                                 
146 A report by the same CFC seems to contradict the above story when it mentioned that about 32, 246 
cubic meters of standing timber were available in AAC 2-2 for harvesting (see CRDKO 2008b, 4). 
 For one local actor, to the extent that the mayor and his team are allegedly engaged 
in various illegal acts such as not respecting AAC boundaries as well as harvesting the forest 
147 For instance, the FCD logging manager was overhead at the Dimako Bus Station talking about the fact 
that their ‘survey’ had shown that close to the Doumé River the area was very rich in timber. On the one hand, that 
assessment is consistent with the conclusion of the 2001 management plan which noted that forest resources seemed 
abundant in the southern part of the forest -close to the Doumé River- which access had remained difficult because 
of the lack of roads (see Mekok Balara 2001, 17-18). On the other hand, that should not have happened to the extent 
that, as Map 5.2 illustrated before, the council is not theoretically supposed to harvest the AACs close to the Doumé 
River until around the years 2013-2014 following the logging rotation cycle. 
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without any planning, the subdivision of the forest itself in FEUs and AACs is meaningless. He 
expressed his disapproval the following way: 
Everybody is really disappointed with the mayor’s governance of the council 
forest. Nobody in Dimako can testify on his behalf even inside his municipal 
council. However, when they will find out what is going on in Dimako, it is going 
to be late because he does not respect anything, anything, anything! AACs are 
being logged in advance despite the existence of the management plan. FEU 1 is 
being logged in all illegality; AAC 2-4 and 2-5 at the same time. 2-5 harvest 
inventory results are almost nonexistent; there is nothing. How can MINFOF 
agree to something like that? They [Dimako] switch in the same unit [FEU], 
logically AACs should be contiguous. How can you leave a unit and go into 
another one? When will you come back [to the ones you left behind]? This is a 
forest that you look and you say this is not worth it (25 May 2010, emphasis 
added). 
6.1.2.3 Forest management on the cheap 
Overall, the alleged situation about illegal logging in Dimako seems aggravated by two 
issues: the equipment used, or the lack thereof, as well as the lack of qualifications of forest 
workers. Firstly, as many observers have noted, within the FCD forest harvesting does not obey 
any techniques of Reduced Impact Logging (RIL), techniques which are designed for operational 
efficiency as well as mitigate ecological damages (see Karsenty 2010, 123). 
Within the FCD all forest harvesting operations, except for felling and loading timber 
onto trucks, are accomplished with only one machine the bulldozer, which, as foresters argue, is 
ill-suited for most harvesting operations, save roads opening, the creation of landings, and so on. 
About the organization of forest harvesting in the FCD, a forester complained that: 
The forest supervisor works only with one chainsaw and one machine for an 
important place like that. That means that that guy [the mayor] is not ready to buy 
a machine. Since work is badly organized, you will find out that the bulldozer 
opens the road and does whatever they want. You will also find out that the 
bulldozer does even skidding instead of the wheel skidder [CAT 528 tractor]. In 
the national forest harvesting guidelines, the bulldozer and the crawler tractor 
cause more damages to the forest compared to the wheel skidder which does not 
leave marks on the forest. Sometimes, the bulldozer can come to help create the 
skidding trail, but other than that it is not needed for extraction (25 June 2010). 
178 
The situation, as the next chapter shall argue, is not about the lack of resources to buy 
new equipment and machines, train current employees or recruit new personnel; it is simply that 
the Mayor of Dimako has refused to utilize the timber revenues to improve upon forest 
management. As CCG member 7 observed, “ever since the first report we asked that he [the 
mayor] equips forest workers, that each worker should have its own hat, boots as well as a 
raincoat. We even recommended that if he could not spend all this money at once, he could 
slowly withdraw it from the workers’ wages over the longer term but this did not go anywhere” 
(12 September 2010). In truth, FCD workers lack everything from compass, limes to machetes. 
This in practice means that forest management in the FCD is being conducted in rudimentary and 
ineffective way. This led one local employee to ask how it could be possible for a council which 
does not even possess rudimentary forest machines and equipment to engage in sustainable 
forestry.148
The second issue which aggravates the alleged illegal logging in vogue in the FCD is the 
lack of qualifications and training of the FCD workers for the conduct of forest harvesting, or for 
that matter engage in SFM. As a reminder, the way forest harvesting operates in the council is 
the following. The CFC, the forest technical unit, which directly answers to the mayor, is 
responsible for ensuring the respect of the management plan provisions; it is also charged with 
conducting forest harvesting operations, that is felling, extracting, and conversion (see 
 
Om 
Bilong et al. 2009, 11). These operations are conducted by a team of local villagers hired by the 
council through a rotative system. Finally, during forest harvesting, workers are under the field 
                                                 
148 A report observed for instance that FCD workers are recruited without a contract agreement as well as 
work without forest harvesting protective equipment (see also Om Bilong et al. 2009, 22). 
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supervision of a logging manager, which incidentally used to work for the mayor’s private 
company.149
This would not pose a problem except for the fact that qualifications are lacking inside 
the FCD, as well as the CFC head and the logging manager according to the available evidence 
appear not competent to conduct forest harvesting. About the lack of appropriate qualifications, a 
forest observer commented that: 
 
Dimako forest’s logging manager is more a faller than a logging manager. He 
does not know how to be a logging manager. If I had to decide, I would suspend 
Dimako harvesting in the FCD. They do not have the equipment; people go to 
work with flip flop, they do not even have the boots, not even the necessary 
equipment. They do not respect the forest harvesting guidelines; they do not know 
how to fell a tree because when you fell a tree, the tree cannot fall into the swamp 
(…) the logging manager does not know how to read a map, but you should have 
at least inside the worksite somebody who can do that! (28 June 2010). 
 
For the aforementioned observer, this is a clear sign that forest harvesting in Dimako is 
an “amateur’s job”. It is a forest which after more than six years of timber harvesting following 
the numerous (unreported) violations of the management plan provisions, this had led to a state 
of affairs whereas more than 30 percent -a third- of timber felled in the FCD is being abandoned 
and wasted. 
                                                 
149 From local testimonies, since 2004, the FCD seemed to have employed three logging managers, 
including the current one. Among the first two, Gbapol Engelbert, who appeared to have served from 2004 to 2005, 
passed away in a 2007 car accident, an event as Chapter 8.0 shall show was of wider local implications. 
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6.1.2.4 A lot of abandoned timber 
 
Figure 6.1. Abandoned timber in the FCD, February 2010 
Source: author 
 
One issue that has beset the FCD from the onset has been the issue of abandoned timber. 
As with ‘skimming’, the same reasons have been advanced to account for the high volume of 
abandoned timber within the FCD. Indeed, local authorities have asserted that the client Alpicam 
because of its election of the most pristine species bears the blame, and that no indiscriminate 
harvesting practices inside the FCD, as shown above, are responsible for this state of affairs. 
However, there is reason to doubt the council argument precisely because the preceding evidence 
appears to support the contention that in his search for harvesting only the most commercially 
valued species ayous and lotofa, Mayor Mongui and his team seems to have been allegedly 
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engaged in various deliberate activities designed to bypass the restrictions imposed by the 
management plan. 
To illustrate the situation in Dimako about abandoned timber, Table 6.7 below exhibits 
the volume as well as the percentage of abandoned timber in the FCD since the start of forest 
harvesting in the FCD in 2004. 
Table 6.7. Officially reported volumes and percentage of abandoned timber in the FCD, 2004-2009* 
Items 2004 2005 20072 20033 2009 TOTAL 
Felled (m3) 33,685.71 6,183.5 6,704 8,843.5 55,416.7 
Sold (m3) 21,761 3,994.5 4,233.4 5,844.9 35,833.8 
Abandoned 
(m3) 
11,924. 7 2,189 2,470.6 2998.6 19,582.9 
Percentage of 
abandoned 
timber (%) 
35.4 35.4 36.9 33.9 35.4 
Source: (CDKO 2006b, 40; 2008a; 2008d, 3; 2010a, 2; n.d) 
* Taking into account the years for which complete data is available for the FCD (2008 and 2009) as well 
as interviews data, it was estimated that about 36 percent of timber was abandoned in the FCD and that rate 
was used for the years for which data were incomplete or unavailable. Thus, the rates of 35.4 for both 
2004-2005 and 2007 were based on the average of the years 2008-2009. 
1 That global figure was reported for both periods in the 2006 management plan (p.40). 
2 Official figures for the extended period (1 January to 14 February 2008) reported an extracted volume of 
1,745.7 cubic meters and a sold volume of 1,042.9 cubic meters, thus a volume of abandoned timber of 
702.823 cubic meters. However, these figures are not included here. 
3 Does not include the extended period figures of 1,153.8 cubic meters of lotofa 
m3: cubic meter 
 
A first glance at the table indicates that about 36 percent of timber felled in the FCD is 
abandoned. Except for the years 2004, 2005 and part of 2007 where the figures have been 
reconstructed because of faulty record keeping, though still based on extent evidence, the rest of 
the figures are self-reported by the council. In 2008 and 2009 respectively about 34 and 37 
percent of trees felled in the FCD were abandoned in the forest. 2009 saw out of a global volume 
of more than 8,800 cubic meters of trees felled, about a third, 3,000 cubic meters, abandoned. 
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The main reason as mentioned before is that the client bears the blame because of its election of 
the most pristine species. 
Like in all commercial ventures, a possibility exists that some products are going to be 
discarded because of inherent deficiencies or damages during the production process. In that 
sense, abandoned timber is nothing new in timber harvesting. In fact, during the API-Dimako 
project, one of its commissioned studies estimated that in the Dimako area the rate of abandoned 
timber after harvesting was between 19 and 25 percent, thus on average 22 percent (Jardin 1995, 
1-2).150
That is why, the figures from 
 Further, the study added that timber abandoned in the Dimako area in 1995 was due to 
three primary causes: human factors during harvest; external natural factors; and internal natural 
factors. For the study although 88 percent of the causes of abandon were due to natural factors –
inherent to the trees-, the rate of timber abandoned for the remaining 12 percent could be 
diminished by the amelioration of harvesting techniques (Jardin 1995, 3-4). Because the above 
estimate dated from the days of conventional logging where talks of SFM were still emerging, in 
theory, under SFM this rate would be expected to decline because of the newer practices 
emphasizing sustainable harvesting. 
Table 6.7 are somewhat higher than one would expect if the 
council was adhering to the management plan provisions as well as applying RIL techniques 
during harvesting. In addition, the actual figures might be higher than the abandoned timber 
estimated volume of 19,582 cubic meters over the 2004-2009 period and the 35.4 percent 
average figure. To clarify, the council reported on top of the normal operating year that during 
the extended period from 1 January to 14 February 2008, it felled 1,746 cubic meters and sold 
                                                 
150 The study objective was to investigate the causes of timber abandon by SFID in the Dimako area in 
1995. The study also concluded that 70 percent of the volume of abandoned timber could be used for local 
processing (Jardin 1995, 12). 
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1,043 cubic meters, thus leaving a remaining timber volume of about 703 cubic meters or 40 
percent of abandoned timber in the two months period. This meant that four trees out of ten 
felled during January and February 2008 were lost and abandoned in the forest. 
Around the years 2004-2005, it is said that the council, after ‘crushing’ the forest, lost 
between 300 and 600 felled ayous because of the fact that though the trees had been felled the 
customer was only selecting the ones without defects, and the council could not find another 
avenue to sell those trees. In its search for revenues and its apparent disregard for the 
management plan provisions (the harvesting of trees below the legal and the management 
diameters, as well as the disregard of the logging rotation cycle and forest boundaries), the result 
appears to be that a higher volume of timber than normally anticipated is being abandoned in the 
forest.151
In effect, in contrast to the council assertions that the buyer bears the responsibility for 
this situation, the evidences presented so far point otherwise. To be sure, if Alpicam was totally 
driving the process, the council should have been able, since it has been in business allegedly 
with the firm for six years, to ‘customize’ its felling operations to the needs of the customer so as 
to reduce the volume of abandoned timber. In other words, if it is known that the client only 
selects the most pristine trees, why continue to fell trees that are not going to get sold, in 
particular when the defects appear obvious at first glance? As the preceding lines have argued, 
the answer to the question of abandoned timber is to be found in the lack of qualifications of the 
FCD workers as well as the harvesting practices and the alleged illegal logging happening within 
the FCD which leads to a situation whereas more trees than needed are being felled. On the 
whole, the issue of abandoned timber suggests a pattern of dismissing the management plan 
 
                                                 
151 Indeed, the harvest inventory was meant to provide the info regarding the volume, quality, location as 
well as a detailed topography of the area to be harvested (for more, see FAO 2003, 20). 
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provisions and harvesting the forest according to one objective only get the most valuable 
timber. 
6.1.3 Reforesting the forest 
In both the 2001 and 2006 management plans, reforestation appears as a major objective for the 
FCD and is targeted at reclaiming the forest cover lost to shifting agriculture (see CDKO 2006b, 
50; Mekok Balara 2001b). In spite of this official commitment to reforestation, from 2004 to 
2006 no plantation had been commenced; it was not until 2007 that the council set up a nursery 
to provide the FCD with the seeds and plants needed for the silvicultural activities.152 Since then, 
local authorities have portrayed the creation of the nursery and the plantations as two of their 
most significant undertakings differentiating them from conventional loggers as well as 
expressing their commitment to SFM. Below, the subsection reviews the council reforestation 
efforts by focusing on the nursery as well as the main plantation called en layons.153
                                                 
152 Silviculture is defined as “the art and science of growing trees. It involves manipulating natural 
biological processes of the forest in order to achieve specific end results. It includes all operations that are done 
between one harvest and the next, such as planting, thinning, pruning, weeding or poison girdling” (Higman et al. 
2005, 170). 
 
153 In the current reforestation efforts, there are in fact two main plantations: en layons and en bandes 
alternées. Because at the time of data collection, the second one had just commenced it is not included in the 
analysis. In general, local authorities have also pointed out that the plantations are being created in order to diversify 
the council source of revenues. That is why, the council has for instance set up a commercial venture in the form of 
a mixed plantation of Moabi and palm trees to produce palm oil which in the future could be sold and bring 
additional revenues to the council. The mixed plantation (Moabi and palm trees) is not included here because 
compared to the other two plantations, it is purportedly designed as an economic venture not reforest the council 
forest. Nonetheless, the same critiques leveled here against the two other plantations could also apply to the mixed 
plantation. 
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6.1.3.1 The Council Nursery 
 
Figure 6.2. Various tree species in the FCD nursery, January 2010 
Source: author 
 
As mentioned at the onset of this section, it was not until 2007 that the council officially 
started its reforestation efforts. To account for the lack of implementation of the reforestation 
provisions of the 2001 management plan, the mayor argued that though the council had begun to 
mobilize the resources for that aim, the transition at the National Forest Development Support 
Agency (ANAFOR) -which is tasked with Cameroon’s national program of plantations and 
provision of technical assistance in the area- was to be blamed for (CRDKO 2005a, 1).154
                                                 
154 ONADEF, the former state monopoly in charge of forest inventory, was officially reorganized into 
ANAFOR in 2002. However, it took some time for the reorganization to take effect. 
 
Nonetheless, a few years after, in 2007, the council and ANAFOR having signed a technical 
assistance agreement, the Council Nursery was set up officially to provide the seedlings to be 
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used in reforesting the FCD (see Menye 2007, 5).155
From official discussions as well as subsequent interviews with local villagers, the 
Council Nursery is organized the following way. First, there is the central nursery located near 
the former Forêts et Terroirs compound in Dimako town (see the figure above). Second, in 
selected villages, notably Kouen and Djandja (see Appendix F), small villages’ nurseries have 
also been created. The official goal of the villages’ nurseries is to supply the central nursery as 
well as involve local villagers into the enterprise, and this is accomplished by remunerating them 
150 CFAF for each plant (
 The ANAFOR agreement called for the 
production in 2007 of at least 40,000 plants at the establishment of the FCD nursery as well as 
the reforestation of 50 hectares of the FCD (Menye 2007, 6, 11). 
Menye 2007, 6). Below are the official nursery figures for the years 
2007, 2008 and 2009. 
Table 6.8. FCD Nursery plants 2007-2009 
Tree species 2007 2008 2009 
Ayous 22 44 36 
Aningré B (white) 44 1,355 220 
Aningré R 0 25 0 
Bubinga 14 14 0 
Bété 0 157 0 
Doussié Pachyloba 2,153 2,000 200 
Dibétou/Bibolo 143 1,220 350 
Ébène 160 493 30 
                                                 
155 The agreement from January to December 2008 included the creation of 70 hectares of forest 
plantations in the FCD; the training of the local population as well as of the council staff in charge of reforestation; 
and finally, the assistance to the creation of the council forest technical unit. The cost of the agreement was around 
17 million CFAF, excluding the costs of training the local population as well the council personnel in charge of 
reforestation and the creation of the council forest unit (see ANAFOR 2007). 
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Iroko 0 06 0 
Lotofa 21 14 0 
Moabi 1,479 518 0 
Sapelli 637 841 195 
Sipo 43 26 0 
Kossipo 0 0 40 
Padouk-R 0 0 180 
TOTAL 4,681 6,713 1,242 
Source: (CDKO 2008d, 5; 2010a; Menye 2007, 9) 
 
First Table 6.8 shows that in 2007, 2008, and 2009 respectively the Council Nursery held 
a total of 4,681, 6,713, and 1,242 plants. Overall, fourteen species were being nurtured in the 
nursery, and among those plants, three species Doussié (Afzelia pachyloba), Dibétou (Lovoa 
trichilioides), and Moabi predominate while ayous with Fraké -which according to the 2006 
management plan were positioned as the primary species for reforestation (see CDKO 2006b, 
50)- totaled only 44 plants. 
The conclusion from the table is that on the whole since 2007 when the technical 
assistance agreement was signed with ANAFOR, the Council Nursery has been unable to 
achieve its objective of producing 40,000 plants. In effect, if cumulative, when added the figures 
for the three years totaled 12,636 plants. Of those figures, the 2009 figures appear the lowest, a 
situation the council blamed on the unusually long dry season that year (CDKO 2010a, 4). 
During interviews local authorities have argued that notwithstanding the issue surrounding the 
ANAFOR agreement, they are still proceeding with the nursery efforts. They have pointed out 
for instance to the villages’ nurseries to show that things are moving as scheduled. 
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Figure 6.3. Abandoned plants in the nursery, January 2010 
Source: author 
 
On the other hand, the reality on the ground is different. Certainly, local villagers 
interviewed have remarked that because of the council inability, or unwillingness, to reward 
them for the villages’ nurseries, they have stopped working. In other words, with the failure of 
the council to honor its side of the agreement –the 150 CFAF for each plant- local villagers have 
all but abandoned villages’ nurseries, further contradicting the council’s assertions that villages’ 
nurseries are still operating as well as local villagers involved in reforestation activities. That 
conclusion about the ineffectiveness of the villages’ nurseries was already noted in 2007 by a 
report in the following terms: 
The young plants are raised in several villages which present different 
microclimates from that of the council nursery. The villages being located away 
from the site [the council nursery], transportation is provided by the [council] 
truck where the young plants suffer shocks when they are loaded and unloaded, in 
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addition those young plants are sometimes carried out during sunlight 
[rayonnement solaire]. This sometimes explains the loss of some young plants 
received in the nursery (Menye 2007, 11). 
 
The same conclusion of ineffectiveness can be drawn from the central nursery which is 
under the management of the CFC. As Figure 6.3 above -obtained during a field visit of the 
nursery- revealed the Council Nursery has followed the same path as those in local villages. In 
truth, the issues affecting that nursery were already evident since 2007, for the same report 
quoted above then noted that the nursery head was not qualified to monitor the plants (Menye 
2007, 6). Since then, the nursery head has faced several health problems with the result that no 
one is in charge of the monitoring of the nursery. In effect, the plants sit under the sun with no 
protection (see Figure 6.3) and no one from the council taking care of them notwithstanding the 
council’s claim found in the 2009 CFC annual report (CDKO 2010a, 3).156
To explain the failure to reach the 40,000 plants target as well as the situation of the 
nursery, the Mayor of Dimako has again argued that the lack of cooperation from ANAFOR was 
the main culprit (
 
CDKO 2008e). At the same time, though problems existed on ANAFOR’s end, 
as the agency former director conceded, in a letter exchange with the mayor he also argued that 
the council, read the mayor, had not complied with its end of the deal especially concerning the 
disbursement of its financial obligations for the provision of technical assistance (see ANAFOR 
2007; ANAFOR 2008). This, according to then-ANAFOR head, was at the root of the delay in 
the implementation of the agreement. A 2007 report already quoted above seemed to confirm the 
                                                 
156 In 2009, a local villager sent by the mayor on behalf of the council to the ENEF (National School of 
Water and Forests) came back and was supposedly tasked with monitoring the nursery. Nonetheless, though he was 
involved in FCD issues, at the time of the study he was not officially tasked with duties pertaining solely to the 
nursery. It still remains uncertain whether in the absence of outside technical assistance as well as financial support 
from the mayor that that technician, even if given control over the FCD nursery, shall succeed. 
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agency claims when it stated that the failure of the council to fulfill its financial obligations 
“seems to discourage ANAFOR monitoring of the silvicultural activities” (Menye 2007, 11) 
 In the same way, the report added that “the part-time personnel employed by the council 
shows some willingness to work for the good of the entire Dimako community, but this 
willingness is sometimes dampened by the lack of working tools (machete, boots, sharpening 
file), the delay in payment of daily allowances, as well as the failure from the council to support 
the [personnel] transportation costs to the site” (Menye 2007, 11). This seemed to suggest that 
the blame for the failure to reach the targets was on the council and the mayor not ANAFOR’s 
side. 
As a last point, notwithstanding the explanation for the shortcomings or where the blames 
lies, the reality is that the council and villages nurseries, which supposedly provide the plants for 
reforesting the FCD, have not reached their target as well as are currently abandoned and left 
unsupervised. The picture of more dried and dying plants, as Figure 6.3 attests, is more prevalent 
in Dimako nurseries than what the local authorities allege, and this is of immediate consequence 
for the plantation. 
6.1.3.2 The plantation en layons 
To begin with, in both the 2001 and 2006 management plans, the plantations were to be 
established in the agroforestry area, the site of villagers’ fields, located at the entrance of the 
forest (see Map 5.1 and Map 5.2). In reforesting the agroforestry area, the focus was not only on 
preserving those species presenting problems of regeneration such as ayous and fraké or 
underrepresented for instance Doussié rouge, Moabi, and Azobé, but also on preventing the 
extinction of indigenous species in case of (over) harvesting (Mekok Balara 2001b, 88). 
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In the 2001 management plan, the reforestation target was set at fifty (50) hectares per 
AC for a total of three hundred hectares (300) over the first 25 years rotation as Table 6.9 
exhibits. In the 2006 management plan, the goal was to reforest 500 hectares of the agroforestry 
area, hence a total of 100 hectares every five year.157
Table 6.9. Five years reforestation targets for the FCD in the two management plans (in hectares) 
 
Items 2001 2006 
Target 50 100 
TOTAL 300 500 
Source: (CDKO 2006b, 49; Mekok Balara 2001a, 42; 2001b, 90) 
 
At the end of 2009, the FCD had been operating for five years, save 2006, thus at the end 
of the period 2004-2009, 50 hectares within the council forest should, at least, have been 
replanted. In fact, as with the nursery plants, reforestation efforts only debuted in 2007, three 
years after the start of timber harvesting operations. This means that during the period of validity 
of the 2001 management plan, no trees were planted in the FCD. Since the 2007 reforestation 
efforts started, instead of the agroforestry area, the efforts have concentrated on FEU 1 and the 
creation of the plantation en layons. 
The plantation en layons was started following the technical assistance agreement with 
ANAFOR. Pursuant to the agreement ANAFOR was responsible for monitoring both the nursery 
and the plantation en layons (Menye 2007, 5). To provide the reader an idea about the FCD 
                                                 
157 In a 2006 letter accompanying the revised version of the management plan, the mayor pointed out that 
the reforestation would also be emphasized in the FEUs not solely in the agroforestry area (see CDKO 2006a). 
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plantation en layons, Table 6.10 below exhibits the tree species as well as the surface area 
planted for the period 2007-2009. 
Table 6.10. Plantation en layons, 2007-2009 
Year 2007 2008 2009 
Tree 
species 
Trees planted Surface Area 
(in ha) 
Trees 
planted 
Surface 
Area (in 
ha) 
Trees 
planted 
Surface 
Area (in ha) 
Ayous 76  
 
 
15 
900 03 300 03 
Dibétou 1,155 765 10 1,000 10 
Doussié 
bidipensis 
0 495 07 650 6.5 
Moabi 80 270 08 800 8 
Sapelli 109 540 5.5 650 6.5 
TOTAL 1,4851 3,060 33.5 3,400 342 
Source: adapted from (CDKO 2008d, 4; 2010a, 4; Menye 2007, 10-11) 
1 includes 65 mixed Moabi, Dibétou, and Sapelli trees 
2 during 2009, according to the CFC 2009 report, only maintenance activities were performed in 
the plantation (see CDKO 2010a, 4) 
ha: hectares 
 
Overall, the table indicates that in 2007 1,485 trees were planted over 15 hectares. Since 
then, the plantation occupies a total surface area of 34 hectares with the latest figures indicating a 
total of 3,400 trees planted representing five main species ayous, dibétou, Doussié, Moabi, and 
Sapelli. However, the figures show some inconsistencies to the degree that for instance in 2007 
1,155 dibétou had been planted compared to 765 in 2008 and 1,000 in 2009. The same thing 
happened with ayous with 900 trees planted in 2008 compared to 2009 where the figures show 
300 ayous, 600 less. Judging by the council records, it is difficult to ascertain the reason of the 
discrepancies in trees planted between those years, or even whether the figures are cumulative or 
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not. On the other hand, the table shows that since the council started reforesting the FCD, a total 
of 34 hectares of FEU 1 had been covered. 
Hence, by looking at the table, it appears that in three years, the council has reforested 34 
hectares in FEU 1, about a third of its five year target of 100 hectares. To achieve its five year 
target, the council would have to plant another 66 hectares over the next two years. The 
conclusion that can be drawn is that in spite of the late start of reforestation efforts, the council 
seems to have implemented the provisions of the management plan relating to establishing 
plantations in the FCD. However, this is a misleading conclusion inasmuch as interviews with 
forest workers have indicated that the council has overstated the surface area planted in FEU 1. 
In effect, the interviews data have given a different picture with estimate of the reforested surface 
area of less than 30 hectares. This in fact would signify that the CFC official figures are either 
incorrect or simply inflated, in accordance with the pattern noted above regarding the council 
forest overall figures (see also Chapter 7.0). 
A final issue with the plantation en layons, similar to the one with the nursery above, is 
that because of the failure of the agreement with ANAFOR, the result is that the plantation en 
layons, which was supposedly set up with ANAFOR assistance and which should have been 
under its monitoring, is left to itself. Thus, putting in doubt the survival of the trees already 
planted. As the CFC head conceded “in 2008, when the first plants were put underground, they 
[ANAFOR staff] were not coming anymore. We did not get any more assistance” (22 January 
2010). 
6.1.3.3 The reforestation efforts in jeopardy? 
Judging by the creation of the plantation en layons, it appears that the Dimako Council 
has followed through its official commitment to engage in reforestation. Even in the face of the 
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inconsistencies noted above, it appears that the council efforts, though they remain short of their 
target, have at least started. However, some local observers have cautioned against early 
optimism because of several conception issues with the plantation. This is critical an issue 
particularly because the 2009 GTZ-MINFOF-CTFC report mentioned above, though it has 
pointed to some of the council activities as being contrary to the management plan provisions as 
highlighted here, has praised the council’s plantations -but not their conception- noting that at 
least the council is proceeding with its commitment to reforest the forest (Om Bilong et al. 2009, 
12). 
For those observers who have cautioned about Dimako’s plantations, they have noted that 
those are unlikely to succeed because of their poor conception. These observers have also 
remarked that in contrast to the management plan provisions which target was to reconstitute 
forest cover in one of the FCD areas, the agroforestry area, which had been the site of villagers’ 
fields, the current reforestation efforts proceed in FEU 1, where the forest cover is still 
supposedly intact, leading one to question the rationale as well as wisdom of this strategy. 158
The preceding conclusion has led other observers to comment that the Dimako’s 
plantation should be seen more as experiment rather than a pure plantation insofar as the growth 
and survival rate of the trees is not guaranteed. As one observer pointed out “5,000 trees equals 
five hectares, it is derisory! How many trees survive after? This is more like a trial not the 
implementation of the management plan…five hectares planted over a 16,000 hectares forest that 
 As 
one outside observer remarked about the plantation en layons “all trees which can grow are 
impeded. Where forest cover exists, there is no need for reforestation. This is an erroneous idea 
of reforestation (reboisement). This is more like enrichment” (29 June 2010).  
                                                 
158 One irony is that the mixed plantation not covered here is now called the ‘agroforestry zone’. 
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is nothing!!!” (9 March 2010). The success is not guaranteed especially because as noted before 
first ANAFOR assistance is not involved, and second, the council does not have the manpower 
and knowledge to take over nor has the mayor been willing to commit the resources needed to 
make the enterprise successful as shall be shown below. 
Related to the above point, the other issue regards the species being planted in the FCD, 
which are at odds with the management plan provisions. As mentioned above, the idea behind 
the reforestation efforts was to target the species presenting problems of regeneration or 
underrepresentation as well as preventing the extinction of indigenous species in case of (over) 
harvesting. Pursuant to those objectives, five species were selected ayous, fraké, Moabi, 
Assaméla and Sipo (see CDKO 2006b, 50; Mekok Balara 2001b, 91). Nonetheless, an 
examination of Table 6.10 above shows that of these five targeted species, only ayous and Moabi 
are being planted in the FCD. Furthermore, the table also indicates that except for Moabi which 
occupies 8 hectares, ayous trees occupy only three hectares while the majority of the surface area 
purportedly planted is occupied by species not mentioned in the management plan. As with the 
rationale for locating the plantations in FEU 1, the same question can be raised for the election of 
those species over those of the management plan. As one local observer commented: 
People have chosen formulas which they prefer and then realize that it is not 
appropriate with the forest milieu as well as ecology. Because already when 
people prefer to reforest with species such as Moabi which growth is very slow, I 
believe the whole experiment is going astray. I believe that given Dimako 
position, we have to set clear objectives. When we are planting Moabi, what is the 
objective? Is it because we are trying to recreate the forest cover or for economic 
reasons. Because given the current trend of the timber market, all the forests of 
Bertoua are turned toward providing northern Cameroon, meaning Chad, Libya 
and so on. If these people were focused on this objective, they should plant 
species with rapid growth such as ayous, Fraké, in short rapid growth species (4 
June 2010, emphasis added). 
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Based on the above, the conclusion is that as with the previous management plan 
provisions, such as the harvest inventory or the MHDs and MMDs, one can conclude that the 
council is proceeding according to its own will and outside of an adequate planification, not on 
the basis of the officially approved document. 
The final element which puts into doubts the council or the mayor’s commitment to 
reforestation pertains to the financial resources devoted to the enterprise. As shall become 
apparent in the next chapter, since 2004 despite the council receiving significant timber 
revenues, the amount dedicated to reforestation has been meaningless as well as inconsistent 
regardless of the fact that the 2003 revenue sharing formula set aside 10 percent of the council 
forest revenues specifically for reforestation (see subsection 5.7.3.4). In 2004 for instance, no 
funds were allocated or set aside for that purpose (see CRDKO 2005b, 3). Furthermore, a recent 
examination of the council financial records points that less than the 10 percent scheduled for 
reforestation is allocated for that purpose, putting in doubt the commitment to creating the 
plantations. Take, for instance, the figures for the year 2009 in Table 6.11 below where instead 
of the more than 4 million CFAF scheduled to be spent for purchasing plants, reforestation as 
well as workers’ wages, a little more than 50 percent of the amount was actually disbursed. 
Table 6.11. Reforestation costs, January-July 2009 (CFAF million) 
Items 10% amount as specified by 
2003 council decision 
Amount officially declared as 
spent 
Plants purchase, reforestation 
and staff costs 
4,148,719 2,120,000 
Source: adapted (CDKO 2009a, 5) 
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In reality, because of the unavailability as well as inconsistency of the figures for the 
years prior to 2009, it has proven difficult to compare the council financial commitment for the 
plantations. However, interview data have confirmed the 2009 trend whereas the council 
commitments for reforestation are short of the actual 10 percent supposedly set aside. This seems 
to suggest that in Dimako reforestation is of a lesser priority. As one forest worker concluded 
“the council was not interested before in reforestation. If one compares the number of hectares 
cut with those that have been planted, it is not even close. I wonder what would remain for the 
future generations” (29 January 2010). 
6.2 THE POWERLESS FOREST MONITORING COMMISSIONS 
So far the chapter has described the situation about forest harvesting and reforestation efforts in 
the FCD, a situation which, the evidence suggests, is characterized by a lack of adherence to the 
forest administration rules and regulations. Indeed, the evidence from the preceding section 
suggested that Mayor Mongui and his team appear to have disregarded the officially approved 
management plans. All this happened in spite of the fact that local organizations were set up 
during the process of creating the FCD to ensure compliance with forest laws, rules and 
regulations. Of particular interest to this study are the two organizations, the CCG and later the 
CSE, which were established, especially for the CCG, in response to local criticism about the 
risk of capture of the council forest by the logger-mayor. The following section focuses on the 
CCG and the CSE as the local monitors of the implementation of the management plan; on how 
it has been possible for the mayor to seemingly disregard the management plans in spite of the 
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presence of these local organizations, supposedly tasked as the ‘guardians’ of the forest for 
future generations. 
6.2.1 The CCG or the phony village organization 
According to the 1999’s Arrêté 11, already mentioned in Chapter 5.0, save the gazetting process 
already completed, CCG members are responsible for recommending to the municipal council 
how to soundly, profitably, transparently and sustainably manage the council forest, and how to 
utilize timber revenues in the pursuit of villages development projects (CRDKO 1999b, Art. 1, 
emphasis added). While the second role shall be briefly addressed in the following chapter, as far 
as forest management is concerned, it appears that despite this officially stated role, the CCG in 
reality has no say on forest matters inside the FCD. That is the case because CCG members have 
argued that they have been embroiled in a feud with the mayor over the extent of the role of the 
organization. Put another way, according to CCG members, Mayor Mongui has opposed any 
attempt by CCG members to assume an assertive role within the FCD or over issues regarding 
the council forest altogether. In effect, former CCG member 2 lamented: 
We were supposed to monitor the forest in all aspects. But inside the forest our 
role was in reality limited. In handling fuel, renting equipment we were at odds 
with the mayor. Even with managing workers we had issues since most of the 
workers were from his family. Inside the forest he created an illegal logging 
scheme that unfortunately CCG members could not monitor (12 March 2010). 
 
For local villagers that situation is in contrast to what was agreed upon prior to the 
creation of the council forest. In fact, CCG members argue that the CCG organization as 
envisioned during the days of Forêts et Terroirs was meant to be an independent organization 
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representing all villagers and involved in forest management through the monitoring of the 
implementation of the management plan. As former CCG member 1 declared: 
Well, the conclusion that we as pioneers draw is that between what was planned 
and what happened in practice, the mayor muzzled this committee 
…[Furthermore], the mayor did not give us the possibility to apply the training we 
had received. When the elections came, 90 percent of the CCG as well as 
Councilors left so the people who are there do not know anything [the new CCG 
and Councilors]. Only one person runs the council forest, it is the Mayor of 
Dimako (26 February 2010, emphasis added). 
 
 For CCG members, who remember are each elected representative of local villagers, the 
mayor’s circumventing of the CCG, which resulted in the irrelevance of the organization, started 
well before the council forest began its activities. For them, the mayor’s objective from the onset 
was to remove the organization from the daily management as well as monitoring of the 
management plan provisions, leaving him alone in charge of the FCD. Indeed, for one 
eyewitness, the mayor even went further during the election of the first CCG to ensure that the 
organization which was to be created did not threaten his interests. To illustrate, a telling episode 
happened at the end of the 1990s during the election for the presidency of the CCG. Vying for 
the CCG presidency were two local villagers, an educated ‘elite’ and an ‘illiterate’ villager. One 
Forêts et Terroirs’ witness recalls the event as follows: 
At the start of the project, the goal was to enable the state to have the tools for 
sustainable forest management. So I admit we did not assess the risk [that the 
experiment went awry], but we put into place safeguards with the creation of the 
CCG. However, where things started to fall apart is when the mayor started to 
influence the CCG elections to have people devoted to him. There was an election 
at City Hall for the CCG president pitting a civil servant against a villager. We 
saw the mayor’s hand behind that. Someone who does not know to read or write 
[got elected]. We realized that the mayor had done his job at midnight [during the 
night]. You know, here in Cameroon, people are poor (15 June 2010). 
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“People are poor” means that in the hours preceding the actual election, the mayor had 
reportedly ‘offered’ money to some villagers to get his preferred candidate -the ‘illiterate’ 
villager- elected. That pattern of giving money to deflect local challenges, as Chapter 8.0 shall 
describe, appears to be a hallmark of Mayor Mongui in his apparent quest for Bigmanship status. 
For the moment suffice to say that in the CCG election episode, the mayor’s fear was that 
he would face a potential competitor in the person of the CCG president, an individual he could 
not control, so he threw his support behind the villager whom he considered more amenable. 
Moreover, to prevent such a scenario from happening in the future, later on, the mayor 
apparently went to the prefect and imposed his vision of a limited CCG role with him as the 
president, a vision embodied in Arrêté 11 (see Chapter 5.0). As a former member of Forêts and 
Terroirs remarked: 
At the beginning, the role of the municipal council was purely deliberative and the 
goal was one CCG member by village. We also did not want them [CCG 
members] to be municipal councilors at the same time. We wanted a really 
independent organization, but the mayor went behind our back to see the prefect 
and got the municipal order [rather the Deliberation Number 4 creating the CCG] 
signed. In the new CCG, he was president with the secretary general as secretary, 
but that was not the initial design (1 June 2010, italics added).159
 
 
Today, the situation in Dimako is that the CCG is an organization that has no purpose in 
the management or monitoring of the management plan of the FCD. It is, as Councilor 4 argues, 
a ‘phony’ organization; an organization without power in reality. That same conclusion was 
reached by the 2009 MINFOF-GTZ-CTFC report quoted above which noted that the 
organization was unfit to monitor forest activities (Om Bilong et al. 2009, 12). The report 
                                                 
159 Before the current framework of political decentralization in Cameroon, according to the 1974 law on 
councils and the subsequent decrees, rules and regulations every act by local councils had to be approved a priori by 
prefects before entering in force. Following the 2004 decentralization laws, that requirement has been loosened with 
the introduction of two types of approval a priori and a posteriori (for more see (Soh 2004, 11). 
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observed for instance that the forest register, which was supposedly designed as the holder of all 
forest harvesting data as well as assist the CCG in its monitoring mission, does not exist (see Om 
Bilong et al. 2009, 12). This last conclusion was expected, for Chapter 5.0 pointed out that local 
villagers had conveyed their doubts as to whether the forest register would be available for all to 
consult if Mayor Mongui was in total control of the council forest. 
The conclusion that CCG members draw is that the mayor is using the organization, in 
the words of former CCG member 1, as a screen “to mask a transparency that does not exist 
[because] people believe if there is a [municipal] councilor as well as a CCG member, things will 
go well” (26 February 2010). What is more, for CCG members, all these local organizations 
created by the municipal council and the mayor are there for outside consumption as well as to 
conceal the fact that local villagers’ representatives do not have a say in the management of the 
forest. As current CCG member 1 asks “when we talk about a CCG member, how can he consult 
about forest management when he is not involved [in the first place]?” (5 September 2010). The 
reality is that while the CCG is fighting with the mayor over its role, the fact of the matter is that 
it cannot monitor the forest, which appears to be ultimately the sought-after objective. 
6.2.1.1 The main objective all along 
In some way the conclusion that the CCG would be powerless to enforce the provisions 
of the management plan was expected. That was the case because, despite Mayor Mongui’s 
above 2000 pronouncement about the role of the CCG, a closer analysis of the CCG founding 
documents revealed that the organization that was created in practice by Mayor Mongui and the 
municipal council was a subordinate one. Indeed, while for local villagers, and for that matter the 
Forêts et Terroirs team, the CCG role was to independently monitor the council forest in ‘all 
aspects’, in the words of one CCG member, the Mayor of Dimako had envisioned another role 
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for the organization. That is why the organization that was established on 22 June 1999 was 
assimilated to a municipal council commission which could also be disbanded upon request by 
the said municipal council (see CRDKO 1999a, Art. 2). Equally important, according to Arrêté 
11, the CCG decisions were not binding; they were only propositions to the municipal council 
which could adopt, amend, or reject them (CRDKO 1999b, Art. 5).160
The conclusion about the ineffectiveness of the CCG was already pointed out in 2001 by 
Samuel Assembé-Mvondo who remarked that: 
 That is to say its role as 
outlined by administrative fiat was purely advisory, not compulsory. 
The Committee, as its name indicates, is only a consultative organ, that is to say, 
it can only make proposals…. Given its lack of power, one must have reservations 
about its potential and ability to invoke dynamic change in sustainable forestry 
management. The fact that the proposals are obligatory is no obstacle to the organ 
invested with decisional powers (the Municipal Council), which can dismiss what 
has been recommended (quoted in Oyono 2004c, 22). 
 
Since Assembé-Mvondo’s visit, which predates the start of forest harvesting and the 
concomitant rise of timber revenues, it seems the situation has worsened in Dimako with Mayor 
Mongui going at length to prevent the organization from exercising even its Arrêté 11 limited 
role. In truth, the tensions between the mayor and the CCG have escalated to the point where 
around January 2009 Mayor Mongui reportedly threatened to dissolve the organization over a 
                                                 
160 Further, the Arrêté reaffirmed the proposition that the CCG was subordinated to the municipal council 
as it was likened to a municipal council commission such as the Great Works or Social Affairs for instance (see 
CRDKO 1999b, Art. 2). On the one hand, the CCG term was set at five years and aligned with the municipal council 
term, and CCG members were allowed to run for other terms without apparent limit (CRDKO 1999b, Art. 4). On the 
other hand, Arrêté 11 also gave powers to the municipal council, read the mayor, to expel and replace a CCG 
member after two unheeded warnings for acts impeding “the necessary cohesion” needed for the functioning of the 
committee as well as its relationship with the municipal council (CRDKO 1999b, Art 6). The said member was said 
to be replaced within thirty days by a new village elected member. 
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few CCG members’ complaints that illegal logging was allegedly happening inside the forest, 
and what the mayor saw as an attempt to trouble peace and order in town.161
For CCG members, attempts like those are designed to discourage them from monitoring 
forest operations and denounce the mayor, in particular given the history surrounding the 
relationship between the mayor and the CCG over the latter’s independence. Apparently, the 
CCG has displeased the mayor to the point where he has privately declared that was he to redo 
the council forest project, the organization would have never been established. Mayor Mongui’s 
assessment was based on the fact that contrary to what he had expected, CCG members by their 
constant recrimination about the council forest and even their threat of resignations over their 
lack of involvement have posed a conundrum as well as brought undue attention to the FCD. 
 
6.2.1.2 The meetings issue 
In fairness, the tensions between Mayor Mongui and the CCG involve more than forest 
management; the roots of those tensions can be traced back to the issue of the management and 
utilization/sharing of timber revenues. In reality, as the next chapter will illustrate in detail, the 
conflict between the mayor and the CCG over the monitoring of the FCD revolves around the 
battle for the control of the timber revenues, a battle which has pitted the mayor on the one side 
against local villagers on the other side. For the time being, to demonstrate the impact of the 
                                                 
161 It seems that while the mayor was travelling abroad, a team of local workers, not affiliated with the 
FCD, was found illegally logging timber in the forest. That team for instance felled some species which harvesting 
within the FCD is forbidden. When one CCG member requested them to stop, the team allegedly replied that they 
were working on behalf of the mayor. Because that CCG member considered the act in contravention with the 
council official policy, he ordered them to leave as well as inform other local villagers so as to collectively devise a 
course of action. When the mayor, still abroad, was informed of the situation, he called Dimako sub-prefect who 
summoned the CCG members and physically threatened them as well as promised imprisonment if any more action 
was taken over this matter. It is at his return to Dimako that Mayor Mongui threatened to dissolve the CCG because 
in his words the CCG members were inciting a strike in the FCD as well as arousing local villagers against him and 
his leadership. 
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Mayor’s alleged capture of the timber revenues on forest management, the example of the issue 
of the CCG meetings shall suffice. According to Article 3 of Arrêté 11, once a year but two 
months before the municipal council’s vote on the budget, the CCG meets at the request of the 
mayor or two thirds (2/3) of its members. 
Notwithstanding the existence of that provision, the mayor has rarely convened the CCG 
or allowed the organization to meet in his absence. Put differently, the reality is that the CCG 
rarely meets. For CCG members, these meetings are critical not only because it provides them 
the opportunity to voice their discontent about the direction of the FCD, but also because it 
allows them to receive session allowances. As CCG member 30 pointed out: 
We spent two years without being called by the mayor so we wrote a protest letter 
and sent it to him. Either he dissolves the CCG or he pays our arrears and then we 
decided to send a copy to the governor [of the Eastern Region, then a province, in 
Bertoua] and the prefect [living in Abong Mbang] but I do not know who tipped 
him so he summoned a meeting and said that he was going to pay us so we 
calmed down. Later on, he reneged and stated that he never agreed to pay us. We 
spent two years without being called for a meeting. It was like we did not exist, so 
we were mad (16 September 2010, emphasis added). 
 
To illustrate the growing tensions between CCG members and the mayor over the 
meetings issue, and more generally over their exclusion from the FCD management, Box 6.1 
below shows copies of official letters sent to Mayor Mongui over a seven months period by CCG 
members during the year 2009. The first letter was written and submitted in May 2009 while the 
second was in November 2009 after the municipal council voted on the 2010 provisional budget. 
Overall, both letters substantiate CCG members’ claims that the mayor has ignored them by not 
abiding to the provisions of Arrêté 11, notably the organization of meetings. The letters also 
indicate that CCG members expect to be paid for their past rounds of service in the forest or they 
would take remedial action in protest. Finally, the mayor acknowledged both letters, and 
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especially in the second letter, he wrote on the margin that he would ‘satisfy’ CCG members’ 
claims before 15 December 2009, although he ultimately did not fulfill his promise. As a former 
CCG member concluded “he does not like to implement stuffs that he himself created”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.2.1.3 The confusion over its role? 
Faced with the CCG contention that he has prevented the organization from monitoring 
the implementation of the FCD management plan, the mayor has countered that CCG members 
are not ‘mere’ spectators in the management of the forest, but full participants despite their 
complaints. For the mayor, the issue stems from CCG members misconstruing their role. As a 
Box 6.1. CCG members’ Requests to the Mayor of Dimako, 2009 
10 May 2009 
Sir, 
 
We, CCG members of the Dimako Council Forest, are writing officially to express our discontent to 
the situation of the last three [municipal] council sessions, 2007-2008-2009. Indeed, we are asking you 
for our overdue compensations related to those council sessions. If not, we will abort the upcoming 18 
May 2009 meeting (….)  
We, CCG members, are very unhappy about the amount of 15,000 CFAF (fifteen thousand) given to 
every one for the monitoring of our council forest. That is why we are asking you to seriously consider 
this request upon reception. 
  
Signed by the Vice-President and the Secretary General of the CCG 
30 November 2009 
Sir,  
We, CCG members of the Dimako Council Forest, are writing this request to wish you well and 
Happy New Year 2009. We also wish to tell you that you have not abided to Article No 3 of the 
Municipal Order No 11/99/AM/CR/DKO.  
Dear Sir, given the content of the said Article No 3 the Municipal Council today voted on the budget, 
so what are we CCG members of Dimako Rural Council expecting from you. The Municipal 
Councilors will be receiving their share [session allowances] at the end of the council thus we would 
like to receive what Article 2 says.  
 
Signed by the Secretary 
 
PS: handwritten note on the side by Mayor Mongui stating that the CCG would meet before 15 
December 2009 and that the members’ requests would get satisfied.  
 
Source: reproduced from (CCG 2009a, 2009b) 
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2005 municipal council session transcript observes, “the mayor notes, unfortunately to deplore, 
that the committee’s assignments have not been achieved because of lack of understanding, 
absenteeism, ignorance of their role by some members” (CRDKO 2005b, 3). Furthermore, for 
Mayor Mongui, the CCG members’ ‘real’ issue is not so much with the monitoring of the FCD, 
but rather it is that they sought to control the FCD, that is to be the Comité de Gestion (CG) or 
the Management Committee, not the consultative committee.162
On the other hand, for Mayor Mongui the CCG cannot be a CG or management 
committee because the mayor as the head of the local council is administratively, financially, and 
legally responsible within the council jurisdictional area. As he put it “CCG not CG, it is a 
council revenue [the council forest] that is handled by the mayor according to the rigorous 
principles of public management (…) people have not thought through all this; people in 
Yaoundé have tried to impose this [CCG managing the forest and the funds] but the council 
executive is the engine [governing the FCD]” (9 March 2010).
 
163
Legally, the mayor seemed to have a point since the council executive over which he 
presides is responsible for handling all local affairs within its purview. That principle was 
reaffirmed recently following the 2004 decentralization laws as well as recent laws pertaining to 
the local governments’ institutional and legal framework in the country (see 
 
ROC 2004a, 2004b, 
                                                 
162 During interviews, CCG members have argued that to the extent that the FCD is the property of local 
villagers, they are the ones -through elected CCG members- who should be in charge of its management instead of 
the council executive-led mayor. That position of CCG members rest on the fact that during the local consultations 
pre-FCD, the mayor was never envisioned as the sole actor in the management, thus monitoring, of the FCD. As 
CCG member 7 commented “We are only CCG by name [meaning no real role] because when we go into the forest, 
we are only there to observe how work is proceeding. When we talk of CCG member, we should say CG or 
management committee. We are villagers, we accepted when we were told of the idea of having a council forest; we 
thought it was a good idea. But we are only CCG by name. The mayor is the one managing the council forest with 
the Secretary General and I can even say the councilors. But the population should have been the one managing it 
since it already belongs to us” (1 September 2010). 
163 Mayor Mongui appeared annoyed when raising that issue of CCG against CG, and actually raised the 
issue without being directly asked the question. 
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2009a, 2009b). That having been said, in this case, given the fact the council forest project was 
supposedly a collaborative effort between the council and the local villagers, which can be seen 
through the creation of the CCG, if the CCG cannot monitor the implementation of the 
management plan or the council adherence to forest rules and regulations, what is its purpose? 
For the mayor, the CCG role is to represent the population through its suggestions. As he 
argued “the municipal council is the deliberative body; the CCG is there to propose; the 
monitoring commission is a control body; [and] the council executive led by the mayor is there 
to impulse and coordinate [everything]” (Mayor Mongui, 9 March 2010, emphasis added). That 
‘new’ position regarding the CCG was in contrast to the mayor’s 2000 official position before 
the creation of the FCD. In fact, again in 2000, the mayor had emphasized that the council forest 
could not be managed like the other council properties. That is why for him it was imperative to 
involve local villagers through the CCG in order to ‘build a project of more general interest’ 
(Mongui Sossomba 2001a, 133-134). Therefore, the mayor’s current position could be seen as a 
surprise. 
Yet, that official stance was new because, after circumscribing the role of the CCG 
during its creation, in the meantime the mayor had successfully thwarted the emergence of an 
independent and assertive CCG. Indeed, the same year that timber harvesting started in the FCD 
in 2004, Mayor Mongui had established another moribund organization, the Monitoring 
Commission, thus effectively putting no institution in charge of monitoring the implementation 
of the management plan provisions. 
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6.2.2 The Monitoring Commission at the rescue? 
Chapter 5.0 above pointed out that despite the risks associated with creating another local layer 
for monitoring the FCD, the mayor went ahead and established the CSE. In contrast to his 2000 
statement quoted at the onset of the section where he emphasized the CCG role as the monitor of 
the forest management plan in the FCD, Mayor Mongui today argues that the CCG was never 
meant to be the local monitor of the management plan. That role rested with the CSE which 
purportedly accomplishes the task through the rotation system previously described. At issue 
with the mayor’s version of the events is that the extant evidence does not support his assertion. 
Further, an examination of the CSE points out that the organization is dominated by the 
mayor’s deputies as well as incumbent upon the mayor to establish its schedule, a schedule that 
he has reluctantly established according to field evidence. In effect, regardless of the CSE wide 
responsibilities as outlined by the mayor (see 5.7.3.3), the fact of the matter is that the current 
forest monitoring system is dysfunctional as the participants and the mayor himself have 
admitted. In other words, the CSE as proven as moribund as the CCG for almost the same 
reason: the mayor’s unwillingness to provide the space for the organization to exercise its role. 
6.2.2.1 The dysfunctional CSE rotation 
According to all the participants, the CSE rotation scheme is not functioning and they 
argue, as with the CCG, that the ineffectiveness of the monitoring system is due to the mayor’s 
opposition to an expansive role of the CSE as provided by Memo Number 11 signed by himself. 
A former CCG member conveyed his opinion this way: 
Me in my head this could not work, I could not see myself there. We were treated 
as guinea pigs, we were not doing anything so we did not want to run for office 
anymore, it was not worth it, maybe the newer member [could change the 
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situation]. But they claimed that we were beaten during the elections. We cannot 
collide every time with the mayor, our older brother. And the current Councilors 
and CCG members, they are sent into the forest but me I went into the forest for 
30 days and I could not tell anything. You just go there and sit; it is just for show 
nothing else. Some people just go there to get the per diem. Nobody can give the 
state of the forest, of things happening there although we were trained for that (26 
February 2010, emphasis added). 
 
The situation about the rotation is exacerbated by two issues: the lack of training among 
the new breed of councilors and CCG members post-2007 and the inconsistency of the rotation 
schedule. First, in contrast to the first CCG and councilors who benefited from Forêts et 
Terroirs’ experience, the current CCG members and councilors, as they have themselves 
conceded, are not proficient with forest harvesting issues; thus even if allowed by the mayor, 
they could not monitor the implementation of the management plan. Second, the inconsistency of 
the rotation schedule means that not only does the schedule depend on the mayor, hence he is the 
only one to have a clear picture of the forest, but equally important this means that no monitoring 
operations can operate first outside of the mayor’s consent. As Chief 30 argued “CCG members 
do not even go into the forest regularly. One goes while another does not and vice versa. So I 
believe they are all underinformed. If they all were going at the same time, maybe they could 
monitor the forest, but currently this is not the case” (16 September 2010).164
Furthermore, councilors have argued that insofar as the CCG was created to monitor the 
council forest, councilors should not be involved in the daily scheme devised by the mayor. For 
 Dimako Councilor 
8 for instance admitted that despite being assigned to monitor forest activities, he never went. 
                                                 
164  A further issue with the inconsistency of the rotation schedule, which bothered CCG members as well 
as councilors, pertains to the fact that because the schedule keeps being changed from a month into the forest to two 
weeks at a time without prior consultation. It is an important matter for councilors and CCG members alike since 
changing the rotation has implications for the monthly allowance that CSE members are set to receive as shall be 
shown below. 
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councilors, this is a waste of time because it involves no ‘real’ duties. As CCG member 11 
remarked about the councilors’ position on the rotation: 
We were supposed to work together with councilors, but since they see 
themselves as big men [important people], they have said that the mayor cannot 
ridicule them like that, so they are not going into the forest. They just wait for 
reports and they have said that this year they are not going anymore inside the 
forest. They said that the mayor has already created the CCG, and those are the 
people who should go into the forest not the big men they are (7 September 2010). 
 
That frustration over the inconsistency of the rotation scheme and schedule is further 
compounded by the lack of cooperation from the logging manager and the CFC head who only 
answer to the mayor. In some cases, both individuals have refused to provide the information 
necessary to monitor the FCD, in particular to CCG members, though Memo 11 affords the CSE 
members the right of information over all operations happening inside the FCD. In fact, CCG 
member 2 rhetorically asks “to whom are you going to ask for the forest log [carnet de chantier] 
and who is going to give that information to you?” (5 September 2010). Only Mayor Mongui is 
privy to all the information needed to monitor the FCD. As Global Witness Cameroon noted 
about its 2004 FCD inspection “the team had to visit Dimako twice because the Mayor, who 
personally keeps the DCF [Dimako Council Forest] logging operations documents, was absent” 
(Global Witness Cameroon 2004b, 2, emphasis added). 
For Mayor Mongui, though he has acknowledged the breakdown of the monitoring 
system, as with the CCG, he has also argued that the breakdown is not his fault; rather, the blame 
rests upon the people in charge of monitoring the FCD who, according to him, have not taken the 
task seriously, especially in their reporting of the ‘alleged’ abuses inside the FCD. Deflecting the 
accusations that he had impeded the work of the CCG first and then of the CSE, he noted the 
following: 
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So until now, can I say that I am satisfied with their work [of Councilors and 
CCG members i.e., the CSE]? No, I have to admit that I am still not satisfied. We 
have realized that the intellectual capacity of these elected members is the biggest 
obstacle for achieving our objectives. Let’s take the example of the Monitoring 
Commission, reports are written although they are supposed to send me a report 
as well as to the other participants [they haven’t] that is why we recently have 
agreed on a new arrangement (Mayor Mongui, 9 March 2010, emphasis added). 
 
Put another way, for Mayor Mongui the issue with the failure of the monitoring system is 
due to the illiteracy of the councilors as well as CCG members who together comprise the CSE. 
If the monitoring system is not working in the FCD, it is because CSE members have failed in 
their reporting duties. That is why he has put forward a new arrangement designed to strengthen 
the monitoring system and make it work.165
Yet the mayor’s assessment of the situation appears to be at odds with that of the CSE 
members, for the so-called new arrangement Mayor Mongui has advanced does not address the 
issue about forest monitoring and the alleged multiple violations inside the FCD; it simply deals 
with the reporting issue which, though related to monitoring, is a separate issue. To be sure, the 
issue raised by CSE members is about the mayor’s attempts to prevent them from conducting 
their work, not upon writing monitoring reports. Similarly, upon which data shall rest the reports 
when, in the first place, CSE members are not allowed to exert the role afforded by the municipal 
council. Finally, what has happened to the mayor’s reference to the intellectual capacity of CSE 
members? Will that have improved in the meantime? 
 
                                                 
165 According to the mayor, the new governing arrangement will consist in the following. First, at the end 
of each month the CSE and the CFC head each write ‘contradictory’ reports. Second, the municipal tax collector 
writes the financial report and from that a final report is written and sent to CCG members and everyone in the 
council for large diffusion. The meetings are set to be presided over by the First Deputy Mayor. As can be seen, it is 
unclear how this ‘new’ arrangement answers the question about forest monitoring. 
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6.2.2.2 The compensation issue 
A major issue why the rotation system has broken off regards the compensation afforded 
to CSE members. In effect, the compensation scheme has become a local point of contention. As 
with the CCG meetings and allowances, the same issues that have been noted before have also 
arisen here. According to the various documents creating the CCG and later the CSE, serving in 
both organizations is not remunerated; however, in order to conduct their official monitoring 
missions, members of both bodies have been afforded allowances to encourage local 
participation. That is necessary in particular because one has to remember that, for the most part, 
CCG members and councilors are local villagers currently living off agriculture. Consequently, 
for them abandoning their daily activities to monitor the council forest has to be balanced by the 
expectation that they shall get compensated in some way. 
Whereas councilors receive a monthly allowance of 30,000 CFAF, CCG members 
receive half of that sum for a month of service in the forest (see Appendix G). In the same way, 
all the CSE operating costs are supposed to be supported by the council budget. It is projected 
that during their tour of the forest, CCG members and councilors shall collect information about 
timber harvesting operations as well as write daily and monthly reports. The compensation is 
supposedly based on that trade-off. However, following the mayor’s reluctance to support the 
costs of the organization monitoring the FCD as well as appropriately compensate councilors and 
CCG members, it is another reason why the monitoring system has failed. 
This is of importance for the implementation of the management plan provisions, for in 
the absence of those compensations, in reality some CSE members have simply abandoned their 
duties while others have actually threatened to resign in protest. This CCG member for instance 
mentioned that “we were compensated at the end of the year, around 23 December 2009 15,000 
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[CFAF], but it was not supposed to be 15,000. The mayor himself told us it was going to be 
between 30 to 35,000 CFAF. Among us, there are some who want to resign because it is not 
working. We want the mayor to take us seriously; he should not act like we do not exist” (CCG 
member 10, 7 September 2010, italics added). 
Apart from the inconsistency between the official figures and those provided by this 
member (see Appendix G) -an issue which comes up frequently in Dimako-, what this CCG 
member is referring to is the fact that CCG members while they are compensated sometimes, 
they believe the compensation to be inadequate for the task at hand. Finally, the situation is also 
aggravated by the fact that in spite of the significance of timber revenues received since the start 
of forest harvesting in the FCD, the council has accumulated arrears over the CSE compensation. 
If the aim was to push away local villagers from close involvement in the FCD matters, 
Mayor Mongui’s objective has been partially achieved. In fact, CCG members and Councilors 
have become despondent over the monitoring of the forest, and for that matter the entire FCD 
issue. As one member concluded “I cannot by myself bear this burden; everyone [meaning local 
villagers] is behind you while they do not know that you are having obstacles thrown before 
you” (CCG member 2, 5 September 2010). 
6.2.3 The only one standing 
Viewed broadly, one cannot deny the fact that all this ‘confusion’ over the role of the CCG or the 
incapacity of the CSE to perform its duties have resulted in a situation where the mayor has been 
given free rein to manage the council forest as he sees fit. As the preceding section has shown, 
the alleged violations of the management plan provisions inside the FCD were not due to a lack 
of reporting from the CSE members; rather, they appear to be part of a deliberate strategy of 
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harvesting the forest outside of the management plan. For that strategy to be effective, the local 
organization, the CCG, created to ensure the respect of the provisions of the management plan as 
described above, needed to be rendered ineffective. This was achieved on paper through Arrêté 
11, but also on the ground through the various obstacles thrown at it as well as the diluting of its 
functions with that of the CSE dominated by the mayor’s deputies. 
Though Mayor Mongui was aware of the risk of creating another institutional layer of 
monitoring on top of the CCG, he nevertheless went ahead. The purpose seems obvious: prevent 
the CCG from exerting its role as envisioned during the creation of the FCD. Indeed, that 
conclusion was shared by one forest administration official who declared that “in any case, let 
me tell you that all these local organizations that they have put in place do not have any real 
responsibilities, they are fictitious entities. All this is a fictitious arrangement. Nobody really 
plays his true role. He [the mayor] is both the president and the manager; he is the one pulling 
all the strings” (4 April 2010, emphasis added). Seen this way, the mayor’s assessment of an 
ineffective CSE makes sense because he never intended the organization as a monitoring device; 
only as an instrument designed to further render the CCG irrelevant and apparently allow him to 
harvest the council forest out of sight and constraints. 
6.3 THE ABSENCE AND SILENCE OF THE FOREST ADMINISTRATION 
The first section of the chapter has shown that far from adhering to the principles of SFM, timber 
harvesting in the FCD seems to be conducted in disregard of the provisions of the management 
plan. In addition, the chapter has also established that the local organizations created to monitor 
the implementation of the management plan have largely proven ineffective because of 
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deliberate tactics by the mayor to sideline them amid his attempts to capture the council forest. 
Absent in this overall picture is the forest administration which by law is responsible for the legal 
enforcement of forest rules and regulations throughout the country. That absence is remarkable 
inasmuch as the preceding sections have also revealed -as illustrated by the various quotes of 
some of the ministry officials above- that the forest administration has been cognizant of the 
violations in the FCD but did not act to condemn or prevent additional violations from occurring. 
The following section attempts to provide some explanations regarding the absence and silence 
of the forest administration. 
6.3.1 The general lack of enforcement of forest laws 
To begin with, the role of the forest administration as far as forest law enforcement is concerned 
has come under intense criticism from several observers of Cameroon’s forests for what they 
regard as a lax attitude towards law enforcement. As an illustration, Cerutti, Nasi and Tacconi 
(2008) have remarked that ‘legal weaknesses and feeble controls’ by the ministry of forests have 
resulted in a situation where forest harvesting in Cameroon is operating as if no management 
plans were in effect (see also Alemagi and Kozak 2010, especially 557-559 on the institutional 
weaknesses of the Cameroon state which facilitate illegal logging). In 2006, according to the 
three authors, the figures stood at 68 percent of the timber production being conducted like no 
sustainable management rules existed (see Cerutti, Nasi and Tacconi 2008). 
That overall situation of an ineffective framework of forest law enforcement in the 
country, which has resulted in no or selective enforcement of the forest law, is one of the major 
reasons why since the early 2000s there exists an independent monitor of the country’s forests. 
To be sure, since 2000 an independent forest monitor has been present alongside the forest 
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administration division in charge of law enforcement in order to improve the forest sector 
governance through primarily the enforcement of existing forest laws as well as prosecution of 
offenders (see Global Witness 2005; REM 2009; Young 2007).166
The BNC [the Brigade Nationale de Contrôle, the forest administration agency in 
charge of forest law enforcement throughout Cameroon] is not an effective forest 
law enforcement agency because: there are no clear procedures in place, no 
internal assessment process and no proper ﬁling system. The lack of coordination 
with decentralized forestry departments/other governmental structures/civil 
society, a lack of objectivity, coupled with political collusion and interventions on 
illegalities undermines law enforcement (
 At the same time, in spite of 
notable improvements -as the various reports of the successive independent forest monitors have 
acknowledged- forest law enforcement in Cameroon still remains a challenge. Indeed, Resource 
Extraction Monitoring (REM) -which acted as the independent monitor of Cameroon’s forests 
from 2005 to 2009- at the end of its four year mission concluded that: 
REM 2009, 4). 
 
That challenge of enforcing forest laws throughout the country is exacerbated by several 
other factors such as the lack of prosecution of forest offenders as well as the lack of deterrence 
of the sanctions régime, and the absence of resources that has plagued the ministry. First, in spite 
of the provisions of the 1994 Forest Law -especially those relating to sanctions and prosecutions 
of offenders- the low level of penalties has been unable to act as a deterrent against forest 
violations (see Assembé-Mvondo 2009, 96-97).167
                                                 
166 Global Witness defines independent forest monitoring (IFM) as “the use of an independent third party 
that, by agreement with state authorities, provides an assessment of legal compliance, and observation of and 
guidance on official forest law enforcement systems” (quoted in Young 2007, 565). For David Young (2007, 565) 
“the defining characteristic of IFM is the unique position of the monitor as official yet independent”. 
 While in the end there has been an increase 
from the forest administration, thanks, in large measure, to the independent monitoring system, 
167 For instance, “in 2002, approximately thirty companies were punished for infringements of the 
regulations perpetrated during logging operations; however, only four of these companies paid fines. In 2003, out of 
forty-eight offending companies, only seven paid fines. During the 2004 financial year, sanctions were imposed on 
fifty-five companies, none of which actually resolved their cases with the forest administration, though seven of 
them requested transactions with the administration” (Assembé-Mvondo 2009, 96). 
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in reporting the violations, the fact remains that “sanctions and compensation payments are often 
not fully applied, and ﬁnes are rarely paid” (REM 2009, 4).168
Second, in general, it has been recognized that the forest administration lacks the 
adequate resources to be effective as well as the political will to enforce the law. As Assembé-
Mvondo (2009, 93) observed “ultimately, the ministry does not have the material means to 
conduct the follow-up and control missions assigned to it. There is not enough equipment, such 
as vehicles, to cover the country’s forests. Furthermore, there is a lack of modern technology, 
such as global-positioning-satellite data and computers, and a problem with the availability of 
fuel”. Hence, the task of enforcing forest rules and regulations on the ground has proven difficult 
in reality in spite of the existence of a National Strategy of Forest Law Enforcement (
 
see 
MINFOF 2005), designed to govern the ministry efforts in its pursuit of SFM. The lack of 
resources of the ministry has led one forest observer to declare that “the forest administration’s 
efforts are largely below the requirements of the forest law”. 
Seen this way, the absence of the forest administration in monitoring and enforcing the 
provisions of the management plan in the FCD does appear logical even though as early as 2004 
violations occurring inside the FCD had been reported. In truth, this chapter pointed out that in 
May 2004 Global Witness Cameroon reported the violations of the 2001 management plan that 
were occurring within the FCD. That report officially validated by the ministry, then-MINEF, 
observed that “even though DRC [Dimako Rural Council] is just beginning its forest activities, it 
has already been found guilty of several offences. While these offences must be sanctioned, 
                                                 
168 In that state of affairs, Assembé-Mvondo (2009, 97) notes that the main loser is always the state. To 
illustrate, REM “reported that of fines totaling 1,460,882 Euros in February 2006, the administration agreed to 
receive a payment of 97,709.9 Euros, 6.7 percent of the total of the fines imposed. In other words, representatives of 
the forest administration reduce fines by accepting deals that cause the state to lose up to 93.3 percent of the sum 
fined” (Assembé-Mvondo 2009, 97). 
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measures should be taken to ensure that the council is more compliant with forest laws 
henceforth” (Global Witness Cameroon 2004b, 3). 
Whereas these 2004 violations were not at the level of a suspension, they were 
nonetheless in contradiction with forest rules and regulations as well as the FCD 2001 
management plan provisions, for instance as relating to the minimum diameters. Therefore, they 
should have warranted from the forest administration a closer look at the practices within the 
FCD. On the contrary, these warnings did not affect the forest administration stance because six 
years after the start of forest harvesting in the FCD and the alleged additional violations 
documented here -some confirmed by the 2009 MINFOF-GTZ-CTFC report referred above, the 
council forest is still operating leading one to question whether the lax attitude alone toward law 
enforcement can explain the situation in Dimako. 
6.3.2 Complicity and corruption 
Though it has been mentioned above that Cameroon’s forest observers have noted the general 
tendency of the forest administration to be negligent in enforcing the laws, it also has to be noted 
that the same observers have pointed to the complicity of some forest administration officials in 
the perpetuation of illegality in the sector. Indeed, elsewhere it has been documented that the 
forest administration itself has encouraged illegality in the sector as some officials have 
themselves been involved or colluded with private sector firms engaged in illegal logging (see 
for instance Global Witness 2005).169
                                                 
169 While this study was being researched, throughout the Dimako Council area a senior forest 
administration official residing in Bertoua was allegedly engaging in illegal logging instead of enforcing forest laws. 
Indeed, one evening this led to a heated conversation that the researcher witnessed between some Dimako villagers 
who opposed him and the younger brother of that official who had come to pick up planks sawn in the area reserved 
 That complicity and corruption of the forest administration 
219 
seems to have been encouraged by the general situation of low salaries prevalent inside the 
ministry, or for that matter Cameroon’s public services. As an example, a senior forest engineer 
before the 1987 economic crisis was paid about 1145 USD compared to today’s 429 USD a 
month (see Assembé-Mvondo 2009, 93). For one author, this situation has enabled a range of 
behaviors such as “corruption, embezzlement of public funds, abuse of public property, and a 
wide range of compromise between civil servants and commercial operators” (Assembé-Mvondo 
2009, 93). 
The same situation noted elsewhere regarding the complicit attitude of the forest 
administration appears to be at work in Dimako Council. Indeed, a Dimako resident remarked 
“all these violations would not have been possible without the complicity of the forest 
administration. There are accomplices in this thing, and if we were to dig deeper we would 
realize that something is not going right!” (4 March 2010). A forest administration official, 
disputing the thought of complicity leveled against the administration, argued that, though the 
violations exist in the FCD, they have not reached to the point where the forest administration 
has to step in. As he stated “there are problems, but not problems that reach the level of 
suspension. Sometimes also, the [forest] administration looks the other way around; sometimes, 
we close our eyes, it is very delicate; sometimes we strike [fine them] so that they do not 
exaggerate” (15 July 2010, emphasis added). 
                                                                                                                                                             
for a future village community forest. That official the researcher heard was later ‘under investigation’ from the 
ministry, though local villagers believe the investigation would lead nowhere and the official would later come back 
for more timber. Similarly, the researcher also heard stories about the same forest administration official coming to 
ask permission from local Dimako chiefs to harvest timber in the surrounding community forests or areas set to be 
reserved for future ones. While some chiefs opposed, others did not object, thus provoking local conflicts between 
these chiefs as well as neighboring villages. Finally, [it is said that] the same forest administration official who 
allegedly illegally harvested timber in the Dimako surrounding forests went as far as to illegally harvest timber 
inside the FCD. (Un)surprisingly, Mayor Mongui seemed to not have lodged an official complaint. 
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The point about the violations being minor in consequence raises an immediate question 
as to what constitutes a major or minor violation of the forest rules and regulations, i.e., at which 
point the forest administration needs to intervene. This is a critical issue because, as the evidence 
presented in the first section of the chapter has demonstrated, the management plan provisions of 
the FCD have been discounted during forest harvesting operations. Furthermore, though the 
alleged violations might not have reached the level of suspension, it remains that they are at odds 
with the law, for the 1994 Forest Law and the implementing decree explicitly provide the forest 
administration the authority to intervene when ‘acts contrary’ to the provisions of the 
management plan are being performed. In fact, two powers are given, the power of suspension 
and of substitution, powers that the forest administration seems not to have utilized in Dimako 
Council so far. 
That argument about the complicity of the forest administration with Mayor Mongui was 
reaffirmed by other Dimako residents who cannot fathom how the FCD is still operating despite 
the multiple alleged violations in the past. It is especially puzzling to them, as the various quotes 
at the onset of the chapter have illustrated, since the forest administration has been aware for a 
while of the situation in Dimako, a fact that some officials have themselves admitted during 
interviews. Further, local villagers recalled that, on several occasions, they have seen the forest 
administration inspection teams visit the forest, but nothing has actually happened. So they have 
argued that these officials have been closing their eyes, and are colluding with Dimako local 
officials. This position was best illustrated by a local chief who commented that: 
The [central state] auditors who come, what do you think they are after? The 
moment you give them money, the auditors, the red brigades [apparently, this is a 
term reserved for the forest administration central inspection teams] come, we do 
not see anything, nothing changes. As soon as they leave, it is over; the next day, 
we see [FCD] workers going back inside the forest and they ship out logs…we 
heard that the red brigade was here and that they stop all operations in the FCD 
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because what the government [meaning MINFOF] told him [the mayor] to cut, 
several times he did what he wanted. Thus, forest operations were stopped but we 
are surprised to see the workers still going into the forest to work. We can say that 
it is the envelope [money, bribes] who is at play here (Chief 28, 17 September 
2010, emphasis added). 
 
About the chief’s assertions as well as this specific episode, a forest administration 
official who was questioned declared that first the ministry did not recognize the term red 
brigade and that second, he could not find an inspection report (procès verbal) about Dimako 
Council violations, hence officially could not comment. Moreover, another official added, rather 
ironically, that sometimes inspection reports disappear in the ministry in Yaoundé so one could 
not ascertain with certainty whether Dimako Council had been subjected to any official fines or 
not for not implementing the FCD management plans.170
There are things that we know but do not tell; bureaucracy is about paper trail, 
about written documents. If there is none, no paper trail, how am I going to say 
that there is a problem? From 2004 to 2009, you do not find any official fines for 
Dimako. So you understand, I cannot say anything without evidences. Which 
proofs do I have to base my claims upon? Inspection reports are known to 
disappear in Yaoundé so you do not have any evidence. If you insist [about 
knowing where the reports have gone] someone tells you to keep quiet and mind 
your business (19 May 2010, emphasis added).  
 As he commented: 
 
For local observers, this is a sign of a complicit attitude from some forest administration 
officials; a complicit attitude that some officials have not denied, preferring instead to counter 
the criticism in other ways. In fact, an official bluntly stated that “forest law enforcement does 
not pay in Cameroon so you leave them [illegal loggers] alone. At the beginning, I had the 
motivation to work but now I am getting older so I am not going to try to fake it” (23 May 2010). 
                                                 
170 Incidentally, in Dimako the workers stated that the mayor came roaring one day into the forest furious 
because he had received a 28 million CFAF fine in early February from the forest administration for some violations 
in the FCD. No one interviewed among the forest administration officials could substantiate or deny the claim and in 
Dimako, since these types of documentary evidence are typically unavailable, it is not known whether the fine in 
question exists or not. 
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In other words, that official is going to try to survive through all available means including 
turning his head in the face of violations.171
6.3.3 The ambiguity surrounding council forestry rules and regulations 
 From this, the following conclusion is that the 
ministry has not been strictly enforcing the laws as well as is enabling Mayor Mongui to 
disregard the management plan provisions and harvest the FCD according to his own objectives. 
On top of the reasons advanced above to explain the absence and silence of the forest 
administration in enforcing the provisions of the management plan in the FCD, some local 
observers have argued that, in the specific case of council forests, the issue is complicated by the 
ambiguity surrounding council forestry rules and regulations following the low attention that 
council forests in general have received from policymakers as well as scholars since 1994 
compared to community forests and FMUs. Because of the legal loopholes and ambiguity in 
council forestry rules and regulations, the argument goes, local councils, in this case the Mayor 
of Dimako through the council, have been able to take advantage and disregard the management 
plan provisions without interference from the forest administration too busy policing community 
forests as well as FMUs. 
In effect, for some council forests observers, notwithstanding the predicaments of the 
forest administration highlighted above, one major issue which complicates the monitoring and 
                                                 
171 The complicity probably reaches the higher levels of the ministry and starts with the approval of the 
management plan. A case in point, the first section of the chapter has demonstrated that the 2006 FCD management 
plan provisions were changed notwithstanding the dangers that they might represent for SFM as well as the fact that 
the data upon which those changes rested were of dubious quality. In fact, the FCD 2006 management plan was 
officially approved in spite of the mayor’s accompanying letter stating that the management plan draft did not fully 
adhere to the forest rules and regulations, especially Arrêté 0222 main provisions (see CDKO 2006a). The 
approbation was granted with the mention that the management plan was “judged to be in line [sic] with current 
regulations [normes en vigueur]” (MINFOF 2006). 
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enforcement of the management plan provisions in council forests is the underdevelopment of 
rules and regulations designed to govern forest harvesting in that type of forests. The point about 
the underdevelopment of council forests’ rules and regulations was highlighted in the already-
cited 2004 Global Witness Cameroon report as follows: 
Timber extraction in a council forest is not well regulated, given that there are 
very few provisions in the forest law and the Decree of Application of Forest 
Management. For instance, the special considerations of a council and the need 
not [to] view councils as private sector economic operators were not taken into 
account when devising a tax system for the exploitation of council forests under 
local government control. They were also not taken into account when specifying 
the litigation procedures to be applied should a council not respect forestry law in 
its exploitation practices. Because there are few regulations governing council 
forests, the forest administration tends to place council forest management in the 
same category as Forest Management Units [FMUs], resulting in problematic 
council forest management (2004b, 3, emphasis added). 
 
That is not to say that the forest administration has not been deficient in its mission; it is 
just to point out that the legal ambiguity surrounding council forests have made it difficult to 
enforce forest rules and regulations in some council forests. That ambiguity, for instance, has 
allowed local councils, as mentioned in Chapter 5.0, to harvest council forests without a land 
title, though required by law to complete the gazetting process, as well as not pay taxes as in the 
case of the FCD.172
More recently, the issue over how to enforce forest rules and regulations in the FCD, thus 
council forests, surfaced again inside the FCD during a 2008 REM mission. Compared to the 
2004 Global Witness Cameroon mission, this time Mayor Mongui, based on his understanding of 
the law, skillfully utilized the provisions of the law to prevent the independent forest monitor 
 
                                                 
172 To take an example about the administrative steps needed pre-forest harvesting itself, in a 2004 report, 
Global Witness Cameroon noted that that the “DRC [Dimako Rural Council] has not drawn up a Five Year Plan; the 
Annual Operation Plan is still being prepared yet activities have already been initiated” (Global Witness Cameroon 
2004b, 1, italics original). This was in contradiction with the forest administration regulations which stipulates that 
all these administrative steps have to be completed before actual harvesting. 
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from inspecting the FCD on the ground that the council forest enjoyed a special status. As the 
authors of the report declared: 
Before arriving on the field, the mayor of Dimako informed the inspectors 
[contrôleurs] about the legal status of the council. According to the mayor, a 
council forest is part of the council private estate and consequently, this forest is 
not subject to the same type of inspection as the forests of the Cameroonian state. 
According to the mayor, one cannot issue official statements regarding the 
violations [procès-verbaux d’infraction] for a violation committed [fait commis] 
inside a council forest, because as he said, it is a ‘private’ forest’. Those who 
share this point of view note that the ministry of forests must limit itself to 
monitoring the implementation of the council forests’ management plans, as 
stipulated by the guidelines of the article 80 (3) of the decree No 95-531 of 23 
August 1995 (REM 2008, 12).173
 
 
Confronted with that refusal, the independent observer’s inspection team noted that in 
lieu of the legal guidelines, they did not believe that council forests held a particular status 
preventing official inspections. The team, nonetheless, added that the question of council forests 
had to be legally clarified and that one of the major issues that had to be solved centered around, 
as the report put it, “the person or the institution who should answer in case of violations [as well 
as] the types of applicable penalties” (REM 2008, 13).174
                                                 
173 To recall about the 1995 implementing decree article 80, 3 see note 59 above. 
 In other words, what is the proper 
sequence of actions or procedures needed in case a council forest is found to be violating the 
provisions of the management plan such as it appears to be the case in the FCD? 
174 In the same way, REM (2009, 17, emphasis added) concluding report noted that “Law enforcement 
within council forests raises important questions. A close reading of the system of sanctions anticipated in the forest 
law reveals that council forests do not form a part of State forests and so a number of the sanctions stipulated by the 
law are not applicable. Other provisions of the forest law specify, with the exclusion of council forests, the areas in 
which some infractions may be suppressed. Some forest officers think that, as council forests are privately owned by 
the council-level authorities, they should not be subject to traditional enforcement on the part of the forest 
administration, whose role should be limited to simple technical follow-up. This controversy signiﬁcantly affects the 
method and quality of law enforcement within council forests, as REM highlighted in a mission report. Given the 
growing place of council forests and the relevance of the issue of law enforcement within these areas, the Ministry 
of Forests needs to urgently clarify these ambiguities”. 
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Finally, whereas it is accurate that specific regulations about council forests are lacking -
and no doubt that complicates the task of law enforcement- the ambiguity issue shall not simply 
get resolved by specifying the law enforcement procedures to be applied in council forests. To be 
sure, as the 2006 audit of the forestry sector reported, the existence of specific regulations for 
community forests did not prevent illegal activities from occurring there (see Karsenty et al. 
2006, 91-95). Hence, simply solving the council forestry ambiguity issue -though it might help 
clarify forest law enforcement inside council forests- shall not be sufficient by itself to bring 
change in the absence of actual enforcement on the ground which appears to be lacking. This 
seems to suggest another avenue to comprehend the absence of the forest administration in the 
FCD. In effect, Chapter 8.0 shall argue that a large part of the answer to the forest administration 
behavior in Dimako, or for that matter council forests, revolves around politics; it revolves 
around the fact that, on top of its own shortcomings, for fear of antagonizing local mayors and 
their patrons, the forest administration has largely stayed on the sidelines in spite of its legal 
mandate. 
6.4 SUMMARY 
This chapter has described the process of forest management in the Dimako Council, specifically 
inside the council forest. Through an examination of the two management plans of the FCD, the 
chapter has presented the evidence suggesting that following his capture of the council forest 
through the self-management mode of operation, the Mayor of Dimako appears to have 
deliberately disregarded the mandatory legal documents and proceeded in a way that is damaging 
for the forest. Similarly, the chapter has also revealed that this alleged situation of illegality in 
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the FCD was rendered possible because the two local organizations created to involve local 
villagers in monitoring forest activities have been stifled by the mayor through the utilization of 
various techniques. Last but not least, the chapter has argued that, though the alleged violations 
of forest rules and regulations in the FCD were known to the forest administration, the 
administration has ignored them for various reasons. The next chapter turns to the other side of 
the forest management decentralization in Dimako, that is local development. 
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7.0  FORET NA MONGUI OR THE MAYOR’S FOREST 
“The idea of council forestry is a good idea; maybe the issue is 
with governance. Just look at Dimako, the council forest provides 
more than 80 percent of the council revenues. In Moloundou where 
they benefit from the RFA, it provides about a quarter [of the 
revenues]. The real issue with council forests is about 
governance…currently, it is the mayor’s reserved domain” (A 
forest administration official, 1 March 2010). 
 
“[Mayor] Mongui! There is nobody who can tell you something 
good about him; he does not do anything for the town, he keeps 
everything for himself” (Chief 28, 17 September 2010, emphasis 
added). 
 
 “According to what he [the mayor] says, timber does not sell very 
well. But we are the ones going into the forest, and we see that 
timber is selling well. Yes, we do not believe that revenues are 
falling because we see that timber is being sold. When we tell him 
that we see that timber is being sold, he tells us that he spent on 
this and that, but we know it is not true. He says that timber does 
not sell very well, that he is spending money elsewhere; however, 
we only can believe that he is spending money when we see what 
he is doing in our village [We only can believe him if we see 
concrete achievements]” (CCG member 17, 12 September 2010, 
emphasis added). 
 
Dimako is a town where, for more than fifty years, the French timber harvesting firm SFID made 
timber trade part of the local way of life until its 2002 departure. Buoyed by that history and the 
sense of entitlement and know-it-all on forest-related matters, Dimako residents are very 
outspoken, especially when they believe their ‘rights’ have been violated. In the case of the 
council forest, this outspokenness manifested itself by referring to the FCD as the Foret Na 
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Mongui, which translated means “Mongui’s Forest”. Local residents use the mayor’s last name 
coupled with the forest to express the idea that the mayor has not only captured the forest, but 
also its revenues. As Chief 28 commented “Dimako’s forest, it is not for the benefit of the 
people; Dimako’s forest is Mongui’s personal forest because he does with the council forest what 
he wants” (17 September 2010). The following chapter presents the evidence regarding the other 
side of council forestry, namely local development.  
7.1 ACCOUNTING FOR (NO) LOCAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
Figure 7.1. The unfinished B-Market in downtown Dimako, February 2010 
Source: author 
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This section describes what has occurred in Dimako Council as far as local development is 
concerned in the aftermath of the creation of the FCD, and the more than 1 billion CFAF 
received in timber revenues since 2004. In line with the introduction of the chapter, the section 
emphasizes Mayor Mongui’s alleged capture of timber revenues and the overall absence of any 
significant development projects. In effect, the section argues that the so-called misappropriation 
of the funds dedicated for local development appears to have been achieved through various 
techniques, mainly overestimations of the council achievements as well as costs (overbilling) and 
fabrications of non-existing projects. 
7.1.1 Where are the development projects? 
When Forêts et Terroirs convened its flagship conference in July 2000 to showcase its 
achievements before its official closure, Mayor Mongui was among the first speakers to 
officially greet all the participants (see the official collection of papers from that conference in 
Collas de Chatelperron 2001c). In effect, Mayor Mongui as the chief executive of the Dimako 
Council since 1987 had been the host of both API-Dimako and its successor Forêts et Terroirs. 
Thus, it was appropriate that the mayor be among the most prominent speakers at the event. 
During that conference, in his synopsis of the Dimako Council Forest gazetting 
experience to all the distinguished guests, Mayor Mongui noted that for local villagers, the 
project appeared as a boon (manne inespérée) given SFID tax exempt status since 1994 which 
for the council had meant that it could not provide its constituents the required basic services or 
fulfill local villagers’ requests for additional amenities (Mongui Sossomba 2001, 132). That is 
why, for the mayor, the council forest project was significant because the forthcoming timber 
revenues would provide the council the necessary financial resources to complete and initiate 
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new local development projects (Mongui Sossomba 2001, 132). As he himself argued in 2000, 
“it is highly recommended that at least eighty [80] percent of the revenues from this forest be 
reserved for investment [that is local development]” (Mongui Sossomba 2001a, 133, emphasis 
added). In that 2000 statement, Mayor Mongui was following the wishes of the local population 
who saw the project through the lens of local development and the amelioration of their living 
conditions as Chapter 5.0 illustrated. 
On the other hand, it appears from the extant evidence that the mayor never envisioned- 
or at least changed his mind- about setting aside ‘at least 80 percent’ of the forest revenues for 
local investment and for the benefit of local villagers. In retrospect, Mayor Mongui’s address 
seemed targeted at the conference guests; at these ‘outsiders’ assembled by the French 
Cooperation, represented by Forêts et Terroirs, in a Yaoundé hotel far away from the rural area 
currently encompassing the Dimako Council. This fact became evident three years after the 
conference and two years after the departure of Forêts et Terroirs when a 2003 council brochure 
specifically targeted at potential investors in the council forest project in the United States, 
Europe, and North Africa to name a few -as the document itself stated- pointed out that 70 
percent of the forest revenues, down 10 percent, would be reserved for local development while 
30 percent would be for the council operating costs as well as its ‘traditional’ missions (CRDKO 
2003b, 10). 
More importantly, the final step towards the emasculation of the revenues dedicated to 
local development occurred, as Chapter 5.0 already mentioned, on 6 August 2003 when the 
mayor-dominated municipal council adopted the revenue sharing formula. Indeed, instead of the 
80 or 70 percent target, only 50 percent of the forest funds were provided for local development 
in the final formula (see section 5.7.3.4). This situation was disconcerting for local villagers as 
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well as the béni oui oui councilors (see 5.7.3.3), who nonetheless remained silent for fear of 
reprisal, insofar as it went against the local agreement. 
Also changed was the initial arrangement governing the selection of the development 
projects to be undertaken with the forest revenues. In fact, as briefly mentioned before, in the 
initial arrangement as part of their mandate to represent local villagers in all FCD matters, CCG 
members were tasked with submitting proposals for local development projects to the municipal 
council which in turn would annually prioritize projects on the basis of needs as well as available 
revenues. In practice, with the marginalization of the CCG which has occurred in FCD matters, 
as the previous chapter has demonstrated, the process has broken and unfolds differently.175
7.1.1.1 The reality on the ground 
 
In order to provide the reader a general idea of the direction of funds dedicated to local 
development since 2004, Table 7.1 below exhibits the official council ‘development’ 
expenditures for the 2004-2010 period. Because the council financial records are sometimes 
inconsistent, incomplete or disorganized, it has proven a difficult task to obtain a comprehensive 
picture. Nonetheless, these reconstructed figures from extant council records are critical, for they 
provide a comparison point to be used against the evidence on the ground.176
                                                 
175 That arrangement from the Forêts et Terroirs’ era only regarded revenues derived from the harvesting of 
the council forest. However, to the extent that the council forest has become the primary source of revenues for the 
council, the selection of projects by CCG members has implication for the entire council. The current process is a 
combination of local villagers, chiefs, councilors, and CCG members all meeting together in their village and 
submitting through their councilors projects to the entire municipal council for further action. By law, the mayor-led 
council executive is tasked with implementing the municipal council decisions, though in truth the mayor is the only 
one to select the course of action. 
 
176 The way the figures were obtained involved the following steps. First, council provisional budgets were 
examined and every expenditure was checked against first the local ‘definition’ of development projects as well as 
the definition of local development adopted in this study (‘concrete’ achievements such as potable water provision; 
electricity; construction and maintenance of roads, etc…) and then included in the list. Second, these provisional 
expenditures were checked against the council administrative accounts which supposedly reflect the actual ‘official’ 
spending that has occurred. Third, the council figures were compared as well as reconciled with observational and 
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Table 7.1. Dimako Council development projects expenditures, 2004-2010 (CFAF million)* 
Years Education1 Housing Subsidies3 Infrastructure Misc6 TOTAL 
2004 28,877,130 2,502,5072 100,000 NA 15,854,945 47,334,582 
2005 7,393,000 71,298,9157 3,031,200 2,992,5509 27,493,900 112,199,565 
2006 5,162,7004 18,213,39810 1,356,000 NA 1,958,000 26,690,098 
2007 3,264,7005 4,659, 96211 1,847,000 1,708,5778 540,000 12,020,239 
2008 4,254,100 NA 30,000 2,908,0648 1,723,000 8,915,164 
2009 2,164,00012 NA 1,632,00014 2,493,4128 10,897,49313 17,186,90515 
SUB-
TOTAL 
51,115,630 96,674,782 7,996,200 10,102,603 58,467,338 224,356,553 
2010 6,000,000 NA NA NA NA 6,000,000 
TOTAL 57,115,630 96,674,782 7,996,200 10,102,603 58,467,338 230,356,553 
FCD 
GROSS 
REVENUES 
1,053,675,66316 
Source: (CDKO 2004a, 2004b, 2005a, 2005b, 2006c, 2006d, 2007b, 2007c, 2008b, 2008c; 2009a, 4; 
2010d) 
* The 2009 figures represent council expenditures from January to July, while 2010 are projected 
expenditures from the council provisional budgets 
NA: no figures available 
1 includes students’ scholarship, school registration fees, exam registration fees, books, etc for Dimako 
High School; Primary and secondary schools; colleges and universities; SAR/SM; CETIC all mentioned in 
the council provisional budget 
2 includes for 2004 an unspecified amount for traditional chiefs and councilors in the budget 
3 includes subsidies to sports associations plus GICs loans in 2005 for 1,031,000 CFAF 
4 originally budgeted 6,900,000 for 23 college students at an individual rate of 300,000 in the council 
budget plus 3,487,000 for exam fees for Dimako High School, SAR/SM for a total of 10,387,000 CFAF 
5 originally budgeted 400,000 for 20 college students as well as official state exam fees for secondary 
education and other charges in the council budget 
6 includes IVAC salaries, reserves for youth employment program, students and interns allowances for 
some years as well as contributions to social bodies for 2005, 2007, and 2008 plus gifts and relief 
assistance for 2004, 2007, and 2008. 2005 also includes 24,823,900 for the purchase of the mayor’s official 
car under the same heading as in previous years where it was used for classroom construction.  
7 support for rural housing improvement as well as other miscellaneous costs 
8 construction and finishing touches of the B-Market 
                                                                                                                                                             
interview data. In the end, in spite of these precautions, because the council financial records are disorganized, the 
study argues a deliberate practice by the mayor to conceal his shortcomings, it proved difficult to provide a 
comprehensive account of local development expenditures. On the other hand, as shall become apparent by the end 
of this chapter, the picture of local development achievements was difficult to obtain simply because in actuality, 
there are almost no achievements in town to be observed. 
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9 includes finishing touches for DCH, classrooms construction plus provision of chairs and tables, but 
initially budgeted at 25 millions 
10 purchase of cement block molds and provision of construction wood and planks 
11 Provision of cement block molds in each village as well as the opening of a community radio. In the 
council provisional budget the estimate was 31,353,668 million CFAF.  
12 10 millions in the 2009 council provisional budget 
13 contribution to social bodies (to local health and medical facilities); assistance to sick people; 3 million 
for a pickup truck purchase; more than 4 million for gardens and open spaces (lawn and landscape) and 
palm grove care; and 2,390,000 for IVAC salaries 
14 for summer internships 
15 slight mistake in the original document which reports 17,156,905 CFAF 
16 Includes the 2009 figures from January to July of 113,480,586 CFAF, but does not include the 2010 
projected FCD revenues of 227.5 million CFAF 
 
An examination of Table 7.1 above indicates that from 2004 to July 2009, the period for 
which ‘complete’ data is available, the council spent about 225 million CFAF on local 
development projects out of the 1.05 billion CFAF of gross revenues received since 2004. Of 
those expenditures, housing and education appear to have benefited the most, respectively almost 
97 and 58 million CFAF. Conversely, Table 7.1 demonstrates that of development expenditures, 
no funds were allocated to roads, electricity, water boreholes, or health initiatives. Finally, the 
table points out that if the council kept its 2010 commitment, total expenditures in favor of local 
development projects should amount to about 231 million CFAF over the period 2004-2010. 
Judging by these figures, it appears that about 21 percent of the FCD timber gross 
revenues, it is important at this stage to note the ‘gross’ aspect, have directly benefited Dimako 
residents in the form of educational and housing improvement as well as subsidies. Yet, upon 
closer inspection, the figures advanced in the council financial records are contradicted by the 
interview as well as observational evidences. Indeed, those figures appear to be all 
overestimations of the council achievements and their costs (overbilling), as well as fabrications 
designed to conceal the fact that the money has been allegedly misappropriated. At this point, it 
is important to distinguish those three strategies. The first one, overestimation of the council 
achievements, just consists in extrapolating the actual number of projects that have been 
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implemented. Related to the first strategy, is the practice of overbilling once the number of 
projects has been overestimated and also of simply billing the council for inexistent projects. The 
third and final strategy simply entails fabricating projects, that is creating fictitious projects. In 
practice, because all these three strategies are intertwined, it is difficult to exactly pinpoint them 
with certitude. 
In truth, that alleged pattern of overestimations, fabrications and embezzlement of forest 
revenues in Cameroon following the 1990s reforms appears not new; in effect, it was already 
noted in the case of the RFA. As an illustration, Karsenty et al. remarked that “globally, the 
utilization of these funds [RFA] by local councils does not adhere to the ethics that one expects 
from the management of public funds. Between overestimation, embezzlement, fictitious projects 
and other bad management practices, the expected impacts on local development are most of the 
time watered down” (2006, 102, emphasis added).177
That having been said, when visiting the Dimako Council, the first issue that stands out is 
the discrepancy between what the mayor touts as the FCD achievements and local villagers’ 
assessment of the situation. A former councilor summed up the mayor’s achievements under the 
FCD the following way, “you see those street lights and the unfinished [B] market, those are the 
works of the council. That’s it under Mongui!” (17 September 2010). Though the councilor 
assessment seems a little bit harsh, the observation on the ground in Dimako seems to support his 
overall view, for in the aftermath of the creation of the FCD and the accumulation of more than 1 
 
                                                 
177 The authors continued that “the capture of RFA revenues by mayors as well as council executives is 
palpable in several local councils. The execution of the projects financed by the RFA funds, is captured by a few 
local councils authorities (in one local council visited, 80% of the projects to be carried out were awarded to the 
mayor, the local tax inspector and the accountant (comptable matières) via companies under their names or 
borrowed names. Overbilling and fictitious projects here are common practice” (Karsenty et al. 2006, 102, emphasis 
added) 
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billion CFAF of timber revenues since 2004, Mayor Mongui has nothing to show for it as far as 
local development is concerned. 
This situation has confounded many a local villager like this chief who argued that 
“Dimako should be on top of Eastern councils because we own a council forest, but really we do 
not get it... Mindourou has a council forest; if you go there you will see that the mayor has 
transformed the settlement into a town because of their council forest, why not here? We want 
everything to change here. This is shameful. We want him [the mayor] to invest here; we want 
things to be different” (Chief 22, 19 September 2010). Apart from the confusion between the 
RFA and council forests -for Mindourou as of 2010 did not yet own a council forest but only 
collects the RFA- Dimako villagers do not understand how six years after the council started 
selling timber, Mayor Mongui has not been able to fulfill the promises he made as well as 
implement the municipal council decisions regarding, for instance, housing improvement, rural 
roads paving or maintenance and so on. 
To illustrate the situation in Dimako, Box 7.1 below provides a list of the council actual 
‘development’ projects from other sources than the council, notably CCG members and 
councilors. In the first place, from perusing the box, it is notable that what is included as part of 
local development includes almost everything from education to clothing, thus making the 
distinction between local development expenditures and others difficult to fathom, a point that 
shall be further elaborated below. Second, though the list is incomplete and no overall price 
estimate is available, the evidence suggests at this stage a gap between the price tag of 225 
million CFAF and the number of achievements that villagers remember and which are actually 
visible throughout the council. 
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In effect, what the box reveals is that in the six years since the creation of the council 
forest, the council has not completed any significant development projects. Additionally, in 
contrast to the council official figures, the evidence on the ground exposed a number of 
unfulfilled projects as well as various techniques to overestimate expenses and overbill the 
council for inexistent or incomplete projects. To be sure, despite the council official figures of 
more than 225 million CFAF expended for local development projects, the reality in Dimako is 
that, save for the B-Market178 Figure 7.1 (  above), some educational assistance, and a few other 
things, the money has been allegedly squandered and misappropriated. Chief 14 summarized the 
matter in those terms: 
                                                 
178 The B-Market (Marché B) was built to replace the now aged A-Market (Marché A) and to improve the 
conditions and safety of Dimako small businessmen and women as well as shoppers. 
Box 7.1. Dimako Council villagers’ list of ‘actual’ 
development projects, 2004-2010* 
 
1. Financial assistance for driver’s licenses to young local villagers1 
2. Provision of birth certificates to 150 local children 
3. Provision to village chiefs of official dress uniforms 
4. Construction works for the B-Market2 
5. Financial contest for the most beautiful village (1,030,000 CFAF 
total prize) 
6. 5 million CFAF grant for local agricultural associations (GICs)3 
7. Scholarships and school supplies for local Bakoum and Pol students; 
classroom construction for CETIC 
8. Construction of a classroom at Dimako High School 
9. Establishment of the palm grove 
10. IVAC salaries 
Source: (Interview and observational data, 2010; Bimbar 2004, 37; CDKO 
2010c, 68-69; and Singer 2008, 103) 
* Note that not all these ‘achievements’ appear in the council financial 
statements nor the figures involved here are the same as in those documents 
when they exist. 
1 Singer mentioned that fifteen people received these grants while Bimbar 
talked of 90 people; however, villagers could not confirm those figures, only 
that the council has given money for that specific purpose. 
2 Unfinished 
3 Singer advances the figures of 7 million CFAF handed out as loans to 15 
GICs across the council. 
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For us, the council forest is a store opened to sell our timber, a store given by the 
state to sell our goods. The state has given us this gift, and we were the first one to 
get it. This store is managed by the mayor. In the beginning, we believed that 
once the store was opened, great works could be done, roads for instance. What 
we get at the end of the year [the 10 percent] is not enough given what the forest 
brings in. Today’s mayors run councils like fields that they have inherited from 
their grandparents. Councils that have not received these gifts [forests] are even 
better run than Dimako, and chiefs and councilors are treated well. We do not 
even know that we have a council forest. Timber is money; one cannot tell us that 
the council forest is not rich, it is beyond comprehension! You put a store 
manager inside a store. The next day, money is missing. You got to change the 
manager (14 September 2010). 
  
In fairness, the only period where consensus exists concerning some of the council 
achievements, though the figures appear to have been overestimated as the data so far suggests, 
regards the early years of the FCD, that is 2004-2005. In actual point of fact, Dimako residents 
reported that during that period the council was buzzing with activities with the mayor 
distributing large amounts of in-cash handouts, school furniture supplies to Dimako school 
students as well as other gifts.179
Table 7.1
 But even during those years where agreement exists that the 
mayor and the council were engaged in ‘local development’, the consensus revolves around one 
main issue, education (see below). Indeed, local villagers remember that the council’s focus was 
on education rather than water boreholes, electricity, infrastructure, housing, roads provision for 
instance, a pattern already noted in  above. 
Beyond 2004-2005, on top of the overall lack of development projects, the consensus 
about the council expenditures for the so-called development projects evaporates. Beginning in 
2006, Dimako residents reported two things. First, the few ‘projects’ which were started around 
2004-2005 were discontinued. Second, residents also reported a decline in the number of new 
                                                 
179 Incidentally, in that case, though the figures diverge, the villagers’ recollections seem to be consistent 
with the council financial documents, for Table 7.1 for example shows council expenditures peaking during those 
two years. 
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projects being taken up by the council. In effect, though caution is still warranted, Table 7.1 
shows that over the years the official amount of money devoted to development projects went 
down from about 160 million in 2004-2005 to 70 million CFAF in the 2006-2010 period, thus 
further lending credence to local villagers’ claims about the decline of development projects in 
the entire Dimako Council. 
7.1.1.2 A story of incomplete, overestimations and fictitious projects 
In Dimako, examples of incomplete and abandoned projects include for instance the B-
Market (above); a community center in Petit-Pol village (Figure 7.2 below); Dimako Bus and 
Trucks Station; the municipal stadium and the official reviewing stand (tribune officielle) 
scheduled to be renovated; bridge repairing in the Pol Sector; as well as several other projects in 
the council villages (see also CDKO 2010c, 33). As of April 2010, those projects were still 
waiting to be completed in spite of the fact that in some cases, most notably the B-Market, the 
money had been reportedly appropriated.180
Similarly, other projects approved by the municipal council scheduled to happen never 
occurred. That is the case for instance of rural roads in the Pol Sector; water and electricity 
provision; and rural housing to name a few. Councilor 6 for instance commented that “the 
council executive submits a provisional budget to the municipal council. When the year is over, 
nothing has been done. For instance, a classroom construction in a given village was agreed upon 
but in the end, nothing. (…) We are talking about projects that are voted on in the budget and 
which are supposed to be executed but which in the end are not” (1 September 2010). What this 
 
                                                 
180 This alleged pattern shares some similitude with previous patterns noted before. As an illustration, 
Karsenty et al. again observed that “the most common cases of embezzlement [of RFA funds] relate to works 
already started, [yet] incomplete, but fully paid and officially received like there was nothing wrong. The solidarity 
network which enables these types of embezzlement is made up of mayors, municipal tax collectors, and some local 
businessmen, who most often are also members of the council executive” (2006, 103). 
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councilor is referring to is the fact that despite the agreement of the municipal council, when 
comes the time to implement the decisions regarding development projects, the mayor ignored 
them though the money was supposed to have been already appropriated. 
 
Figure 7.2. The unfinished community center (foyer) in Petit-Pol village, February 2010 
Source: author 
 
Two examples from Table 7.1 above shall illustrate this situation. First, in 2005, the 
municipal council voted for the council to spend 25 million CFAF on finishing work for the 
DCH compound, classrooms construction as well as the provision of chairs and tables for those 
new classrooms. Second, in 2007, this time the municipal council reserved about 32 million 
CFAF for the provision of cement block molds to local villages as well as the establishment of a 
community radio. In both cases, instead of the officially adopted amounts, about 3 million and 
less than 5 million CFAF were respectively officially declared as spent in 2005 and 2007 (for a 
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more comprehensive look at these figures, see CDKO 2005a, 2005b, 2007b, 2007c). This meant 
in actuality that, in those years, the priority projects decided by the municipal council were never 
implemented. 
On the other hand, Dimako Council is replete with stories such as these ones; stories 
where instead of the money being used for local development, and rather than improve local 
villagers’ living conditions the money has been allegedly diverted by the mayor. As Councilor 4 
commented, “despite the council forest, people are still sleeping on mats. The mayor had said 
that he would buy the bricks for construction, but nothing happened. We have some councilors 
who have been in place for more than fifteen years with the mayor, but he is [the only one] 
becoming richer. If he was like us, OK; but he is becoming richer while the council forest 
produces” (3 September 2010). 
To illustrate further the lack of development achievements in the council following the 
creation of the FCD, Box 7.2 below reproduced an anonymous protest letter sent in January 
2009, five years after forest harvesting started in the FCD, by Dimako residents of the greater 
Tombo quarter to Mayor Mongui. The context of the letter is one where local villagers are 
frustrated over the direction of the FCD as well as Mayor Mongui’s alleged capture of the 
council forest revenues. In that letter emanating from Tombo villagers -whom the mayor 
theoretically represents as councilor from that specific part of the council- three issues are at the 
heart of the discontent. First, the lack of provision of galvanized-tin roofs; second, the lack of 
access to wood from the council forest in general, and particularly for burial purposes; and third, 
the decline of the 10 percent funds reserved for local villagers (see section 7.2.2 below). On the 
whole, the protesters asked of the mayor what has become of his promises of using the forest 
revenues for the benefit of local populations as well as invest the money for local development. 
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More importantly, for the argument reviewed here, the portrait painted by Tombo 
villagers diverges considerably from the one put forward by the council above records. On the 
housing issue for instance, Table 7.1 showed that about 97 million CFAF since 2004, with more 
than 71 million alone in 2005, were devoted to local housing. This is surprising because from the 
conversations with Dimako villagers, it appears that the issue of rural housing improvement is 
among the most sensitive issues raised in town.181 Table 
7.1
 On the other hand, the council figures in 
 beg the question to whom the money was directed when in fact, as Box 7.2 above clearly 
illustrates, local villagers are dissatisfied with Mayor Mongui’s performance, particularly on that 
issue. As Menye (2007, 12, emphasis added) observed for instance in 2007 about the local 
                                                 
181 It appears so because following the increase of the cost of galvanized-tin roofs, villagers primarily use 
Raphia leaves to make up the roofs of their houses and these have to be frequently replaced because of the rainy 
season damages (see Mendouga Mebenga 2000a, 13). 
Box 7.2. Anonymous request by Dimako populations (3 
January 2009) 
 
The populations of Tombo I, Tombo II, Dieu-Connaît and 
Kampala write this request to remind you of the promises [of 
development projects] and the ten percent of the council forest. 
Sir, regarding the promises to the populations 
 
1) The distribution of galvanized-tin roof to the 
inhabitants, this was never achieved. 
2) Dimako’s sons and daughters are dying and buried 
without caskets and no help even though we have wood 
in our forest and [the council] possesses a woodwork.  
3) We are noticing regrettably that the 10 percent revenues 
coming from the Council Forest keeps declining [since] 
at the beginning we received 900,000 CFAF, after 
450,000 CFAF and now 300,000 CFAF.  
 
What is going on sir? 1 
 
Signed by the Populations  
 
Source: reproduced from (Requête des Populations de Tombo I, 
Tombo II, Dieu-Connaît et Kampala (3 Janvier)  2009, emphasis 
added) 
1 enlarged in the original document 
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population and the issue of wood generally, “it shows some real need in wood supply: need of 
wood for housing, coffins, furniture, and even for fuelwood. The populations are sometimes 
forced to purchase wood in Bertoua where the costs are significant”. Seen this way, who are the 
beneficiaries of the almost 97 million CFAF that the council allegedly spent for local housing 
since 2004? 
As argued above, this discrepancy between the official council figures and the 
observational and interview records seems to suggest that the council figures, including costs and 
number of achievements, have been overestimated and in some cases fabricated as with the issue 
of rural housing improvement. That is why, the Tombo episode is critical because it appears to 
symbolize what has taken place in Dimako in the aftermath of the creation of the FCD, namely 
the overall lack of development projects as well as the alleged fabrications of local achievements 
to after-the-fact validate the arguable utilization of timber revenues, in this case local 
development-reserved funds. 
The reported overestimation and fabrication of the council figures also appear to be made 
possible by what respondents describe as Mayor Mongui’s strategy of labeling anything as local 
development expenditures. In contrast to the 2003 revenue sharing formula which clearly 
apportioned the FCD revenues among four sectors, the mayor’s alleged strategy has resulted in a 
situation where local development projects are amalgamated with other council expenditures and 
contribute to their overestimation. According to Dimako observers, that pattern of overestimation 
as well as fabrications, which shall further be documented in section 7.2 below, is designed to 
conceal the fact that the FCD revenues are not utilized for local development, but rather to 
personally benefit and enrich the mayor. 
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What this alleged practice also means, as the evidence presented so far seems to suggest, 
is that the council’s official, that is actual, local development expenditures are well below the 
actual ones. As an illustration, Table 7.2 below reveals Dimako Council expenditures for the 
January-July 2009 period. During that period, the FCD net revenues after operating costs totaled 
about 42 million CFAF (not included in the table) which were to be divided per the 2003 revenue 
sharing formula (see CDKO 2009a, 4). 
Table 7.2. Development projects expenditures, January-July 2009 (CFAF million) 
Items Officially declared amount 
spent 
Projected 50% per 2003 
revenues sharing formula 
Gardens, open spaces (lawn 
and landscape care) 
3,343,000  
 
 
 
20,743,597 
Palm grove care 1,069,000 
B Market construction 2,493,412 
Pickup truck purchase 3,000,000 
Summer internship 1,632,000 
IVAC salaries 2,390,000 
Students scholarship 2,164,000 
Assistance to sick people 285,000 
Contribution to social centers 
(community health centers) 
810,493 
TOTAL 17,156,9051 
Source: (CDKO 2009a, 4) 
1 From adding the various figures from the table, the total should be 17,186,905 CFAF. For consistency 
purpose, the original council figure is kept. 
 
From the table, the first point is that about 21 million CFAF were to be reserved as part 
of the 50 percent for local development. However, the table shows that the official amount spent 
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is more than 3 million CFAF short of what was officially required. In fact, the council official 
local development expenditures stood at a little more than 17 million CFAF or 41 percent of the 
FCD net revenues for the January-July 2009 period.182 The second point is that out of the 17 
million CFAF officially disbursed during the January-July 2009 period, no funds were allocated 
to infrastructure, roads, or water boreholes for instance. The bulk of the money went to education 
(IVAC -part-time teachers- salaries, summer internship, and students’ scholarship), the B Market 
construction183, and items such as Garden and open spaces (lawn and landscape care), Palm 
grove care, and a pickup truck purchase.184
The third and final point, and perhaps the most important for the purpose of the argument 
made here, is that what is labeled as expenditures for local development –the last three items 
mentioned above- does not appear to have an immediate connection to local development to say 
the least. At the same time, by including those items into local development expenditures, this 
contributes to the overestimation of costs that was noted before in 
 
Table 7.1, for those items 
totaled about 9.9 million CFAF or 58 percent of the overall local development expenditures in 
the said period. 
The point about the distinction between what is included or not in local development 
expenditures is critical insofar as the lens through which FCD timber revenues is distributed 
remains the municipal council-adopted 2003 revenue sharing formula, though it has been 
bypassed as the evidence so far suggests. In addition, it is important to recognize the 2003 
                                                 
182 As a comparative example, the council official operating expenditures for the same period stood at about 
15.5 million CFAF or 37 percent of the FCD revenues after the forest operating costs were removed instead of the 
30 percent per the 2003 revenue sharing formula (see CDKO 2009, 5). 
183 Incidentally, the B-Market construction is being authorized annually since 2007 though it was supposed 
to be completed a long time ago (for more about that, see Table 7.1 notes). 
184 From the conversation with council authorities, it appears that the palm grove care is included in local 
development expenditures because supposedly it is an economic venture designed to bring more revenues and 
resources and potentially employs local villagers in the future. However, based on the criticisms leveled above it 
should not be included here (see also the notes on the section on reforesting in Chapter 6.0). 
245 
revenue sharing formula not only because it apportions the forest revenues according to four 
sectors, but also because when for instance other unrelated costs are added onto local 
development expenditures, this essentially means that less money is available for local 
development. Hence, following the 2003 revenue sharing formula, the costs attributed to local 
development per Table 7.2 were to be borne primarily by the 30 percent reserved for the council 
operating costs. Similarly, notwithstanding their value, how is the provision of birth certificates, 
drivers’ licenses, and a contest for the most beautiful village of the council (see Box 7.1) directly 
related to local development? Can these costs not be incurred by the council operating budget or 
any other item than the 50 percent timber revenues dedicated to local development? 
It is those types of spending and priorities that Dimako residents have criticized as not 
being in line with their aspirations. On the other hand, as section 7.2 shall argue, Mayor 
Mongui’s alleged strategy of labeling anything as local development expenditures which leads to 
an overestimation of the council achievements as well as overbilling seems to be part of a pattern 
through which the council forest revenues are reportedly squandered. Then, it appears that the 
utilization of the money is accounted after-the-fact with the overestimated and fabricated figures 
that have been reported here. This, at least, is the view of local villagers, which the example 
below shall illustrate. 
In 2009, at a meeting of council staff and CCG members, the so-called practice of 
overestimating council costs was apparently denounced by some in the audience. The meeting -
slated to be the first of many- was convened by the mayor in response to local villagers’ growing 
criticism of his handling of the FCD revenues. During the first meeting held at Dimako City Hall 
(DCH) on 25 September 2009, a CCG member present recalled the astonishment of local 
villagers’ representatives following Dimako Council municipal tax collector report about local 
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development expenditures. He recalled that “in their report, (…) they spoke of 18 million. It was 
when the RM [municipal tax collector] was reading the figures in the middle of the meeting that 
we asked him to whom they gave the money. And he answered that all the small expenses added 
to that figure. We said Oh! And we were surprised (CCG member 7, 1 September 2010). 
That CCG member recollection of the meeting is supported by the figures of almost 18 
million CFAF that the council officially disbursed in favor of ‘development projects’ for the 
January-July 2009 period as Table 7.2 above illustrated. Clearly, those expenditures, as argued 
before, do not represent local development; they simply are an amalgamation of various 
purported expenditures apparently designed to validate the questionable utilization of FCD 
revenues after the fact by the Mayor of Dimako. 
7.1.2 Education as the answer? 
For local authorities, the local villagers’ picture of the situation in Dimako is inaccurate. Faced 
with the evidence on the ground that in six years the council has not achieved any significant 
development projects, local authorities have argued that this situation is due to the fact that since 
2004 the council efforts have been focused on education. In truth, Mayor Mongui for instance 
has remarked that since the beginning “the priority for the council socio-economic projects [local 
development], is afforded to education” (9 March 2010), a statement is reiterated more recently 
to outside visitors (see Elvido 2011a). In the same way, Dimako first deputy mayor declared that 
it was because of the current emphasis on education that Dimako residents were not feeling the 
impact of projects done so far, not that the council had not achieved anything. 
Why the council elected to focus on education when the villages lack the basic amenities 
has been a matter of debate locally. Indeed, local villagers have argued that the focus be 
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broadened and concentrated to areas of prime importance such as roads, water boreholes and 
health centers, especially in remote sections of the council instead of education only. On the 
other hand, for Mayor Mongui, “the choice of [the] education [sector] as the primary beneficiary 
of this forest revenues was not fortuitous; it was an answer to the wishes [sic] expressed by all 
the inhabitants of our council during the socioeconomic census conducted in each household in 
2001” (CRDKO 2004b).185
Thus, from the mayor’s point of view, his focus on education as the main spending 
emphasis was in response to the desire expressed by local villagers. One has to remember that, as 
Chapter 5.0 briefly alluded to, following the 2002 departure of SFID, local employment has 
become scarce. Moreover, the situation is exaggerated by the fact that, because of the previous 
availability of local jobs -therefore no need for more education-, most residents in town do not 
possess an adequate education to recycle themselves.
 
186
However, even among those who agreed with the mayor’s educational emphasis, 
disagreement persists as to the authenticity of the figures advanced by the mayor not only 
because it is difficult to verify them in the first place, but also because they believe the figures 
have been overestimated as well as fabricated in order to justify their questionable utilization. 
One government official, for instance, exclaims that “I do not see anything in terms of concrete 
achievements. They [the mayor and his staff] only say that they have given to university 
 Hence, presumably, the current 
emphasis on education is necessary because, as several residents have incidentally argued, 
Dimako cannot survive in the future if there is no emphasis on education today. 
                                                 
185 In the same way, one year later a municipal council session transcript observed that “the mayor said that 
he put the emphasis on educating the young people because it has to be said that the subdivision is lacking the elites 
in quantity as well as quality” (CRDKO 2005, 9, emphasis added). 
186 Singer notes that SFID “would often would often recruit teenagers during summer holidays for 
temporary jobs and encourage them to stay on even after term started. As a result, the town suffered from an 
important dropout rate from local schools and to this day education standards in Dimako are well below those of 
neighboring towns, despite having had earlier access to education thanks to schools built by SFID” (2008, 91). 
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students, to high school students X amount of money. How much have they given to each student 
and to how many we do not know? They only give grand figures, how are we to know if it is 
true. I am telling you this is robbery which is developing here in Dimako” (4 March 2010, 
emphasis added). 
That ‘robbery’, as this official referred to the situation about the utilization of local 
development funds in Dimako seems to be supported by the inconsistency of the education 
figures at hand. For example, Table 7.1 reported that in 2004-2005, about 36 million CFAF were 
spent on education while Bimbar provided a figure of almost 43 million CFAF -7 million more-
for support to primary, secondary and higher education (colleges and universities) (Bimbar 2006, 
27).187
In general, the impreciseness over the figures for education has meant that in the absence 
of complete details, ascertaining the direction of the money is a complex task. In this regard, 
Oyono et al. -about the 42 million CFAF earmarked in 2004 for local development- observed 
that “village-level socioeconomic priorities [local development projects] seem rather vague, with 
elements such as scholarships, book purchase, financial support for students, and hiring of 
temporary teachers in primary schools, which are not easy to assess” (
 How many students and how much each has received is a matter of contention, especially 
given the fact that some local students have declared that the sums they purportedly received 
were overestimated or in some cases the payments never occurred. 
2007, 10). That task of 
evaluating the direction of the money appears to have been intentionally rendered difficult 
simply because for villagers the so-called education assistance is designed to conceal the fact that 
the revenues reserved for local development are being reportedly misused as well as siphoned off 
by Mayor Mongui. 
                                                 
187 Poum Bimbar, a former municipal councilor, is now the current municipal tax collector. The figures 
come from his municipal tax collector thesis. 
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What is more, in town it is widely known that the council has accumulated arrears toward 
the local schools in spite of the fact that the council resources under the FCD have been 
substantial. As one villager commented “the council owes money to Dimako High School, they 
promise but do not fulfill even though money is available” (5 September 2010). As with the 
other expenditures in Table 7.1, most local observers as well as Dimako residents interviewed 
see the use of revenues for education as simply wasteful spending by the mayor. A Dimako 
resident simply declared about education: “it is a few university students, not even 10 people, but 
he is telling everyone that he is helping a lot of students” (2 July 2010). 
Another issue which has arisen about education is the criteria for selecting the recipients 
of the council aid.188
CRDKO 2005b, 11
 According to local villagers, over the years the criteria have become more 
selective and discretionary. As a former CCG member commented “currently, they give to whom 
they choose, not as they used to give to all villages”. This view seemed to be supported by a 
2005 municipal council transcript in which members of the Social Affairs Commission of the 
municipal council recommended that the financial assistance be given to all local students 
without any discrimination ( ). To that request, the mayor answered that it was 
simply an issue of some students being forgotten or not registering on time; but he emphasized 
that the financial assistance to high school students was only reserved to children whose parents 
could not afford to support them (CRDKO 2005b, 13). How was the mayor to determine the 
eligibility given the fact that almost all local villagers are currently without employment, thus 
paradoxically eligible to receive that aid? 
                                                 
188 Singer (2008, 104) observed for instance that the education aid is primarily reserved for the two main 
local groups the Bakoum and the Pol. This in practice means that the Baka pygmies are simply excluded from the 
council forest benefits. 
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In recent years, the issue of the selectivity of the education aid has led to some open 
confrontation between the mayor and some local villagers to the point that the mayor had to 
publicly justify himself. Indeed, when confronted by local villagers about the criteria for 
selection, the mayor argued that he had to stop subsidizing some students because they were 
using the money for other purposes but school. Conversely, after those discussions, he agreed to 
renew the support on the condition that the parents contribute half of the sum. It seems that 
promise was never fulfilled, for local villagers indicated that in 2010 the support was still 
selective, whereas educational assistance continued to be listed for almost 10 million CFAF from 
2007 to 2009. The question one might ask is where did the money go and, if any, how many 
students benefited from it? 
For local observers familiar with the Dimako situation, the mayor’s figures as well as 
overall spending priorities are overestimated and completely out of sync with local priorities. For 
instance, the mayor has given 300,000 CFAF in cash to each councilor during the period 2004-
2005, as well as promised to build houses for village chiefs, councilors as well as CCG members, 
and distributed most of the 50 percent on in-cash handouts in the name of education and local 
development. This has been happening at the same time that villages lack basic amenities such as 
health centers, water boreholes, electricity or adequate schools. One chief, visibly irritated, 
pointed out the following: 
It has already been 8 years [in fact 6 years] since the forest started and you should 
have seen some nice things here, because the council revenues were supposed to 
equip villages. Go see the Superior Chief [who incidentally is the second deputy 
mayor] he does not have an official car. Where does the money go? He [the 
mayor] buys a 50 million Prado [the name of the Toyota SUV]; he forgets the 
others, he forgets that he has deputies while we should all be benefiting from this 
forest (Chief 16, 13 September 2010). 
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The conclusion from Dimako observers is that the mayor’s spending are designed to prop 
him up, instead of helping the population with much needed local infrastructure for instance. 
This sentiment was echoed by a former forest administration official who asked, for instance, 
whether the mayor had made judicious use of council resources by purchasing an official car. As 
he put it “is this in line with local development?” The question is critical, for as Chief 16 above 
mentioned, the council forest project was, in theory, designed to help local villagers, not the 
mayor. 
Finally, to conclude on how the mayor spending priorities are in opposition with those of 
the local villages, Table 7.3 below presents the results of a survey of local development priorities 
conducted in 2000 by Forêts et Terroirs. Though the survey was taken one year prior to the one 
referred to by the mayor as the justification for supporting education, the table indicates that in 
2000 in Akano, Ngombol, Nkolmeyanga, Simeyong, and Nkolbikon villages, school 
construction, construction of health centers, the provision of electricity and water boreholes were 
among the key priorities.189
Table 7.3. Local development priorities in five selected villages of Dimako Council, 2000 
 
Priorities Villages 
School construction Akano, Ngombol, 
Nkolmeyanga, Simeyong 
Health center/clinic (dispensaire) Akano, Ngombol, 
Nkolbikon, 
Nkolmeyanga, Simeyong 
Housing improvement Akano 
                                                 
189 It is worth mentioning that the survey was conducted specifically for the redaction of the management 
plan of FMU 10-046 which borders some Dimako villages. Nonetheless, it is fair to assume that this information 
could be applicable for the case of Dimako Council since these five villages are part of the council. Second, it has to 
be noted that the five selected villages are all located in the remote Pol Sector. Finally, though the council officially 
comprised of 17 villages at the time of the Forêts et Terroirs survey, the five above villages give an indication of the 
local priorities, which presumably should be similar across the council, save a few things. 
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Electricity Ngombol, Nkolbikon, 
Nkolmeyanga, Simeyong 
Water boreholes Ngombol, Nkolmeyanga, 
Simeyong 
Road maintenance to facilitate 
commerce 
Akano 
Community center for young people Akano 
Source: (Mpayiguia and Ondoua 2000a, 10; 2000b, 10; 2000c, 10; 2000d, 13; 2000e, 11) 
 
Viewed broadly, the table illustrates the discrepancy between the mayor’s focus on 
education and the priorities of the local population. Indeed, that discrepancy was confirmed by a 
2003 council promotional document which noted that local villagers ranked education along with 
health, housing improvement, assistance to agricultural production, village water and rural 
electrification, and improvement of basic infrastructure primarily as the areas in need of most 
intervention (see CRDKO 2003b, 10). 
In fairness, a case can be made for investing in education and the long term future of 
Dimako children especially in light of the Dimako history under SFID where education was 
neglected. On the contrary, that is not what appears to be happening in Dimako; rather, in 
Dimako, the situation about local development projects seems to be characterized by 
overestimations, fabrications as well as dubious financial expenditures whose objective seems to 
make it hard to ascertain the actual utilization of the funds as well as justify the use of revenues 
after their alleged misappropriation occurred. Seen this way, similar to the other expenses 
dedicated to the overall local development efforts, the spending on education suggests the same 
abovementioned pattern of overestimation as well as fabrication at work. 
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7.1.3 The deliberate local confusion? 
A final issue, referred to here as the ownership issue, which has arisen regarding local 
development achievements pertains to the deliberate confusion entertained by Mayor Mongui 
between the council actual achievements and what other organizations have accomplished in 
Dimako with or without the help of the council. To clarify, in Dimako, as in other local councils 
in the country, besides the council, at least three other organizations intervene in local 
development, namely government ministerial bodies, and local as well as international NGOs 
(see Njoh 2011, 103).190
Specifically, on the case of FEICOM, it is known in town that the DCH compound 
(
 Two examples of such organizations, which have financed several 
projects throughout the council, are the central state-led FEICOM and Plan Cameroun, the local 
branch of the international NGO Plan International. Despite knowing that, Mayor Mongui has 
allegedly taken ownership of various achievements from both organizations -and for that matter 
others too as the evidence suggests- by claiming that they are of his own making following the 
creation of the FCD and the increase in timber revenues. 
Figure 7.3 below) was built in 2001 prior to the start of the FCD thanks to a FEICOM grant. As 
a former councilor argued “you know the council forest that you just mentioned, it has been six 
years. The City Hall compound was not built by the council forest [funds]; it was FEICOM with 
the help of all the councilors and it was not easy [to get the grant]” (17 September 2010). In spite 
                                                 
190 This situation of local and international NGOs directly intervening in local development is set to change. 
In fact, before the 2004 decentralization laws outside organizations, notably NGOs, could directly provide services 
to local communities and villages thus bypassing local councils which resented it. On the other hand, since 2004 
local councils have been legally recognized as the main actor of local development, thus compelling outside 
organizations such as PLAN Cameroon for instance to switch from a community-centered to a council-centered 
approach. Some local villagers have been uncomfortable with this shift in emphasis, for as one local actor noted 
based on the FCD situation, how are local villagers going to monitor the mayor when they are already locked in a 
struggle with him over the most important resource of the council. 
254 
of that fact, this has not deterred Mayor Mongui from listing and advertising the DCH compound 
among the FCD achievements. As an illustration, in a brochure prepared for the March 2010 
National Forum on Forests, the cover of the mayor’s exposé about the council forest 
achievements was illustrated by a picture of the DCH compound.191 
 
Figure 7.3. Dimako City Hall (DCH) front porch, January 2010 
Source: author 
 
To outside visitors, the DCH compound is the work of the FCD and this stands as a 
concrete achievement of the mayor of Dimako. The only problem is that the compound was 
erected, though it still stands incomplete, before the FCD era.192
                                                 
191 In the end, because the mayor was absent from the country, he did not participate to that conference held 
in late March 2010. 
 Even council documents from 
192 The DCH compound lacks everything. The whole compound is not only unfinished with faulty wires 
hanging, but also most of the offices lack furniture. In the same way, the office doors have no handles or 
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the period before confirm the claim that FEICOM is at the origin of the DCH compound, hence 
the council forest revenues could not have contributed to its erection.193
Another example involves water boreholes in some of the council villages. According to 
local villagers, these water boreholes -which incidentally were repaired in 2010 by FEICOM-
were either built depending on the villages by the NGO PLAN or the central state through what is 
locally known as Public Investment Budget funds (BIP). As one local villager pointed out 
“before he [the mayor] said that he was the one who built these [water boreholes], but later some 
central state auditors came and stated that it was built by the state, not him” (15 September 
2010). 
 
In this alleged scheme of deliberately confusing the council forest revenues achievements 
with those of other organizations, Mayor Mongui appears not alone. Indeed, the same situation 
was also noted for the local council of Ndélélé -still in the East Region- where the local 
population, in an open letter sent to President Paul Biya, accused Mayor Jean Mboundjo of 
allegedly misappropriating the council revenues. More specifically, they accused him of having 
deliberately misused about 1.5 billion CFAF of RFA revenues (3 million USD) from 2000 to 
2008 and then misled the population about the RFA achievements through the same process 
                                                                                                                                                             
identification tags making it difficult to distinguish the office holders. It is a compound which is in need of dire 
repair though it was only built in 2001. 
193 Bimbar (2006, 18) confirms that the compound was built by a FEICOM grant obtained in 1998. 
Furthermore, to be fair, it has to be mentioned that FEICOM, as the main central state agency involved in financial 
assistance to local governments, has been involved in local development in Dimako with such activities as 
classroom and latrines construction, most recently in the Kandara village on the Mbang Road. While in theory 
according to FEICOM statutes, depending on the type of investment, local councils are set to share the burden of the 
costs, it remains that their participation is insignificant compared to that of FEICOM. That having been said, this 
issue about cost-sharing is not the same as the one raised here, the alleged deliberate confusion about the ownership 
of local achievements, an issue which seems designed to stir confusion in the minds of local and outside observers. 
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reportedly used in Dimako of designating other organizations achievements -such as the BIP 
incidentally- as the fruit of the forest revenues (see Onohiolo 2009b).194
At issue in Dimako Council is not whether these achievements, whether the DCH 
compound or water boreholes, stand to benefit or not the council and its inhabitants; rather, at 
stake with the alleged misrepresentation over the ownership of local development projects is a 
more profound question about the utilization of timber revenues as well as ascertaining the 
impact of forest management decentralization in the council. What is more, if Mayor Mongui can 
allegedly portray outside organizations’ achievements as of his own making, and this is not 
recognized, it becomes difficult to disentangle the impact of forest management decentralization 
from other factors. This is critical to recognize because, as the evidence presented in this section 
so far suggests, this alleged practice of misleading outsiders by overestimating the council 
achievements appears not incidental. 
 
The alleged strategy of overestimating the council achievements appears to be part of a 
strategy designed to misappropriate the FCD revenues as well as personally benefit from them 
and then utilize them for a larger purpose. As it shall be evident by the end of this dissertation, 
based on the field evidence, the study argues that for the mayor the rationale is straightforward. 
First, capture the forest revenues for himself instead of spending it on local development 
projects, the local villagers’ 10 percent, or the council operating costs and reforesting the FCD 
for that matter -the four sectors of the 2003 revenues sharing formula-; and second, utilize those 
resources for electoral and self-aggrandizement purposes, that is to become a Big Man. 
                                                 
194 Cerutti et al. (2010, 137) caution against completely laying down the blame on mayors. In effect, they 
observe that “Mayors are often blamed when mismanagement occurs or the expected impacts on rural poverty do 
not eventuate. Indeed, they are assigned by the current legal framework the most prominent role in the management 
of the AF [RFA revenues] and should be held accountable for their decisions, but a deeper analysis of the 
redistributive and sanctioning mechanisms shows that they are often [not all the time] only political scapegoats.” 
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7.2 COMPLETING THE FOREST TAKEOVER 
The first section of this chapter has described what has happened to the second goal of forest 
management decentralization in Dimako Council. In fact, the evidence presented above indicates 
that instead of the council forest revenues being used for local development, the Mayor of 
Dimako has allegedly misappropriated the money through the use of various techniques 
(overestimations, overbilling, and fabrications) designed to conceal that state of affairs. The 
following section, building on the previous one, demonstrates how, through the use of mostly the 
same techniques alluded to above, the mayor reportedly appropriated for himself the rest of the 
revenues designed to cover the council operating costs as well as the villagers’ 10 percent to 
‘eat’. Through these final acts, Mayor Mongui allegedly completed his entire takeover of the 
council forest revenues on his way to national glory. 
7.2.1 The imbroglio over the rental agreement and the operating costs 
As Chapter 4.0 and 5.0 already indicated, among the five council forests operating in Cameroon 
during the year 2010, the FCD was the only one officially harvested en régie. As the study also 
described before the mayor and his first deputy had argued that the decision had been taken to 
allow the council to benefit from ‘the gross margin’ as well as rationally and sustainably manage 
the forest (see section 5.7.4.1). For a council entering the timber harvesting business for the first 
time, one of the main issues it had to resolve was to acquire or lease the machines it needed to 
commence operations. To the extent that the council did not possess the machines or could not 
yet afford it, the council had to acquire it from somewhere, or someone in this case as it seems. 
According to Mayor Mongui, after a ‘competitive’ bid involving several private commercial 
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firms, Alpicam was selected as the provider of the council machinery (see CRDKO 2005b, 3). 
Thus, officially today, the council rents two machines from Alpicam, the Bulldozer also known 
as ‘The Bull’ (Figure 7.4 below) and the 966 Front End Loader, commonly called la chargeuse 
(Figure 7.5 below).195 
 
Figure 7.4. The old ‘Bull', February 2010 
Source: author 
 
The main issues which have arisen, and stirred much local controversy, regarding the so-
called rental agreement revolve around the exact terms of the agreement -or whether the Alpicam 
deal even exists- as well as the ownership of the machines. In effect, except for the mayor, no 
                                                 
195 However, local authorities have pointed out that because Alpicam is also the main purchaser of FCD 
timber, the cost of renting the machines is directly deducted from the timber sales. This in practice signifies that, on 
top of the rental agreement, an informal agreement reportedly exists between the two partners whereas officially the 
Dimako Council is only paid for the timber after the rental charges are deducted. Conversely, in some cases, if the 
FCD timber sales revenues are insufficient to cover the cost of rental, in theory, the council would have to pay 
Alpicam. 
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one among CCG members as well as councilors seems aware of the terms of this contract 
supposedly signed in the early years of the FCD. The suspicion about the ownership of the 
machines -and thus of the whole rental agreement- has been heightened not only because of the 
status of Mayor Mongui as the private owner of a logging company, but also because, as 
Chapters 5.0 and 6.0 indicated earlier, behind the official heading of the Dimako Council it is 
believed that the mayor is the one privately harvesting the FCD. 
Who is really leasing the machines to the council, and if indeed it is Alpicam, what are 
the terms of the contract and how much Alpicam actually pays for FCD timber have been the 
subject of intense speculations in town? 
7.2.1.1 A costly agreement 
Simply put, the overarching reason why the rental agreement issue has taken center stage 
in local politics is primarily because of the prohibitive cost of renting the machines. Officially for 
every day usage the council pays 200,000 CFAF for the ‘Bull’ as well as 1,500 CFAF for every 
cubic meter of wood loaded onto a truck with Alpicam’s 966 (see CRDKO 2005b, 3).196
Table 7.4
 To 
illustrate the situation for the council finances, below  presents the overall expenditures 
related to renting the timber harvesting machines -including the maintenance costs- since the 
start of the FCD in 2004. 
 
 
 
                                                 
196 In the past, the council also used to officially pay 150,000 CFAF for the 528 Skidder (see CRDKO 
2005b, 3). Today, inside the forest, only the bulldozer and the Front end Loader are visible. No one could clarify the 
situation of the 528 skidder. Likewise, the council extant records do not mention it after 2005. For that reason, it is 
difficult to ascertain whether the machine is no longer at the disposal of the council or for that matter whether the 
council is still being billed for its usage. 
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Table 7.4. FCD machines, fuel and lubricants expenditures, 2004-2010 (CFAF million)* 
Year Machines 
Rental 
Fuel and 
lubricants 
TOTAL FCD 
revenues 
2004 88,777,004 28,750,649 117,527,653 179,603,808 
2005 80,988,287 59,746,637 140,734,924 345,598,854 
20061 180,000 19,271,776 19,451,776 84,912,000 
2007 39,750,854 48,372,767 88,123,621 171,726,821 
2008 41,492,741 32,878,397 74,371,138 158,353,594 
2009 23,406,691 23,882,254 47,288,945 113,480,586 
SUB-TOTAL 274,595,577 212,902,480 487,498,057 1,053,675,663 
2010 39,000,000 39,000,0001 78,000,000 227,500,000 
TOTAL 313,595,577 251,902,480 565,498,057 1,281,175,663 
Source: (CDKO 2004b, 2005b, 2006c, 2007c, 2008c; 2009a, 4; 2010d) 
*2009 figures are from January to July, while 2010 are projected costs as well as revenues from 
the council provisional budget 
1 Officially, no forest harvesting occurred that year 
 
An examination of the table reveals that from March 2004 to July 2009, Dimako Council 
spent about 488 million CFAF on the machines and their maintenance -with approximately half 
of that amount alone to honor the rental agreement. Moreover, it was expected to spend another 
78 million CFAF for the year 2010 bringing the total up to 566 million CFAF. Finally, the 
overall expenditures related to the rental agreement and the machines constituted almost half (47 
percent) of the 1.05 billion CFAF of the council timber revenues in the March 2004-July 2009 
period. The question is to whom the council pays out this amount? Is it to its customer Alpicam 
as Mayor Mongui argues, or to the mayor himself as local villagers believe? 
For local observers and Dimako residents, no doubt is permitted that under the official 
disguise of the Dimako Council renting the machines from Alpicam, Mayor Mongui is the 
person leasing his machines to the council as well as the only one to personally take advantage 
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and benefit from the arrangement. In so doing, he prevents local villagers as well as outsiders 
from looking at what is happening behind the façade. Indeed, a former forest administration 
official commented that “all FODDI’s machines [the mayor’s now defunct logging company], 
that is what the FCD is using, but the mayor is telling people that the machines are from 
Alpicam. The ‘Bull’ belongs to him; the only thing that he is renting from Alpicam is the Front 
end Loader, but he is telling people that everything belongs to Alpicam in order to fool them” (7 
May 2010).  
 
Figure 7.5. The Front end loader also known as 'The 966', February 2010 
Source: author 
 
In truth, there appears to be some substance to the assertion that the mayor is at least 
leasing one of his machines to the council, and thus benefiting from the so-called rental 
agreement. Singer for instance notes that “following failed negotiations with SFID which 
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showed little interest in the allegedly mediocre quality of the council forest’s products, Alpicam, 
an Italian company operating close to Dimako, accepted to lease some of its equipment to the 
local council for two years. During the next two years, equipment was leased by the mayor’s own 
company” (2008, 100, emphasis added). Equally important, from his investigations Singer 
observed that “the equipment was leased for free in exchange for the exclusive contract with 
Alpicam” (2008, 106, emphasis added). Hence, according to Singer, Alpicam gratuitously loaned 
the council its machines for the first two years (2004-2005), and then the mayor’s company took 
over, a fact that the mayor has denied insisting that Alpicam has been all along renting the forest 
harvesting machines. Singer’s point about the gratuity of the machines is important because, if 
true, it would substantiate the argument that even when Alpicam was in effect leasing its 
machines, the mayor was still the primary beneficiary of the arrangement. 
That having been said, the evidence in the field suggests that the so-called rental 
agreement is another mechanism through which the mayor is personally benefiting from -and 
possibly misappropriating- the forest revenues, in this case almost half (488 million) of the 1.05 
billion CFAF of FCD total timber revenues. By acting concurrently as the council chief 
executive, thus the author of the agreement, as well as the private person renting his machines to 
the council, Mayor Mongui appears well positioned to set the rental price for the equipment. 
Indeed, he appears to be the only one who knows how much the council spends on renting the 
machines and, consequently, can easily overestimate at any time the ‘real’ rental cost. As one 
Dimako observer declared Mayor Mongui “is at the same time seller and buyer for the FCD. He 
authors contracts and harvests the forest on behalf of the council, but he is really the one 
harvesting the forest. He pays the bill and emits them at the same time. It is a clear conflict of 
interest” (29 April 2010, emphasis added). 
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To complicate matters, the ‘Bull’, the main machine used for forest harvesting (see 
Chapter 6.0), has been beset by repeated mechanical failures which have reportedly delayed 
forest harvesting (see CDKO 2010a, 1). More to the point, the decrepitude of the ‘Bull’, as 
Figure 7.4 above illustrates, signifies that financially the council is losing money, but not 
necessarily the mayor, to the extent that, as local testimonies have suggested, when the machine 
is inactive the council is still purportedly bound by the agreement. The question Dimako 
residents ask is why cannot the mayor buy or rent to buy the machines that the FCD needs 
instead of spending a lot of money, about 47 percent of the FCD gross revenues, on aged 
machines alone which barely work? Similarly, residents ask can Mayor Mongui at least tell 
Alpicam to replace ‘the Bull’ -the primary machine and the costlier one- with another one if the 
company is really the owner of the ‘Bull’. 
In response to the various local criticisms about the rental agreement and the machines, 
the mayor has argued that the council cannot afford to buy or rent to buy new machines because 
of their prohibitive costs. However, some villagers have objected to the mayor’s argument about 
the prohibitiveness of the machines arguing that over the long term the council shall benefit from 
that investment. A former CCG member protested that the mayor “should have bought the 
equipment a long time ago, but this arrangement suits him well. He bought himself a Bulldozer 
[for his defunct FODDI], so how is it possible that the council cannot afford one on its own? 
[with all the forest revenues]” (26 June 2010). A 2008 CTFC-commissioned report concurred 
with villagers when it observed that given the costs of the machines and the ‘pathetic’ -its words- 
situation in which the council found itself into, “we believe that instead of leasing the machines, 
the council should rather rent to buy or even buy the machines and those could be used for the 
council maintenance works” (CTFC 2008, 27). 
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For the abovementioned former CCG member as well as other observers, the mayor 
seems not interested in buying new machines for the FCD because he is the sole beneficiary of 
the so-called rental agreement. Therefore, they believe all the mayor’s excuses are provided to 
conceal the fact that he is, through the rental agreement, personally benefiting from the forest 
revenues by imputing high expenses while forest workers and council employees are poorly paid, 
if paid at all as it shall be shown below. In the end, in spite of the mayor’s denials, the fact 
remains that overall the rental agreement is costing almost half of the council total timber 
revenues while the villages lack basic amenities, and development projects are postponed under 
the pretense of the focus on education as described above. 
7.2.1.2 The alleged siphoning off of the forest revenues through the FCD operating costs 
Apparently the situation about the rental agreement, hence the claims about the mayor’s 
alleged capture of the timber revenues, also extends to the council forest operating costs. As an 
illustration, below Table 7.5 shows the FCD overall operating costs -separate from the council 
own operating expenses- since March 2004. Except for 2006 where according to council 
authorities, timber harvesting did not occur and 2010 where those represent projected costs, the 
table discloses that three items fuel and lubricants, machines rental and staff and personnel costs 
constitute the major expenditures of the FCD. Indeed, all three account for over 531 million 
CFAF or 89 percent of the FCD operating costs and 57 percent of the 1.05 billion CFAF received 
in total timber revenues over the same period. Moreover, the council was expected to spend an 
additional 106 million CFAF in 2010 for the FCD operating costs alone, adding the total sum to 
more than 700 million CFAF or 55 percent of total timber revenues for the period 2004-2010. 
Finally, the table reveals that, save 2006, from March 2004 to July 2009, the FCD operating 
costs oscillated between 72 million in 2009 to more than 150 million CFAF in 2005. 
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Table 7.5. FCD operating costs, 2004-2010 (CFAF million)* 
Items 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 SUB-TOTAL 2010 TOTAL 
Fuel and 
lubricants 
28,750,649 59,746,637 19,271,776 48,372,767 32,878,3971 23,882,2547 212,902,480 39,000,0001 251,902,480 
Machines 
rental  
88,777,004 80,988,287 180,000 39,750,854 41,492,741 23,406,691 274,595,577 39,000,000 313,595,577 
Staff and 
personnel 
costs 
14,587,8962 - 2,012,6673 1,450,0283 18,790,6964 6,700,0005 43,541,287 16,140,0006 59,681,287 
Miscellaneous 
(purchase of 
light 
equipment 
and repair) 
8,466,399 13,900,870 5,872,644 14,325,517 7,570,073 17,779,5978 67,915,100 12,254,017 80,169,117 
TOTAL 140,581,948 154,635,794 27,337,087 103,899,166 100,731,907 71,768,542 598,954,444 106,394,017 705,348,461 
FCD 
REVENUES 
179,603,808 345,598,854 84,912,000 171,726,821 158,353,594 113,480,586 1,053,675,663 227,500,000 1,281,175,663 
Source: (CDKO 2004b, 2005b, 2006c, 2007c, 2008c; 2009a, 4; 2010d) 
* 2009 figures are from January-July while 2010 are projected costs from the council provisional budget 
-No individual figure available 
1 Includes also for council vehicles 
2 Includes 270,000 CFAF for CCG members’ allowances 
3 CSE members’ allowances; no individual figures available for staff costs 
4 Includes 2,170,000 CFAF for CCG members’ allowances and an unspecified amount for IVAC, SAR/SM, CETIC teachers 
5 Includes 700,000 for CCG members’ allowances 
6 Includes 2,640,000 for CCG members’ allowances in the 2009 provisional budget 
7 Includes also for council vehicles in the 2009 provisional budget 
8 Includes 5,200,000 CFAF for debt reimbursement; 6,099,997 CFAF for repair equipment; 4,271,000 CFAF for timber harvesting administrative documents; and 
2,208,600 CFAF for light equipment purchase 
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Viewed broadly, Table 7.5 confirms that which was already apparent from Table 7.4 
above, that is renting the machines as well as maintaining them account for the bulk of the 
council forest expenditures. More importantly, the table indicates that the cost of operating the 
FCD is fairly significant, with officially more than half of the council forest total revenues alone 
affected to recurring expenditures. This conclusion is surprising in light of the fact that Mayor 
Mongui argued that the prime reason for the council decision to self-harvest the FCD was in his 
words to ‘benefit from the gross margin’ (see Chapter 5.0). The question then becomes how can 
the council benefit from the gross margin when it spends more than half of its total revenues -57 
percent- on the council forest operating costs alone? In theory, for the council to benefit from the 
gross margin, the FCD operating costs would have needed to decrease over the years. 
Equally important is the fact that to the mayor this should have appeared obvious. In 
effect, as a professional logger himself, and now at the head of a council forest, theoretically 
Mayor Mongui was well positioned to understand the timber trade business. Therefore, how 
could he as the council chief executive allow such a scenario to happen?  
For local observers, the conclusion seems obvious. The Mayor of Dimako is reportedly 
again misappropriating the council forest revenues by imputing high operating costs to the 
council for the FCD operations. As one local resident lamented “If he tells me that the FCD is 
not profitable, it is not the truth. We know forestry, operating costs and so on, we do not deserve 
this treatment, money is there” (26 February 2010). As with the so-called expenditures for local 
development noted previously, the evidence suggests that the same two patterns of 
overestimating the costs as well as fabricating expenditures are repeated with FCD operating 
costs, though at a wider scale. 
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Take the example of staff and personnel costs. The FCD according to field accounts as 
well as council documents employs less than twenty full-time and part-time people, with only the 
CFC head and the logging manager being the sole full-time employees. An examination of Table 
7.5 above discloses that staff and personnel expenditures oscillated between 2 and 18 million 
CFAF totaling 44 million CFAF in the 2004-2009 period. On the other hand, these figures differ 
from the evidence obtained in the field. In fact, in Dimako, it is an open secret that forest 
workers have complained over the years about low as well as recurring unpaid wages to no avail. 
This has led to a situation whereas, as Councilor 17 argued, villagers refuse to work for the 
council or the council forest, preferring instead to attend their fields. As he put it “people think 
that they are losing their time over there”. 
Although people get eventually paid after a while, as some interviewees have 
acknowledged, the accumulation of arrears raises the following question: how can a council 
which made more than 1 billion CFAF in six years in timber revenues not afford to pay its 
employees, especially when it employs about twenty people, most of them working part-time?197
In truth, the larger issue raised by the above 44 million CFAF figure is simply about 
ascertaining the beneficiaries of the money, i.e., the direction of the funds. Put differently, to 
whom was this amount paid when in actuality forest workers have gone for months -and as the 
accumulation of arrears story suggests- and years without being paid. Likewise, to which forest 
workers were destined the bonuses that the mayor referred to in 2005 (see CRDKO 2005b, 3) 
when forest workers themselves have denied receiving any such compensation? As this Dimako 
 
                                                 
197 The council financial records seem to substantiate the villagers’ story when for instance the 2007 
council provisional budget indicated a figure of almost 19 million CFAF (18, 809,691) overdue to the council 
employees as well as forest workers (see CDKO 2008b). Whether, the actual amount has been overestimated or not 
is not the issue at hand here since it probably has been; rather, the issue is that it confirms the villagers’ story that the 
council owes them money when in fact it should not based on the revenues it received from the FCD harvesting. 
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long-time observer remarked about this situation “this is terrible; you [the mayor] cannot treat 
people like that. The workers are miserable; the mayor keeps everything for himself. The people 
who work with the mayor, the contractors [they do not get paid]…the mayor does not care he 
will in any case find a way to harvest the forest. He completely acts like the council belongs to 
him” (25 April 2010). 
Another illustration of the alleged practice of overestimating and fabricating expenditures 
is illustrated by the figures for the year 2006 in Table 7.5 above. According to the council 
authorities, officially that year no timber harvesting occurred because of the revision of the 
management plan and the inability of the council to obtain the PAO (see also Singer 2008, 104). 
Yet, the table points out that in 2006 the council received almost 85 million CFAF in timber 
revenues from the FCD, as well as spent about 28 million CFAF for operating the forest. The 
question is how could it be possible for the council to have spent more than 19 million CFAF on 
fuel and lubricants for the machines, 2 million CFAF on staff and personnel, as well as the other 
expenditures for that year when officially no forest harvesting operations occurred?198
The reality is that similar to the practice of labeling anything as local development 
expenditures (see section 
 
7.1.1.2), the so-called FCD operating costs are unrelated to the cost of 
operating the council forest, hence appears to serve the purpose of hiding the alleged 
misappropriation of the timber revenues. One example, the fuel and lubricants section of Table 
7.5, shall illustrate this state of affairs. 
                                                 
198 Based on the pattern described in Chapter 5.0 two explanations for the revenues received, not the 
spending, can be suggested. First, the revenues were received after the 2005 official fiscal year ended, thus they 
were simply reported in 2006. The second, and most likely hypothesis based on the harvesting practices inside the 
FCD described in Chapter 6.0, suggests that the timber was already felled and waiting for customers which came 
around 2006 or even before. This story seems consistent with the ‘crushing’ of the forest described by one local 
observer in the previous chapter. Yet, in both cases, the 28 million CFAF figures seem too high to account for the 
‘almost’ no forest harvesting.  
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To begin with, in spite of the fact that the FCD operating costs are solely designed to 
support the cost of operating the council forest, the fuel and lubricants section for instance also 
includes the cost of fuel and lubricants for the council vehicles, namely the pick-up, the truck, as 
well as the mayor’s official vehicle as in the years 2008 and 2009. Similar to the previous issue 
about local development expenditures, this bundling of unrelated expenditures has two 
immediate effects. First, it augments the FCD operating costs to the significant levels mentioned 
above. And second, it raises the question as to what constitute the FCD operating costs given the 
fact that following the 2003 revenues sharing formula, 30 percent of the FCD revenues are 
allocated for the council operating costs, thus presumably also for the maintenance of the council 
vehicles? 
In line with the so-called rental agreement, the conclusion from Dimako observers is that 
first the mayor rents his ‘Bull’ to the council, and then the ‘Bull’ commands higher operating 
costs, apparently overestimated and fabricated as well as unjustified, in the end swallowing more 
than half of the council total timber revenues.199
7.2.1.3 The council operating costs 
 
In general, the issues surrounding the imbroglio over the rental agreement as well as the 
ownership of the timber harvesting equipment, and the FCD operating costs reflect the larger 
                                                 
199 It has also been suggested that another reason why the FCD operating costs are high pertains to the fact 
that, following the Mayor of Dimako's capture of the council forest, it has been difficult to distinguish the expenses 
of the mayor own private activities from those of the council forest. Simply put, it seems that the mayor has covered 
his private company expenses with the FCD revenues. As an illustration, local testimonies have indicated that 
Mayor Mongui used council properties such as the council white pickup truck, fuel and lubricants, as well as FCD 
workers, though employed and paid by the council, to conduct his private forest harvesting activities near the 
Bertoua area, where the forest administration granted him a SSV. Seen this way, it is understandable that the FCD 
operating costs reach these significant levels since they do not reflect the ‘true’ cost of operating the council forest; 
rather, they represent a combination of various items directly related to and benefiting the mayor himself as well as 
his private endeavors. 
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governance problems that local villagers have argued are at the heart of the matter in Dimako 
Council. As one villager declared about the town’s predicaments, “it is simply about bad 
governance. That’s it!!!”. Moreover, these alleged ‘bad’ governance practices - of overestimating 
as well as fabricating and adding unrelated expenditures to the FCD which leads to excessive 
FCD operating costs- have profound consequences for the distribution of timber revenues in the 
council per the 2003 revenue sharing formula. 
To clarify, as it became apparent from the above discussion, higher operating costs mean 
less revenues for other sectors (local development, and reforestation primarily). For that reason, 
local villagers have argued that it has become imperative to revisit the issue of the FCD 
operating costs. In town, the discontent has reached alarming levels. As CCG member 7 
explained: 
We should be told how the council forest logging operations are going on. We 
should be told how much we spend on fuel each month; we should be able to 
know monthly expenses as well as revenues. But we do not know how much we 
spend and bring in each month. All this should be known monthly so that after we 
can divide according to the revenue sharing formula, population, the council, etc. 
But we do not even get to that level of details about the council forest and this is 
the reason of the discontent here (…) How much do we spend for fuel? How 
much do we have at the end of the day? This is a business activity. You need to 
know how to divide the revenues, that’s the way it is (1 September 2010, 
emphasis added). 
 
The discontent is especially pronounced in light of the fact that the FCD operating costs 
do not include the council own operating costs. This in practice means that on top of the FCD 
significant operating costs, 30 percent of the remaining timber revenues as mandated by the 2003 
revenue sharing formula, are set aside for the council own operating costs.200
                                                 
200 At some level, this distinction between the FCD and the council operating costs no longer matters 
insofar as after the forest expenses are deducted, a large portion of the forest revenues is already ‘missing’. The 
alleged siphoning off of the council own operating costs revenues just ‘complete’ the process. 
 For the mayor and 
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council authorities, the issue of the FCD operating costs has proven a thorny predicament; 
nonetheless, they have argued that the council does not have the choice but to pay first those 
expenses, since it would be unreasonable to apportion the forest revenues before subtracting the 
forest harvesting operating costs. In this, local villagers have seen nothing less than another ruse 
by Mayor Mongui to continue benefiting alone from the FCD revenues to the extent that they 
already believe that these ‘high’ operating costs are unwarranted, and the evidence appears to 
support their contention.201
Specifically on the council own operating costs, the evidence also suggest that the mayor 
is using the same techniques that he utilized before to allegedly misappropriate the 30 percent 
dedicated to the council own operating costs. To provide an example of this state of affairs, 
 
Table 7.6 below shows the Dimako Council operating costs for the January-July 2009 period. 
Table 7.6. Dimako Council operating costs, January-July 2009 (CFAF million) 
Items Official  declared 
spending 
30% amount as specified 
by 2003 revenues 
formula 
Dimako City Hall 2,259,490  
 
 
 
Postage stamps and 
telecommunication costs 
875,000 
Permanent staff costs 7,851,492 
CNPS contributions/social security 992,834 
                                                 
201 That issue of the FCD operating costs has been complicated by the ambiguity related to the terms of the 
2003 revenues sharing formula. In effect, the 2003 municipal council Deliberation Number 7 only states that timber 
revenues were to be divided along the four sectors identified before. The deliberation does not state whether the 
division would be performed after the forest operating costs have been accounted for. Yet, this makes sense because 
one has to remember that the council was only scheduled to receive royalties not operate itself the council forest. For 
local villagers, to the extent that the forest operating costs appear to swallow an important part of the FCD revenues 
resulting in less money for local development as well as their 10 percent, it makes perfect sense for them to request 
that the division occurs before (see CRDKO 2003a). Finally, were it not for the fact that the FCD operating costs 
swallow more than half of the FCD revenues, that issue would be a non-starter in Dimako. 
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Sitting allowances 660,000  
12,446,152 Allowances for the municipal council 
commissions 
330,000 
Duty allowance for the mayor 
(indemnité de fonction)  
721,287 
Other allowances and insurances 919,418 
Duty allowances for deputy mayors 480,858 
Duty allowance for the mayor 
(indemnité de representation) 
406,287 
TOTAL 15,496,666 
Source: (CDKO 2009a, 5) 
 
In the first place, the table shows that during the January-July 2009 period, for its normal 
operations, the council spent about 15.5 million CFAF. That figure equaled 37 percent of the net 
revenues for that period –about 42 million CFAF after removing the forest operating costs- 
instead of the mandated 30 percent. In comparison, the first section of the Chapter showed that 
for the same period, the official amount of money dedicated for local development only totaled 
41 percent of the net revenues, 9 percent less than the mandated 50 percent (see subsection 
7.1.1.2). 
Second, the further analysis of the table reveals that whereas 2.3 million CFAF were 
disbursed for the DCH compound, 7.9 million CFAF were to cover the permanent staff salaries 
and about 3.5 million CFAF for various compensations to the mayor and his deputies. The 
overall observation about these expenses is that they appear questionable. Firstly, in the case of 
the DCH compound, Table 7.1 (see note 9) in the section on local development observed that in 
2005 the costs for the compound were supported at one time by the local development 50 percent 
leading one to question their inclusion again here, thus their authenticity. Likewise, in the case of 
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the 7.9 million CFAF disbursed on behalf of the permanent staff, the same question can be 
raised. In fact, the previous lines observed that the FCD staff and personnel expenditures already 
included the salaries of the permanent staff, and this allegedly constituted one of the ways for the 
mayor to overestimate the FCD operating costs as well as misappropriate the council forest 
revenues. Finally, regarding the various compensations -all perfectly legal- purportedly paid to 
the mayor and his deputies, which almost totaled 3.5 million CFAF for the said period, it is 
difficult to identify the actual direction of the money inasmuch as all these expenses are directly 
connected to the mayor or his deputies.202
Put another way, only the mayor and his deputies are supposed to have received this 
amount of money, and only they can guarantee that they have effectively received it or not. As 
one NGO representative put it “in all the villages, people are despondent. You [referring to the 
mayor] cannot capture all the council revenues. The FCD represents seventy five percent of the 
council revenues. If the [municipal] council cannot even have a minimum of oversight on the 
most important resource of the council, how do we expect to have good governance?” (25 
January 2010). That is why the discontent about the FCD issue is also about the overall 
governance of the Dimako Council; about the fact that in practice the municipal council, the 
deliberative body, of Dimako Council has no say on forest or council matters; that only the 
mayor seems to be benefiting from the council forest and the council revenues as well as 
allegedly putting the Dimako Council en coupe réglée, meaning he is reportedly plundering the 
council.
 
203
                                                 
202 Cerutti et al (2010, 135) makes a similar point in their analysis of eight local councils benefiting from 
the RFA revenues in Cameroon when they observe that “several other budget categories cover a large spectrum of 
intangible expenditure which is hardly traceable and seems to depend on the discretionary power of the mayors”. 
 
203 A prime example, the truck that the council uses to conduct official business and also transport forest 
workers shall illustrate this state of affairs. To begin with, the story of the truck is interesting because of the 
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To conclude this section, it can be noted that all the above examples appear to show a 
similar pattern to the one described in the previous section on local development; a pattern from 
the mayor of not utilizing the money for local development nor for the Dimako Council 
operating costs, but only for himself through the various techniques detailed above. This alleged 
pattern, which seems visible everywhere through a thorough examination of the council financial 
records as well as a comparison of those expenditures with the reality on the ground as 
performed here, appears to support the contention that the officially declared figures are not 
simply accounting mistakes; rather the data seems to indicate a deliberate strategy designed by 
the Mayor of Dimako to personally benefit from the forest revenues through arrangements that 
only he knows and controls as in the case with the various examples reviewed above. 
In the end, the mayor’s alleged misappropriation strategy looks like it is intended to make 
it harder for attentive observers to obtain a clear picture of the state of the FCD revenues as well 
as the utilization of those revenues. 
                                                                                                                                                             
‘mystery ‘surrounding it. In effect, in the past, Dimako Council used to own a truck, but the truck had to be sold 
because of engine and mechanical failures. In the absence of the official transaction record, it is unclear to whom the 
truck was sold to. What is certain in this story is that to the extent that the council no longer owned a truck it had to 
rent it from somewhere. Unsurprisingly, the company which ‘won’ the bid, known as Kakouandé et Fils (K&F), and 
which many believe is a front company for the mayor (see section 5.6), happened to belong to the mayor’s wife. 
Like with the rental agreement of the timber harvesting machines, the details of the deal are unknown, though a local 
estimate puts the daily cost of renting the truck at 50,000 CFAF, a figure impossible to confirm or deny. Equally 
important, like the mayor’s bulldozer, the KF truck -la benne at it is known in town- is beset with engine and 
mechanical failures and has neither insurance nor brakes according to the council workers. In fact, the truck has 
been involved in a number of local accidents -with a major one- which shall be discussed in the next chapter, in 
2007 having wider implications for local politics. The entire issue about the KF truck can be summed as follows: on 
top of allegedly ‘renting’ his Bulldozer to the council, the mayor is also reportedly renting his truck to the council 
and billing it as part of the council operating costs, in order to conduct the official business of the town he represents 
as the chief executive. 
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7.2.2 Popular discontent and the decline of the 10 percent 
To begin with, pursuant to the 2003 revenue sharing formula, two ways exist for local villagers 
to directly benefit from FCD timber revenues. The first is through the abovementioned 50 
percent reserved for local development while the second is through the 10 percent ‘to eat’ (in-
cash handouts), the focus of this section.204
For Mayor Mongui, the rationale behind the 10 percent idea was to help ensure that local 
villagers directly feel, that is individually, the FCD revenues. As he argued:  
 Save these two schemes -which in theory represent 
60 percent of timber revenues- local villagers are excluded from 40 percent of the FCD revenues 
insofar as the remaining 40 percent are allotted for matters that, at first glance, do not directly 
benefit them. 
you know the reality is that when the state functionaries and the small 
businessmen party at the end of the year, the small amount that local villages 
received [the 10 percent] is enough to say that at least I have eaten the meat from 
the council forest [that is to say that local villagers directly feel the impact of the 
council forest in contrast to water boreholes for instance which benefit everyone]. 
This act by itself has put some serenity in the council; there has never been any 
social movement, and I am proud of that (9 March 2010).  
 
Though the mayor is correct to point out that there has not been a large scale social 
movement in town over the issue of the utilization of the forest revenues, it remains that his 
assessment of a ‘serene’ climate is inconsistent with the evidence in the field. Indeed, besides the 
lack of local development achievements to show after six years of timber harvesting revenues, 
the other sensitive issue in local politics pertains to the handling and decline of the 10 percent to 
‘eat’. 
                                                 
204 At this stage, it is worth mentioning that initially local villagers and the municipal council had opposed 
the 10 percent idea when proposed by the mayor. However, as one councilor acknowledged, the mayor imposed his 
will and the idea became the council official policy. 
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7.2.2.1 The decline of the 10 percent 
The issue which has arisen in Dimako Council is that local villagers have protested 
against what they see as the inexplicable decline of the revenues allotted to them. As CCG 
member 7 explains: “in the beginning, things were going well. I am talking about the money that 
belongs to the people that he [the mayor] often gives at the end of the year. But today, this does 
not work anymore. We are not given as much money as before, only the first time it was good, 
[and] people were happy” (1 September 2010). That story about the decline of revenues allotted 
to villagers mirrored the pattern noted above a propos the lack of development achievements. 
To give an example about the villagers’ claim, below Table 7.7 provides self-reported 
figures in selected villages of the Dimako Council. Except for the years 2004-2005 where 
villagers reported ‘significant’ amount of cash being handed out, the pattern which is evident 
from the table is of a downward trend. 
Table 7.7. 10 percent to ‘eat’ distributed in selected villages of Dimako Council (CFAF thousand)* 
Villages 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Akano 400,000 200,000 200,000 NA NA 150,000 
Beul 400,000 250,000 02 150,000 150,000 150,000 
Djandja 400,000 200,000 NA NA 150,000 150,000 
Grand Pol 800,000 500,000 350,0001 350,000 250,000 250,000 
Longtimbi 750,000 750,000 NA 500,000 300,000 250,000 
Tahatte 350,000 350,000 NA 250,000 250,000 100,000 
Source: interview data 
* Note that these data as well as the years come from the participants recollection not necessarily supported 
by documentary evidences. However, in the absence of council documents, these give the reader a general 
picture of the situation regarding the decline of the 10 percent reserved to villagers. 
1 This particular figure is to be taken cautiously not only because officially logging operations did not occur 
during that year, but also because some villages reported receiving cash handouts while others did not 
provide that information or could not remember. 
2 Villagers specifically declared that they did not receive anything that year in contrast to before where 
information was or could not be provided. 
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Furthermore, a detailed examination of the table indicates that in those six selected 
villages, the 10 percent revenues constantly declined and reached their lowest level around the 
years 2008-2009. In all but two villages, Longtimbi and Tahatte, where revenues declared 
remained constant in 2004 and 2005, the decline began in 2005, a surprising result in light of the 
fact that 2005 represented the year where officially timber revenues reached their high peak, 
more than 345 million CFAF (see Table 5.2).205
In Dimako, the decline of the 10 percent is not a trivial issue not only because of the 
scarcity of local employment, but also because of what the decline has meant individually for 
each villager. Take the examples of both the Grand Pol and Longtimbi villages in 
 
Table 7.7 
above which have respectively received in 2004 800,000 and 750,000 CFAF. Whereas in 2004, 
per capita allocation was 1,000 in Grand Pol and 750 CFAF in Longtimbi, in 2009 per capita 
allocation was 310 in Grand Pol and Longtimbi 250 CFAF. Hence, per capita allocation went 
down from 2004 to 2009 by about a third, leading one villager to complain that in 2009, after 
utilizing the money to buy food as required and apportioning it among all villagers, each villager 
received about a mackerel and half.206
                                                 
205 Though the data only covers six villages out of the council approximate two dozen villages which 
receive those funds (see below), the general pattern of decline of the 10 percent ‘to eat’ was substantiated in the 
twenty four villages –out of thirty two- visited for this study. However, those data were not included above because 
of their incompleteness. 
 For that villager, this was unacceptable, especially in the 
FCD era and all the timber revenues received which were supposedly designed to benefit local 
villagers. As CCG member 18 further noted: “I do not see the advantage of the council forest for 
local villagers. We do not reap any benefit from this forest; at the end of the year the mayor 
comes to fool us with leftovers [meaning the 10 percent]” (11 September 2010). 
206 This fish is widely used in the local diet not only because of its affordability but also easy availability. 
278 
In the end, the case of Grand Pol and Longtimbi villages narrated above are symptomatic 
of the malaise in Dimako about the utilization of timber revenues designed for local villagers. 
Indeed, whereas, as the evidence in the preceding section has shown, the council operating costs 
keep increasing or remain significant, the revenues reserved for local villagers, through local 
development and the 10 percent are constantly declining while the officially declared amount 
point to the villagers benefiting from substantial returns from the FCD. As one forest observer 
concluded “the Mayor of Dimako is telling everybody the same story. We established the 10 
percent, and [through it] we are giving rice to old ladies; they also have to eat something from 
the council forest since they do not have any children [supposedly because education takes the 
bulk of the FCD revenues]. When you ask people if they receive the money, some say yes, others 
say no. However, at the end you only hear the mayor talk of a 40 million figures!!!” (8 April 
2010). 
To illustrate the point raised by the aforementioned forest observer, a brief final example 
shall be presented. Below Table 7.8 provides the council officially declared expenditures for the 
period of January to July 2009. 
Table 7.8. 10 percent to ‘eat’ expenditures from the FCD revenues, January-July 2009 (CFAF 
thousand) 
Items Officially declared  amount Projected 10% per 2003 
revenues formula 
Bonuses and other allowances  300,000  
 
 
4,148,719 
Conference and seminar 
allowances 
630,416 
Gifts and relief assistance 385,000 
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Allowances CSE members 400,000 
TOTAL 1,715,416 
Source: (CDKO 2009a, 5) 
 
From Table 7.8, two issues are immediately noticeable. First, although Table 7.8 is 
limited to the period of January to July 2009, the figures indicate that the funds earmarked for 
local villagers for that period are below the mandated 10 percent. In reality, the table shows that 
instead of the 4 million CFAF allocated for local villagers, less than 50 percent (around 1.7 
million CFAF) of what is legally mandated has been officially reported as expenditure. 
The second issue, and the more important, is that instead of direct in cash handouts at the 
end of the year, the expenditures included items such as Bonuses and other allowances, 
Conference and seminar allowances, and Allowances for CSE members, items which are 
unrelated to local villagers’ share. Specifically about the CSE members’ allowances, the council 
document creating the organization states that the council budget bears its operating costs (see 
CRDKO 2004a), thus in theory these should not be included in the villagers’ 10 percent. More 
importantly, Chapter 6.0 before showed that among the contentious issues between Mayor 
Mongui and the CSE members, the compensation sits at the top. Therefore, whence are those 
figures derived? Similarly, who are those local villagers who received bonuses as well as 
allowances for attending some conferences and seminars when most local villagers have shied 
away from the FCD and prefer to attend their fields, precisely because of what they see as the 
lack of redistribution of the timber revenues? 
This situation has led some villagers to complain that the mayor is not only benefiting 
from the council forest revenues reserved for local development and the council operating costs, 
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but also the villagers’ 10 percent. Councilor 4 expressed his discontent as follows: “before we 
knew the mayor was fabricating stuffs, but we did not care because we were content with the 
800,000 or 900,000 CFAF we received” (3 September 2010). But today, because of the decline, 
the issue has taken another turn in town with villagers openly complaining about Mayor 
Mongui’s alleged misuse of FCD timber revenues as Box 7.2 above showed. 
A final issue, linked to the above point -though not visible in the table- regards the 
ambiguity of the selection criteria for receiving the money. In 2004, according to a council 
document, voter registration lists were used to apportion the 12 million CFAF reserved for local 
villagers (CRDKO 2004b).207 Table 7.7 On the other hand, as was already apparent from , in 
recent years different villages have received different allocations. Chief 1 lamented the situation 
in the following words: 
The first year the council gave for the 10 percent of the population 400,000, the 
second year 200,000, the last 2 years 150,000. Nowadays, everything depends on 
how they feel. The first years they said that timber was not selling; now they say 
that timber is still not selling despite the fact that we are seeing a lot of loaded 
trucks leaving the town. What we are lamenting is the fact that the 10 percent 
keeps dwindling. If it was stable, we would be OK. Maybe next year they will 
give us less, maybe 100,000!!! (5 September 2010). 
 
Notwithstanding the fact that by using voter registration lists, not only did this exclude 
non or unregistered voters, but it also contributed to a general and growing unease in town. In the 
end, in town, local villagers are neither content with the 50 percent reserved for development 
projects, nor with ‘their’ 10 percent share. 
                                                 
207 Note that in 2004 if we are to follow the council figures (FCD total revenues [179 million CFAF] minus 
the forest operating costs [140 million CFAF], about 4 million (10 percent) should have been reserved to local 
villagers. Yet, the figures reported by the council totaled 12 million CFAF (see CRDKO 2004b, and also Table 7.5 
above). This further strengthens the argument made here about the mayor’s alleged dubious and questionable 
financial practices in the overall management of the FCD. 
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7.2.2.2 Growing tensions over the allocation of money 
According to local villagers as well a council records (see CRDKO 2004b), in previous 
years in order for Dimako villages to receive the 10 percent funds, each village had to set up a 
committee to oversee the distribution of the funds which were then officially handed over in 
front of all local villagers. Further, in each village, the committee was headed by a councilor, 
assisted by the village chief, the CCG member and the leaders of the local youth and women 
chapters of the ruling party CPDM (see CRDKO 2004b). For Mayor Mongui, two major reasons 
were at the heart of this scheme. First, by putting councilors in charge of the distribution of the 
funds, they could be made more accountable insofar as they are elected officials. Second, by also 
associating all the other local organizations, this would create a more open and transparent 
process and alleviate the risk of conflict (see CRDKO 2004b). 
That system was officially in effect for a few years until it was changed leading to an 
increase of the conflict over the allocation of the 10 percent which was already visible in town. 
From the public and ‘participative’ process where the money was handed over in front of all 
villagers, the current process is under the sole responsibility of councilors and local villagers 
have assimilated that to another of the mayor’s strategy to siphon off the revenues in cohort with 
local councilors. Although councilors denied any wrongdoing, the change from the 2004 
‘inclusive’ village committee to the sole councilors’ responsibility has alienated many villagers, 
in particular because this has coincided with the decline of the 10 percent. In some villages, for 
instance, prior conflicts between councilors and chiefs have erupted into the open over the matter 
of the 10 percent as well as symbolic issues of local status and preeminence. A chief once 
complained that the mayor was attempting to sap its authority because when the funds were 
distributed in 2009, his nemesis, the councilor, was in charge of the distribution. 
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Equally important, the tension has also been heightened because of the fact that following 
the lack of development projects in the council, some village chiefs, CCG members and 
councilors have argued that the 10 percent ‘to eat’ instead of being used for food be better used 
to improve villages conditions. Obviously, the tempers have flared between, on the one hand, 
those who seek to use the revenues for local development instead of buying food and drinks, and, 
on the other hand, those who believe that the 10 percent ‘to eat’ should be reserved for its 
‘original’ purpose, that is to eat. As Mayor Mongui argued in a 2004 letter, the 10 percent “funds 
shall be used in accordance with the real wishes [sic] of the population to buy food (meat, fish, 
rice and drinks….)” (CRDKO 2004b). 
Finally, it is important to mention that Dimako 10 percent ‘to eat’ does not involve all 
Dimako residents. In effect, while in practice it is difficult to distinguish who is and who is not 
an autochthon in town, the 10 percent in-cash handouts are exclusively reserved for Dimako 
Council natives. The rationale behind the idea is that only Dimako natives have rights over the 
forest, for they are the ‘real owners’ and, thus, they should be the only ones to benefit. That 
practice of excluding non-natives has been mentioned by Peter Geschiere (2004; 2009, especially 
chapter 3 which deals with the case of the Eastern Region forests) who lamented that in the wake 
of the 1994 Forest Law, autochthony claims have increased in Cameroon’s forest regions. 
For distributional purposes, in Dimako these natives have been exclusively assimilated to 
local villagers located mostly out of Dimako town -the largest and most populated area- that is 
the center of the council. Hence, this has led to a situation where other Dimako inhabitants, 
especially the dominated-nonnatives (allogènes) downtown Dimako as well as some Dimako 
town quarters, are excluded from the FCD revenues. In 2004 for instance, only 22 villages out of 
the 32 villages and quarters of the council purportedly received that allocation (see CRDKO 
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2004b).208
For one local chief, this situation was regrettable, for as he argued when a town develops, 
it is not only because of the natives, but also because of the non-natives’ contribution. In his 
view, the exclusion of other inhabitants from the council benefits and the concomitant capture of 
the forest benefits by the mayor were part of the tragedy of the FCD. A tragedy where, as this 
chapter has suggested, the Mayor of Dimako, through his capture of the council forest, appears to 
have misappropriated as well as personally benefited from the 50 percent revenues reserved for 
local development; the FCD as well as the council 30 percent operating costs and finally, the 
villagers’ 10 percent. 
 The tension in town is not only related to the decline of the 10 percent revenues, but 
also over what natives or non-natives residing throughout the council -but not in the ‘selected’ 
villages- perceive as blatant discrimination. That fact stands in contrast to Mayor Mongui’s 2000 
speech where he specifically mentioned that all efforts had been made during the process of 
creating the FCD for all of the council villages to benefit from the council forest revenues (see 
Mongui Sossomba, 2001a, 133-134). 
In conclusion, as the title of this chapter Foret Na Mongui suggested, despite his public 
pronouncements, it seems the mayor was never interested in spending the money for local 
development or local villagers; his goal all along appears to personally seek to benefit from the 
forest resources. The next chapter shows why it was so imperative for the mayor to capture the 
council forest. 
                                                 
208 In 2004, based on electoral rolls, the money was officially distributed to twenty two villages subdivided 
into five groups as follows. Group 1: more than 400 registered Dimako town; group 2: from 200 to 400 registered 
Ngolambélé, Longtimbi, Petit-Pol, Grand Pol, and Baktala; group 3: Toungrelo, Tonkoumbé, and Simeyong; group 
4: Nguinda, Akano, Nkolbikon, Mayos, Bongossi-Ngombol, Kouen, Lossou, and Beul; and group 5: Djandja, 
Kandala, Petit-Ngolambélé, Nkolmeyanga, Tahatte (see CRDKO 2004b). 
284 
7.3 SUMMARY 
Following Chapter 6.0 which described forest management inside the FCD, the goal of this 
chapter was to present the evidence regarding the other side of forest management 
decentralization in the council, namely local development. The main conclusion of this chapter is 
that instead of the timber revenues being used for local development or to the benefit of the local 
population, the bulk of the more than 1 billion CFAF (2.1 million USD) in timber revenues 
received since 2004 seems to have been utilized in ways contrary to the objectives of the Dimako 
experiment in local natural resource management. Indeed, the field evidence presented 
throughout the chapter suggested that through the use of various strategies –overestimation, 
overbilling and fabrications- as well as schemes, such as the rental agreement and the FCD 
operating costs, the Mayor of Dimako has attempted to conceal the fact that most of the money 
appropriated either for local development, the council operating costs as well as the 10 percent 
earmarked for local villagers appears to have been misappropriated, with the mayor appearing as 
the main beneficiary. The next chapter reveals what has become politically of the mayor since 
the creation of the council forest. 
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8.0  BEYOND DECENTRALIZED FOREST MANAGEMENT AND LOCAL 
DEVELOPMENT: THE MAKING OF A BIG MAN 
“That mayor really screwed us a lot. All his money comes from the 
council” (Chief 1, 2 September 2010). 
  
“The mayor when he has issues, he does not deal with street-level 
bureaucrats; he directly calls the [forest] minister and the minister 
calls down the echelon to solve the problem” (A forest worker, 17 
February 2010). 
 
“The mayor of Dimako he threatens, he intimidates. When he sees 
that your eyes start to open [meaning that you start to understand 
what he is doing], he pushes you aside... He is a crocodile, no 
councilor can tell you the truth about the mayor; he has his own 
trusted people” (A local villager, 6 May 2010). 
 
“Now, he wants to become president of the Chamber of 
Agriculture and he needs the GICs’ votes…so he is obedient 
[meaning that he is acting like he cares about the villagers’ plight 
and will attempt to solve their problems]. But once he will get the 
votes, it is over. Where are you going to see him again?” (A 
Dimako resident, 26 April 2010). 
 
Chapters 6.0 and 7.0 above have described what have become of the two goals, sustainable forest 
management and local development, of forest management decentralization in Dimako Council. 
As such, the evidence in Chapter 6.0 suggested the deliberate harvest of the council forest 
outside of the forest administration rules and regulations as well as the complete disregard of the 
management plan, all this putting in doubt the long term sustainability of the forest. Equally, 
Chapter 7.0 revealed that, following his capture of the council forest, the Mayor of Dimako 
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seemed to have been neither interested in local development nor improving the lot of local 
villagers; rather, the data indicated that the mayor appears to have utilized the council forest for 
personal gain through the various maneuvers detailed above. On the whole, the previous two 
chapters have indicated that in the entire Dimako Council, following the forest management 
decentralization, the Mayor of Dimako has been the main beneficiary, especially financially, of 
the council forest project, if not the only one. The following chapter, the last before the 
conclusion, describes how thanks to the council forest resources in large part, Mayor Mongui 
expanded his power as well as achieved national prominence. 
8.1 THE MAKING OF A BIG MAN 
This section chronicles the rise of the Mayor of Dimako from a ‘small’ chief executive of the 
impoverished rural Dimako Council to a position of national prominence, that is a ‘true’ Big 
Man. The section main contribution resides in showing how the council forest project enabled 
the Mayor of Dimako to achieve his political ambitions, but also how the mayor skillfully used 
his connection to the Dimako native Chantal Biya to advance his own power-building agenda. 
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8.1.1 The quest for hegemony 
 
Figure 8.1. Mayor Mongui (with the white hat) being mobbed during his arrival for the rally in 
honor of the appointment of his nephew, 6 March 2010 
Source: author 
 
On 15 March 2011 by presidential decree No 2011/072, Janvier Mongui Sossomba, Mayor of 
Dimako, was appointed president of the Chamber of Agriculture, Fisheries, Livestock and 
Forests of Cameroon (Chambre d’Agriculture, des Pêches, de l’Elevage et des Forêts), or 
CAPEF after its French acronym (see Cameroon Tribune 2011; Mbodiam and Elvido 2011). For 
the 64 years old Mayor Mongui, the news that he was to preside over the interests of the 
‘Farmer’s Parliament’ -as it is locally known- was expected, though long-awaited. As one 
Dimako resident put it a year earlier, “he wants to be appointed president of the Chamber; he 
really wants it!!!” (19 March 2010, emphasis added). 
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For Mayor Mongui, who appears to have long sought to achieve national prominence, the 
Chamber presidency was ideal for several reasons.209
see Eya 2011
 First, since 2008, the position had been 
vacant following the resignation of the late former president Philémon Adjibolo who previously 
held the position for ten straight years ( ).210
see Belibi 
2008
 As a member of the National 
Assembly, by law Adjibolo could not cumulate both positions, hence he had to vacate one 
position and he chose the Chamber presidency, not without some controversy (
).211
Second, for the mayor, the position was also ideal because in the past he had been a 
former civil servant at the Ministry of Agriculture -the Cameroon Tobacco Company-, thus 
presumably he would be at ease with the Chamber area of competence. Third, following the 
2009 reorganization of the Chamber after a period of inertia, the Chamber was set to become 
once again an important player in Cameroon’s agricultural world (see 
 
ROC 2009c; Sonkey 
2011).212
                                                 
209 By his own admission, in a 2011 press article, Mayor Mongui indicated that in 2002 he had intended to 
run to be a member of parliament (député) for the Haut-Nyong division. However, according to him, despite being 
‘favored’ by the early polls, he had to abandon the project because of ‘harassment’ by the media about his tenure at 
the helm of the Dimako Council (for more about the details of the story, see Elvido and Ngouem 2011). 
 In theory, this meant national exposure for the Chamber president. Finally fourth, and 
perhaps the most important reason, the position, though not a government ministerial one, held 
210 Adjibolo, known for his franc parler, was not only regarded as a ‘true’ Big Man, but also as one of the 
East Region’s Big Men, if not the Big Man, until he passed away on Sunday 12 June 2011. At one time, Adjibolo, 
who held various high state positions and had been involved in politics since the 1960s, had been mayor for fifteen 
years of the Kadey division town of Batouri. 
211 Since that 2008 resignation, the Chamber vice-president Samuel Duclair Fandjo had been running the 
organization on an interim basis. Because the former president Adjibolo was from the East Region, some people had 
speculated that President Biya might appoint another Easterner to fill up the position. As one Dimako villager 
declared about the person to be appointed “he is bound to come from the East” (12 March 2010). 
212 According to the latest reorganization, the Chamber is composed of 200 members representing the four 
sectors of Agriculture, Fisheries, Livestock; and Forests (ROC 2009c). Among the main duties of the Chamber are 
the following: defend the interests of farmers (le monde rural); protect and represent them in decision-making 
organizations as well as institutions; train and represent farmers in national and international agricultural forum (see 
Sonkey 2011). 
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the rank and privileges of junior government minister (Sécrétaire d’Etat), definitively thrusting 
his or her holder firmly onto the national stage. 
To achieve that ultimate goal of being the Chamber president, the mayor did not spare 
any efforts. First, on 5 February 2010, he summoned the local representatives of the Common 
Initiative Groups (GICs), the Chamber’s collège electoral, to City Hall to announce his intention 
to run to be a member of the Chamber during the then-upcoming July national election. As one 
participant to the meeting recalled, “the mayor summoned us because soon a lot of things 
[money and assistance] will come, so he is running his campaign. He is candidate; it seems that 
the state wants to help the GICs and they [the GICs] need a president” (5 February 2010). The 
meeting over, the mayor ‘thanked’, that is gave some money to, the approximately thirty-five 
attendees. Second, the mayor reportedly spent more than half a million CFAF to administratively 
register local GICs for the election. That step of registering the GICs was indispensable 
inasmuch as only officially registered GICs, that is recognized by the central state, comprised the 
Chamber’s electoral college. 
On 11 July 2010, the awaited Chamber elections were held amid cries of electoral fraud 
as well as farmers’ disenfranchisement (see Onohiolo 2010; Samnick 2010). But once the 
elections over, and the results validated by the Deputy Prime Minister in charge of Agriculture 
and Rural Development (MINADER) Jean Nkuété, everyone was expecting the presidential 
appointment -which eventually arrived on 15 March 2011. 
From that 2010 February day when Mayor Mongui announced his intention and the 
presidential appointment, it took a little more than a year for the news to arrive; but at last, the 
news was there and the efforts had clearly paid off. Indeed, as one newspaper writer remarked, 
“Mr. Janvier Mongui Sossomba received news on his appointment with total jubilation at the 
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Dimako Council where he [has been] mayor [for] 24 years” (Sonkey 2011, emphasis added). 
Immediately, the mayor “assured Cameroonians that he [would] revitalize and re-awaken the 
Chamber with the collaboration of his executives and all those willing to give ideas” (Sonkey 
2011). 
Whereas Mayor Mongui was still ‘jubilating’ over his triumphant appointment, the news 
quickly spread around Dimako as well as in Bertoua where the mayor’s private -but also main 
official- residence sits in the middle of the Mokolo neighborhood between two regional seats of 
power, the Regional Governor’s mansion and, ironically, the Regional office of the Delegation of 
the Forest Administration. The news was significant for local as well as regional politics, for in 
an instant the mayor had completed his march towards national prominence. As one Dimako 
observer exclaimed upon learning the news, “the mayor got a terrific promotion…he now has a 
bodyguard” (16 March 2011, emphasis added). The bodyguard image suggested that the mayor 
at the present commanded a political power and stature sufficient enough for it to warrant this 
type of state protection as well as privilege, only reserved to a few national political figures. 
Viewed broadly, the mayor’s trajectory was astonishing, for not long ago, in fact seven 
years ago, Mayor Mongui was the chief executive of the Eastern remote, impoverished, and rural 
local council of Dimako. But, almost exactly seven years after the official start of timber 
harvesting in the FCD on 17 March 2004 and the first timber revenues, Mayor Mongui went 
from being a ‘small’ mayor of a rural local council to the holder of a national position with the 
rank equivalent to that of a junior government minister. 
On the other hand, for observers of council forestry in Cameroon, the political rise of the 
Big Man Mongui, which started well before this latest appointment, could have never been 
achieved without the Dimako Council Forest project; in effect, the FCD, that is more generally 
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the forest management decentralization, created the Big Man Mongui. Without the forest 
resources, the Mayor of Dimako would have been nothing more than the mayor of Dimako, 
meaning a ‘small’ resourceless mayor of an impoverished rural local council in one of the 
poorest, yet resources-rich, regions of the country. To understand Mayor Mongui’s trajectory, a 
brief look at his political history pre-FCD is necessary. 
8.1.1.1 A ‘small’ local elected official among many 
From the moment the Dimako Council hosted the French-funded API-Dimako project in 
1992, and the start of timber harvesting operations in the FCD as well as the flow of the first 
timber revenues in 2004, a dozen years had passed. That is the time it took before the first 
experiment in decentralized local council forest management in Cameroon was underway. 
During those years, the Mayor of Dimako’s primary role -as the council chief executive and a 
member of the steering committees of both API-Dimako and Forêts et Terroirs (see API-
Dimako 1995b, 2; Forni and Chatelperron 1999, 3)- was to ensure that the council forest project 
went from abstraction to reality. Beginning in 1994, that role was to become more critical 
because SFID, the town main tax contributor as well as employer, was afforded the special 
economic zone as well as tax-free statuses, thus further contributing to the deterioration of the 
already shaky council finances (see Mongui Sossomba 2001a, 142). 
For the mayor who before the creation of the FCD, as Chapter 5.0 alluded to before, had 
been in place since 1987 the council forest project seemed like a ‘one in a lifetime occasion’ to 
realize his political ambitions. A former civil servant and the private owner of a small logging 
company, Mayor Mongui at the onset of his political career was at the head of the impoverished 
and SFID-dependent Dimako Council. As such, Mayor Mongui was merely another 
administrator, hence the term administrateur municipal, of an everyday countryside council; an 
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insignificant local elected official at the head of a council whose total revenues were averaging 
about 26 million CFAF annually in the six years period prior to the FCD (see subsection 5.7.3.5). 
That lack of revenues, in the words of Dimako municipal tax collector, earned the council 
the unenviable title of a structure de fonctionnement, meaning a resourceless local government 
whose primary function was dominated by administrative tasks rather than the provision of basic 
services or revenues-generating activities as expected by its constituents (Bimbar 2006, 17). 
Within that environment, as Poum Bimbar put it, “the office of the Mayor therefore had almost 
no raison d’être” (2006, 18, emphasis added). In fact, the mayoral position was mostly a 
ceremonial position, and Mayor Mongui was the temporary holder of the office since 1987. 
Though he was the council chief executive, but because the mayor position had no raison 
d’être, the mayor’s primary focus was on ensuring the prosperity of his private ventures. In spite 
of this focus, by all accounts, Mayor Mongui was a minor player in the timber trade; in reality, at 
one point the mayor had to oversee one of his companies, FODDI, filed for bankruptcy in the 
early 2000s because of financial woes (see section 5.6). Furthermore, in the SFID-dominated 
local economy and politics, the mayor was seen more as a small businessman than an elected 
official motivated by the pursuit of power and higher political offices. Indeed, Chapter 5.0 
pointed out that the main reason why the local population was opposed to the idea of the council 
forest in the first place was because of the fear of the logger Mongui, the small businessman, not 
the Mayor Mongui, the elected official, capturing the forest for his own private firm (see 
subsection 5.7.3.3). 
For local villagers, the impression that the mayor was more interested in his private firm 
compared to his political fortune rested at least on two reasons. First, in the pre-FCD era, as 
mentioned above, the French SFID was the focus of local politics and economy inasmuch as 
293 
villagers depended on the company for their living and political power was the company’s 
preserve. As Bimbar again notes in the period of inadequate local financial resources, that is pre-
FCD, “the council was not even known by the population. Its role among the community was not 
even understood by its inhabitants” (2006, 18). 
The second reason, and related to the previous one, was that in this context the council as 
the seat of the local government was not the object of attention; hence, the mayor’s objectives 
could not be fathomed or were totally irrelevant to local villagers. It is for that reason a local 
chief could, for instance, declare that “before the forest [was created] we were not mingling with 
the mayor. Whether he was bad or not we did not know [whether he would capture the forest for 
himself]; it is only because of the forest that we are mingling with him” (Chief 22, 19 September 
2010). With the council forest project, and in particular in 2004 when the first timber revenues 
commenced flowing into the council coffers, the mayor’s true motives increasingly appeared 
evident for all to see. The financial resources that all along he had lacked to further his political 
ambitions were at hand, and ready to be put to work. 
8.1.1.2 Building political power through the council forest project 
For Mayor Mongui, as the evidence presented in the previous chapter suggested, the 
council forest turned out to be a boon, for on the whole he seemed the sole beneficiary of the 
project. To be sure, outside of any central, regional and local scrutiny, the mayor was allegedly 
able to misappropriate as well as personally benefit from the beginning the timber revenues 
through questionable expenditures, such as the FCD rental agreement as well as operating costs. 
Together those two expenditures consumed approximately half of the more than 1 billion CFAF 
of the council forest total revenues over the period 2004-2009. What is more, the mayor appears 
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to have used the council forest like his private commercial venture to apparently overbill the 
council forest and cover his private expenses. As one local villager commented: 
He had a Sales of Standing Volume at Giwa in the Lom and Djerem [division] so 
the operating costs of his Sales of Standing Volume, fuel, workers, and sometimes 
the machines, were paid by the council forest which means that over there it cost 
him zero Franc. Because of that money, he became financially powerful. You see 
when you can run a logging company without paying for operating costs, you 
benefit a lot. He has been mayor since 1987; he has been there for a long time. 
Before he was very unhappy like everybody else but with the creation of the 
council forest, he got some wings. Whatever the case, he was not very powerful 
before the creation of the council forest. You know as a small logging company, 
you have to cover the operating costs as well as the other expenses, and if you not 
too careful you end up losing money. It is only from 2003-2004 and onwards that 
he started to become powerful (17 June 2010, emphasis added). 
 
But the road to financial and political power as well as national prominence was not at all 
guaranteed from the outset. Certainly, an episode illustrates how the mayor two years prior to the 
official start of timber harvesting operations in the FCD almost lost the helm of the council 
because of his lack of financial resources to sustain his political ambitions. In 2002, after the 
nationwide council elections, before the municipal council was set to renew Mayor Mongui’s 
mandate -a formality as in the past- a few councilors dissatisfied with the mayor’s performance 
attempted a coup (d’état) to remove him. The mayor, unaware of his changing fortune, survived 
thanks to the support of two trusted councilors who alerted him that another councilor was 
proposing between 50 and 100,000 CFAF to each councilor –excluding the mayor and the 
challenger between 1.15 and 2.3 million CFAF for the twenty three councilors- to switch 
allegiance.213
                                                 
213 Although the practice is illegal, it is widely believed to be in use throughout local/rural councils, 
especially in light of the fact that most local rural councilors such as in Dimako are part-time elected officials who 
for the most part are unemployed and depend on agriculture for their livelihoods. Thus, sums like the ones proposed 
above represent significant amounts of money. 
 As one local villager, aware of the details of the episode, recalled “the mayor 
begged the councilors [because] he did not have yet a lot of money at the time” (19 March 2010, 
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emphasis added). Indeed, because of his lack of financial resources to offer a counter proposal to 
the discontented councilors, the mayor was forced to ‘beg’ to stay in power. In the end, the two 
councilors who warned the mayor about the intrigue convinced their colleagues that Mayor 
Mongui deserved another chance, and consequently he weathered the challenge. 
The 2002 episode and his reelection as Dimako chief executive assured, Mayor Mongui 
refocused his efforts on ensuring that the project for which he had been involved since the mid-
1990s became a reality. On the one hand, for the political actor that the mayor represented, the 
2002 episode and the near humiliation of losing power and not benefit from the upcoming timber 
revenues served as a reminder that the financial resources to sustain his political ambitions were 
still lacking, and that if he were to achieve his Big Man dream, episodes such as this one had to 
be averted at all costs. On the other hand, albeit the episode also stood as a warning for Mayor 
Mongui, because of the 2001 issuing of the FCD gazetting decree a year earlier (see section 
5.7.4), it was only a matter of time for the council forest and its resources to be at his disposal 
and the 2002 story, hence potential challenges to his rule, would belong to the past. In fact, since 
that almost fateful event, as shall be shown in the following section, the mayor has used all 
means at his disposal, primarily intimidation and cooptation and money, to ensure that he 
remained unchallenged in town. 
Whereas local villagers were preoccupied that the interests of the logger predominate 
over those of the elected official, in truth they should have been worried about both because they 
were inseparable. It appears that for the logger Mongui, harvesting the forest without any 
consideration for its long term survival as well as privately accumulating the FCD timber 
revenues were only the first steps in his overall power-building scheme. All along, the final 
objective, it seems, was for Mayor Mongui to use the newly-acquired financial resources to 
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further his political aims. In his apparent quest to build and strengthen his political power, the 
mayor still needed some support to prosper out of outside scrutiny. And in that regard, Dimako 
benefited from one important asset, that is it represented the birthplace of Cameroon’s current 
First Lady, Chantal Biya. The mayor, quickly seeing the opportunity, seized onto this fact and, as 
a shrewd political actor, exploited to his advantage his relationship with the Dimako native. 
8.1.2 The President of the Republic in the East 
 
Figure 8.2. “Dimako’s Youth behind President Paul Biya” reads the banner, 6 March 2010 
Source: author 
 
In Cameroon, outside of academic and policy circles, Dimako Council is better known for being 
the birth town of Chantal Biya, Cameroon’s current First Lady. Certainly, the town represents 
the place where as a youngster Chantal Vigouroux spent most of her childhood before tying the 
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knot with President Paul Biya on 23 April 1994 -two years after the death of his first wife 
Jeanne-Irène Biya (see Dikouba 2004). Over the years, thanks to that union, the Dimako Council 
has benefited from several ‘gifts’ from the First Lady, ‘the daughter of the village’ as she is 
referred to in town, notably through her foundation. The ‘gifts’ have ranged from schools 
computer equipment to the annual Festi-Foot summer soccer tournament, where local teams with 
names borrowed from the big Europeans clubs, such as Barcelone de Tombo or Milan AC, battle 
for local hegemony alongside community groups promoting health efforts against sexually 
transmitted infections (see Okole 2006, 2009; Tchakounte 2007).214
Far from the debates about sustainable forest management, conservation, 
decentralization, local development and the likes, for Dimako villagers, only one person, Maman 
Chantal is responsible for the creation of the council forest. Though the evidence points 
otherwise, as Chapter 5.0 above alluded to, local villagers and even a lot of the current breed of 
councilors, CCG members, and some chiefs, who were involved in some capacity during the 
efforts of Forêts et Terroirs, argue that it was not accidental that the town was chosen as the site 
of the first council forest ever created in Cameroon. For local villagers, among all the ‘gifts’ that 
Maman Chantal has provided the council since her union with the president, the FCD constitutes 
the ultimate gift that the central state, through her intervention, afforded their community.
 
215
The perception that Chantal Biya was the originator of the FCD project, albeit contrary to 
the extant evidence, rests at least on two ideas. First, it revolves around local villagers’ 
expectation about the redistribution of power, in terms of ‘concrete’ achievements, from the 
 
                                                 
214 Officially, Festival Football (Festi-Foot) is organized by a young Dimako elite Oswald Baboke (see 
below for more on him) under the sponsorship of the First Lady. The 2009 edition of the tournament was especially 
‘dedicated’ to her husband President Biya (see Okole 2009). 
215 That assertion has even been encountered among some notable forest administration officials who, in 
theory, should have been privy to the ‘true’ information. 
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center to their village, in particular now that ‘one of their own’ is at the pinnacle of state power. 
As Chief 30 remarked “Chantal Biya was born and raised here; she knows this is her village. 
Even when she does [things] in Nanga [Eboko; the village of origin of her mother], she cannot 
forget Dimako” (16 September 2010). In this view, a project of such importance as the council 
forest could not have been initiated first in Dimako without the First Lady intervention. 
Second, and of more importance here, this belief was cultivated and reinforced by an 
event that happened in 2001 where Mayor Mongui prominently figured at the center. To 
illustrate, after the issuance by Cameroon’s Prime Minister of the FCD gazetting decree as well 
as the reception of the document by local authorities, Mayor Mongui convened a public meeting. 
Officially, the meeting was designed to unveil the decree in front of local villagers as well as the 
Forêts et Terroirs team. However, in town, instead of a ‘regular’ public meeting, the meeting 
turned into a political rally followed by a march covered by the official state channel Cameroon 
Radio and Television (CRTV) as well as other local media. During the rally, the mayor publicly 
thanked President Biya as well as Dimako’s ‘daughter’ Chantal for ‘offering’ the town a council 
forest and for not abandoning her native village. To the astonishment of all the Forêts et 
Terroirs’ team members present, nowhere was mentioned the critical contribution of the project. 
Needless to say that not only was the mayor’s act in Dimako not well received by the 
project team, but also it is said that when the local representative of the French Cooperation in 
Yaoundé was informed of the matter, he was flabbergasted that Mayor Mongui did not utter a 
single word about the French assistance for the creation of the FCD. However, within the 
council, as this former Forêts et Terroirs member observed “the image that stayed was that this 
[the FCD] was a gift from the First Lady although this was the work of the French Cooperation. 
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The mayor seized on the opportunity. You know politicians here are like that” (1 April 2010, 
emphasis added). 
8.1.2.1 The First Lady connection et la récupération politique 
For the project team members, the Mayor of Dimako’s act was surprising not only 
because of their conception of the project as purely technical, but also because within all the 
town residents, as a membre averti of the project (see Forni and Chatelperron 1999, 3), that is 
well-informed, no one apart from Mayor Mongui was well positioned to differentiate the history 
of the FCD, having been involved from the onset in the two predecessors of the FCD. On the 
other hand, if one takes a political perspective and sees the mayor as a self-interested elected 
official attempting to build his political power, there was a ‘pure’ political advantage in holding 
this rally to thank President Biya and his wife. Indeed, for the mayor, this was an act of 
récupération politique, or of political opportunism, designed to curry favor from the First Lady, 
and ultimately her husband, as well as associate himself with them, a pattern that would be 
repeated in another key event in March 2010 as the reader shall witness later in this chapter. 
The 2001 political rally was especially significant to the extent that in town, and in 
Bertoua where he resides, Mayor Mongui has been known as an ally as well as family related, 
sometimes as an uncle, President’s Biya father in-law, or a cousin, to the Dimako native Chantal 
Biya.216
                                                 
216 Singer (2008, 110, note 65) for instance observed that “the mayor is known to be a high-ranking 
member of the RDPC, President Biya’s political party, and a close friend of Chantal Biya, the First Lady. In fact, 
Dimako has benefited from the gift of a school from Chantal Biya and its secondary school was recently equipped 
with a computer lab thanks to a grant from the Ministry of Secondary Education (one of the three schools in the 
country to have benefited from such a grant, the other two being in Yaoundé)”. 
 How that alliance or family relationship came to be about is unknown, especially given 
the fact that Chantal’s family is originally from the central town of Nanga Eboko, while the 
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mayor’s, from extant document, is indigenous to Dimako. As one local actor for instance 
remarked: 
He has this bogeyman true or not so people are afraid; he always reminds people 
of his [family] connection to the First Lady. Yet, it is not true. At the time, he was 
the most prominent person [in town] so that when something came up, he 
captured that because he was the mayor. Just like that, you take a hat and you put 
it (…) At the national level he is an influential figure; here in Dimako, he is our 
problem (…) The truth is that when the First Lady’s wedding with the Head of 
State happened, he acted as the bride’s godfather since he was the town’s mayor. 
So she relied on him and thus at the beginning he started having higher 
responsibilities such as member of the central committee of the CPDM and so on. 
In the past, he was a frequent guest at the presidential palace so everybody 
started to be afraid of him (…) he did everything for people to see his face on TV 
so that he could intimidate them (26 February 2010, italics added). 
 
How much support did he, or does he still, enjoy is uncertain.217
                                                 
217 In the absence of the testimonies from the main concerned parties, it is really difficult to ascertain the 
extent of that support. In the East Region, two main explanations have been advanced about the mayor’s relationship 
with the First Lady. The first one maintains that in the past the mayor had benefited from the First Lady patronage, 
but lately because she had been displeased with the mayor over his handling of the council as well as over some 
‘business’ dealings, the mayor had reportedly fallen out of favor. In this view, while he continues to use her mantle 
to protect himself, he has no longer her entire backing. On the contrary, some argue that Mayor Mongui still enjoys 
her support and more importantly has been able to politically exploit the relationship to his advantage with her 
knowledge. For these observers, the fact that in 2010 and 2011 respectively, Oswald Baboke, the mayor’s nephew 
(see below), and the mayor himself were appointed to senior positions within the state apparatus is a sign that the 
mayor’s clout is still potent, and that if disagreements there were those were minor and quickly resolved. 
 What seems certain is 
that at one point the mayor appeared to have benefited from the First Lady’s patronage, and still 
does some argue as seen by his latest appointment. More importantly, by projecting himself as a 
close ally of the First Lady, Mayor Mongui was able to politically exploit to his advantage this 
relationship and benefit from it, especially at the beginning of his political rise. An illustration of 
that state of affairs came in the early days of the FCD when the forest administration, then 
MINEF, was putting bottlenecks into the council path. A former CCG member remembered that 
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the First Lady intervened to tell the minister “to leave Dimako run their forest and that the forest 
belongs to Dimako”.218
For Mayor Mongui, it was important to cultivate the First Lady’s patronage not only 
because it could shield him from outside scrutiny, thus allowing him to quietly build his power, 
but also because it could greatly enhance his chance of achieving national prominence. However, 
an immediate issue that the mayor had to confront in order to benefit from the forest resources 
was to keep at arm’s length the numerous state functionaries, especially the forest administration 
officials whom he had known from his days as logger as well as involvement in the Dimako 
Council Forest Project, and who knew that behind the Dimako Council, Mayor Mongui had in 
fact captured the council forest as Chapter 5.0 already indicated. 
 
8.1.2.2 Mister Untouchable 
Above, Chapter 6.0 pointed out that the forest administration, in spite of the legal 
authority to oversee the implementation of council forests’ management plans, has been on the 
whole absent on the FCD matter. That absence it was noted was due to several internal and 
external issues besetting the forest administration. Moreover, since MINATD (the Ministry of 
Territorial Administration and Decentralization) -the ministry overseeing local councils- has 
remained on the sidelines on the issue of the utilization and alleged misappropriation of council 
forests’ revenues, de facto the forest administration has become the overseer of local councils, 
though it lacks the appropriate jurisdiction. In the view of some of the ministry officials, this 
situation has encouraged the overall misuse of the council forest revenues, and in order to tackle 
                                                 
218 In that sense, this might explain why in 2001 Mayor Mongui publicly thanked the First Lady and 
President Biya. Indeed, the mayor probably surmised that in the future to move the project forward, their help might 
be needed. That having been said, from the viewpoint of Forêts et Terroirs, the mayor should also have thanked the 
French for their help. 
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that issue a recent report recommended the implication of MINATD to address the reported 
mismanagement issue in council forestry (see Om Bilong et al. 2009, 33; 36).219
That having been said, the absence of the forest administration in Dimako still appeared 
troubling because for some local and regional forest administration officials used to dealing with 
private firms, the FCD, at the start, represented just another occasion to extort some gombo, that 
is money, from the council, and in particular since Mayor Mongui, the logger they knew, was in 
charge, this could prove easy. But for Mayor Mongui, the occasion was at hand to take revenge 
on some forest administration officials -whom all along he had seen as an impediment to his 
quest for hegemony- for all those years where they stood in front of his private activities and 
sought to extort money from him, and now wanted to do the same with the FCD. As he declared 
about their [the field inspectors] general attitude towards the council forest: 
 
We are under the impression that the deconcentrated offices [meaning local and 
regional forest administration officials] are not in line with the council forestry 
policy that the central actors are trying to put into effect. Since the signature of the 
agreement between MINFOF and ACFCAM [designed to assist as well as speed 
up the gazetting of council forests], we are on better terms with the central offices 
than with deconcentrated offices. We are under the impression that at the level of 
people in the field, engineers, deconcentrated offices’ agents are there to look for 
fraud, and crackdown rather than to provide assistance. They should be here to 
assist us. They treat local councils like ordinary (vulgaire) timber harvesting firms 
(9 March 2010, emphasis added). 
 
                                                 
219 It should however be pointed out that the forest administration officials, at the central, regional and local 
levels, lost a lot from the 1994 reforms, for those ended the forest administration monopoly on forest management in 
the country. Thus, their statement should be cautiously waived against the other evidences. As some observers have 
pointed elsewhere, forest officials have put, and still are putting, a lot of bottlenecks along the way in order for 
logging firms to ‘bribe’ them to get for instance official documents. That is why, Mayor Mongui’s frustration 
expressed above about the difficulties that he encountered with the forest administration field inspectors, the study 
argues, should be seen along these lines. Forest administration officials, the study would suggest, are not 
disinterested officials who only look for the health of forests. To be sure, the evidences point otherwise. Finally, 
given the past history of the ministry and the abysmal working conditions of its staff, it is fair to say that those 
officials have had the most to lose from the current changes. Hence, voicing their opinions is also a way of voicing 
their discontent with their own situation, on top of hiding their shortcomings. 
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While some local and regional forest administration officials saw the mayor as the ‘same 
old’ logger Mongui whom they could extort money, Mayor Mongui had a long time ago figured 
out the leverage that he could hold over these low and middle level civil servants. In fact, with 
the council forest, the mayor had realized early on that he was no longer simply the small 
businessman Mongui or the vulgaire, his words, owner of a private timber harvesting firm; 
rather, he was an elected official who happened to be at the same time a logger. That elected 
official now had at his entire disposal about 17,000 hectares of a council forest, hence enormous 
financial resources in the form of standing timber, which, as the gazetting decree stated, was part 
of the council private estate, no longer the state or the public domain.220
Equally important, with the First Lady connection and his skillful use of it, the mayor 
understood that it was possible for him to keep these officials, or any state officials for that 
matter, at bay and harvest the forest without any outside interference. And even if some of these 
officials tried to ‘scrutinize’ him, he could use his relationship with the First Lady, and later his 
growing financial resources, to escape scrutiny. It is for that reason that a local chief could for 
example declare that the mayor “believes he is the President of the Republic in the East; that he 
is the father in-law of the President of the Republic [of Cameroon Paul Biya]. That is why, he 
thinks he is above the law” (Chief 28, 17 September 2010). 
 
The mayor immediately made it known to the forest administration officials that the 
balance of power had changed. Now that the financial resources he had lacked before were 
available, the time had come to fully utilize the First Lady’s bogeyman, and in turn intimidate 
those officials as well as keep them at bay. An anecdote, famous among the East Region 
                                                 
220 The animosity between the forest administration and the mayor was symbolized in some way by the 
rapport the mayor entertained with the UTO Doumé-Dimako composed of the staff of the former Forêts et Terroirs 
project whom he believed to ‘spies’ of the forest administration eastern provincial -now regional- delegation (see 
Chapter 5.0). 
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veterans’ forest administration officials, will illustrate the change of fortune from the logger 
Mongui to the Mayor Mongui and its impact on the forest administration officials. The story 
begins this way. One day, a few forest administration officials visited the mayor after inspecting 
the forest and reportedly finding some violations. Whereas both parties were seeking to find a 
common ground, that is most likely the officials were attempting to extract some money out of 
the mayor to forgo the issue, unfortunately no one was willing to budge. Because of the 
stalemate, it is said that at one point, the mayor ended the talks by declaring that henceforth he 
was not talking as the logger, but as the mayor, l’élu or the elected official. The forest 
administration team got the message and departed. 
In the above story the mayor was arguing at first with forest officials as a logger, which 
he is personally through not only his private activities, but also the Dimako Council and the 
FCD, attempting to settle the violations issue in some way. However, faced with the insistence of 
the forest administration officials, the mayor put on his elected official and mayoral hat to escape 
the situation. The subtext of all this is that as an elected official and a mayor he disposes of some 
leverage that could be activated anytime. Therefore, forest administration officials had to be 
cautious when threading the needle. One forest administration official summed up the 
predicament facing his colleagues as follows: 
Council forests you have to admit, it is politically sensitive. People used to say 
that the [forest] administration was not interested in council forestry [because] it 
is an area where mayors like to intimidate people. They say I was with the head of 
the ruling party, so it is a way to intimidate people since mayors are usually from 
the CPDM. You will sometimes see that these mayors are influential members of 
the party. The forest revenues go not only into the mayors’ pockets, but also inside 
the party’s coffers. No one openly says it, but we know our context; if you try to 
implement sustainable forest management by ignoring the politicians who are 
involved in forest harvesting, you do it at your own peril. The mayors they will go 
complain at the presidency that you want to stir up the populations and cause 
troubles. In all African countries, politicians have significant room for maneuver; 
you bother them, they go complain to the top (4 May 2010, emphasis added). 
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For some forest administration officials who had hoped to get some ‘gombo’ from the 
mayor, the obstacle proved difficult, if not insurmountable, insofar as standing in the way of the 
mayor meant a direct confrontation, whether it was true or not, with the wife of the president or 
the mayor’s other purported allies won over the years.221
Karsenty et al. 2006, 103, emphasis added
 In all fairness, that form of political 
protection or the use of forest resources to fend off any outside scrutiny is not new in the forestry 
sector. Certainly, the authors of the 2006 audit of Cameroon’s forestry sector remarked about the 
50 percent RFA revenues that “the administration does not play its executive and supervisory 
role as far as the utilization of the RFA is concerned, even though the dual order [Arrêté Conjoint 
No 0122] gives it the authority. The [central state] functionaries seem to fear the political 
connections of mayors most of whom are either connected to a member of government, or are 
now rich men and vastly influential” ( ). 
That the mayor has used the threat of his political connections as well as current stature to 
prevent outside organizations from entering and investigating the FCD has already been 
documented above in Chapter 6.0 with the REM case. To recall, for the mayor, to the degree that 
council forests are part of local councils’ private estate, the team did not possess jurisdiction to 
conduct that inspection, a claim REM emphatically denied as previously mentioned. Deliberately 
                                                 
221 About what he calls the mayor’s ‘intimidation attempts’, the same aforementioned forest administration 
official went on to comment that: “You go to inspect the forest and the mayor tells you that he was on the phone 
with the minister of forests not long ago. You have never seen the minister so you understand that the mayor is 
trying to intimidate you. If you press him too much, he can call the First Lady Chantal Biya and say that MINFOF 
people are harassing us and then you are transferred to a remote part of the country. These people are very 
powerful; you are nothing but a mosquito and you want to get crushed. We are civil servants and we are trying to 
protect our job. The [colleagues] have told us that the issue of Dimako you have to forget it; only look at it with your 
eyes. You do not want any trouble. Even the delegate does not look into this issue…so you understand that this is a 
delicate matter” (19 April 2010, emphasis added). If the Regional Delegate, who has jurisdiction over the East 
Region’s forest administration, fears Mayor Mongui and has largely stayed away from the council forest because of 
the political ramifications of the enterprise, it is difficult for lower-level functionaries to venture into the council 
forest affair. 
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missing from the mayor’s argument was the fact that the same 1994 Forest Law, which provided 
for council forests, also afforded the forest administration monitoring and control jurisdiction 
over the implementation of the forest management plan. 
On the other hand, the mayor’s claim was based on more than his interpretation of the 
law. Indeed, the mayor’s 2008 position contrasted with his 2004 ‘open’ stance when Global 
Witness Cameroon, then assuming REM role, visited the FCD and found some violations as 
reported in Chapter 6.0. Whereas in 2008, the mayor objected to REM inspecting the forest, in 
2004, the mayor did not find any issue with Global Witness Cameroon visiting the council forest. 
The first obvious reason for not allowing REM was that between both periods, four years had 
passed and more violations were allegedly being committed inside the FCD. 
The second reason, and of more importance for the study, was that, between both 
inspections, Mayor Mongui was no longer the logger-mayor but an elected official at the head of 
the now rich Dimako Council. What is more, in the wake of the council forest project, the mayor, 
through his holding of various positions among which the ACFCAM presidency prominently 
figured at the center, had become an important player within regional and forest politics. His 
appetite for additional power, which would be materialized through a position at the national 
level, was insatiable and, almost inevitably, would lead him to the 15 March 2011 
abovementioned presidential appointment. 
8.2 YES-MAN COUNCILORS (THE BENI OUI OUI) 
The Béni oui oui is a French term used to describe someone who is obedient, who agrees with his 
or her superior all the time even when the decisions taken are against his or her own interest. In 
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Dimako, that term is widely utilized by the local population -and even among councilors 
themselves- to designate their councilors whom they regard as subservient elected officials. For 
the villagers, the councilors deserve that appellation because, in spite of their knowledge of the 
situation in town, they have proven unable to challenge the mayor and make him account for the 
governance of the entire council, in particular over his utilization of the timber revenues. In truth, 
as narrated in the preceding lines, the béni oui oui appellation or yes-man councilors is not new 
in the council, for it predates the FCD and the timber revenues era. 
Though, as the previous chapters have made it apparent, the independence of the CCG 
was jeopardized from the start and its creation did not prevent Mayor Mongui’s capture of the 
FCD, in the local economy and politics dominated by the French SFID, the issue of the mayor’s 
domination of the municipal council was not the focal point. In other words, local villagers, 
notwithstanding their criticisms, accommodated themselves with the situation. However, in the 
wake of the 2002 departure of the French company, which has resulted in increased dependence 
of local villagers on the council, controlling the FCD and its timber revenues has taken center 
stage in local politics. In this battle for the control of the council forest and timber revenues, the 
role of the municipal council as the local deliberative body, especially following the capture of 
the forest by Mayor Mongui, has become critical. 
This final section of the chapter looks at how faced with local challenges to his capture of 
the council forest the mayor has employed various techniques, including intimidation and the use 
of the forest resources to coopt political opponents as well as for electoral purposes -the ‘stick 
and carrot’ technique-, to protect his newly found financial power as well as further consolidate 
his power base locally. In so doing, the mayor suppressed potential challengers to his rule from 
emerging in town and continued his road unto the national stage unabated. 
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8.2.1 Divide and conquer 
First of all, to set the stage for this section, it is important to remind the reader that by 
Cameroonian law, elected mayors, except in major urban centers such as Doula or Yaoundé, are 
at the head of ‘strong’ council executives.222
ROC 2004a
 That is the case because the deliberative municipal 
councils in Cameroon’s local government system have been traditionally weak, and this 
weakness has been reinforced in some way following the 2004 decentralization laws supposedly 
designed to strengthen local councils (see for instance , 2004b, 2008b).223
While legally the ‘permanent’ local mayors run the day-to-day operations, in contrast 
municipal councils –composed of part-time councilors– are only supposed to convene four times 
annually or once every three months for a maximum of seven days at the time (
 The 
omnipotence of local mayors, and the reinforcement of their powers compared to the municipal 
councils after the 2004 laws, led for instance one former Dimako councilor to mildly lament that 
“the mayor has been given enormous powers; he is the authorizer (ordonnateur); he is the 
president of everything” (3 June 2010, emphasis added). 
ROC 2004b, Art. 
30, 1).224
                                                 
222 In major metropolitan centers such as Yaoundé, Doula or Bertoua in the East, the position of mayor is 
held by an appointed civil servant known locally as the Délégué du Gouvernement who is likened by some as a kind 
of super-mayor. Regarding the creation of these super-mayors, Mawhood (1983a, 193) remarked that in 1969, “it 
was the prospect of a big-city mayor becoming so powerful as to embarrass the government that caused the 
creation… of a special structure for the towns of Douala, Yaoundé, and Nkongsamba. Their commune [municipal] 
councils continued to be chaired by an elected mayor, but he was allowed no other function. The whole of his 
executive and ceremonial role was transferred to a Government Delegate, a civil servant appointed together with a 
number of assistants to take the place of the assistant mayors”. 
 Thus, despite a municipal council legal mandate of overseeing a local mayor and 
223 Note that while local mayors’ powers may have been reaffirmed or strengthened after the 2004 
decentralization laws and the various decrees issued after, this does not necessarily mean that local councils’ powers 
have suffered the same trajectory. That having been said, it is important to note that the mayor is a councilor chosen 
from among his or her peers. Finally, in theory, any councilor can run for mayor while in reality because of the party 
list mode of election, the mayor is usually known in advance (see Kuaté 2002, 83; 100 and beyond). 
224 In fact, by law, the position of a local councilor is not a full-time occupation. Article 49, 1 for instance 
of the ‘law on councils’ obliges the employers of any local councilor to provide him or her time to attend the 
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ensuring his or her accountability, in practice, a mayor usually dominates a municipal council. 
Indeed, Jean-Pierre Kuaté, a Cameroonian observer of local governance, before the 2004 
decentralization laws remarked that in a “context marked by a strong council executive facing a 
deliberative body with reduced powers and a more or less discreet role, it is inevitably around the 
mayor that the local life revolves” (2002, 82). Whereas institutionally a local mayor holds the 
upper hand on the municipal council, the fact still remains that legally the municipal council 
holds the power to make a mayor accountable for his or her management. Hence, in theory, a 
municipal council can sanction a local mayor during his or her tenure. 
Seen this way, for any local mayor establishing a ‘working’ relationship with the 
municipal council is the first critical step. For a power building-driven mayor such as the Mayor 
of Dimako with higher aspirations, the urgent matter is not only establishing a ‘working’ 
relationship; rather, it is achieving a total control of the municipal council. As it will become 
clear in the following lines, in order to fully benefit from the forest resources and avoid the 
municipal council sanction, Mayor Mongui needed to ensure the complete loyalty of his fellow 
councilors. That objective was central, for this meant that the Dimako Council Municipal 
Council would further become an irrelevant deliberative body -which it already was as the term 
béni oui oui suggested- that could not thwart his Big Man quest. 
Having neutralized the central state functionaries, primarily from the forest 
administration, who might have exposed him and threatened his control of the council forest, for 
the mayor the unconditional subservience of the municipal council over the years had become a 
critical concern. Though he might, or claimed to, have commanded the support of the Dimako 
                                                                                                                                                             
municipal council sessions (see ROC 2004b). Generally, on top of the four annual sessions mentioned above, a 
mayor can convene the municipal council as many times as he judges necessary usually for an extraordinary session 
(see ROC 2004b, Art. 31, 1). Finally, the mayor is the president of the municipal council and as such presides over 
the council sessions (see ROC 2004b, Article 29, 2). 
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native Chantal Biya, the dissatisfaction in town over his handling of the council forest was 
growing, and local challenges to his rule were slowly emerging in particular inside ‘his’ once 
docile municipal council. In fact, the challenge, as the 2002 attempted coup (d’état) episode 
narrated above illustrates, had commenced even before the first timber revenues started flowing. 
For the mayor, the mounting challenges to his local leadership, increasingly fueled in turn 
by the discontent over his alleged capture of the timber revenues, was that although he had been 
in power for more than two decades, his position at the helm of the council was becoming 
threatened by his opponents’ desire to also benefit from the timber revenues. That was the case 
because as his power grew regionally and nationally in forest circles thanks to the forest 
revenues, his support locally was shrinking precisely because of the discontent over the FCD. 
Consequently, if he were to continue to fully benefit from the timber revenues and fulfill his 
ambition of becoming a ‘true’ Big Man, some arm-twisting was mandatory. 
8.2.1.1 The mayor reigns with ‘terror and fear’ 
In that enterprise of domination, the mayor was aided early on by his local reputation as 
an authoritarian figure contemptuous of local councilors. In effect, for local villagers one issue 
which had become apparent over their years of attending the municipal council sessions was that 
the mayor was a formidable adversary, for he did not tolerate any dissent from his peers. As one 
villager remarked “during the municipal council session, he does not like people who ask 
questions. He speaks alone and says that it is over. People are afraid of the baobab, so they shut 
up” (15 September 2010, emphasis added). Similarly, another one added that “he says that in the 
Pol Sector there are no educated people; he even insults councilors, he says that they are lousy, 
that they are inept and illiterate” (11 September 2010). 
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But the mayor’s attitude towards local councilors was not exceptional, for the same 
‘courtesy’ also extended to local villagers. To illustrate, residents point out for instance that it is 
not simple for local villagers to approach the mayor and interact with him. That position is 
sometimes contrasted with that of the neighboring Mayor of Doumé who apparently has been 
‘open’, meaning listening and providing services, towards local villagers even though they are 
not residents of his council.225 In town, stories about local villagers’ ‘bad’ encounters with the 
Mayor of Dimako are common, leading them to eschew this type of opposition.226
You know our mayor he insults us in our patois. [He asks] Who are you? Why are 
you here? I came to talk about a problem and I needed to see the mayor not his 
deputies. I saw one of his deputies and he told me that the mayor was in his office 
so I went to see him. When I got into his office, a councilor was there, and that 
day I brought a small chicken for the mayor. He asked me why you have come 
 This point is 
made by a local villager during his recount of an encounter with the mayor: 
                                                 
225 Four immediate hypotheses about the distinction between the behaviors of the Mayors of Dimako and 
Doumé can be suggested. The first obvious one is the fact that compared to the mayor of Dimako, the current mayor 
of Doumé is relatively new on the local political scene having been elected for the first time in 2007 after the 
dissatisfaction about the previous mayor’s performance had reportedly reached alarming levels and he had 
apparently lost the ruling party support. Hence, it can be suggested that as a newcomer and less ‘entrenched’ mayor, 
he still needs ‘popular’ support to build his power and stay in office. The critical question in this hypothesis is how 
long can the mayor of Doumé remains responsive to local villagers when the whole political system is unresponsive, 
in particular given the threat that he might represent for the survival of the ‘unaccountable’ elites which currently 
dominate the country. In other words, the risk exists that if he continues in his current path, he might become a 
‘target’ of some in the ruling elite insofar as his stance might ‘delegitimize’ their mode of governance. The other 
hypothesis directly related to the previous one is one advanced by Dimako villagers who believe that the larger pool 
of educated residents and elites [educated villagers] in Doumé positively constrains the local elected officials’ 
behaviors. In this view, the level of education in Doumé and the political competition of ideas and positions between 
local elites make it difficult for one man to completely dominate local politics as in Dimako. The third hypothesis, 
also from Dimako villagers, centers on the positive ‘personal’ characteristics –his ‘personality’- [leadership] of the 
mayor of Doumé who is simply viewed more favorably than the mayor of Dimako. A fourth and final hypothesis 
relates to the inherent distinction between the schemes in vogue in the two towns. In Dimako one is talking of 
council forests which, until recently, have received less scrutiny compared to the more highly visible RFA revenues 
for which some prominent local mayors have been sent to jail, though not yet formally found guilty. This ‘less’ 
versus ‘more’ scrutinized schemes could have had for effect to put the mayor of Doumé under more pressure to 
perform than his counterpart in Dimako. Finally, it is worth mentioning that it would be interesting to find in what 
regard the people of Doumé hold their mayor, for most of the hypotheses suggested here are based on fieldwork 
carried out in Dimako not Doumé. 
226 The image of the mayor in town was that if villagers sought to address him, he would dismiss them as 
‘dogs; as one villager put it. The mayor was even known as someone who would stop his car in the middle of the 
street to fight someone else because he had heard that that person had criticized him. Over the years, these ‘stuffs’ of 
legend contributed to creating the legend of the authoritarian figure. Added with the capture of the forest revenues, 
this created a dynamic combo of all-out fear. 
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here. As I was sitting down, as soon as the mayor made a sign, the councilor 
grabbed me and threw me outside of his office. I come to see the mayor and I am 
being thrown outside. I said damn and I was stunned! The chicken that I brought 
they kept it. The mayor made a sign, and I did not even say why I came to see him 
(15 September 2010). 
 
That pre-FCD era reputation of Mayor Mongui, which overtime grew, as an assertive 
figure who was antipathetic and did not hesitate to curse or ridicule local councilors as well as 
villagers in front of the whole assembly was to serve well the mayor when, thanks to the forest 
resources and the patronage of the First Lady, he started to acquire more political power. Buoyed 
by the forest resources, the discrepancy of power which was already apparent in the pre-FCD era 
between on the one hand Mayor Mongui, an educated former civil servant and private 
entrepreneur, and on the other hand, a group of local councilors who, for the most part, were 
illiterate or uneducated was accentuated. As one regional official aptly put it, the reign of ‘terror 
and fear’ was definitively set into motion. 
Now, the mayor was no longer simply the mayor who cursed, ridiculed and chastised 
local councilors as well as villagers for all to see, he was an elected official with the financial 
wherewithal as well as patronage of important personalities who could threaten and put to jail 
anyone who dared challenge him locally. As one local villager remarked, “people here are afraid 
of him because he is the mayor. He has connections and a lot of titles and responsibilities. He has 
influence everywhere; he can give orders to the CB [Commandant de Brigade] to take anyone 
and put him in jail” (12 March 2010). 
Whereas in town some were still confounded after all those years that the mayor could 
address in such a demeaning way his fellow councilmembers in front of the whole assembly, the 
reality was that the mayor was just expressing the rapport de force prevailing within the 
municipal council. In effect, the mayor was just reflecting the fact that he had extended his 
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domination of the municipal council that local villagers had seen as a threat to the council forest 
project as Chapter 5.0 before mentioned. That is to say, the béni oui oui had become more than 
the term suggested. Simply put, local councilors are too afraid to challenge the mayor, especially 
now that he has become a Big Man. Today, in Dimako, almost no local councilor has dared 
challenge the mayor over his utilization of the timber revenues for fear of reprisal. Indeed, over 
the years, councilors have learned that the mayor is a political actor willing to go the distance to 
crush his opponents, particularly his fellow councilmembers, if they oppose him. As Chief 14 
argued: “if fifteen councilors are against him and the villagers are behind them, it is over. But 
already the councilors are afraid; the mayor slaps and insults the councilors. When he arrives at 
City Hall, it is like the lion is there. We are talking now because he is not here. If he was here, 
we could not dare to speak” (14 September 2010, emphasis added).227
Unaware of, or suspecting, each other’s allegiance, councilors have been reluctant to 
come forward and openly challenge the mayor. At the same time, the mayor has been able to 
further exploit the local divisions -the ‘divide and conquer’ rule- primarily between councilors 
and chiefs, to his advantage to consolidate his power base locally. A local anecdote recounted 
multiple times among councilors shall illustrate this state of affairs. 
 
                                                 
227 As an illustration, during the 30 November 2009’s municipal council session, the mayor rebuked and 
threatened two councilors in front of local villagers present because they had illegally occupied two houses in the 
former SFID’s Camp Blanc- the residential compound reserved to the middle and upper management executives. 
The mayor took this act in spite of the fact that some of his family members were also living in the Camp, leaving 
some to argue that the mayor was using a double standard. In the end, the mayor gave both councilors twenty four 
hours to vacate the premises. Globally, the issue of the future of SFID properties has become a major issue in local 
politics. This is the case because officially Mayor Mongui has requested on behalf of the council the properties. On 
the other hand, following the 2008 creation of the Forestière Industrielle et Agricole de Dimako (FIAD), which, 
according to the mayor, is a council corporation, the speculation in town is that the mayor intends to capture the 
assets for himself. These fears have been heightened by the 2009 episode at the municipal council session as well as 
the conflict between the mayor and another councilor known as ‘Maman Titi’ -the sister of the late Superior Chief of 
Dimako André Bangda- over a house in the camp she was reportedly ‘offered’ by SFID from which the mayor 
sought to expel her. 
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The story involved a couple of village chiefs as well as councilors crossing paths 
somewhere in the region. One of the councilors commenced the conversation by criticizing the 
mayor over the FCD issue forcing the other members present to jump into the conversation. At 
the end of the discussion, everyone departed his own way. Later on, the councilor who initiated 
the conversation allegedly called the mayor and reported the whole meeting. At the following 
municipal council session, the mayor made sure to publicly confront all the parties present, thus 
reminding the entire assembly as well as his critics that he was aware of their moves. As one 
villager commented “he has created inside the town an intelligence gathering network like Al 
Qaeda [note the comparison]. Suffice for anyone to say anything and one of his agents go to tell 
him what is happening” (12 June 2010). 
For local villagers, the councilors’ fear of suffering the mayor’s vengeance has enabled 
him to apparently continue benefiting alone from the council forest. Furthermore, for villagers, if 
councilors, who have been elected alongside the mayor and hold the legal power to make him 
account for his actions, cannot face up to him, then challenging him is a lost cause. One Dimako 
resident summed up the predicament facing the town in these words, “If we had people here [to 
denounce the mayor], it is a small village, things would change; but you have to be like Nelson 
Mandela” [willing to sacrifice yourself for the good of the community]” (16 September 2010, 
emphasis added). 
Since no Nelson Mandela has emerged locally, the mayor has been allowed to extend his 
domination over the municipal council and the entire Dimako Council, hence control the council 
forest. The result of this domination is that the municipal council has further become a rubber 
stamp body which approves everything the mayor submits without discussion. That is why for 
instance, all the official acts relating to the financial management of the council forest, though 
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questionable as the evidence presented above suggested, have been validated by the municipal 
council without question. 
8.2.1.2 Witchcraft and the power of the dark side 
At another level, the ‘almost’ irrational fear, from the outside observer’s vantage, of 
offending the mayor displayed by local councilors as well as villagers is incomprehensible if one 
does not venture outside of the ‘physical’ world. Indeed, for local councilors as well as villagers, 
the fear of challenging the mayor is also in part rooted in their conception of the pursuit of power 
and the use of ‘unsavory’ methods to achieve it. To clarify, Peter Geschiere in several works has 
shown that for the Maka ethnic group who live in Cameroon’s East Region, witchcraft is thought 
to be a powerful weapon (Geschiere 1982, 1997). Though Dimako villagers are mostly from the 
Bakoum and Pol ethnic groups, they share a similar worldview about the importance of 
witchcraft and its relationship with the pursuit of power. In effect, for local villagers, the mayor 
is not only utilizing his financial and political power to stave off any local challenges, but also 
his ‘magical’ power,228
In fairness, the so-called use of witchcraft to achieve political objectives is not 
exclusively limited to the mayor, for it is also a lens though which some villagers look at local 
politics or life in general. To be sure, that permanent fear of the occult is illustrated by an episode 
that happened in February 2010. A retired Gendarmerie captain and founder of a local NGO in 
 with this being potentially lethal. A local actor summed up the 
worldview this way: “people told me that if I was praying before once daily, with the mayor you 
have to pray thrice because he is very powerful” (19 May 2010). 
                                                 
228 Sahlins (1963, 291) remarks for instance that for a ‘classic’ Melanesian Big Man, a demonstration of 
‘magical powers’ is among the ‘kinds of skills that command respect’, and also fear in the case of Dimako it might 
be added. 
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the Longtimbi village died in a car accident on his way to Yaoundé. Before his death, the retired 
captain was involved in local politics; in particular, there were rumors that he had been locked in 
a fight for the Longtimbi chieftaincy with the current chief. Because of that fact alone, some 
villagers speculated that foul play was involved. For them, it did not matter that the captain died 
at the wheels of his own car, nor to know the circumstances surrounding the accident in the 
country’s notoriously dangerous roads. For them, the captain’s death was simply due to an occult 
battle that he ‘evidently’ lost as his death suggested. 
While for scientific observers, references to witchcraft or occult powers in forest 
management shall be seen as a deviation from the actual object of study, in Dimako Council this 
is a critical element to understand local councilors as well as villagers’ attitude towards Mayor 
Mongui. The fears of the occult, of being hurt by ‘invisible’ forces, coupled with the 
authoritarian image of the mayor have ensured local villagers’ submission. For villagers past 
events have vindicated their claim that the mayor is prepared to use his ‘powers’, if challenged, 
to get rid of his political opponents in unorthodox way, read witchcraft, especially those who 
seek to get closer to the FCD. As one villager put it “when you ask what is happening [with 
forest revenues] they [meaning the mayor] say that you like to put your eyes on everything. 
Because of that, they will try to harm you, not only physically, but also through mystical means” 
(13 September 2010). 
One main event will illustrate the importance of witchcraft in understanding local 
councilors as well as villagers’ fear of the mayor. The event in question occurred on 16 
December 2006 and involved a seemingly banal car accident -note the similitude with the above 
2010 crash. The event began with the death of Mayor Mongui’s mother in-law and his invitation 
extended to the chiefs, councilors, and other local residents to assist him at the funeral ceremony 
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in the Djandja village. While attendees were being transported from Dimako town to Djandja 
village, the KF truck (la Benne) (see subsection 7.2.1.3, note 203) and a small passenger bus that 
the mayor had rented to transport the guests collided at the level of Kouen’s village primary 
school (see Map 5.1 for a panorama of the situation). The result was that several people instantly 
died as well as others got injured (Elvido 2010, notes that five councilors lost their lives in the 
2006 accident).229
Following the crash, villagers have complained not only about the lack of compensation 
by the insurance company or the council, but also about the adequacy of those compensations for 
the ones who received them. More importantly for our purpose, villagers saw the mayor’s hand 
behind the tragedy. First, the mayor was the one who had invited the councilors as well as chiefs; 
and second, he was the one who had rented the small passenger bus belonging to one of his 
trusted fellow councilmember. Therefore, local villagers found it hard to believe that this car 
accident happened by coincidence no matter the fact that the old KF truck apparently does not 
have working brakes. Instead of a mechanical or a human error for example, witchcraft, 
commandeered by the mayor, of course, was thought to have ‘induced’ the accident. Finally, 
villagers also saw with the death of the logging manager a vindication of their claim that 
something was not right with the forest, for as one villager argued “[he] knew everything about 
 Among the most prominent deaths at the site of the accident were Camp Nord 
and Grand Pol chiefs, the younger brother of Tombo chief, as well as two of the mayor’s 
nephews, most notably the then-logging manager. On the injured side were several councilors. 
                                                 
229 Reportedly, the KF truck was on its way from Djandja to Dimako to pick up the funeral equipment, 
chairs as well as council staff and guests, whereas the small passenger bus was coming from Dimako and carrying 
some guests. The collision happened right at Kouen’s village, about three kilometers from Dimako town. 
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the revenues so he could not get fooled; people believe he got killed for that” (6 September 
2010).230
Among the councilors, the trauma was total not only because some of their colleagues 
lost their lives or got injured, but also because apparently Mayor Mongui, the council chief 
executive, did not provide them any solace, further confirming to them his ‘cold-blooded’ 
personality. Councilor 14 for instance pointed out that, following the accident, he had become 
more wary of the mayor especially given the fact that the mayor denied that he ever invited the 
councilors in their official capacity but as friends, meaning that the council revenues or insurance 
policy would not be used to cover the costs of treatment or compensate them.
 
231
In truth, one can find several examples such as the one mentioned above about so-called 
witchcraft events that occurred in town and are being blamed on the mayor by some villagers. 
Whether one believes in the potency of witchcraft or not is irrelevant; what is critical here is that 
this view of Mayor Mongui as willing to resort to unorthodox means just reinforced his local 
narrative as an uncaring, authoritarian personage who would go the distance to preserve his 
power, i.e., stay atop the council and continue benefiting from the forest resources. 
 
                                                 
230 According to the council records, the late Gbapol Engelbert was officially hired as logging manager 
effective 1 May 2004.  
231 It is critical to note that even in the case of the car accident, the discontent expressed is accentuated, if 
not the result of, by the lack of appropriate compensation. Hence, money issues are ‘almost always’ at the root of the 
matter. 
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8.2.2 Elections and the politics of the belly 
 
Figure 8.3. Inside DCH Deliberation Room a banner says “Dimako people thank you Maman 
Chantal Biya” for the appointment of the mayor’s nephew, 6 March 2010 
Source: author 
 
On 4 March 2010 in Yaoundé, 310 kilometers away from Dimako, one of the town’s most 
prominent promising young elite Oswald Baboke, locally known as his “Excellency”, was 
appointed as Technical Advisor in the office of the President of the Republic of Cameroon (see 
Cameroon Tribune 2010).232
                                                 
232 Oswald, who holds a doctorate from the Institut des Relations Internationales du Cameroun 
(IRIC)/Université de Yaoundé II obtained in July 2001, was precisely appointed in the president’s cabinet civil. In 
town, it is said that Oswald is a ‘humble’ and discreet man who shuns being called his ‘Excellency’. But because of 
his ‘already’ important official responsibilities in the office of the president, in deference to him, some local 
villagers, in particular in the mostly-dominated Muslim Pwengué neighborhood, prefer to call him that way. More 
importantly, it is unclear what attitude Oswald holds towards his uncle, especially on the issue of the FCD. While 
 Though Oswald had been apparently working for a while at the 
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presidency in some capacity, the news of his latest appointment was significant for local politics. 
Indeed, those who knew Oswald also knew that he was Mayor Mongui’s nephew. That 
promotion was to play a major role in town, for two days after, on 6 March 2010, the mayor held 
a political rally and march to publicly thank President Biya and his wife Chantal for the 
appointment of his nephew, ‘a son of Dimako’ as he put it. At the same time, he also called for 
the candidacy of President Biya for the 2011 presidential election.233
In his celebratory speech, delivered, notably, in the absence of the central character, the 
mayor took ownership of the promotion and reminded local villagers that Oswald was his son -
being the son of his sister. What is more, throughout the speech, Mayor Mongui made sure to 
mention that he had personally raised his nephew as well as advised him during the course of his 
life leading to this seminal appointment. As one council employee exclaimed during the rally 
“the boss is politically recuperating the event...This is pure political opportunism”.
 Apart from the date and the 
occasion, the ceremony resembled the 2001 rally recounted above where the mayor thanked the 
First Lady for the creation of the FCD. In fact, amid the numerous attendees were, as usual, the 
CRTV, the official government channel, as well as several regional news outlets invited to cover 
the event and disseminate the ‘good’ news. 
234
                                                                                                                                                             
some see him as the nephew of the mayor, thus definitely in collusion with him or at least being aware of his 
actions, others have pointed out that privately he has criticized his uncle, especially on the issue of the FCD. In the 
absence of ‘hard’, concrete evidences, it is impossible to confirm or deny all these claims. 
 
233 Indeed, the period since the end of 2009 and onwards saw an onslaught of CPDM initiatives calling for 
the candidacy of their leader Biya. Those initiatives culminated in multiple ‘pleas’ published in the governmental 
newspaper Cameroon Tribune as well as the publication of a book, reedited four times since, L’Appel du Peuple 
(The People’s Call) purportedly revealing the country’s desire for Biya to run again for presidential office.  
234 Previously, it seems Oswald Baboke had held various positions around the presidential couple, most 
notably as an aide (chef de cabinet) of the First Lady. It is said that he was introduced to Chantal Biya by his uncle 
Mayor Mongui. Whether Oswald ‘owes’ all these appointments to his uncle, as the mayor implied during the 
speech, or was recommended by him to the First Lady, the evidence at hand is insufficient to support the mayor’s 
version. Rather, what the evidence supports is that the mayor during that 2010 March rally used the appointment for 
his own political aggrandizement. 
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For the power-seeking Mayor Mongui, and soon to be a national Big Man, the March 
2010 appointment of his nephew was a godsend because the previous year had been in some way 
an Annus horribilis for his ambitions. In effect, 2009 was the year when the discontent about the 
council forest, which was already simmering, had reached its highest expression, putting him on 
a colliding path with the local population. As the preceding chapters have described (see in 
particular Box 6.1 and Box 7.2), local villagers had threatened to bring into the open the issue of 
the ‘bad’ governance of the FCD. Some in the town had even menaced to write a protest letter to 
the Regional Governor in Bertoua exposing the mayor for what they saw as his mishandling of 
the whole council forest project.235
Therefore, for Mayor Mongui, the appointment of his nephew came at the appropriate 
time because it constituted a perfect occasion to remind discontented villagers that he was still a 
potent adversary for those who doubted his reach. At the same time, whether he was at the origin 
of the appointment or not, it was an occasion for the mayor to emphasize that he still benefited 
from some support at the highest level, and that the people who sought to challenge him had to 
be careful. As he noted during his tribute on that 6 March rally, Oswald’s appointment in the 
state apparatus was the highest ever achieved for a Dimako native. The implication of that 
statement was that his power and connections with higher officials, in particular the First Lady, 
were limitless and could be used to reward allies or punish opponents. That last statement was 
 By troubling the peace and order in town, the local threats, if 
they had materialized, could have brought undue attention to the FCD as well as possibly 
jeopardize the mayor’s hegemonic quest. 
                                                 
235 To calm the rumblings, as Chapter 6.0 mentioned above, the mayor had for instance promised CCG 
members that he would pay back the compensations owed as well as resume the payments. In the same way, to woo 
the local chiefs who had felt marginalized on the FCD issue, the mayor, after officially inviting the chiefs to the 30 
November 2009 municipal council session, promised that he would include them in the future into the management 
of the council forest. This was seen as a ‘tacit’ acknowledgment that the chiefs would receive some form of 
monetary compensation. 
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critical, for at a basic level following the difficult 2009 year, the speech reminded local villagers 
why they had voted for Mayor Mongui in the past and why they would likely support him in the 
future. 
The political rally was the type of event which got Mayor Mongui reelected in the past 
precisely because in some way he was now sharing -or about to share- the timber revenues with 
the entire community. Indeed, later on, villagers would get treated to drinks, food and music all 
night long. Even his main adversaries, comprised of some local councilors, and to some extent 
CCG members as well as chiefs, who had repeatedly voiced critical opinions against him leading 
him to see them as his enemies, attended the event. Though they knew, as one chief 
acknowledged, that the mayor was using them for political purposes, that is to show the outside 
world that everything was going well in Dimako, they nonetheless did not have a choice but to 
attend the event. 
Whereas some among these local representatives feared that their absence would openly 
signal to the mayor their opposition to his policies, others came because this was the town’s main 
activity on this Saturday and the occasion was there to at last ‘eat’ some of the timber revenues. 
A villager summed up the issue as follows: “people are complaining [about the mayor] but when 
the election will come they will yet again vote for him. Here it is the politics of the belly (la 
politique du ventre); you give them food and drink and again they will vote for you even after all 
that they have said before [even after they have railed against you before]” (6 February 2010). 
Hence, to understand in part why the mayor has been able to stay out of trouble, one has 
to look at the fact that he has reportedly utilized the timber revenues to strengthen his position by 
either co-opting his political opponents, or for largesse during electoral contests. Indeed, it would 
be simply wrong to assume that the Mayor of Dimako was able to get reelected in town just 
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because of the reign of ‘terror and fear’ or the fear of witchcraft as highlighted above. After all, 
he almost lost power in 2002 precisely because of the councilors’ disdain for his reign of ‘terror 
and fear’. Thus, to consolidate his power, the mayor needed to expend the resources that the 
council forest brought in, and, as a shrewd politician, that is what he did. 
8.2.2.1 Cooptation and the fear of losing their jobs 
In actuality, those who have dared challenge the mayor have met a serious contender in 
Mayor Mongui, for the mayor has skillfully utilized the forest resources to co-opt and reward 
many of the local councilors, especially the young ‘educated’ promising ones, whom he had 
sensed might threaten his hold of the council. The rationale for that strategy was well 
summarized by a local observer who remarked that “politicians here believe that you cannot 
allow two roosters to be in the same chicken coop (bassecour); [because] if you allow another 
one to hang around, it will grow and eventually challenge you (7 February 2010). Everytime 
someone has attempted to challenge the mayor about his handling of the council affairs, the 
mayor immediately co-opted the person. Where cooptation attempts have failed, the mayor 
removed the troublemakers as in the case of the councilors who have opposed him. As this 
former councilor argued, “I was a councilor before…when we approve budgets, they are 
supposed to be put into practice. But, as soon as my eyes got opened, the mayor did everything 
to sideline me” (16 September 2010). 
In the same way, the mayor has ensured that his purported local allies, especially among 
councilors, are rewarded. To illustrate, Dimako Council current municipal tax collector was a 
former schoolteacher as well as councilor elected in 2002 alongside Mayor Mongui. A couple 
years later, he had to resign when he was sent by the municipal council, read the mayor, to the 
Centre de Formation pour l'Administration Municipale (CEFAM), the local government training 
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center, to become a municipal tax collector. At the end of his curriculum in 2006, he was 
appointed as the municipal tax collector, effectively handling the council financial affairs (for an 
overview of the municipal tax collector's role see Kuaté 2007, 393-397). 
How is it possible for the former schoolteacher-councilor to be sent to the training center, 
and then get his first appointment in Dimako, his native town? Dimako residents insisted that it 
is because of the fact that he had been co-opted by the mayor. In return for his political 
allegiance, the mayor then used his political connections to get him the local job. Whereas on the 
one hand, the municipal tax collector appointment was facilitated by the fact that for some time 
the position in the council had been vacant, on the other hand, this appointment was troubling for 
some local villagers, in particular given the fact that the 2006 audit of the forestry sector 
observed that the mismanagement of the RFA revenues had been rendered possible because of 
the complicity between some local mayors and municipal tax collectors (see Karsenty et al. 
2006, 103), a dangerous parallel to the FCD.236
In reality, the mayor has been able to co-opt some of the councilors because of another 
critical institutional weakness, on top of the municipal council own issues already alluded to 
 The case of the municipal tax collector, though 
one of the most prominent, is not exceptional in that respect. Indeed, within and without the 
municipal council, there exists a variety of examples of local villagers who have been subdued 
by the mayor. 
                                                 
236 When the issue was raised with the municipal tax collector, he simply declared that “MINFI [the 
Ministry of Finances] and MINATD had the latitude to appoint me anywhere they desire; it was coincidence that 
brought me here” (5 March 2010). The presidential Decree No 94/232 of 5 December 1994 defining the role and 
responsibilities of municipal tax collectors in its Article 5 mainly stipulates that the decision to appoint them is 
jointly done by both the ministries in charge of local councils and finances for provincial [now regional] capital 
cities and councils which total revenues reach at least 250 million CFAF (see Kuaté 2007, 393-397). Furthermore, it 
seems that to be sent to CEFAM the municipal council has to approve the proposition and then the mayor sends the 
trainee to the center which, because it purportedly receives local councils’ financial contributions, cannot turn down 
the trainee. Then, the trainee sent by the said council has to come back to serve in his/her council, but it is unclear in 
what capacity. 
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before, in the local electoral system. To be sure, the political contest at the local level appears to 
be rigged from the start. That is the case because in Cameroon’s local elections, only party list 
voting is allowed. This means that independent candidacies for local elections are not permitted. 
Hence, in order to run for office, a candidate must be selected by a political party and be on the 
running list, with the order on the list being very significant since it can determine the place that 
one will occupy when the time to elect the council executive comes (for more see Kuaté 2002, 
25-38). 
Within that electoral environment, Mayor Mongui has guaranteed for instance that ‘his’ 
municipal council is composed of non-threatening councilors. As this local observer pointed out 
“in each village we know each other. We know who is capable and who is not. But in the case of 
the mayor, he sits in his office and tries to co-opt the people that he knows cannot confront him. 
He is the one to pay for the applications …the councilors act like they are his employees. They 
do not know their responsibilities; that the mayor is [also] a councilor and they can replace him 
with another councilor (26 February 2010, emphasis added). For Dimako residents, once the 
mayor is able to handpick his municipal council team as well as the one covering the 25,000 
CFAF deposit (caution) that each candidate is required to pay to the public treasury to run, 
councilors have already forfeited their right to challenge him on any count (Cerutti et al. 2010, 
136, make a similar point when they talk of local councilors' 'theoretical accountability to the 
people but practical dependence on the mayor'). 
Because of the local standards of living, it is difficult for villagers to amass the resources 
to challenge the mayor and run by themselves for office, especially since the losing candidate or 
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party does not get reimbursed the deposit (see Kuaté 2002, 49).237
The fact that the local elections are conducted on a party list vote has meant that, 
notwithstanding the mayor’s alleged utilization of the timber revenues for electoral purposes, 
local villagers have a lesser role in choosing the mayor than a party, in this case the ruling 
CPDM. As another villager commented about why it has proven difficult to vote the mayor out 
of office despite villagers’ constant recriminations: 
 That is why, some local 
villagers believe that the municipal council has been unable to challenge the mayor because local 
councilors already ‘owe’ him for being on the list. As the same local observer quoted above 
concluded, the mayor “did everything to surround himself with mediocre people because he 
wants to be autonomous; he wants people to depend on him for everything (…) as a politician if 
you fight him, he believes that you are his enemy. It is the politics of the belly; everything for 
me, nothing for the others even if they have nothing inside the belly” (17 June 2010). 
It is not easy, his allies are strong. Even his deputies and councilors he is the one 
choosing them. The orders come from the top. Cameroon is a democratic country, 
is it true? You are the one voting him and after that he forgets that you exist. If he 
finds out that [someone] talked against him, he will crush him. Many people are 
afraid; because of fear when asked questions they said that everything is OK. He 
tells everyone that he will leave office when he is ready. If you refuse to vote him 
here, he will get chosen anyway by the top. He promises a lot; maybe this year [he 
will do something] since the elections are near. Whether you vote him or not, he 
himself knows who is going to vote him. He will get voted by the top [he will get 
selected by the top despite villagers’ criticisms] (15 September, italics added). 
 
An illustration of the rigged nature of the local electoral contest in town came in late 
March 2010 when the mayor’s sister was appointed as the local head of Elections Cameroon 
                                                 
237 Kuaté (2002, 49) notes that the deposit is given back to each candidate who has been elected as well as 
to those who have at least reached 5 percent of the total votes cast (suffrages exprimés). For the unlucky ones, the 
money goes to the state treasury. 
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(ELECAM), the central state arm organizing political elections.238
Kini Nsom 2010
 That appointment came amid 
a national controversy, which began in the early months of 2010, surrounding ELECAM because 
the previous law governing that agency, which made it autonomous and independent from 
central control, primarily MINATD, was amended. Thus, the change in law effectively made 
MINATD again the chief organizer of elections in the country ( ; Kini Nsom and 
Gwarbarah 2010). Though all of this was happening in the wake of the 2011 presidential election 
for which Biya is running for the fourth time, the implication for local politics was clear. Once 
again, the mayor had triumphed over his local opponents and the 2012 local reelection, if he 
sought it, would be a ‘mere’ formality. 
8.2.2.2 Feeding the rooster before the market day 
The final strategy, related to the previous one, that the mayor has used to consolidate his 
hold onto power in town, and thus benefit from the timber revenues, prelude to his national rise, 
was to employ the timber revenues not only to woo the local population, but also against his 
political opponents, especially around electoral contests or other important social and political 
events. Chief 24 calls this practice ‘feeding the rooster before the market day’. This simply 
means that one feeds the rooster the day before it gets sold. If one attempts to feed it before, it is 
a pure waste of resources. Translated at the level of politics, this signifies that a politician only 
takes care of local villagers, the electors, the day of the vote, or the immediate period preceding 
it. Beyond that, he or she is under no obligation to answer their requests, though that might 
occasionally happen. 
                                                 
238 Privately, it is said that the First Deputy Mayor was ‘disappointed’ over that appointment, for the mayor 
promised to get his son appointed to that position. Hence, the surprise when the decision appeared in the 
government-controlled newspaper the Cameroon Tribune. It seems that the mayor bypassed his deputy and rather 
got his sister appointed to that critical position overseeing all elections at the local level.    
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In effect, the previous chapters have shown that rather than the timber revenues being 
used for local development or reforesting the forest, the money has been reportedly squandered 
and misappropriated. In the same way, when the money has been distributed to local villagers, it 
has been mostly given in the form of cash handouts, such as the 10 percent to ‘eat’ for instance. 
Although, the mayor has devoted less money than anticipated to local development efforts, one 
thing the mayor did, especially during the early years of the FCD, was to ‘flush’ local villagers 
with cash. Notwithstanding the fact, as Chapter 7.0 demonstrated, that the sums received by local 
villagers were a tiny fraction of the FCD revenues, in a context where the local economy was 
dormant, these sums represented significant resources for cash-strapped villagers. 
Albeit local councilors were at first reluctant to have the 10 percent established, the 
mayor decided otherwise because all along his political objectives seemed clear. The 10 percent 
‘to eat’ would remind local villagers that he had been there when they needed him the most; at 
‘the end of the year when they had no money to party like the others’ as he put it above. Thus, it 
is in that regard that one has to look at the issue of the establishment of the villagers’ 10 percent 
to ‘eat’ as part of the 2003 revenues sharing formula. 
The 10 percent to ‘eat’, and more generally a fraction of the forest resources dedicated to 
local villagers, was a political move that would be utilized when needed. In effect, a local 
villager attributes the mayor’s longevity to the fact that he is a clever politician who knows how 
and when to utilize the timber revenues. As she remarked “people are not afraid of the mayor; 
the only thing one can say is that the mayor is able to convince everybody. After the first term, 
they [villagers] decided not to vote for him anymore, but they still voted him. The mayor is a 
wise man because some years he sends people food and drinks and this quiet them down” (17 
September 2010, emphasis added). 
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On the whole, buoyed by the financial resources coming from the FCD, the mayor has 
been able to silence his critics. For instance, during the 2004-2006 period, he reportedly gave 
each councilor 300,000 CFAF in cash. The mayor has used the strategy of giving money 
everytime he has faced local challenges as in the first CCG election as chapter 6.0 before 
described. To take a more recent example, in 2007, for the first time since the return of 
multipartism in the country, a group of local councilors and other residents challenged the mayor 
for the ruling CPDM party primary for the control of the Dimako Council. Facing the list led by 
Mayor Mongui was a former councilor Maître Lucie Mana, a Bertoua notary (huissier de 
justice), and Onésime Ebongué, now the manager of the CADBAP (Communauté Active pour le 
Développement Bakoum-Pol) community forest. 
The list Mana-Ebongué, the intellectuals’ list as it was called by opposition to Mayor 
Mongui’s so-called ‘illiterate’ one, was no match for the mayor. This was not 2002 when the 
mayor had no resources and had to ‘beg’ the local councilors to get reelected. This was three 
years after the first timber revenues started flowing into the council coffers. The 2007 primary 
election episode happened exactly three years after the council had officially received more than 
600 million CFAF (1.2 million USD) in timber revenues during the years 2004-2006. Those 
resources appeared to have been quickly put to use and, despite the fact that for the first time in 
Dimako two lists ran for popular suffrage, the mayor’s adversaries easily lost. Whereas, as one 
local commentator put it, incumbent elected officials such as the mayor amass financial 
resources all year long to distribute them around elections time, the challengers believe that 
political support from villagers is enough to win local elections. Apparently, the mayor’s 2007 
adversaries did not learn that lesson, for they did not possess the strength nor the resources to 
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compete with him. For one villager, “for the mayor to go down, you have to vote down the entire 
list and that would require a powerful list to accomplish that” (20 September 2010). 
As a last point, in town it is believed that in the next municipal election scheduled for the 
summer of 2012, the same people who unsuccessfully ran in 2007 shall run again; but this time it 
is unclear who they will face in light of Mayor Mongui’s latest appointment. Particularly 
interesting is the fact that as of March 2010, Mayor Mongui is no longer the only manager of a 
forest in Dimako. Indeed, in 2008 and 2010 respectively the CADBAP and APOBA community 
forests were officially put into exploitation leading to a political race for local supremacy, hence 
more local conflicts between the three managers.239
Council forests and community forests should work together for local 
development. However, I notice that creating both types of forests generate 
conflicts. The manager of the CADBAP forest is not on good terms with the 
manager of the council forest the mayor, while the manager of the APOBA 
community forest is not on good terms with the one from CADBAP…They now 
see each other as adversaries instead of seeing each other as development actors. 
Everyone wants to be seen as the leader instead of using the forest resources for 
development…Instead of being development actors, they have become 
leadership-seeking actors. Everyone is in his corner and wants to say that it is He 
[the leader] although this was not the primary objective. All these people are 
using the forest titles [community and council forests] in order to strengthen their 
leadership, not for local development (4 May 2010, emphasis added).  
 A regional official summed up the whole 
predicament facing community and council forests in the Dimako Council as follows: 
 
In reality, this has been the central argument of this study; a story of power, politics and 
the pursuit of hegemony and Bigmanship via the forest management decentralization -which 
                                                 
239 While the CADBAP Community Forest includes the three villages of Petit-Pol, Mayos, and Beul, the 
APOBA Community Forest covers the Pol Sector’s villages of Petit-Pol, Nkolbikon, Tonkoumbé, Siméyong, 
Nkolmeyanga, and Grand Pol. A third community forest, the Paloba (Progrès des agriculteurs Longtimbi-Baktala or 
Progress of the Longtimbi-Baktala farmers) covering the Bakoum villages of Longtimbi and Baktala was supposed 
to have started in 2010 too, but it is unclear if it did in fact commence its activities as of the writing of this study. 
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resulted in the entrenchment of the so-called patrimonial state-, not of sustainable forest 
management or (local) development. 
8.3 SUMMARY 
This chapter has described what has become politically of the Mayor of Dimako in the wake of 
the council forest project. First, the chapter chronicled the rise of the Big Man Mongui from the 
humble position of the head of a small and impoverished rural local council in the East Region to 
a position of national prominence. The chapter argued that without the council forest project 
Mayor Mongui would have likely remained a marginal actor within local, regional, and national 
politics. That is to say that the forest management decentralization in the country created the Big 
Man Mongui. Overall, the chapter observed that the forest resources and the patronage of the 
Dimako native Chantal Biya, as well as the mayor’s political exploitation and intimidation 
maneuvers, helped cement his hold onto local politics and continue benefiting from the forest 
resources, prelude to his national rise. The last chapter, the conclusion, summarizes the main 
findings of this study as well as discusses its implications for the current decentralization theory 
and practice. 
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9.0  SUMMARY OF FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION: THE HARD LESSONS FROM 
THE EASTERN FRONT 
“The East is the country’s poorest region although it is endowed 
with forests, mines, and gold. The issue here is that people are 
uneducated and the [regional] elites in Yaoundé only think of 
themselves” (A Bertoua resident, 15 January 2010). 
 
“The idea of council forest is a good idea; the real issue with 
council forestry is governance…currently, it is the mayor’s 
reserved domain” (A forest administration official, 3 June 2010). 
 
“When it is time to cheat, he is really good at it. In reality, there 
were no [forest] inspections. Even the rare inspection missions that 
went into the forest, when they faced the mayor they did not know 
what to do anymore. The real issue is that the mayor and the 
minister [of forests] are CPDM party comrades; he [the mayor] 
calls him to tell him that he is facing some troubles, and when it is 
serious the minister calls the Secretary General of the party and the 
story might even go to the presidency and you are told to leave the 
mayor alone…Now, elections are coming, people are looking for 
money, are you going to stand in the way of a mayor?” (A 
government official, 23 May 2010, emphasis added). 
 
When the French-funded Forêts et Terroirs project was phased out in late 2001, the Dimako 
Council Forest, as part of Cameroon’s 1994 landmark forest management decentralization, had 
been officially created. Though it would take another three years for the council forest to be 
operational, the first experimentation of an elected local government in the Congo Basin region, 
the second largest reservoir of tropical forests after the Amazon, managing a natural resource 
was set into motion. In the region, this constituted a test for a new type of forestry; a type where 
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instead of the central state leading the way as in the past, elected local councils were put in 
charge to try out a different approach to forest management as well as local or rural 
development. The rationale was that this would improve both forest management and local 
development prospects, and thus relegate the failures of previous centralized approaches to the 
dustbin of history. This concluding chapter summarizes the overall findings of the Dimako 
Council Forest experiment, the main subject of this study. The chapter is divided into three main 
sections. Whereas the first briefly summarizes the major findings of the dissertation, the second 
section discusses these findings in light of the relevant literature as well as the implications of the 
Dimako case study for the decentralization theory and natural resources management at large. 
Finally, the chapter concludes by highlighting the limitations of the study as well as areas in need 
of further research. 
9.1 SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS 
The central question addressed at the onset of this dissertation was straightforward: why did the 
forest management decentralization in Dimako Council fail to achieve the goals of Sustainable 
Forest Management (SFM) and local development? In other words, what accounted for the 
failures of the theoretical predictions of improved forest management as well as enhanced 
prospects for local development following the transfer of powers, resources, and responsibilities 
from the central state to the Dimako Council local government? In order to answer that question, 
the dissertation examined the case of the Dimako Council -the first elected local council to 
benefit of this type of transfer in Cameroon’s forest management decentralization-, and the 
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Dimako Council Forest located in the East Region of the country, the largest forest region as 
well as main site of timber production. 
The dissertation found that neither SFM nor local development occurred in the Dimako 
Council following the transfer of powers, resources, and responsibilities from the central state to 
the elected local council. In effect, the evidence presented in Chapter 6.0, which dealt with forest 
management, indicated that in spite of the existence of two successive forest management plans, 
the Mayor of Dimako appeared to have deliberately disregarded the management documents 
when harvesting the council forest, preferring instead to concentrate on the two most 
commercially valuable species ayous and lotofa, hence putting in doubt the long term 
sustainability of the forest. This situation seemed to have been rendered possible because the 
previous chapter (Chapter 5.0) had indicated that before the official start of forest harvesting in 
the council forest, the mayor had already captured the council forest. Thus, instead of the 
Dimako Council ‘government’ managing the council forest, it was the mayor who, in truth, was 
really behind it. 
Second, following the mayor’s capture of the council forest as well as his alleged 
disregard of the management plans and the forest rules and guidelines, the evidence in Chapter 
7.0 suggested that through various techniques, the Mayor of Dimako captured the council forest 
timber revenues for himself. Indeed, the evidence in the chapter indicated that, at least, 
approximately half of the 1.05 billion CFAF (2.1 million USD) received in timber revenues 
appears to have personally benefited the mayor through the various schemes detailed above, 
notably the rental agreement. All this was happening at the same time that almost no timber 
money was allocated to local development or improving Dimako villagers’ livelihood. Overall, 
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the same chapter noted the lack of development achievements in the council in the aftermath of 
the forest management decentralization. 
Finally, the last chapter to report the findings of this study, showed how the Mayor of 
Dimako, a relatively ‘small’ and insignificant local elected official at the head of a rural local 
council, became overnight a national figure (Big Man). In effect, the chapter traced the mayor’s 
political rise to the council forest project and argued that primarily thanks to the council forest 
revenues, later complemented with his skillful exploitation of his relationships in the state 
apparatus -the main one being the Dimako native but also Cameroon’s First Lady Chantal Biya- 
the Mayor of Dimako fulfilled his Big Man dream. 
In the end, the answer to the central question of this dissertation is simple. The forest 
management decentralization in Dimako Council failed to achieve the goals of SFM and local 
development because the Mayor of Dimako, taking advantage of the new opportunities provided 
by the forest law, captured the council forest and utilized it for power-building purposes. To be 
sure, the field evidence suggested that in the mayor’s scheme to achieve the Big Man status, the 
capture of the council forest was a prerequisite in order to have access to the timber revenues. 
That is why the harvesting of the council forest according to the management plans was 
pointless, for the main objective was to capture the timber revenues for personal benefit. In turn, 
the timber revenues would provide the indispensable resources to launch the quest for national 
prominence. Thus, the forest was never valued for itself or for what it could bring to local 
development, but for what it represented financially and politically, that is a resource as any 
other which could help launch a national career. The Big Man concept was critical because, in 
two words, it illustrated the quest for personal power that the council forest represented for the 
elected Mayor of Dimako. 
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Seen this way, instead of laying down or creating the conditions for improved forest 
management as well as local development, the forest management decentralization in Dimako 
Council ‘created’ a Big Man and a local potentate who in turn used the forest resources to further 
strengthen his power locally before moving on to the national stage.240
9.2 DISCUSSION 
 Indeed, the major 
contribution of this study is to show that the decentralization theory of natural resources 
management instead of solving the ‘bad’ governance issues that it purportedly identified in the 
first place has in effect extended and entrenched the reach of the patrimonial state as well as 
aggravated the state of affairs in Dimako, leading to question its potency. The next section 
discusses the implications of these findings in light of the decentralization, natural resources 
governance, and development literature as well as the future of the decentralization theory. 
This study began as an attempt to examine and explain the failure of Cameroon’s forest 
management decentralization in Dimako Council. Indeed, following the 1994 Forest Law 
scholarly assessments about the experience of the first ever created council forest in the Congo 
Basin, the Dimako Council Forest, were still lacking at the same time that the country was 
witnessing an increase in the number of council forests being created primarily because of the 
support of international donors in the form of the PAF2C as Chapter 4.0 above described. Thus, 
the dissertation sought to fill that gap in the literature as well as explain the Dimako experiment. 
The following section starts by examining the main discussion points -but also the three main 
                                                 
240 Note that in this study a Big Man does not necessarily have to be a potentate. The term simply reflects a 
type of leadership. 
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theoretical arguments for the failures of previous experiments- which have arisen from the study 
of the Dimako Council experience and ends by considering the implications of the Dimako case 
study for the decentralization theory and natural resources management.  
9.2.1 The lack of financial resources and central obstacles 
Almost three decades ago, Mawhood remarked that decentralization: 
suggests the hope of cracking open the blockages of an inert bureaucracy, curing 
managerial constipation, giving more direct access for the people to the 
government and the government to the people, stimulating the whole nation to 
participate in national development plans. But what do we often see in practice? 
Experiments with local government that end in chaos and bankruptcy; 
‘decentralized’ structures of administration that only acts as a more effective tool 
for centralizing the power; regional and district committees in which government 
officials make decisions while the local representatives sit silent; village councils 
where local people participate but have no resources to allocate (1983b, 1). 
 
What Mawhood then realized about decentralized experiments was a general assessment 
shared by a lot of scholars. Indeed, earlier studies of decentralization had pointed out that the 
lack of financial resources, central obstacles to cede powers and responsibilities to local 
governments were at the root of the failures of decentralized experiments to achieve their 
officially stated goals the world over (see Ferroukhi 2003; Larson 2003). On the other hand, 
today the situation is different. In fact, despite the validity of these above findings, in Dimako 
Council the study has shown that there was no shortage of financial resources for the council 
forest experiment to succeed, or central obstacles to impede its progress. Rather, the problem 
was elsewhere. The issue was about the alleged mismanagement and misappropriation of the 
council forest revenues for other purposes. 
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In truth, as the authors of the 2006 Audit of the Forestry Sector, -abundantly referred to in 
this study- had already observed in the case of the RFA revenues, while some of the governance 
shortcomings identified in the utilization of those revenues were to be blamed on the central 
state, most of the dysfunctions resided with the local councils (Karsenty et al. 2006, 102). That is 
to say that the central obstacles as well as the lack of financial resources cannot bear the fault for 
the shortcomings of the Dimako experience as the evidence presented above suggests. That is the 
case because the study has shown that from 2004 to 2009, at least 1.05 billion CFAF (2.1 million 
USD) were directly received into the council coffers. 
Contrary to past decentralization experiments where local governments had to wait for 
central government transfers, in the case of Cameroonian council forests, as mentioned above, 
once the forest is gazetted and transferred to local councils, the council is responsible for 
managing the forest. More importantly, by law, all the revenues of the council forest are the 
council property; indeed, unlike in the RFA revenues scheme where the money is divided 
between the central state, local councils, and local communities, in council forestry, 100 percent 
of the revenues go to the local council, which until recently, with the introduction of minimum 
standards for utilizing the money, were free to use those revenues as they wished. 
Specifically on that last point about the lack of minimum standards for utilizing the forest 
revenues, some local observers saw the absence of those standards as at the root of the matter 
insofar as local mayors did not have guidelines, unlike in community forests and RFA revenues 
(see MINEFI and MINATD 1998), which could constrain their utilization of the money. That is 
why some local observers favorably greeted the 2010 issuance of Arrêté 0520 which established 
regulatory provisions regarding the use of council forests’ revenues (see MINATD, MINFI, and 
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MINFOF 2010, for instance Article 4).241
Kemajou 2010, 3
 The CTFC, as the chief operating agency of the 
PAF2C -while deploring that the changes did not go far enough- has, through the voice of his 
director, welcomed the change as it reportedly bodes well for the future of council forestry in the 
country ( ). 
Though that change is welcomed, it is important to note that the issuance of provisions 
like those of Arrêté 0520 does not solve the issue of the alleged ‘bad’ governance, as could be 
seen through the example of the 1998 Arrêté 0122 which, despite having been issued since 1998, 
did not prevent the misuse of community forests money as well as RFA revenues (see Karsenty 
et al. 2006, 91-95; 101-103). Hence, simply issuing an administrative edict without enforcing it 
will be worthless. Certainly, the issue in Dimako was not whether a legal or administrative 
provision existed or not to compel the mayor to behave in ways congruent with the forest 
management decentralization objectives, for it existed. In effect, the study showed that even the 
2003 revenues sharing formula -legally adopted by the municipal council led by Mayor Mongui 
himself- did not prevent him from disregarding the council deliberation about the utilization of 
the timber revenues. The key for success, the evidence presented in the study would suggest, is 
enforcing the already existing institutional framework, that is the current rules though they may 
be imperfect (see below). That is “structures -however defined- do matter” (Peters 2008, 5). 
9.2.2 Technical assistance and the capacity argument: the CTFC as the answer? 
Some proponents of council forestry in the country, who are aware of the issues described herein 
in the Dimako Council, have argued that the Dimako Council trajectory should not be construed 
                                                 
241 The Arrêté 0520 was an update of the 1998 Arrêté 0122 which prescribed the use of RFA as well as 
community forests’ revenues. Previously, this administrative order had not included council forests. 
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as representative of the council forestry experience in the country. Furthermore, they have 
argued that the Dimako experience preceded the launch of the PAF2C which, through the CTFC, 
is providing technical as well as financial assistance for local councils to help ensure the success 
of the forest management decentralization. For these observers, the CTFC was the missing link 
and, it is said that, since the launch of the PAF2C local mayors working with the CFTC have 
shown a commitment and a willingness to act to improve forest management in the country as 
well as utilize the forest revenues for local development. 
One example among many cited is the case of the Mayor of Doumé Council -about 
fifteen minutes from Dimako- who has been pointed out as one of the most committed mayors 
for sustainable forest management and local development (see also subsection 8.2.1.1). Indeed, it 
has been noted for instance that although Doumé is still in the process of gazetting and acquiring 
its council forest, the mayor has already demonstrated its dedication by reforesting old fallows in 
the area reserved for the future council forest. As one council forest proponent once declared, 
“the council forests that are being created with the support of the CTFC will be exemplary 
forests”, supposedly because the other local mayors do not want to repeat the Dimako experience 
of alleged ‘bad’ forest management. In other words, the issue according to that last observer, and 
other proponents of council forestry, was the absence of technical assistance in managing the 
council forest which doomed the experiment. 
Again, as with the absence of administrative and legal provisions to direct the use of the 
forest revenues, the assessment that technical assistance is the issue is missing the point. To be 
sure, the issue is not simply one of lack of capacity, for one thing that forest policy has 
accomplished in Cameroon is to bring flexibility to the sector. By that it is meant that following 
the 1990s reforms, many organizations are now involved in forestry and one can find former 
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forest administration officials now working in various other capacities, such as in private 
commercial firms, NGOs, development projects as well as numerous Cameroonian nationals and 
expatriates working in the sector. Hence, technical assistance is available if one seeks it. As 
documented in this study, the problem in Dimako was not its absence; rather, the evidence 
suggests a deliberate and conscious attempt by the mayor to evade forest rules and regulations as 
well as use the money for everything but local development. 
Certainly, the caveat -about the commitment of some local mayors currently involved 
with the CTFC as well as the role of the CTFC- advanced by these local proponents of council 
forestry should be taken seriously. However, as the researcher got reminded when visiting the 
now defunct site of the Forêts et Terroirs project -with all the project documents littering the 
floor- the extant evidence shows that Mayor Mongui was once a committed party to the effort to 
create a council forest in Dimako; a party too eager for local villagers as pointed out in Chapter 
5.0. One has to remember that it took about a dozen years between the launch of API-Dimako in 
1992 and the official start of timber harvesting in the FCD in 2004. All over that period the 
Mayor of Dimako appeared committed to seeing the dream of the council forest happening as 
well as benefited from the assistance of the two French-funded projects. But, the study showed 
where all this apparently led to. 
Furthermore, when the researcher raised the issue of project documents littering the floor 
in Dimako, one of those proponents conceded that the mayor had already gotten the resource -the 
forest-, so why would he need to preserve the project documents? In other words, the project and 
its documents were a conduit to the resource, not the resource itself. Therefore, the documents 
were no longer needed in spite of their value for forest management. Similarly, what prevents the 
so-called ‘committed’ mayors of today, even with the CTFC support, from repeating the 
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experience of Dimako? Nothing, the study results would suggest. Like the Mayor of Dimako, 
local mayors, maybe not all, have clearly seen, or shall see, the value of having a council forest, 
and more importantly being at the head of one. They have seen how one of their fellow 
ACFCAM members has been able to accumulate financial and political power, and project 
himself in places where he might not have been, absent the forest resources and the forest 
management decentralization. Hence, in the same way as API-Dimako and Forêts et Terroirs 
were conduit to the forest resources, so the risk exists that the PAF2C and the CTFC shall 
become too. 
The situation is compounded by the fact that the CTFC is at the service of mayors, not the 
other way around. As CTFC officials like to remind outside observers, they are not there to 
substitute for mayors and councils but to technically assist them. In other words, they cannot 
force mayors into abiding by the forest laws as well as using the forest resources for local 
development. Rather, what the CTFC can do is to encourage and persuade mayors that it is in 
their long term interest to engage in sustainable forestry as well as use the funds as originally 
intended. However, for local politicians who seek to build and reinforce their own power, the 
results of the Dimako case suggest, the CTFC shall be powerless unless the overall structure of 
incentives for local mayors is changed.242
To conclude, the study does believe that one cannot overnight transfer powers and 
responsibilities over a portion of the forest and expects that a local council abides by SFM 
principles. It is simply unrealistic. Providing technical assistance shall, without a doubt, help 
 
                                                 
242 To be fair to proponents of council forestry, it is true that the FCD as well as the other three council 
forests -Moloundou, Gari Gombo and Yokadouma- got their start before the PAF2C was launched. Therefore, the 
program cannot be faulted for their shortcomings. Nevertheless, the program, through the CTFC, has sought to assist 
the four council forests in existence to redress their problems but, as can be seen by the case of Dimako, it does not 
appear to have achieved that aim yet. Because of the fact that the CTFC has been involved in providing technical 
assistance as well as attempting to improve council forest management in the four preexisting forests, de facto the 
CTFC ‘owns’ them. 
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alleviate some of the concerns surrounding the management of council forests. Yet, in the 
absence of a clear commitment and strong accountability mechanisms to enforce the forest laws, 
and laws regarding the management of public funds -that is the overall structure of incentives 
needs to be adapted to constrain behaviors- mayors shall be free to run council forests 
unimpeded as in the case of Dimako. The evidence already exists for this conclusion as seen in 
the 2009 MINFOF-GTZ-CTFC report widely referred to throughout this study (see Om Bilong et 
al. 2009). 
9.2.3 Downward or upward accountability? 
The last argument to be reviewed here regards the downward accountability dimension as being 
critical for the success of decentralized experiments. To recall, accountability is defined as “the 
exercise of counterpower to balance arbitrary action. It is manifested in the ability to sanction. 
The accountability relation is established through an ensemble of sanctions. Accountability is 
constituted by the set of mechanisms that, in theory, ensure that policy outcomes are as 
consistent with local needs, aspirations, and the best public interest as policy makers can make 
them” (Ribot 2004, 18).243
Ribot, Lund, and Treue 2010, 36
 More importantly, downward accountability “refers to situations 
where local bodies can be held to account by the populace through an ensemble of positive or 
negative sanctions” ( ). By contrast, upward accountability refers 
to a situation where local authorities are more answerable to central authorities than to the local 
populations. 
                                                 
243 Accountability mechanisms include elections; public meetings; public reporting requirements; recall; 
protest; etc (see Ribot 2004). 
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As pointed out in the first two chapters of the study, for the ‘democratic’ decentralization 
school, downward accountability and representation is the key to ensuring that the objectives of 
decentralization are met. On the other hand, in Dimako Council, the study evidence showed that 
there was no such downward accountability mechanism at the local level. In fact, it could be 
argued that there was simply no accountability, downward or upward, insofar as the mayor 
appeared free to harvest the council forest in ‘unsustainable’ ways as well as reportedly 
misappropriate as well as benefit from the forest revenues without being troubled by local and 
outside observers. Surely the mayor seems to have benefited from the complicity of some central 
actors to the extent that the central state did not play its monitoring and auditing role, but it is 
difficult to argue that in his quest for national prominence, the mayor was answerable to any 
central authorities. Rather, the evidence suggests that he skillfully utilized the patronage of 
important personalities to achieve his means, which is altogether a completely different proposal. 
Does this mean that downward accountability does no matter in achieving the official 
goals of decentralization? Not necessarily. The study shall argue that it certainly matters, but less 
than theorists would like to believe. To illustrate, in Cameroon, the current local electoral system 
of party list and no independent candidacy as well as the ‘historical’ status of local councils and 
mayors as extensions of the central state (see Guimdo 1998), though evolving, has meant that in 
practice the entity holding leverage on local mayors still remains the central state, primarily 
through the supervisory ministry of territorial administration (MINATD). That is why, for 
instance, even if the forest administration could effectively monitor the implementation of the 
forest management plan in council forests, it would still remain powerless in enforcing the legal 
provisions regarding the utilization of timber revenues. It is in this way that one has to 
understand, aside from the forest administration’s own shortcomings, not only the plea of some 
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of the ministry officials for the involvement of MINATD (see Om Bilong et al. 2009, 33), but 
also the issuing of the abovementioned 2010 Arrêté 0520 involving the three ministries of 
finances, forests, and territorial administration. 
Specifically about the issue of the local electoral system, the previous chapter showed 
that in the current system the chance of reaching downward accountability is almost nonexistent 
because of the fact that the elections appear already subverted from the beginning. That is why, 
in Dimako Council local villagers believe that because of the power differential between them 
and the mayor, it is not possible for change to ‘come from below’. In fact, in some cases they 
have emphasized that ‘change has to come from above’. What they mean by ‘change from 
above’ is simply for the central state to intervene and investigate the actions of the mayor and his 
so-called development achievements, that is to make him account for his actions. 
In truth, villagers believe that if the central state was involved from the start in the forest 
management decentralization, for instance monitoring, supervising and constantly auditing the 
direction of funds, the current situation in Dimako could have been averted. The villagers’ 
rationale for the intervention of the central state is simple. First of all, since the central state is 
the one that transferred powers and responsibilities to the council and helped create the council 
forest, it is appropriate that it be the one who monitors and audits the mayor and make him 
account for the use of forest revenues. Second, villagers believe that insofar as their numerous 
calls for reform to the mayor went unheeded, the only entity which legally can apply some 
pressure remains the central state primarily through MINATD. But as the dissertation has 
illustrated, MINATD was clearly invisible in decentralized forest management, having not 
appeared to recognize its critical role. 
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The idea of the central state, through MINATD, as the guarantor of local accountability 
would seem far-fetched given the history of domination of the African centralized state (see 
Wunsch and Olowu 1990). After all, one of the primary rationales for decentralizing is because 
of the so-called ‘failures’ of the central state in the first place. In the same way, it has been noted 
elsewhere that through their purported alliance with local actors central state actors, notably 
MINATD officials (governors, prefects, sub-prefects), have been complicit in subverting the 
goals of the forest management decentralization (see for instance Oyono 2004c), so presumably 
that would disqualify them for playing a positive role in the future. Thus, (re)involving the 
central state seems in itself at first counterintuitive given its past, and also, current shortcomings. 
Those, the study shall argue, are fair questions. However, a clear distinction has to be 
made between the policy prescriptions that are inferred from the results of the field investigation 
from the traditional central state dominance of localities. This matter is given more urgency 
because of the tradition of French centralization that Cameroon inherited. In French, the word 
which in practice has come to determine the over-dominance of the central state over local 
councils is known as tutelle. In Cameroon, it is against this tutelle that local councils, mayors and 
independent observers have been at war mostly. In spite of the new decentralization laws, some 
observers have noted that although the tutelle mechanism has moved from a priori to a 
posteriori scheme, it still remains that local councils are, according to these observers, unfairly 
subjected to supervision of the central state through unaccountable local deconcentrated 
authorities such as prefects and governors (see Soh 2004 for instance). 
Nevertheless, what the study is arguing is not a return to that kind of overbearing tutelle, 
but rather to a mechanism combining coercion and monitoring to ensure that council forestry 
goals are not diverted from their original goals. This prescription is based on the realization that 
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left alone it would prove difficult for council forestry to reach its objectives because, as the 
Dimako example indicates, it is easy for these goals to be diverted from their original intent. The 
thought of a powerful and ‘permanent’ mayor at the head of a strong executive in contrast to 
part-time municipal councilors and local villagers dispersed throughout the council is enough to 
warrant this caveat against leaving local councils to run their affairs alone as the current 
decentralization theory advocates. This is especially critical since we are talking of forest 
management which involves significant revenues as well as requires important technical skills. 
Hence, the fact that the study has argued here that accountability mechanisms to the 
central state appear to be important for council forestry in reaching its goals should not be 
construed as an endorsement of the tutelle mechanism that has been denounced for a while in 
Cameroon, and that many local actors have sought to alter. On the other hand, council forestry is 
a different type of forest management. Certainly, politicians in Cameroon have been in the past 
holders of forest titles. However, council forestry is a different kind of forest title; one where 
mayors and councils are not the temporary holders, but the forest has been permanently granted 
to them. 
It is fair to say that council forestry has rendered forest policy more complicated in 
Cameroon. That is why, so far, the answers to this new type of forestry have yet to be found. 
Where before the relationship was traditionally between forest officials and timber harvesting 
firms, now on top of community forestry and other participatory schemes, forest officials have 
had to deal with an increasing number of elected politicians, some with powerful allies, but all 
potentially having at their disposal forest resources that can be used, as apparently in the case of 
Dimako, to increase their power and project themselves into national circles where previously 
some might have been absent. How to deal with elected officials without antagonizing them is 
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the current dilemma facing council forestry proponents. It is because of that predicament that the 
guarantor idea is based on the recognition that, in the absence of alternate local centers of power, 
outside powers are needed to help local villagers not only counterbalance a dominant and 
unaccountable local elected official, but also because in Cameroon MINATD possessed the 
formal powers as well as responsibilities over local councils. Hence, it needs to be part of the 
‘solution’, if solution there is. 
That having been said, the study does not wish to convey the opinion that only central 
accountability matters in contrast to ‘democratic’ decentralization scholars who have argued that 
the critical factor for decentralized forest management achieving its goals is downward 
accountability. But what the Dimako evidence makes clear is that in the current local political 
configuration where the mayor sits at the head of a strong executive assisted by part-time 
councilors all elected on a party-list, local villagers have all but a slim chance of their concerns 
being heard. Downward accountability is important; but, it has been largely irrelevant in Dimako 
Council and can, in truth, be contrary to the objectives of the decentralization program. To 
illustrate, the study showed that when periods of downward accountability were present, that is 
when the Mayor of Dimako’s acts were congruent with some of the wishes of the local 
populations about the utilization of forest revenues, it was when the mayor reportedly utilized the 
money for personal in-cash handouts to local villagers. 
Those acts which the previous chapter argued had a political payoff, it could be argued, 
ran contrary to the long-term objectives of the forest management decentralization of 
ameliorating local livelihoods through the provision of essential services since the money is 
individually distributed instead of being for instance invested in infrastructure development 
which could benefit the whole town. In the same way, because the mayor and his associates have 
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sometimes argued that the issue with the lack of development achievements was also due to the 
fluctuation of timber revenues (see Table 5.2), some local villagers have proposed that more 
trees be cut to solve the issue.244
In the end, it seems that among all critical elements needed to ensure that council forestry 
reaches its goals of sustainable forest management as well as local development, accountability 
mechanisms are central to it. First, accountability towards the central state combined with a dose 
of coercion to compel local actors, especially the main one the mayor, to behave in ways 
congruent with the objectives of the forest management decentralization. That is to use the words 
of Ribot et al. among the set of incentives directed at altering local politicians’ behaviors, 
upwards accountability appeared to be the missing element for the success of the forest 
management decentralization in the Dimako Council. 
 Hence, in theory if the issue was the insufficiency of timber 
revenues not the alleged capture of the timber revenues, and the Mayor of Dimako was 
downwardly accountable he would have responded to the wishes of his electors by cutting more 
trees. Presumably, this is not what theorists are advocating when they are talking about 
downward accountability as the key for success. That is to say, the presence of downward 
accountability might not always be congruent with the goals of decentralized natural resources 
governance experiments. 
The second dimension of accountability pertains to the forest dimension; to the fact that 
technical assistance is needed, as mentioned before, in order to ensure that management plans do 
not simply stay on the council shelves but are implemented. Both the technical assistance and the 
                                                 
244 Faced with contrary evidence, on top the education argument reviewed in the preceding chapter, the 
mayor and his associates have advanced another reason, the low production timber figures resulting in the 
downward fluctuation of timber revenues–really the decline- of the FCD revenues, for the lack of development 
achievements or the incompletion of certain projects. As the argument goes, following the revision of the 2001 
management plan, FCD revenues have decreased primarily because of the reduction of the annual harvesting area 
from about 3,000 on average to less than 500 hectares. Hence, the situation has resulted in less revenues being 
available for local development. 
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upwards accountability dimensions are key for the future of council forestry in Cameroon. That 
is to say that MINATD and MINFOF –the current forest administration- cooperation as well as 
coordination in council forestry appear critical for achieving the goals of the program.245
On the other hand, the above scenario supposes that the two ministries, especially 
MINFOF, resolve their own internal issues, which is not an easy task, in particular given the 
national context where political elites have been for the most part unaccountable and trying to 
cling to power by all means, but democratic ones (see 
 Insofar 
as MINATD constitutes the key pressure point on mayors and that MINFOF reportedly 
possesses the technical savoir faire to help councils harvest timber sustainably as well as 
implement the management plan provisions, both ministries working together shall help ensure 
that local councils do not repeat the Dimako experience, or at least mitigate some of the most 
obvious reported abuses. 
Fonchingong 2004; Gros 1995; 
Takougang 2003) as well as oblivious of the respect of the ‘rules of the game’. Hubert Kamgang, 
a presidential candidate in the 2004 Cameroon election, summed up the predicament facing the 
country in the following words: “when Paul Biya was asked the question about the siphoning of 
public funds, he replied “where is the evidence?”. People have realized that they can do all they 
want as long as they do not get caught” (Boyomo 2009, 7, emphasis added). Hence, the incentive 
to bypass or disregard the current (legal) rules is enhanced insofar as sanctions are rarely applied, 
if at all. 
The issue is rendered especially difficult not only because local mayors have seen their 
powers reinforced not only following the 2004 decentralization laws (see ROC 2004a; 2004b), 
                                                 
245 The CTFC could also impact the technical assistance side though the study is less confident on the 
utilization of forest revenues side in the absence of the central state intervention. Note that the ‘guarantor’ idea 
assumes no large scale reform of the current local electoral configuration which, if changed, could alter the 
accountability mechanism by giving more leverage to local people vis-à-vis their local elected officials. 
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but also, and perhaps the most important point, because most of the local mayors are from the 
CPDM ruling party, and thus applying the pressure on local mayors, even from MINATD, to 
behave according to standards that the national politicians do not even obey themselves would 
prove thorny a predicament. However, in the absence of the resolution of these internal and 
national issues first, it is more likely that the Dimako experience shall get replicated elsewhere, 
with the disastrous consequences both for SFM and local development as documented here. 
9.2.4 A revised theory of decentralization? 
The point about the importance of resolving the internal and national issues first seems to stand 
as a critical element for the future of the decentralization theory that the Dimako case study 
suggests. Indeed, in the end, the larger question that the Dimako experiment raises pertains to the 
issue of the relevance of the wider political system and whether it is simply possible to seek to 
bypass the central scale and reform the local scale without altering the wider political economy, 
in particular in states such as Cameroon where the central level is not known for exemplary 
behavior. As Topa et al. argue “can reform in one sector change the wider trajectory of society in 
any meaningful way? Or will the forest sector remain at variance with the rest of the country 
until it succumbs to the inertia that prevails elsewhere?” (2009, 128). 
This issue is critical because many scholars and policymakers have regarded the forestry 
reforms as a way out of the crisis of governance in African states (see for instance Brown et al. 
2002; Brown, Vabi, and Nkwinkwa 2003). It is thought that by reforming sector by sector -in 
this case the forestry sector- it shall be possible to build on those reforms and shake up the 
foundations of the so-called African patrimonial state. However, the Dimako case makes clear 
that local level or sectoral reforms cannot be completely dissociated from the wider political 
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economy, for those reforms takes place within the larger (political) system which enables or 
constrains behaviors. Failure to do so only seems to lead to a further entrenchment of the 
governance model –the so-called patrimonial state- that the reforms sought to dismantle in the 
first place. Time has finally come to recognize, after the 1990s local and participatory shift, that 
the local scale is not necessarily ‘better’ than the central one, and that individuals interact in a 
wider arena where the rules of the game, the incentives constrain or enable behaviors. That is to 
say that there are no inherent reasons why local elected officials would not behave like the ones 
at the central level when given the same opportunity to accumulate financial and political power. 
Local, regional or national loci of power are capable of repeating the mistakes of centralized 
forest management as the Dimako example illustrates. 
Thus, the issue of the decentralization of natural resources management inevitably leads 
us back again to the question of the reform of the wider political system- the structure- in which 
local elected officials operate, an issue which, after the early 1990s mixed attempts at democratic 
reforms, has been, for the most part, eluded in recent years. As Philip Woodhouse once put it 
“reform at the local level cannot therefore be a substitute for a progressive political agenda at the 
centre” (1997, 546). Indeed, the lesson from the Dimako case seems to be that an only focus at 
democratizing the local level without altering the wider political economy is more likely to lead 
to failures of decentralizing experiments, especially of schemes which resemble the 
Cameroonian model of council forestry (for a contrary view on the role of local democracy on 
national democracy, see Fox 1994). 
It would be wrong, the study argues, to see the Dimako experiment as another case of a 
‘good’ theory, but just another failure at implementation. Ultimately the story of the failure of 
the Dimako experiment in achieving its officially stated objectives is not so much a story about 
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an individual actor reportedly ‘gaming’ the system, but more generally it is an indictment of all 
the participatory and decentralization/local schemes assumptions which provided such a platform 
in the first place by imbuing the local scale with inherent ‘good’ governance properties- ‘the 
small is beautiful’ paradigm. In so doing, these participatory schemes supported by various 
decentralization theorists bypass the conflict and asymmetry of power that exist in local polities 
as in other scales of governance, further contributing to the degradation of the local state of 
affairs. 
As mentioned in the introduction, the decentralization theory, and in particular the current 
emphasis on decentralizing the management of natural resources, is as much a reaction to the so-
called failures of the previous centralized approaches to natural resources management than an 
inherent belief –sometimes empirically supported but not all the times- on the superiority and 
preferability of local solutions over national ones, a view that has been lately ‘fashionable’ in 
development circles. On the other hand, what the Dimako case suggests for the decentralization 
theory and natural resources management is that scholars and practitioners might have to rethink 
their deeply held assumptions. Too many cases of mixed successes and outright failures seem to 
indicate that it is time to revamp the theory and set aside indiscriminate assumptions about the 
local scale to reflect a more ‘realist’ model. 
Three immediate assumptions, some already critiqued by other scholars, need to be 
discarded. The first apparent, discussed at length in the introduction, is to stop viewing 
decentralization as free of conflict, power as well as power asymmetries; to throw away the 
harmonious view of the local and community. The time has come to problematize those 
assumptions and look at decentralization as an inherently political process subject to the same 
vagaries of the political system with winners and losers as in any other process. The second 
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assumption, related to the one above, which needs to be thrust aside is the one that holds that the 
local scale is immune to the governance issues that have plagued the central level and which 
considers it as intrinsically the ‘right’ scale of governance (see Purcell and Brown 2005). 
The issue as the introduction argued is not about the scale of action, for the evidence in 
Cameroon since 1994 and the world above has shown that the same predicaments noted before 
with the centralized approaches have been repeated at the local levels. Simply thinking that by 
transferring powers and resources over forests to local actors, in this case elected officials, shall 
improve forest management as well as conduce to the proper utilization of forest resources for 
local development without taking into account their own interests as well as their operating 
environment has proven naive an idea. Also in need of discard as well as deep rethinking is the 
belief that scholars and practitioners hold that the transfer of powers, resources and 
responsibilities to local levels necessarily leads to more efficient, flexible, equitable, accountable 
and participatory local governance outcomes (see Andersson, Gibson, and Lehoucq 2004, 421). 
The third and final assumption which the Dimako case study suggests needs to be revised 
concerns the role of central states in supporting and enabling decentralization efforts. As Chapter 
2.0 and the preceding section demonstrated, most of the extant literature takes for granted the 
negative role of the central state in furthering the aims of decentralized experiments. That 
assumption is based on the fact that for a number of years central states have in effect tried to 
retain most of the powers they were supposed to have transferred to local entities. On the other 
hand, as the Dimako case study indicates, the presence, or lack thereof, of the central state can be 
a decisive factor for or against the success of these programs. Indeed, more than three decades 
ago, David Leonard, in his 1977 study of agricultural administration in Kenya, argued that “in a 
decentralized administrative structure the center needs to be every bit as strong as in a 
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centralized one, but the reorientation required is one of technical service rather than of 
hierarchical control” (quoted in Rondinelli 1981, 144). In other words, central states can 
sometimes play a positive role, particularly when they exhibit themselves ‘good’ governance 
characteristics. 
To conclude, the implication of the Dimako case study for the decentralization theory at-
large is that local elected officials are embedded within the wider system and they are in turn 
influenced by it. This means that decentralized experiments happen in a wider political arena and 
that the rules of the game which are in effect nationally also enable local actors to take advantage 
of the process, especially when they appear to be selectively enforced, if not at all. By not 
recognizing this critical factor, it seems the current decentralization theory has fallen victim to 
this trap and only served to reinforce the current inequalities as well as entrenched one 
detrimental form of governance. In the end, rather than focusing on opposing the central and the 
local scales, both need to be thought as mutually influencing each other, with the central 
potentially having a decisive impact through its role of enacting, enforcing or not the rules of the 
game which allow or not the reproduction of some forms of governance. 
9.3 LIMITATIONS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE STUDY 
This section briefly indicates the limitations of the study as well as suggests further areas of 
research for the future of decentralized experiments in natural resources management. 
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9.3.1 Limitations of the study 
To begin with, though the study has argued that the pattern described in Dimako Council can be 
found in other council forests in Cameroon, thus its findings are potentially relevant for the study 
of forest management decentralization, it remains the case that the instance of the Dimako 
Council Forest only represents one instance among many others in the world, though five 
currently in the case of Cameroon. Thus, more needs to be done to examine other cases to 
determine whether the pattern described here holds. At another level, the absence of satellite 
forest cover data could have greatly enhanced the findings of the study, for they could have 
shown whether the alleged pattern of illegal logging and unsustainable harvest described in the 
study is widespread as argued here. 
Second, the main assumption of the study of self-interested elected officials only 
motivated by the pursuit of power can be disputed in light of the conventional critique of rational 
choice theories. That having been said, the study did not argue that elected officials are only 
motivated by the pursuit of power; it also argued that the overall structure of incentives will 
determine their behavior if power is their sole motivation. In other words, if local politicians seek 
to acquire power at the expense of SFM and local development, in theory if the institutional 
structure (administrative and legal sanctions from the central government, electoral sanctions 
from the local population, etc.) works, they shall adjust their behavior. It is the absence of those 
institutions, especially the central state, which made the Dimako case fail, the study would 
suggest. 
Finally, the dissertation was only interested in studying the implementation of the 
management plan, not its quality, though in passing it briefly critiqued the changes which 
occurred in the Dimako case which, it was argued, weakened the overall quality of the 
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management plan and further compounded the issue. This is an important point, for it has been 
generally observed that the quality of management plans in the country is problematic, with the 
ministry in charge of forests approving management plans that do not even meet its own criteria. 
That the technical quality of officially approved forest management plans in Cameroon is 
arguable was beyond the scope of this study. Indeed, this study focused on the implementation of 
the officially approved management plans for the Dimako Council Forest. Although the quality 
might have been problematic, as suggested in Chapter 6.0, it had nonetheless to be implemented 
as is. Additionally, since management plans are legally revisable every five years, it would have 
been possible to ameliorate them. That is not what happened in Dimako Council. Still, that is an 
issue which affects the study insofar as the quality of the management plan might have affected 
the practice in the Dimako Council Forest, though the study harbors some doubts in light of the 
evidence presented here. It nonetheless constitutes a limitation of the study. 
9.3.2 Implications and suggestions for further research and policy 
The main implication of this research is that scholars and policymakers overlook the role and 
impact of elected officials in the failure or success of forest management decentralization at their 
own peril. In effect, both have to recognize that decentralization is about power and forest -and 
more generally natural resources- is power. Consequently, the local elected officials’ interests 
cannot be taken at face value; rather, they have to be problematized. Similarly, attention needs to 
be paid to the overall structure of incentives which constrains or enables local elected officials to 
pursue their personal objectives at the expense of the broader goals of decentralization programs. 
Also in need of problematization are the major theoretical assumptions of the current theory of 
decentralization of natural resources management. 
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Finally, from the preceding three main suggestions for further studies arise. The first 
obvious one is for scholars to examine whether the overall pattern described here exists 
elsewhere. The second one, and perhaps more interesting for scholars interested in Cameroon, is 
to determine whether the experience of the council forests which have been created with the 
assistance of the PAF2C -and which supposedly benefit from the technical assistance and 
financial guidance of the CTFC as well as are in theory currently more scrutinized- shall be 
different. The last one regards a comparison of community and council forests to ascertain which 
model of decentralized natural resource management holds greater promise, if any, for the future 
of both natural resources and local development in the world. 
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EPILOGUE 
On 15 February 2011, a month before his appointment, Mayor Mongui and the entire Dimako 
Council community greeted the German Ambassador in Cameroon Reinhardt Buchholz and the 
Ministry of Forests Elvis Ngollé Ngollé for a visit of the Council Nursery. After touring it, both 
officials made a surprising announcement. In fact, they “solemnly declared Dimako as the 
‘Premiere école de gestion de la forêt communale au Cameroun’, [that is the First school of 
council forest management in Cameroon] (…) [and] afterwards invited all the forest councils of 
Cameroon to visit the town to learn so that future generations may have forests to manage” 
(Elvido 2011a). Were both officials jesting when extolling the virtues of the Dimako experiment, 
or were they really unaware of the situation in Dimako? How could it have been the case when in 
the council forestry milieu it is an open secret that council forests, and in particular Dimako’s, 
have turned out as the private properties of local mayors as the 2009 MINFOF-GTZ-CTFC 
report widely quoted throughout this study made clear. 
The answer is simple. Everyone was playing its role. For the German Ambassador, 
representing the donor, this served as a justification for their continued support, and their [naïve] 
hope, as one European technical assistant once put it, that the seeds for ‘better’ governance in the 
forestry sector over the long run would be planted through continued engagement. For the 
Cameroonian authorities, since the Germans and the donors were ‘insisting’ that the country 
managed its forests ‘sustainably’, when in the first place they had been reluctant, they gave them 
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an example of ‘sustainable forest management’. Finally, for the Mayor of Dimako, the apparent 
sole beneficiary of the project, it was just another occasion to sell and reinforce his Big Man 
image, conferring with the German Ambassador as well as the Minister in charge of forests. 
Missing in the picture were the conditions of most of the local villagers and the entire Dimako 
Council as well as the council forest. 
As the evidence above described, the only beneficiary of the entire forest management 
decentralization seems to be Mayor Mongui. After allegedly harvesting the council forest outside 
of the forest administration rules and regulations as well as capturing the council forest revenues, 
he was able to extend his power at the national level where today instead of council forest 
revenues averaging around 176 million CFAF (352, 000 USD) a year, he would potentially have 
at his disposal 850 million CFAF (1.7 million USD) of annual budget to manage (see Mbodiam 
2011b). Based on the evidence presented above, it can be suggested that the Big Man Mongui 
shall utilize that position to further strengthen his status, especially in light of the fact that the 
Chamber itself has been known more for being a sinecure, that is a cash cow and a place to 
reward friends and allies (see Mbodiam 2011a; Ntiga 2011). 
That having been said, by wanting to extend his power at the national level, thus 
becoming a ‘true’ Big Man, the Mayor of Dimako might have exposed himself to more scrutiny 
and political competition, hence more trouble, which could potentially derail the enjoyment and 
continuation of his status. The signs are already visible. Indeed, a recent newspaper article 
revealed that less than three months after his CAPEF appointment, the mayor had been a ‘victim’ 
of a blackmail attempt over the alleged misappropriation of a check of 721 million CFAF (1.44 
million USD) of RFA revenues, incidentally not the council forest (see Elvido and Ngouem 
2011). Surprisingly enough, the mayor paid the informant -who was also the reporter attempting 
361 
to recoup the information with the mayor- in order to obtain possession of the copy of the check. 
It is only when the attempt failed, presumably because the reporter did not apparently possess the 
copy, that the mayor contacted the police. 
What this episode illustrates is the danger that comes with national exposure, especially 
in a country where it is widely known that the President does not hesitate to put in jail 
embarrassing political actors, whether friends or foes. A parallel exists with the Mayor of 
Yokadouma Council -incidentally ACFCAM honorary chairman before his demise- Paulin 
Abono Moampamb, later a junior government minister for Public Works who was arrested under 
suspicions of mishandling the council RFA revenues and lately found guilty (see Mahop 2011; 
Ntiga 2008). For the moment, thanks to the forest management decentralization, the mayor is 
enjoying his hardly acquired Big Man status. For how long remains the question. 
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APPENDIX A 
GLOSSARY OF FOREST TERMS 
The following forest terms used throughout this study have been reproduced as well as adapted 
from the following sources: (FAO 2003, 118-124; ITTO 2005, 35-36; Lele et al. 2000, xxvii-
xxx); U. S. Department of Labor). 
 
ANNUAL ALLOWABLE CUT: Volume of timber that can be harvested from a given forest 
area in a year. 
 
ANNUAL COUPE: Precise extent of forest to be harvested during a year. Depending on the 
underlying criterion (surface or volume to be harvested), we distinguish between surface area 
coupe, volume coupe and surface area coupe with regulated volume. 
 
BUTTRESS: Ridge of wood above the ground between the main lateral roots and the base of the 
tree stem. 
 
CONSERVATION: Rational and prudent management of natural resources to achieve the 
greatest benefit, while maintaining the potential of the resource to meet future needs. 
 
CONVENTIONAL LOGGING: Conventional logging has come to be viewed as less 
concerned with forest regeneration through management—frequently lacking government 
control—and unsustainable, that is, not focused on long-term timber supplies. 
 
COUPE: Specific area of forest to be harvested during a particular period of time (see AAC). In 
forest harvesting, this generic term is also used to designate all felling and cross-cutting 
operations. 
 
EXTRACTION (SKIDDING): Operation whereby trunks or logs are taken from felling site to 
landing by winching and skidding by wheeled tractors. 
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FELLING OR CUTTING CYCLE: Under selection (polycyclic) harvesting systems, the 
number of years envisaged between two successive harvests on a specific tract of forest 
(compare with Rotation). 
 
FELL (FALL): To cut down trees 
 
FELLER (FALLER): An employee who fells trees 
 
FOREST: Ecosystem with a minimum of 10 percent crown cover of trees and/or bamboo, 
generally associated with wild flora and fauna and natural soil conditions and not subject to 
agricultural practices. Forests are in two categories: Natural forests: forests composed of tree 
species known to be indigenous to the area. • Plantation forests: established artificially by 
afforestation on lands previously non-forested within living memory, or established artificially 
by reforestation on land that was forested, by replacement of the indigenous species with a new 
and essentially different species or genetic variety. 
 
FOREST [TIMBER] HARVESTING: All tree felling, extraction and conversion operations as 
far as handling (stacking, grading and storage) of logs at the landing. 
 
FOREST MANAGEMENT UNIT: A clearly defined forest area, managed to a set of explicit 
objectives according to a long-term management plan 
 
FRONT END LOADER: A mobile machine mounted on a wheeled or tracked chassis, 
equipped with a grapple, tuck, bucket, or fork-lift device, and employed in the loading, 
unloading, stacking, or sorting of logs or materials. 
 
HARVEST INVENTORY: Survey operation whereby trees to be felled are counted and 
marked, and their species, diameter, status and quality recorded, together with future crop and 
heritage trees that need to be protected. 
 
LANDING: Any place where logs are laid after being yarded and before transport to the 
worksite 
 
LOGGING: The process of harvesting timber from a forest, logging has come to be used in the 
context of unsustainable cutting, which is cutting that is not focused on long-term timber 
supplies. 
 
MINIMUM HARVESTING DIAMETERS: Diameter below which harvesting of a given 
species is not allowed. MHDs can differ from one country to another 
 
MINIMUM MANAGEMENT DIAMETERS: Diameters from which the management plan 
envisages the extraction of targeted tree species felling cycle. MMDs are determined on the basis 
of the forest structure, diameter distribution, increment and mortality of main species, and the 
rotation regime. 
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REDUCED IMPACT FOREST HARVESTING (OR RIL REDUCED-IMPACT 
LOGGING): Practices aimed at optimizing operational efficiency and minimizing negative 
impact on environment, workforce and local population [Well-managed logging, usually 
supervised]. 
 
REFORESTATION: The replacement or establishment of a tree crop on forestland. 
 
ROTATION: Planned number of years between the formation or regeneration of a crop of trees 
and the time when the same crop is felled for final harvest. The age at the time of harvest is 
referred to as the exploitable age when this coincides with the rotation, and as the harvesting age 
when not. 
 
SHIFTING CULTIVATION: Farming systems in which land is periodically cleared, farmed, 
and then returned to fallow; synonymous with slash-and-burn or swidden agriculture. 
 
SKIMMING: Metaphorical expression designating the hyperselective harvesting of a handful of 
species. Skimming can jeopardize the sustainability of polycyclic systems. By utilizing a smaller 
volume of timber than planned, it creates a constant need for new areas, and, as market demands 
for new species rise, it tempts foresters to repeatedly re-enter already harvested blocks without 
observing the felling cycle. 
 
TIMBER: Wood that can be converted into industrial forest products. This term is sometimes 
synonymous with industrial roundwood and may also designate certain large pieces of 
sawnwood (construction timber). 
 
TROPICAL MOIST FORESTS: Natural forests with varying degree of disturbance and crown 
cover, located between the Tropic of Cancer in the North and the Tropic of Capricorn in the 
South, comprising numerous species with permanent foliage and dominated by a relatively high 
ambient humidity. 
 
VOLUME: The estimated or measured quantity of wood in a log, trunk, bole or tree, usually 
expressed in cubic meters (m3). 
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APPENDIX B 
METHODS 
B.1 OPERATIONAL DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS AND INDICATORS 
Concept Operational definition Primary indicators 
Forest Management Plan 
(Sustainable Forest Management 
(SFM)) 
Implementation of the 
officially approved 
forest management 
plan provisions 
- MHD and MMD 
- logging rotation 
cycle 
-  Reforestation 
Local development Implementation of 
development projects 
agreed upon by the 
Municipal Council 
- Potable water 
provision 
- Electricity 
-  Construction and 
maintenance of 
roads, bridges 
- Construction works 
- Sports equipment;  
- Construction, 
maintenance, and 
supply of schools as 
well as health 
centers 
- Provision of 
medications 
- All other projects 
fulfilling 
community interest 
Personal enrichment Alleged 
misappropriation of the 
council forest revenues 
- Overestimations 
- Overbilling 
- Fabrications 
- The rental 
agreement 
- The FCD operating 
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costs 
Big Man/Pursuit of political power Achievement of 
national prominence 
- Intimidation 
- (Patronage) 
- Cooptation and use 
of forest resources 
Note that the table does not include all indicators and is only provided as an illustration. 
B.2 DATA CODING RAW CATEGORIES 
Repeating Ideas Themes Theoretical constructs 
- The Eastern president of 
the republic 
- Divide and conquer 
- Yes-man councilors 
- He is very powerful 
- Building political power 
- Fear of losing their jobs 
Powerful and 
untouchable politician 
Big man 
- Lack of transparency 
- Forêt na Mongui  
- CCG by name only 
- Revenues shortfall 
- FIAD is actually working 
- Arrears 
Non transparent 
management 
Governance problems 
- Sustainable forest 
management is dead 
- Collusion and passivity of 
deconcentrated authorities 
- Problems with logging 
partners 
Forest management is 
dead/forest is badly run 
 
Bad forest governance 
- The agreed-development 
projects are not completed   
- Education  
- Unfulfilled promises 
- Popular discontent and 
resentment 
Lack of concrete 
achievements 
Something about 
absence of 
development projects 
- The state has to intervene 
and look what is going on 
inside the FCD 
- Technical assistance vs. 
repression/crackdown 
- Good government for 
things to work well 
Outside help needed for 
change 
Accountability and 
capacity building 
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APPENDIX C 
CAMEROON'S POPULATION BY REGIONS 
Regions Capital Area (km2) Population (2010) 
Adamaoua Ngaoundéré 63,691 1,015,622 
Centre Yaoundé 68,926 3,525,664 
East (Est) Bertoua 109,011 801,968 
Far North (Extreme-Nord) Maroua 34,246 3,480,414 
Littoral Douala 20,239 2,865,795 
North (Nord) Garoua 65,576 2,050,229 
Northwest (Nord-Ouest) Bamenda 17,812 1,804,695 
West (Ouest) Bafoussam 13,872 1,785,285 
South (Sud) Ebolowa 47,110 692,142 
Southwest (Sud-Ouest) Buéa  24,571 1,384,286 
TOTAL INHABITANTS 19,406,100 
Source: http://www.minatd.cm ; and (Nyuylime 2010) 
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APPENDIX D 
CAMEROON'S FOREST ESTATE SINCE 1994 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: adapted from (Topa et al. 2009, 30) 
National forest estate 
Nonpermanent forests 
Other Forests 
 Community Forests 
 Private forests 
 
Permanent forests 
State forests Local council forests 
Protected areas for wildlife 
• National parks 
• Game reserves 
• Hunting areas 
• Game ranches belonging 
to the state  
• Wildlife sanctuaries 
• Buffer zones 
• Zoological gardens 
belonging to the state 
 
Forest reserves 
• Integral ecological 
reserves 
• Production forests 
• Protection forests 
• Recreation forests 
• Teaching and research 
forest 
• Plant life sanctuaries 
• Botanical gardens 
• Forest plantations  
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APPENDIX E 
COUNCIL FORESTS 
E.1 ESTIMATED COSTS FOR THE GAZETTING PROCESS AND THE LAND 
TITLE FOR A LOCAL COUNCIL FOREST* 
Types Costs 
Preliminary steps (collecting data 
about the region, maps, and so on)1  
700,000-1,160,000 
Information campaign for local 
deconcentrated authorities 
500,000-1,500,000 
Information campaign for local 
populations 
1,000,000-2,500,000 
Convening the Gazetting commission 
session 
500,000-1,500,000 
SUB-TOTAL GAZETTING 2,700,000-6,660,000 
Costs associated with the land title2 189,098,000 
TOTAL 191,798,000-195,758,000 
Source: Adapted from (MINFOF and GTZ 2008, 19 and 22) 
* These costs do not include other costs such as frequent travels to the capital needed to advance 
the process, compensating local villagers for their field, and so on 
1 Not included in the official steps, but nonetheless important for administrative purposes 
2 At a base price of 1FCFA for a square meter (m2) for a forest of 16,000 hectares 
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E.2 SUSTAINABLE FOREST MANAGEMENT PLANNING STAGES 
E.3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT PLAN 
Long term > 15 years 
 
• formulation of the strategy of sustainable management of forest area 
• global and thematic mapping at 1:200,000, 1:50 000 and/or 1:20,000 
• analysis of the forest and its socio -economic environment 
• quantitative and qualitative assessment of forest resources and wildlife 
• management decisions: 
- determining the harvesting cycle [rotation d’exploitation] 
- minimum diameters for harvesting and management 
- sustainable yield and annual allowable cut 
TACTICAL MANAGEMENT PLAN 
Medium term: 5 to 7 years 
 
• mapping at 1:50,000, 1:20,000 and /or 1:10,000 
• delimitation and demarcation of boundaries 
• establishing harvesting areas: sectioning into management units and 
annual cutting blocks 
• pre-determination of harvest activities in space and time 
• establishing modalities for survey methods and harvesting  (equipment 
and workforce) 
• harvesting program: characteristics of units and blocks, strata sizes 
• planning of primary road network 
 
OPERATIONAL PLAN 
Short term: 1 year 
 
• planning of harvesting operations at the level of the annual allowable cut 
• harvesting map at 1:10,000 or 1:5,000 
• complete harvest inventory 
• identification and marking of trees 
• layout of secondary forest roads, skid trails and landings 
• training of staff, worker safety 
• monitoring, control and evaluation of harvesting 
 
Source: (adapted from FAO 2003, 15) 
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E.3 GUIDELINES FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE MANAGEMENT PLAN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E.4 TYPES OF COUNCIL FORESTS TAXES 
Types of 
harvesting 
RFA Felling Tax Sawmill Tax Log Export Tax  Progressive 
Surtax 
Self-
management 
(en régie) 
No tax No tax No tax in order 
to encourage 
timber 
processing 
Taxes paid by 
the council 
Taxes paid by 
the council 
Sale of 
Standing 
volume 
Taxes paid to 
the local 
council by the 
harvesting 
firm 
Taxes paid to 
the local 
council by the 
harvesting firm 
Taxes paid to 
the state 
treasury 
Taxes paid if 
logs exported 
Taxes paid if 
logs exported 
Private 
authorization 
to log 
Taxes paid to 
the council 
Taxes paid to 
the council 
Taxes paid to 
the state 
treasury 
No taxes No taxes 
Exploitation 
permit 
Taxes paid to 
the council 
Taxes paid to 
the council 
Taxes paid to 
the state 
treasury 
No taxes No taxes 
Source: Adapted from (Noiraud et al. 2007, 64) 
1. Forest biophysical characteristics (the section provides the general characteristics 
of the forest and the environment) 
2. Socioeconomic environment (in this section the socioeconomic survey data are 
integrated into the management plan) 
3. State of the forest (describes the forest inventory results) 
4. Proposed forest management objectives (this section contains the division of the 
forest into series as well as the environmental measures to be taken based on the 
EIE. Finally, other provisions regarding fauna, research and monitoring and more 
importantly how forest management activities will coincide with local populations’ 
usage rights are included here) 
5. Provisions about the length and revision of the management plan (by law the 
management plan is in effect for 30 years revisable every five years 
6. Economic and financial statement (this section describes the expected costs and 
revenues of the proposed management scheme) 
 
Source: (MINFOF and GTZ 2008, 25-26) 
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E.5 COUNCIL FORESTS GAZETTED AND CURRENTLY OPERATING* 
Names and (Divisions) Area (ha) 
Dimako (Haut-Nyong) 16,240 
Moloundou (Boumba and Ngoko) 42,612 
Gari Gombo (Boumba and Ngoko) 22,206 
Yokadouma (Boumba and Ngoko) 40,000 
Djoum (Dja and Lobo) 15,270 
Messondo (Nyong and Kellé)  16,864 
TOTAL 153,192 
Source: (ACFCAM and CTFC 2010, 21; Om Bilong et al. 2009, 6)  
* Only Dimako, Moloundou, Gari Gombo, and Yokadouma have been in operations for more than 
three years. Djoum only started timber harvesting operations in 2010. 
E.6 COUNCIL FORESTS IN CAMEROON, NOVEMBER 2010 
Types Number Estimated Area (ha) 
Council Forests (FCs) gazetted and 
harvested under an officially approved 
management plan 
05 125,1571 
FCs gazetted and management plans 
in progress 
07 127,4872 
FCs waiting gazetting decree and 
management plans in progress 
073 183,9284 
FCs gazetting process started 15 260,4405 
FCs created by plantation or in project 
of creation by plantation 
266 NA 
TOTAL 60 697,0127 
Source: (Adapted from CTFC figures CTFC 2010a) 
NA: not available 
ha: hectares 
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1 Dimako (16,240), Gari-Gombo (29,255), Moloundou (42,612), Yokadouma (21,780), and Djoum 
(15,270) Council Forests. 
2 Lomié (15,690), Messondo (16,864), Nanga Eboko (19,755), Dzeng (25,182), Minta (32,770), Akom II 
(11,626), and Efoulan (5,600) Council Forests. 
3 Ambam Council in the South Region, near the Gabon border, is for the moment involved in the gazetting 
process not the management plan.  
4 Yoko (29,500), Ndikiniméki (23,080), Ambam (44,620), Batouri (14,152), Messaména/Mindourou 
(36,507), Salapoumbé (24,150), and Nguti (11,919) Council Forests. 
5Angossas (22,120), Ayos (12,006), Bélabo (9,914), Doumaintang (37,966), Doumé (40,700), Ebolowa 
(15,270), Mbang (19,821), Mundemba (34,163), Ndélélé (10,550), Sangmélima (32,820), Yingui (25,110) 
Council Forests. However, the figure does not include Ndom/Gambé/Nyanon, Mvangan, Massock-
Songloulou, and Makak Council Forests. 
6 Nguibassal, Foumban, Demdeng, Tonga, Mandjou, Meiganga, Mora, Darak, Hilé Alifa, Blangoua, 
Makary, Goulfey, Waza, Kolofata, Mozogo, Mogodé, Mokolo, Méri, Maroua 1er, Maroua 2e, Maroua 3e, 
Kalfou, Karhay, Tokombéré, Kaélé, and Lagdo Council Forests.    
7 Excluding council forests being created by plantation 
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APPENDIX F 
DIMAKO COUNCIL VILLAGES ORGANIZATION BY SECTOR 
Savanna sector: 4 villages Longtimbi, Baktala, Ngolambélé, and Petit-Ngolambélé  
 
Forest sector: 3 villages Djandja, Kouen and Toungrelo.  
 
Pol sector: 11 villages Petit Pol, Grand Pol, Tahatte, Nkolméyanga, Siméyong, Bongossi, 
Akano, Tonkoumbé, Ngombol, Nkolbikon, Mayos 
 
Dimako town: 5 villages Kandala, Nguinda, Koumadjap, Beul, and Lossou  
And 9 quarters: Tombo, Kpwengué, Ayene, Camp Nord, Camp Hévéa, Mokolo, Source, 
Madagascar, and Dieu-Connaît  
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APPENDIX G 
DIMAKO COUNCIL FOREST PROJECT 
G.1 MAIN OBJECTIVES OF API-DIMAKO 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. The forest massif was to be rationally exploited (harvested) according to a 
management plan written and implemented with the assistance of the commercial 
partner SFID. The exploitation (timber harvesting) was to be accompanied by 
silvicultural activities in order to replenish and conserve the forest. 
 
2. Shifting agriculture (slash and burn) was to be stabilized by rural development 
projects (opérations de développement rural) building on local potentialities as well 
as local knowledge of local populations, autochthones and Pygmies and women. 
 
3. Peripheral research activities were to be conducted on silviculture, harvesting and 
agroforestry techniques and on how to better use forestry resources. 
 
4. The project was to help in defining the human, technical and financial resources 
needed to carry out the new role envisioned by the then-emerging form of forest 
management. 
 
Source: (Esteve et al. 1993, 2) 
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G.2 OVERVIEW OF SOME OF API-DIMAKO ACHIEVEMENTS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
G.3 AREAS OF INTERVENTION AND OBJECTIVES OF FORÊTS ET TERROIRS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Forest inventories over an area of 510,000 hectares as well as the creation of a forest and 
cartography database over the area. 
2. The creation of a new method of harvest inventory complete with map references 
3. The project provided guidelines for the later forest administration forest management 
guidelines 
4. Studies were conducted and information gathered on the damage that forest logging 
operations were producing as well as the ways to mitigate it through Reduced Impact 
Logging (RIL) techniques 
5. Information was produced about local villages’ tenure system and customs as well as use 
of forest resources for the eastern Bimba and Bandongoué villages. 
6. Finally, assistance was provided for the preparation of the administrative process of 
creating a community forest, for instance for the Bimba village. Furthermore, the project 
pioneered the use of the approach of including local populations into administrative 
processes for FMUs boundary demarcation as well as forest management 
 
Source: (Collas de Chatelperron 2000, 2; Forêts et Terroirs 1997, 5-6). 
Zone 1 covering 256,000 hectares included FMU 10-046, the FCD, as well as areas to be later reserved 
for some villages’ community forests. Priority was given here to gazetting and updating the 
management plan of the FCD, gazetting FMU 10-046 as well as implementing its management plan ; 
and finally to assisting local villagers in establishing community forests. 
 
Zone 2 covering 327,000 hectares was represented by four FMUs already inventoried for which API-
Dimako had produced management plans proposals (FMUs 10-059, 10-060, 10-038, and 10-031). 
Here, technical assistance as well as training was to be provided to the target participants regarding the 
gazetting process and the implementation of the management plan. 
 
Zone 3 over 162,000 hectares involved FMUs (10-054, 10-058, and 10-057) which were being 
harvested though the gazetting process had yet to be completed or the management plan established. 
Here, the focus was on the provision of technical assistance and training to engage in the gazetting 
process. 
 
Source: (Forêts et Terroirs 2000b, 3-5) 
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G.4 DIMAKO COUNCIL FOREST MAJOR MILESTONES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• April 1999: information campaign for local deconcentrated authorities as well as 
local elites 
• 22 June 1999: creation of the Consultative Management Committee (CCG) 
• 23-30 June 1999: information campaign for local populations for the then-17 
villages of the council/subdivision 
• 12 October 1999: CCG mission outlined by Arrêté 11 
• 7 December 1999: meeting headed by the Haut-Nyong prefect to approve the limits 
of the council forest between the populations and the forest administration 
• 7 December 1999: meeting of the Gazetting Commission to officially approve at the 
local level the council forest project 
• 13 June 2000: training SFM CCG members and municipal councilors 
• 23 June 2000: establishment of the technical letter 
• July 2000: gazetting application submitted to MINEF 
• March 2001: FCD boundaries delimited on the ground 
• 13 June 2001: the gazetting decree creating the FCD is signed by the prime minister 
specifying that the forest is reserved for timber harvesting/production 
• 6 January 2003: the management plan is approved by MINEF Letter 
No0042/MINEF/SG/DF/SDIAF/SA 
• 2003: 40 million CFAF FEICOM equipment grant to start timber harvesting 
operations 
• 6 August 2003: Deliberation 7 is adopted by Dimako Council Municipal Council 
creating the revenues sharing formula 
• March 2004: start of timber harvesting in the FCD 
• 28 April 2004: creation of the CSE 
• 2006: Revision of 2001 management plan and change from five years Area Coupe to 
AAC 
• 2006: officially because of administrative delays, no timber harvesting occurred in 
the FCD that year 
 
Source: (Collas de Chatelperron 2001b, 5; CRDKO 1999a, 1999b, 2003a, 2004a; Efandène 
2000; Forêts et Terroirs 1999, 2000a; Global Witness Cameroon 2004a, 1; Mekok Balara 
2001a, 6) and interviews data. 
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G.5 DIMAKO COUNCIL FOREST BOUNDARIES 
 
Source: Adolphe Ondoua, adapted from (Mekok Balara 2001a, appendix 13) 
G.6 MONTHLY ALLOWANCE FIGURES FOR CSE MEMBERS (CFAF 
THOUSAND) 
Members Amount 
Deputy mayors 30,000 
Councilors 30,000 
CCG members 15,000 
Secretary General 15,000 
Source: (CDKO 2007a) 
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APPENDIX H 
DIMAKO COUNCIL REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES 
H.1 FCD PROJECTED AND OFFICIALLY DECLARED REVENUES, 2004-2009 
(CFAF MILLION)* 
Year Projected Officially 
declared 
Balance % officially 
declared/projected 
2004 142,353,150 179,603,808 +37,250,658 126.2 
2005 450,000,000 345,598,854 -104,401,146 76.8 
2006 162,500,000 84,912,000 -77,588,000 52.3 
2007 334,080,000 171,726,821 -162,353,179 51.4 
2008 364,080,000 158,353,594 -205,726,406 43.5 
2009 87,000,000 113,480,5861 +26,480,586 130.4 
TOTAL 1,540,013,150 1,053,675,663 -486,337,487 68.4 
Source: (CDKO 2004a, 2004b, 2005a, 2005b, 2006c, 2006d, 2007b, 2007c, 2008b, 2008c; 2009a, 4) 
*2009 figures are from January to July 
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H.2 DIMAKO COUNCIL TOTAL REVENUES, 1998-2003 (CFAF MILLION) 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 TOTAL 
49,967,002 21,055,911 27,922,232 27,711,196 17,898,131 15,590,825 160,145,297 
Source: Adapted from (Bimbar 2006, 14) 
H.3 DIMAKO COUNCIL REVENUES AND EXPENDITURES FIGURES, 1998-2010 
(CFAF MILLION)* 
Year Recurrent Revenues 
Investment 
Revenues 
Recurrent 
Expenditures 
Investment 
Expenditures 
Total 
Revenues 
1998 n/a n/a 40,473,272 9,493,730 49,967,002 
1999 n/a n/a 16,680,987 4,815,599 21,055,911 
2000 n/a n/a 20,585,360 7,274,821 27,922,232 
2001 n/a n/a 22,723,181 4,710,905 27,711,196 
2002 n/a n/a 13,244,617 4,653,515 17,898,131 
2003 n/a n/a 13,980,868 1,480,868 15,590,825 
2004 236,501,293 14,079,300 228,944,460 17,879,367 250,580,5931 
2005 358,069,645 2,769,728 225,915,315 133,306,981 360,839,3732 
2006 110,388,685 24,859,470 90,961,782 42,034,299 135,248,1553 
2007 190,539,999 13,395,869 168,648,437 35,556,308 204,435,8684 
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2008 180,368,224 14,017,853 150,179,649 34,326,239 184,505,888 
2009 117,440,898 268,347,194 160,363,047 225,425,045 385,788,092 
2010 262,392,800 47,238,487 210,563,270 103,068,017 313,631,287 
TOTAL 1,455,701,544 
 
384,707,901 
 
1,363,264,245 
 
624,025,694 
 
1,995,174,553 
 
Source: (Bimbar 2006, 17; CDKO 2003b, 2004b, 2005b, 2006c, 2007c, 2008c)  
*2009 and 2010 projected costs from the council provisional budgets not the administrative accounts; the 
budget and administrative accounts are divided as usual into two main parts -revenues and expenditures- 
each composed of two main sections recurrent and investment revenues and expenditures. 
1 2005 overall expenditures totaled 246,823,827 thus the council carried a positive balance of 3,756,766 for 
the following year. 
2 2005 overall expenditures totaled 358,915,315 thus the council carried over a positive balance of 
1,924,058 for the following year. 
3 2006 overall expenditures totaled 132,996,081 thus the council carried over a positive balance of 
2,252,074 for the following year. 
4 2007 overall expenditures totaled 204,204,745 thus the council carried over a positive balance of 231,123 
for the following year. 
 
H.4  COMPARISON OF DIMAKO COUNCIL TOTAL REVENUES, 1998-2009* 
 
Source: (BIMBAR 2006, 14; CDKO 2003B, 2004B, 2005B, 2006C, 2007C, 2008C, 2009B) 
*The 2009 figures are projections from the council provisional budget 
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APPENDIX I 
DIMAKO COUNCIL FOREST TIMBER HARVESTING FIGURES, 2004-2009 AND 
MISCELLANEOUS 
I.1 2004-2005 FELLED TIMBER VOLUMES (CUBIC METERS)* 
Tree species 2004 2005 
Aningré-R 22.562 193.816 
Ayous 7,110.527 10,012.03 
Bété 171.089 397.954 
Bossé-C 41.276 117.024 
Dibétou/Bibolo 51.117 328.689 
Doussié-B 31.131 54.512 
Eyong 38.038 281.215 
Fraké 776.293 512.126 
Iroko 67.908 481.128 
Kumbi 21.201 290.633 
Lotofa 1,991.871 3,191.59 
Padouk-Rouge 31.188 453.627 
Sapelli 82.112 1,759.389 
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Tali 211.305 532.905 
TOTAL 10,647.608 18,606.638 
Source: (Mongui Sossomba, n.d) 
* These figures are incomplete because the 2006 management plan reported a volume of felled 
timber of 33,685.740 cubic meters without providing the actual breakdown (see CDKO 2006b, 
40).  
I.2 APRIL-NOVEMBER 2007 FELLED TIMBER VOLUMES (IN CUBIC METERS) 
Month Ayous Bété Dibétou Iroko Lotofa Sapelli TOTAL 
April 772.465 55.809 - 40.030 - 22.507 890.811 
May 651.680 13.967 - - - 30.422 696.069 
June 426.798 19.110 - - 181.370 15 642.278 
July 505.554 12.625 - 3.953 - - 522.132 
August 81.193 - - - - - 81.193 
NI 955.367 5.997 4.657 10.946 - 65.939 1,042.906 
October 315.812 - - - - - 315.812 
November 585.740 - - 18.914 437.120 - 1,041.774 
NI  758.205 - - 49.076 111.565 15.953 934.799 
TOTAL 5052.814 107.508 4.657 122.919 730.055 149.821 6,183.464 1 
Source: (adapted from CDKO n.d.) 
1 There is a 15.69 minor difference between the original document figures of 6,183.464 and the computation above 
which gives 6,167.774. This might be attributed to a computation error. For consistency, the original figure is kept.  
- Not included 
- NI: No period indicated, might be September in the first case and December in the second 
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I.3 FELLED TIMBER 2008 (IN CUBIC METERS)* 
 
Tree species Logs Volume 
Ayous 327 2,191.171 
Lotofa 348 1,314.57 
Padouk R 42 236.668 
Bété 31 95.398 
Sapelli 8 49.760 
Tali 24 146.202 
TOTAL 780 4,233.3561 
Source: (adapted from CDKO 2008e, 3) 
*This period includes the months of April, May, July, August, October and November 2008 and 
the figures are based on sold timber not felled. The exact figure reported as felled in 751 stems for 
6,703.995 cubic meters. However, because no actual breakdown is provided, those figures are 
used rather. 
1 There is almost a 200 cubic meters difference between the figures reported in the original 
document and my computation of the original figures which gives 4,033.769 cubic meters. The 
cause of this discrepancy is unknown. However, for consistency purposes, the original total is kept 
as. 
I.4 2009 FELLED TIMBER VOLUMES (IN CUBIC METERS) 
Species Number of stems Volume 
Ayous 416 7,140.674 
Iroko 02 18.289 
Lotofa 258 1,260.636 
Padouk-R 01 7.485 
Sapelli 07 65.22 
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Tali 41 351.174 
TOTAL 725 8,843.4781 
Source: (adapted from CDKO 2010a, 2). 
1 There is a 0.06 minor difference between the above data and those reported in the report 8,843.540, 
probably due to a computation error. 
 
I.5 THE FIVE MOST FELLED SPECIES IN THE FCD, 2004-2009 (CUBIC 
METERS)* 
Species 20041 20051 20072 20083 2009 
Ayous 7,110.5 10,012.03 5,052.8 2,191.2 7,140.7 
Lotofa 1,991.9 3,191.6 730,05 2,4684 1,260.6 
Fraké 776.3 512.2 NA NA NA 
Tali 211.3 532.9 NA 146.2 351.2 
Sapelli 82.1 1,759.4 165.6 49.8 65.2 
SUB-TOTAL 10,172.1 16,008.1 5,948.5 3,701.4 8,817.7 
PERCENT 
SUB-TOTAL 
95.5 86 96.2 87.4 99.7 
OTHERS 475.5 2,598.3 235 532 25.8 
PERCENT 
OTHERS 
4.5 14 3.8 12.6 0.3 
TOTAL 10,647 18,606.4 6,183.5 5,387.2 8,843.5 
Source: (CDKO 2008a; 2008d, 3; 2010a, 2; n.d; Mongui Sossomba n.d.) 
*officially, no harvesting occurred in 2006 
NA: officially no mention of the harvesting of that species 
1 Incomplete figures because the council reported the global figure of 33,685.7 cubic meters for both 
periods in the 2006 management plan (see CDKO 2006b, 40). 
2 Does not include the extended period (1 January-14 February 2008) figures of extracted not felled 1,745.7 
cubic meters of unspecified species. 
3 These figures are based on timber sold not felled; the total breakdown of the 6,704 cubic meters of timber 
felled was unavailable, thus those figures were instead used. 
4 Includes the extended period (January to February 2009) figures of 1,153.8 cubic meters of lotofa  
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I.6 SCIENTIFC NAMES OF SPECIES FOUND IN THE DIMAKO COUNCIL 
FOREST 
Local species name Scientific name Local species name Scientific name 
Acajou bassam Khaya anthotheca Ilomba Pycnanthus angolensis 
Acajou blanc Khaya ivorensis Iroko Milicia excelsa 
Acajou g folioles Khaya grandifoliola Kapokier Bombax buonopozense 
Aielé Canarium 
schweinfurthii 
Kondroti Bombax breviscupae 
Ako Antiaris africana Kossipo Entandrophragma 
candollei 
Alep/Omang Desbordesia 
glaucescens 
Kotibé Nesogordonia 
papaverifera 
Amouk/Mambodé Detarium macrocarpum Koto Pterygota macrocarpa 
Angueuk Ongokea gore Kumbi Lannea welwitschii 
Aningré Altissima Aningeria altissima Landa Erytroxylum mannii 
Aningré Robusta Aningeria robusta Lati Amphimas spp 
Assamela /Afrormosia Pericopsis elata Longhi Gambeya africana 
Avodiré Turreanthus africanus Lotofa/Nkanang Sterculia rhinopetala 
Ayous Triplochiton 
scleroxylon 
Moabi Baillonella toxisperma 
Azobé Lophira alata Movingui Disthemonanthus 
benthamianus 
Bahia Mitragyna ciliata Mukulungu Autranella congolensis 
Bété Mansonia altissima Mutondo Funtumia elastic 
Bilinga Nauclea diderrichii Naga Brachystegia eurycoma 
Bodioa/Noudougou Anopyxis klaineana Niové Staudtia kamerunensis 
Bongo H Fagara heitzii Oboto Mammea africana 
Bossé clair Guarea cedrata Okan Cylicodiscus 
gabonensis 
Bossé foncé Guarea thompsonii Onzabili Antrocaryon 
klaineanum 
Bubinga E Guibourtia ehie Ossanga Pteleopsis hylodendron 
Bubinga Rose Guibourtia tessmanii Ozigo Dacryodes buettneri 
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Bubinga Rouge Guibourtia demeusei Padouk rouge Pterocarpus soyauxii 
Dabéma Piptadeniastrum 
africanum 
Padouk blanc Pterocarpus 
mildbraedii 
Diana Z Celtis zenkeri Pao rosa Swartzia fistuloides 
Dibétou / Bibolo Lovoa trichilioides Sapelli Entandrophragma 
cylindricum 
Difou Morus mesozygia Sipo Entandrophragma utile 
Douka/Makoré Tieghemella africana Tali Erythrophleum 
ivorensis 
Doussié blanc Afzelia pachyloba Tchitola Oxystigma oxyphyllum 
Doussié rouge Afzelia bidipensis Tiama Entandrophragma 
angolensis 
Doussié Sanaga Afzelia africana Tola Gosweilerodendron 
balsamiferum 
Ebène Diospyros crassifolia Wenge Milletia laurentii 
Ebiara Edéa Berlinia bracteosa Zingana Microberlinia bisulcata 
Ekouné Coelocaryon preussii   
Emien Alstonia congensis   
Eyong Eribroma oblonga   
Fraké Terminalia superba   
Fromager Ceiba pentandra   
Iatandza Albizia ferruginea   
Source: (Mekok Balara 2001a, 65-66) 
I.7 DIMAKO COUNCIL FOREST SPECIES RECONSTITUTION RATE FIGURES 
(2001 MANAGEMENT PLAN) 
Species MHD % Reconstitution MMD % Reconstitution 
Acajou à gr. folioles 80 140 80 140 
Amouk/Mambodé 50 114 50 114 
Aningré « R » 60 75 80 152 
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Aningré A 60 45 100 88 
Avodiré 60 554 60 554 
Ayous 80 47 100 104 
Bété 60 159 60 159 
Bilinga 80 263 80 263 
Bossé clair 80 35 100 105 
Bossé foncé 80 140 80 140 
Diana Z 50 99 50 99 
Dibétou / Bibolo 80 47 100 123 
Emien 50 25 110 199 
Eyong 50 223 50 223 
Fraké 60 31 80 100 
Fromager 50 16  <20% 
Iatandza 50 70 60 135 
Ilomba 60 91 60 91 
Iroko 100 17 110 175 
Kapokier 60 4 120 118 
Kondroti 50 133 50 133 
Kotibé 50 102 50 102 
Koto 60 169 60 169 
Kumbi 50 13 90 291 
Lati 50 74 90 105 
Longhi 60 14 90 118 
Lotofa/Nkanang 60 93 70 106 
Niové 50 96 50 96 
Padouk blanc 50 111 50 111 
Padouk rouge 60 131 60 131 
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Sapelli 100 21 110 117 
Tali 50 12 90 125 
Tola 100 140 100 140 
Source: (Mekok Balara 2001a, 65-66) 
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